Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 --- Ss. 540, 94 & 265-F(7) --- Power to summon material witness --- Accused’s right to summon witness and documents --- Refusal by trial Court without valid reasons --- Effect Where the accused applied under Sections 540, 94, and 265-F(7) Cr.P.C. for summoning the Control Room Wireless Operator/Moharrar along with the Control Room register containing Rapts made between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on the day of the incident, the trial Court erred in dismissing the application without recording cogent reasons. Under Section 265-F(7), the Court “shall” issue process unless it finds the request vexatious or intended to delay proceedings — refusal is to be an exception, not the rule. Similarly, Section 540 empowers the Court to summon any person whose evidence is essential for a just decision. In the instant case, such evidence could have clarified material facts and possibly affected the outcome; the trial Court's failure to exercise its discretion judiciously amounted to a material irregularity. (b) Evidence --- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 --- Art. 24 --- Relevancy of facts not otherwise relevant --- Rescue 15 call logs as inconsistent fact --- Admissibility The requested Rescue 15 call records/Rapts from the Control Room, though not part of the initial prosecution case, were held to be relevant under Article 24 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Since they may reveal inconsistencies with the prosecution’s version—such as the absence of the petitioner’s name in initial calls—they could make the existence or non-existence of material facts highly probable or improbable. Thus, their production was necessary for fair adjudication and could not be denied merely on procedural grounds. (c) Criminal trial --- Judicial discretion --- Duty of Court to avoid miscarriage of justice --- Scope of intervention in revision The Court observed that the primary aim of criminal adjudication is the administration of justice. The trial Court’s refusal to summon a potentially material witness and document—without recording any legal basis—amounted to a failure to exercise discretion judiciously. Referring to PLD 1960 SC 387 and 2003 SCMR 1419, the High Court reiterated that the power under Section 540 Cr.P.C. must be used to prevent miscarriage of justice and to obtain the best possible evidence. Revision jurisdiction was rightly invoked to correct the procedural error. Disposition: Revision petition accepted. Impugned order dated 17.05.2025 set aside. Trial Court directed to summon the Control Room Wireless Operator/Moharrar along with the relevant Rapts as Court witness under Section 540 Cr.P.C. and record testimony in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence唯enefit of doubt---Delay of about 02-hours in lodging the FIR---Consequential---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---Incident place on 08.01.2020 at about 05.10 pm at a distance of 09-kilometers from police station---Information of crime was reported by complainant through statement made before Investigating Officer upon his arrival at the spot at about 06.30 pm on the eventful day and FIR was chalked out at 07.05 pm---In this way, FIR in this case seemed to have been registered within two hours---However, according to the inquest report, Investigating Officer received information regarding the happening of crime at 5:10 p.m. on 08.01.2020 who during cross-examination stated that he arrived at the place of occurrence in pursuance of call on '15' at 5:30 p.m. i.e. within twenty minutes of the occurrence---However, astonishingly the statement of complainant was recorded by Investigating Officer at 6:30 p.m.---From the narration of said facts, it could easily be gathered that Investigating Officer reduced into writing the statement of the complainant after one hour of his reaching at the spot and in that regard the prosecution failed to give any satisfactory explanation---Thus, � one hour time was spent to arrange witnesses who got registered FIR after deliberation while specifying the role of each accused as per their choice---Even otherwise, the question as to what task Investigating Officer kept on performing after his arrival at the crime scene was shrouded in mystery and made the case of the prosecution highly doubtful---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. ������ Ghulam Abbas and another v. The State another 2021 SCMR 23 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Ocular account not proved---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---As per FIR at the relevant time accused, since acquitted, raised Lalkara to take his revenge and fired three successive shots from his pistol .30 bore which hit on the left side of chest, right side of chest and upon right elbow of deceased---Appellant was ascribed the role of firing 30 bore pistol shot which landed on the upper side of abdominal area of deceased, whereas the blame of causing firearm injury with pistol .30 bore at the right buttock of deceased was attributed to accused, since acquitted---Scrutiny of the eye-witness account also raised doubts about the sequence of the shooting involving accused, since acquitted and appellant, as well as who shot whom, was not established from the testimonies of Investigating Officer, complainant and eye-witness---Sequence of the shots allegedly fired by the accused, as reported by complainant, was not found established by the prosecution evidence---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Presence of eye-witnesses at the spot