Summary: The scheme of CPC has drawn a distinction between seeking setting aside of ex-parte decree and reversal of ex-parte proceedings, respectively. In the former case, an application can be filed under Order IX Rule 13 which must be filed either from the date of decree or the date of gaining knowledge, if the summon has not been properly served or for any other sufficient cause, if in the opinion of the court, the applicant provide any substantial reason that precluded the applicant from appearance before the court on the date fixed. Such application as per Article 164 of the Limitation Act, shall be filed within 90 days either from the date of decree or from the date of his gaining such knowledge, whichever is earlier. However, it is noticeable that, in the latter case, no period of limitation is provided for setting aside ex-parte proceedings and the same would be governed by the residue Article 181 of the Limitation Act that provide a period of three years for filing those applications for which no period of limitation is provided under the Limitation Act. The case of the petitioners admittedly falls within the latter category of cases and application filed, being well within time, should have been allowed by the trial court as the law demands a decision to be made upon merits and encourage to avoid technicalities by providing proper opportunity to the parties to present their case by producing pro and contra evidence in support of their respective contentions. Nevertheless, the conduct of the parties must be taken into consideration while deciding such like applications but instead of resorting to taking stern actions, the delinquent party could be burdened with heavy costs to make them realize the importance of smooth progress of the proceedings before the court. Even otherwise, law on the point has been settled by the superior courts wherein it has been categorically held that there is no impediment in the way of a defendant, against whom the ex-parte proceedings has been initiated, to join proceedings at any stage before the same culminate into an ex-parte decree. When the petitioners have made the application for setting aside ex-parte decree, they actually joined the proceedings and they could not have been shunted out and debarred from participation at any stage of the proceedings. The need for filing of application for setting aside ex-parte proceedings only arises when during the absence of the defendant/applicant from the court, certain proceedings have been carried out which are detrimental to the interests of the defendant/applicant which are required to be undone to provide an opportunity to the defendant/applicant to present his case properly before the court and to take the requisite remedial steps to rectify any adversarial material produced before the court in his absence.

Summary: (a) It has been a settled principle of law that inheritance devolves upon legal heirs ipso facto at the moment of death of the propositus (the deceased), and any third-party document or nomination made during the lifetime cannot override this natural devolution. Thus, even where institutions transfer funds to a nominee, it is only a provisional handing over, not an adjudication of title. The final distribution of the estate must be done after determination of the rightful heirs and their respective shares under Islamic law. The fiduciary responsibility of the nominee is of utmost importance. The nominee must act in good faith and discharge the trust reposed in them by promptly disbursing the collected funds among the rightful heirs. Any attempt by the nominee to convert the property or funds to their own use beyond their legal share may give rise to civil and even criminal liabilities. Nomination does not entitle the nominee to become the exclusive or full owner of the deceased's assets. Legal heirs cannot be disinherited through the guise of nomination. The estate of a Muslim deceased must be distributed strictly in accordance with the Islamic law of inheritance, and the nominee must act as a mere conduit to facilitate this lawful distribution. Any deviation from this principle would be legally impermissible and liable to correction by competent court of law. (b) The benevolent fund and group insurance of a civil servant, both during his lifetime and as a death benefit, are considered his rightful property. Upon his death, the entitled amount shall be deemed part of his estate (‘Tarka’) and shall devolve upon his legal heirs in accordance with the applicable personal law of inheritance. Any nomination made during his lifetime does not override the legal rights of the heirs unless specifically permitted by law.

Summary: Existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to exercise the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.

Summary: The cursory look at section 5 (1) of ibid Section of Law provides that the Family Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon the matters specified in Part-I of the Schedule, the same would manifest that the Family Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in matters pertaining to dissolution of marriage including Khulla; dower; maintenance; restitution of conjugal rights, custody of children including visitation rights of parents to meet them; guardianship; jactitation of marriage; dowry and personal property and belongings of a wife. Similarly, Section 5(2) denote that the Family Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try offences, where one of the spouses is a victim of an offence committed by the other, if the offence falls in Part-II of the schedule i.e. the offences, including its aid and abetment thereof under section 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 352 and 509 of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) An independent overview of Part-11 of the ibid schedule read with section 5(2) of the West Pakistan Family Court Act, 1964, manifest that if any offence mentioned in the schedule is committed by one of the spouses against the other, then the exclusive jurisdiction would lie with the Family Court to try such offences; however, a threadbare perusal of the ibid provisions of law, glorify that when the accused has been charged under section 6(5)(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, which is not part & parcel of Part-11 of the schedule; then, the jurisdiction to try such an offence only lies with the courts of ordinary criminal jurisdiction, to be tried by the concerned judicial magistrate. Meaning thereby that the offences which are not included in Part-11 of the schedule of West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964, including Section 6(5)(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, shall not be tried by the Family Court. In the present case, the accused/ respondent has been charged under section 6(5) (b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, which can be tried by the courts of ordinary criminal jurisdiction; therefore, assumption of jurisdiction and taking cognizance by the learned Judicial Magistrate was unexceptional, which could not have been reversed, solely on the point of jurisdiction.