not proved---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---Complainant stated during cross-examination that when the occurrence took place the time was not of any prayer and besides that he failed to give any plausible explanation for his being present at the spot---Complainant during cross-examination also admitted that the residence of eye-witness was situated at a considerable distance from the place of occurrence---Similarly, eye-witness while appearing before the Trial Court deposed that his residence was situated at a distance of half kilometer from the place of occurrence--- Eye-witness further admitted that he did not mention any reason in his statement under S.161, Cr.P.C. for his presence on the spot at the relevant time---Absence of both the eye-witnesses at the spot could further be verified from the fact that according to inquest report, deceased was identified by given up witness and other witness--- In � this way, the case of the prosecution that both the eye-witnesses had seen the incident fell on the ground---Non-identification of the dead body by the eye-witnesses led to the conclusion that had they been present at the place of occurrence or accompanied the deceased to the hospital, they would have definitely identified him and such aspect made the case of the prosecution highly doubtful---All the said facts and circumstances accumulatively were sufficient to show that it was an unseen occurrence and an effort had been made by the prosecution to implicate the appellant through planted eye-witnesses---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. ������ Iftikhar Hussain alias Kharoo v. The State 2024 SCMR 1449 rel. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Medical evidence not supporting the case of prosecution---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---Medical evidence furnished by Medical Officer unfolded that deceased was in receipt of eleven injuries, out of which seven were firearm entry wounds---Numerical strength of the injuries noticed by the Medical Officer on one hand negated the case of the prosecution and on other hand did not coincide with the number of assailants--- As per record, three injuries were attributed to accused, since acquitted, and one was ascribed to other accused, since acquitted, whereas appellant was saddled with the role of causing one firearm injury on the person of the deceased---Since the prosecution case was disbelieved to the extent of two co-accused to whom the effective role in the incident had been assigned and the reasons given by the Court also created a reasonable doubt qua the guilt of the appellant therefore depending on the medical evidence alone to maintain appellant's conviction would be unsafe---Medical evidence served as a form of corroborative evidence, which could validate the prosecution's account concerning the location and type of injury, the weapon involved in the incident, and the time elapsed between death and postmortem, but did not reveal the identity of the murderer--- Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. ������ Muhammad Tasaweer v. Hafiz Zulkarnain and 2 others PLD 2009 SC 53 and Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another 2008 SCMR 1103 rel. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Motive not proved---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---Perusal of the motive aspect of the prosecution's case revealed that that at the time of registration of FIR, in the private complaint, and throughout the trial, a specific motive was presented---According to that, on 16.02.2019, son of deceased, fired a pistol shot at acquitted accused, for which both deceased and his son were challaned---In this context, it was noted that the motive was ascribed to accused, since acquitted and not to the appellant---Complainant during cross-examination admitted that appellant/accused had no previous litigation with them---Similarly, Investigating Officer during the course of his evidence further made it clear that appellant/accused had no personal enmity with the deceased---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. ������ Muhammad Ashraf alias v. The State 2019 SCMR 652 rel. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence and crime empties---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---Perusal of the record revealed that on 16.02.2020 after his arrest appellant led the police party to his house and got recovered pistol .30 bore and two live bullets which were taken into possession---Likewise, on the day of occurrence, Investigating Officer visited the spot and took into possession six crime empties---Both the said parcels were received in the office of Forensic Science Agency on 14.01.2020 and 19.02.2020 respectively---According to the Forensic Science Agency Report, the five crime empties secured from the spot matched with the weapon recovered from the appellant---However, positive report of Forensic Science Agency lost its importance when seen in the context that according to columns Nos. 22 & 23 of inquest report no crime empty was recovered from the place of occurrence---From this aspect, it could conveniently be concluded that no crime empty was secured from the spot and apparently the same were planted by the police so as to knit the evidence for corroborating the statements of eye-witnesses---Furthermore .30 bore pistol and two live bullets recovered at the pointing out of appellant were sealed in a parcel, and if that parcel was submitted to the Forensic Science Agency office, it should have been noted in the report that the parcel contained two live bullets also, which were not indicated in the report---Notable that Investigating Officer received parcels containing six crime empties and a pistol on 13.01.2020 and 18.02.2020, but he submitted them to the Forensic Science Agency office on 14.01.2020 and 19.02.2020, respectively---One-day delay in depositing the said parcels indicated that their secure handling had been jeopardized, rendering the recovery inconsequential---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. ������ Mansab Ali and another v. The State 2024 PCr.LJ 617; Muhammad Saleem v. Shabbir Ahmed and others 2016 SCMR 1605 and Kamal Din alias Kamala v. The State 2018 SCMR 577 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Specific plea taken by accused in his statement recorded under S.342, Cr.P.C---Accused was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the son of complainant by firing---In his examination under S.342, Cr.P.C. appellant took a specific stance that he was falsely implicated in the instant case and the felony mentioned in the FIR was committed by one 鄭A� upon the asking of 典� family who had hired him for the very purpose---Accused-side also produced 鄭A� as defence witness, who stated that 溺T� was his friend who sustained fire shot injuries at the hands of son of deceased and that he committed the murder of deceased at the behest of 溺T�---At the time of arrest of appellant on 09.02.2020 his first version was recorded by Investigating Officer wherein appellant stated that he was present at the spot empty handed while murder of deceased was committed by one 鄭A�---Said fact was even admitted by Investigating Officer during his cross-examination---Since the prosecution failed to prove its case against appellant beyond scintilla of doubt, there was no need to dilate upon the plea taken by appellant---Plea so taken by the appellant at the time of his arrest being admissible in evidence in terms of Art.27 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, also created a reasonable doubt in the credibility of the prosecution case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. ������ Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2021 SCMR 736 and Qaisarullah and others v. The State 2009 SCMR 579 rel. (h) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Premium of every reasonable doubt is to be extended to the accused which could best be extended via verdict of acquittal. ������ Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 rel. (i) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 417---Appeal against acquittal---Scope---When a Court of competent jurisdiction passes the judgment of acquittal on the basis of cogent grounds, the same is not to be disturbed in a mechanical manner---In order to set-aside the judgment of acquittal, it is to be proved that the judgment of acquittal is arbitrary, fanciful, perverse and contrary to record---An accused on the judgment of acquittal acquires a verdict of innocence hence it is to be disturbed in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. ������ Mst. Anwar Begum v. Akhtar Hussain alias Kaka and 2 others 2017 SCMR 1710 and Raja Khurram Ali Khan and 2 others v. Tayyaba Bibi and another PLD 2020 SC 146 rel. ������ Muhammad Irfan Malik and Rida Noor for Appellants. ������ Muhammad Sufiyan Lone and Faraz Akhtar for the Complainant. ������ Muhammad Akhlaq, Deputy Prosecutor General with Nazar Hussain SI for the State. ������ Date of hearing: 24th June, 2025.

Summary: (Against order dated 25.01.2022 passed in C.R. No. 3308 of 2022 by Lahore High Court, Lahore). (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42, 54 & 55---Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), 42---Suit for declaration with perpetual and mandatory injunction---Oral gift subsequently translated into mutation---Fraud---Exclusion of sisters/respondents from their right of inheritance---Essential ingredients of gift---Proof---Non-mentioning of necessary details as to offer and acceptance of gift in the written statement or evidence---Effect---Evidence beyond the scope of pleadings---Admissibility--- Suit of respondents/plaintiffs was decreed, however, the appeal and revision filed by the petitioners/defendants were dismissed by the Appellate and Revisional Court, respectively---Validity---Basic ingredients of a valid gift are: offer, acceptance and delivery of possession---No descriptions of making of offer as to gifting out of the disputed property to the petitioners by the donor, acceptance thereof by them, venue and names of witnesses in whose presence such transaction took place, had been given, which were necessary to be pleaded and proved --- Even the same had not been deposed during evidence either by the petitioners or their witnesses---A party cannot lead any evidence beyond its pleadings---No illegality was found in the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court as well as judgments and decrees passed by the trial and first Appellate Court warranting interference by Supreme Court---Thus, no case for grant of leave was made out---Leave was refused, in circumstances. Bilal Hussain Shah and another v. Dilawar Shah PLD 2018 SC 698; Khalid Hussain and others v. Nazir Ahmad and others 2021 SCMR 1986; Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim (deceased) through L.Rs. and others 2025 SCMR 955; Zulfiqar and others v. Shahdat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582; Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914; Combined Investment (Pvt.) Limited v. Wali Bhai and others PLD 2016 SC 730 and Saddaruddin (since deceased) through LRs. v. Sultan