Summary: High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution read with its inherent powers u/s 561-A Cr.P.C, has no authority (i) to quash an FIR except in rare and exceptional circumstances where the complaint discloses no cognizable offence or if is patently mala fide or constitutes a clear abuse of the legal process; (ii) quashing an FIR, at the investigation stage, amounts to prematurely interfering in the lawful functioning of investigative agencies, which is neither the object nor the scope of constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court; (iii) once a cognizable offence is disclosed, registration of an FIR u/s 154 Cr.P.C. becomes a statutory obligation and any assessment of the veracity, sufficiency or reliability of the allegations falls exclusively within the domain of the investigating agency and the trial Court; (iv) the mere pendency of civil proceedings, speculative improbability of conviction or interim relief granted earlier cannot override this settled legal position; and (v) the High Court’s assumption of such power without clear evidence of mala fide is legally untenable and runs contrary to the consistent principles laid down by the superior Courts, which emphasizes that factual controversies and questions of evidence must be resolved through a full-fledged trial and not by short-circuiting the criminal justice process through invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.

Summary: (Petition Under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973) (a) Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973— Writ of quo warranto—The two conditions which are essential for the issuance of a writ of quo warrant are that the appointment under challenge must be to a public office and that the said appointment should have been made without the authority of law or in other words, contrary to the relevant statutory provisions. (b) Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973— writ of quo warranto—For the issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the person invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 is not required to comply with the stringent conditions required for bringing himself with the term of “an aggrieved person”. Any person can move the High Court to challenge the usurpation or unauthorized occupation of a public office by the incumbent of that office and he is not required to establish his locus standi to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution in a manner as generally required by the said Article. It is not mandatory for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto that any of the fundamental and/or legal rights of a person seeking such a writ are infringed, but nonetheless, the Court must satisfy itself as to the filing of a petition of quo warranto that the same has been filed with bonafide intention. The conduct of a person seeking a relief in the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court is of paramount importance for the exercise of such powers. (c) Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973— Constitutional Courts should ordinarily refrain itself from interfering in the policy making domain of the Executive. (Writ petition was dismissed in the circumstances).

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 498 & 561-A---Pre-arrest bail---Dismissal---Duty of investigating agency---Effect of pendency of petition before Supreme Court---Petitioners’ application for pre-arrest bail was dismissed by the High Court, yet they remained at large for over six months without any effective effort by the police to arrest them---Held, such inaction by the investigating authorities was a matter of serious concern and undermined the rule of law---Filing of a petition before the Supreme Court does not constitute a legal bar to arrest in the absence of an express injunctive order---Refusal of pre-arrest bail implies a judicial finding that no exceptional circumstances exist to justify protection from arrest, and therefore, arrest becomes lawful and necessary to facilitate investigation---Any contrary practice by police treating such petitions as implied stays is impermissible and defeats the object of pre-arrest bail law---Interim protection from arrest must be specifically sought and granted; it is not automatic---Failure to execute arrest post-refusal of bail was held to be non-compliance with binding judicial orders. (b) Police Practice and Judicial Enforcement ----Investigation---Obligation of police to enforce judicial orders---Circular issued by Inspector General of Police, Punjab---On direction of Supreme Court, I.G. Punjab appeared and confirmed that pending petitions before superior courts do not bar arrest unless an express stay is granted---Circular was issued instructing all police officers to ensure immediate compliance with bail refusal orders and to reissue the directive biannually---Held, delay in enforcement weakens investigation, erodes judicial authority, and fosters a culture of impunity---Police officers are under a legal duty to arrest accused persons promptly upon dismissal of pre-arrest bail; administrative excuses or pendency of further proceedings do not justify inaction. (c) Disposition ----Petition dismissed as not pressed---Petitioners opted to avail appropriate remedies under the law before the relevant forum. Cited Statutes: • Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 498, 561-A Disposition: Petition dismissed as not pressed.