Khan (since deceased) through LRs and others 2021 SCMR 642 rel. (b) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S. 42(7)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Oral gift---Mutation---Independent transactions having two part---Burden of proof---Failure of the petitioners/donees to prove transactions of gift and mutation independently being beneficiary thereof---Effect---Petitioners instead of proving the gift and mutation thriving on the shortcomings of the evidence of respondents---Held: Oral gift has two parts i.e.firstly the fact of the oral gift which has to be independently established by proving through cogent and reliable evidence the three necessary ingredients of a valid gift, and secondly mutation on the basis of an oral gift has to be independently established and proved by adopting procedure provided in the Land Revenue Act, 1967, as well as the evidentiary aspects of the same in terms of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Petitioners could not lead any cogent, strong, unimpeachable and confidence inspiring evidence with regards to first part of alleged oral gift---Petitioners could not produce the stamp vendor, scribe, marginal witnesses, identifying witness, sub-registrar and revenue officials as well as Patwari, meaning thereby the best available evidence was withheld by the petitioners, which raised a serious adverse presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Matters pertained to inheritable property, so the petitioners being alleged donees were under heavy burden to prove valid execution of oral gift because he could not take benefit from the shortcomings in the evidence of respondents, rather he had to stand on his own legs---Leave to appeal was refused, in circumstances. Mushtaq Ul Aarifin and others v. Mumtaz Muhammad and others 2022 SCMR 55; Mst. Parveen (deceased) through LRs. v. Muhammad Pervaiz and others 2022 SCMR 64; Mst. Hayat Bibi and others v. Alamzeb and others 2022 SCMR 13; Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Rafiq 2002 SCMR 1291; Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Sakina Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 1021; Atta Muhammad and others v. Mst. Munir Sultan (deceased) through her LRs and others 2021 SCMR 73 and Farhan Aslam and others v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and another 2021 SCMR 179 rel. (c) Gift--- ----Mutation---Failure of donees to assign reasons prompting the donor to gift out the property to exclusion of female/daughters---Effect---No reason prompting the donor to gift out the disputed property to the petitioners, excluding his daughters (lawful heirs), had been impleaded, asserted and proved by the petitioners in their pleadings (written statement) and evidence --- It is rare for a gift to be made without some reasons like affection or in reward of some sincere service. Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 and Faqir Ali and others v. Saina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85 rel. Ajmal Raza Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th June, 2025.

Summary: Drugs Act (XXXI of 1976)--- ----Ss. 18(1), 27(1) & 31(7)---Selling spurious or unregistered drugs Appeal, filing of---Maintainability---Appeal before the High Court not filed by aggrieved person---Section 31(7) of the Drugs Act, 1976, provided that a person who had been sentenced by a Drug Court might file an appeal before a Bench of the High Court consisting of not less than two judges within thirty days of the passing of the judgment---In the present case, the conviction and sentence were passed against “SUK”, Manager Regulatory Affairs, respondent No. 3, in his personal capacity---However, the instant appeal had not been preferred by the said convict, rather it had been instituted by the private company which was neither convicted in specific terms nor held guilty through a separate order---Only a person aggrieved by a conviction or sentence passed by the Drug Court, or a person legally competent to represent him under due authorization, could file an appeal under S.31 (7) of the Act---In the absence of such authorization, the appellant lacked locus standi---Therefore, the appeal, as filed by the private company against the conviction of its erstwhile employee, “SUK”, was not competent in law---Consequently, the appeal filed by the private company against the conviction of respondent No.3 was misconceived and incompetent for want of locus standi---Appellant company could not challenge a conviction passed against an individual in his personal capacity unless duly authorized and empowered to represent him for that specific purpose---Appeal was dismissed being incompetent and not maintainable. Inayat Ullah Khan for Appellant. Abdul Waheed Khattak, Asst: A.G. for Respondent No.1. Yasir Rauf Wazir for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 24th June, 2025.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.28---Enlargement of time for rendering an award---Application under S. 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, filing of---Locus standi---Whether such application could be maintained only by the arbitrator or also by any of the parties to the arbitration agreement---Powers and discretion of court to enlarge time for making an award---Scope---The petitioner’s application under S. 28 of Arbitration Act, 1940 (the Act) was dismissed by the lower court on the ground that it was only the arbitrator who could seek such extension, giving rise to the present petition---Core legal question for determination before the High Court was as to “Whether under S. 