Summary: (a) Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958: ----Ss. 10, 22 & 25---Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD)---Evacuee property---Jurisdiction of civil courts---Ouster clause---Maintainability---Petitioner/plaintiff sought a declaration that the suit property was evacuee in nature and claimed ownership through a family settlement involving his elder brother (predecessor-in-interest of the respondents), who had obtained the PTD in his own name---Petitioner alleged fraud in issuance of the PTD and claimed possession of a 7½ Marla house based on a Panchayat decision---Held, both the trial and appellate courts concurrently dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction, holding that matters relating to issuance, challenge, or cancellation of PTD were exclusively within the domain of the Settlement Authorities---Civil courts have no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes over PTD in view of the express ouster clauses in Ss. 22 and 25 of the Act of 1958---Relief against actions of Settlement Authorities could only be sought via appeal/revision within the statutory framework or through constitutional jurisdiction (writ petition), not through civil suits---Principle reiterated that omission of Rule 7 of the Permanent Transfer (Houses and Shops) Rules, 1961, did not revive civil court jurisdiction, as the settlement scheme remained self-contained with adequate appellate mechanisms---Petitioner failed to pursue any remedy before Settlement Authorities and attempted to bypass the statutory procedure. ---Cited cases: Syed Abdur Rashid v. Pakistan PLD 1962 SC 42 Muhammad Ismail v. Mst. Shamsun Nisa CP No. 104/1965 Sher Bahadur Khan v. Qazi Islam-ud-Din PLD 1984 SC 213 Muhammad Saleem v. Sardar Ali 2004 SCMR 1640 Nasir Fahimuddin v. Charles Philips Mills 2017 SCMR 468 Muhammad Ayub v. Ghulam Muhammad 2005 SCMR 1650 Muhammad Din v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner 2022 SCMR 1481 (b) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908): ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of facts---Misreading or non-reading of evidence---Scope---Where both the courts below have concurrently dismissed the suit after full appraisal of evidence and no illegality, jurisdictional defect, or material irregularity is demonstrated, revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to disturb such findings---Held, petitioner failed to establish misreading or non-reading of evidence---Trial and appellate courts properly appreciated oral and documentary evidence and rightly dismissed the suit---Revisional jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C., could not be exercised to reassess findings of fact unless manifest injustice or jurisdictional defect was shown. ----Cited cases: Muhammad Sarwar v. Hashmal Khan PLD 2022 SC 13 Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLJ 2023 SC 8 (c) Limitation Act, 1908: ----Arts. 14 & 120---Suit to challenge official act/order (PTD)---Limitation period---Suit filed in 1979 to challenge PTD dated 22.05.1965---Bar of limitation---Held, suit was grossly time-barred whether examined under Art. 14 (one year) or Art. 120 (six years)---Petitioner failed to bring action within the prescribed time, rendering the suit barred by limitation. ---Cited case: Muhammad Din v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner 2022 SCMR 1481 (d) Evidence Act, 1872: ----Oral agreement---Panchayat---Burden of proof---Petitioner claimed ownership based on a family arrangement allegedly settled through Panchayat---Held, no particulars of such Panchayat (date, place, members) were given; neither petitioner nor any credible witness of the event testified---Evidence on record was insufficient and lacked probative value---Such oral agreements, especially involving property rights, require cogent, convincing evidence, which was not furnished in this case. ----Disposition: Revision petition dismissed; concurrent findings upheld; suit barred by jurisdiction and limitation; no interference warranted.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) --- S. 302(b); Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) --- Ss. 382‑B, 374; Evidence evaluation—Delay in FIR, unproved motive, interested witnesses—Sentence recalibration— The deceased was attacked with hatchet and dagger; trial court and High Court affirmed convictions under S. 302(b) PPC and imposed death. Supreme Court noted a nearly ten‑hour delay in lodging the FIR, all eyewitnesses were close relatives, no independent witness supported either occurrence or recoveries, and the motive (a vague “biradari” dispute) remained unsubstantiated. Following settled precedent that absence or failure of motive in a capital case warrants mitigation, the Court upheld guilt but reduced punishment from death to imprisonment for life, extending benefit of S. 382‑B Cr.P.C. (b) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 --- Art. 6; ECOSOC Resolution 1984/50—“Most serious crimes” threshold— Pakistan, having withdrawn reservations to Art. 6, is bound to restrict capital punishment to the “most serious crimes” and ensure rigorous procedural safeguards. Death penalty must be “quite exceptional,” and its imposition is disproportionate where motive is unproven and evidential weaknesses subsist. The Court invoked ICCPR principles and UN Safeguards to justify commutation to life imprisonment. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 --- Arts. 4, 9 & 14—Right to life, liberty and dignity— Reinforcing Shehla Zia v. WAPDA (PLD 1994 SC 693), the Court held that domestic sentencing discretion must align with constitutional guarantees; where evidentiary defects create doubt, preservation of life prevails over capital sanction. (d) Law of Evidence—Interested testimony & recovery— Eyewitnesses were all related to the deceased; no independent corroboration of ocular account or of the alleged recovery of dagger and hatchet. Such circumstances, coupled with FIR delay, generate reasonable doubt and preclude confirmation of death sentence. Disposition: Jail petition converted to appeal and partly allowed: convictions and fine maintained; death sentences of both appellants commuted to life imprisonment with benefit of S. 382‑B Cr.P.C.; appeal dismissed to the extent of compensation/default sentence, allowed only as to quantum of punishment.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 --- S. 134A(2) [Second Proviso], S. 134A(11), S. 133 --- State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) --- Failure of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) Committee to decide within time --- Maintainability of appeal before Appellate Tribunal --- Hierarchy of appellate remedies The second proviso to Section 134A(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 confers upon State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) the right to pursue appellate remedies before the Appellate Tribunal, High Court, or Supreme Court, contingent on the applicability of subsection (11). Where the ADR Committee constituted under subsection (5) fails to render a decision within the statutory 60-day period, subsection (11) mandates its dissolution, and jurisdiction reverts to the appropriate appellate forum. The Appellate Tribunal is the next competent forum in the statutory hierarchy to entertain appeals arising out of such circumstances. In the present case, since the ADR Committee failed to resolve the dispute within the prescribed timeframe, the applicant’s appeal before the Appellate Tribunal was held to be maintainable. The Tribunal's order declaring the appeal non-maintainable was set aside, and the appeal was remanded for fresh decision. Cited Case: Messrs National Logistics Cell v. Assistant/Deputy Commissioner (2025 PTD 614) Federation of Pakistan v. Attock Petroleum Ltd. (2007 SCMR 1095) Commissioner Inland Revenue v. RYK Mills (2023 SCMR 1856) Province of Punjab v. Haroon Construction Company (2024 SCMR 947) Strategic Plans Division v. Punjab Revenue Authority (PLD 2024 Lahore 545) (b) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 --- S. 134A(1), (5) & (11) --- Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism --- Mandatory constitution of ADR committee for SOEs --- Legislative intent and judicial endorsement of mediation Section 134A(1) makes it mandatory for an SOE to first approach the Federal Board of Revenue for constitution of an ADR Committee where the disputed tax liability is PKR 50 million or more. The Court reiterated that this mechanism was introduced in light of Supreme Court precedents to promote mediation and reduce court burden. Failure of the Committee to decide within time under subsection (5) triggers subsection (11), dissolving the Committee and restoring the right to seek adjudication before the relevant appellate forum. This statutory scheme is designed to foster efficient resolution while safeguarding due process rights of SOEs. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 --- Art. 4 & Art. 10A --- Access to justice --- Exhaustion of alternate remedies --- Doctrine of hierarchical recourse A party must adhere to the procedural hierarchy prescribed by statute and cannot bypass forums or prematurely approach higher judicial forums without exhausting available remedies. The Court held that the phrase “as the case may be” in Section 134A(2), second proviso, requires parties to avail appellate forums sequentially in accordance with the legal stage of the case. Approaching the High Court under Section 133 without first exhausting appeal before the Appellate Tribunal is premature unless such tribunal remedy is demonstrably unavailable or inapplicable. Disposition: Reference application allowed. Impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue dated 28.04.2025 set aside. Applicant’s appeal before the Appellate Tribunal restored to be decided afresh after providing opportunity of hearing to both parties.