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, application for enlargement of time for making an arbitral award could only be filed by the arbitrator, or whether any party to the arbitration agreement also had the legal standing (locus standi) to move the court for such extension” ?---Held: plain language of S. 28 of the Act made it evident that there was no explicit or implicit requirement that an application for enlargement of time be filed by an arbitrator---The language of S. 28(1) of the Act did not specify as to who would have the standing to move the court for enlargement of time for making an award---In terms of S. 28 of the Act, any party to the arbitration agreement had legal standing to move the court for enlargement of time---Court had wide discretion and jurisdiction to enlarge the time limit for making an award especially where the request for extension of time was not a joint request made by both the parties to the arbitration agreement---Such extension could be sought and granted on more than one occasion---However, discretion vested in the court to grant extension of time ought not to be exercised in favor of a person who had adopted dilatory tactics---It was not for the High Court to determine whether or not extension was to be granted in the present matter as the said question was to be determined in the first instance by the civil court---Impugned order was not sustainable and was therefore set aside---Application filed by the petitioner was to be deemed pending before the civil court---Present civil revision petition was allowed, in circumstances. Civil Aviation Authority, Karachi v. Wrist Consultation (Pvt.) Ltd. 1998 SCMR 2393 rel. Aftab Ahmed Khan v. The Installment Supply, Private Ltd. and others 1961 ILR 503; Corporation Engineering (Pvt.) Limited v. Pak Arab Refinery Limited 2002 CLC 836; Sulaiman Ebrahim H. Jaffer v. Karachi Cooperative Housing Societies Union Ltd. PLD 1963 (W.P.) Karachi 316; Narsing Das Hiralal Limited and another v. Bisandayal Satyanarain Firm AIR 1954 Ori 29; Aniruddh Asharam Vyas v. Deepak Kantilal Ghiya Lnind 1970 GUJ 37; J.K. Enterprise v. Win Medicare Limited 1994 (45) DRJ; Engro Chemicals Pakistan Ltd. v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan 1996 CLC 344; J.W. Oliver v. Mian Dost Muhammad AIR 1935 Lahore 191 and Pakistan v. Gayer & Co., Karachi PLD 1964 Kar. 3 ref. Ali Ibrahim, Ambreen Khalid and Barrister Faiza Asad for Petitioner.

Summary: (a) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----Ss.263 & 265---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Investigation into the affairs of a company, challenge to---Initiation on the basis of a shareholder’s complaint---Complaint---Maintainability---Statutory threshold, requirement of---Potential misappropriation involving advance payment against purchase of land and failure in paying outstanding amount of provident fund, allegations of---Initiation of proceedings under inapplicable provision of law---Legality of proceedings---Briefly, the petitioner company challenged before the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction a show cause notice issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) under S. 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, and a subsequent order appointing inspectors to investigate the affairs of the company on allegations relating to advance payment for purchase of land and non-payment of provident fund---The issue requiring determination before the High Court was “whether the SECP could lawfully invoke S. 265 to initiate an investigation on the basis of a single shareholder’s complaint, without fulfilling the statutory requirements and threshold prescribed under S. 263 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?”---Held: Impugned show cause notice was issued under S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984 and a holistic reading of the same made it abundantly clear that the proceedings were not initiated by the SECP on its own and under its suo motu powers conferred by S. 265 by forming an in dependent and bipartisan opinion---Instead, the entire process was initiated on a complaint from an individual claiming to be a shareholder of the petitioner company---Thus, the SECP’s issuance of the impugned notice under S. 265 of the Ordinance, 1984, based on a shareholder complaint, was fundamentally flawed because it failed to meet the legally required threshold, specifically, the complaint must have been filed by 10% of the total voting power of the shareholders---Proceedings commenced by the SECP under S. 265, an inapplicable provision, on the basis of a complaint by a shareholder of the petitioner company were in clear contravention of statutory requirements and thus vitiated the legality of the proceedings---Impugned notice issued on the basis of misappropriation of payment against purchase of the land was not in essence of the third round of proceedings since it was regarding the same issue, transactions and allegations---Since it was an admitted fact that the documents submitted by the petitioner company in respect of the land were already available with the SECP, who had not yet given any findings in respect of the same due to pendency of these proceedings, the department retained the liberty to initiate separate and independent proceedings, if required according to the law---Impugned show cause notice and order were set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----S.265---Investigation into the affairs of a company---Scope---Under S.265 the SECP can appoint one or more competent persons as inspectors to investigate the affairs of a company and report thereon as directed---This power is exercised in two principal scenarios: (a) mandatorily, where the company by resolution in a general meeting or the Court by order declares that an investigation is warranted; and (b) at the Commission’s discretion, where circumstances suggest, inter alia, that the company’s business is being or has been conducted with intent to defraud creditors, members or others for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose, in an oppressive manner or where there is evidence of fraud, misfeasance, breach of trust, unauthorized business, deprivation of reasonable return to members, inadequate disclosure of information, allotment of shares for inadequate consideration, unsound business practices, or financial instability endangering solvency. (c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----S.263---Investigation into the affairs of a company on the basis of a shareholder’s application---Initiation of proceedings---Legal framework---Section 263 is engaged on the happening of an event either on an application by members (holding certain threshold voting power) or on a report compiled under subsection (5) of S. 231 or by the registrar under subsection (6) of S. 261---If at all the SECP seeks to investigate into the affairs of a company on the basis of a shareholder’s application, it must have initiated proceedings under S. 263. (d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]--- ----S.263---Investigation into the affairs of a company on the basis of a shareholder’s application---Statutory threshold of 10% of total voting power---Essence, significance and purpose of a statutory threshold---The statutory threshold is not a mere formality; it serves as a critical safeguard designed to prevent undue interference in a company’s internal affairs by individual shareholders or regulators without sufficient backing---This provision ensures that only a significant portion of shareholders can initiate regulatory action, thereby maintaining corporate independence and stability. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.10A---Right to due process---Initiation of proceedings under an inapplicable provision---Legality of proceedings---Due process, violation of---Due process constitutes a fundamental constitutional right and no proceedings may be lawfully initiated except in strict adherence to due process and the prescribed procedural formalities---Any exercise conducted without due process of law is unconstitutional, illegal and void---Proceedings initiated underan inapplicable provision would vitiate the legality of proceedings. (f) Administration of justice--- ----When the legislature requires the doing of a thing in a particular manner then it is to be done in that manner and all other manners or modes of doing or performing that thing are barred. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance, Islamabad and another v. E-Movers (Pvt.) Ltd. and another 2022 SCMR 1021 and Chairman, NAB v. Nasar Ullah PLD 2022 SC 497 rel. Salman Aslam Butt and Anique Salman Malik for Petitioner. Hafiz Munawar Iqbal and Syed Pervaiz Zahoor and Muhammad Waseem A. Rana, Makhdoom Ali Hamaza, Ms. Syeda Muneeza Fatima and Omer Azad Malik, SPPs for SECP for Respondents Nos.1 and 2. Muhammad Saeed Raja, DAG for Respondent No.3. Assisted by: Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Judicial Law Clerk.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The respondent was admittedly employee of the Police Department as Traffic Assistant and was on probation period when his services were rescinded on the ground that he obtained the employment through concealment of facts. The said orders were set aside by the learned Single Bench and in Intra-Court Appeal, it has been held that Rule 12.21 of the Police Rules, 1934 ("the Rules") bars departmental appeal, however, Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal, 1974 ("the Act") allows a civil servant whether regular or probationer, aggrieved by a final order?whether original or appellate?to file an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). Hence, jurisdiction of the Single Bench was barred. Having held that the respondent is a civil servant and that a statutory right of appeal under Section 4 of the Act was available to him against the original order of termination before the Tribunal, we are now constrained to consider whether the present Intra-Court Appeal is itself maintainable in law in terms of the crucial jurisdictional bar contemplated under Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 ("Ordinance"), which expressly excludes the maintainability of an appeal against an order passed by a learned Single Judge in constitutional jurisdiction, where the order impugned before the learned Single Judge arises from proceedings in which a statutory remedy, such as an appeal, was available. In the present case, since the order of termination of services of the respondent under Rule 12.21 of the Rules was appealable under Section 4 of the Act and the respondent nonetheless opted to invoke Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 instead of availing the statutory remedy, the constitutional petition was not maintainable and as a direct consequence thereof, the present Intra-Court Appeal, being a continuation of a procedurally flawed proceeding, is also hit by the bar contained in Section 3(2) of the Ordinance. Accordingly, the instant Intra-Court appeal is held to be not maintainable and is dismissed on that score alone. The appellant-Police Department may avail the alternate remedy.