Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The respondent was admittedly employee of the Police Department as Traffic Assistant and was on probation period when his services were rescinded on the ground that he obtained the employment through concealment of facts. The said orders were set aside by the learned Single Bench and in Intra-Court Appeal, it has been held that Rule 12.21 of the Police Rules, 1934 ("the Rules") bars departmental appeal, however, Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal, 1974 ("the Act") allows a civil servant whether regular or probationer, aggrieved by a final order?whether original or appellate?to file an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). Hence, jurisdiction of the Single Bench was barred. Having held that the respondent is a civil servant and that a statutory right of appeal under Section 4 of the Act was available to him against the original order of termination before the Tribunal, we are now constrained to consider whether the present Intra-Court Appeal is itself maintainable in law in terms of the crucial jurisdictional bar contemplated under Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 ("Ordinance"), which expressly excludes the maintainability of an appeal against an order passed by a learned Single Judge in constitutional jurisdiction, where the order impugned before the learned Single Judge arises from proceedings in which a statutory remedy, such as an appeal, was available. In the present case, since the order of termination of services of the respondent under Rule 12.21 of the Rules was appealable under Section 4 of the Act and the respondent nonetheless opted to invoke Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 instead of availing the statutory remedy, the constitutional petition was not maintainable and as a direct consequence thereof, the present Intra-Court Appeal, being a continuation of a procedurally flawed proceeding, is also hit by the bar contained in Section 3(2) of the Ordinance. Accordingly, the instant Intra-Court appeal is held to be not maintainable and is dismissed on that score alone. The appellant-Police Department may avail the alternate remedy. 361Murder Reference 2561404.53-

Summary: (Against the order dated 22.09.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in Writ Petitions Nos. 1478, 1479 and 1480 of 2010/BWP). Supreme Court Rules, 1980--- ----O. XX, R. 1---Proceedings, pendency of---Effect---Matter pending before Supreme Court pertaining to assailing of remand order passed by High Court wherein Supreme Court had not issued any restraining order---Validity---Pendency of any appeal, revision, or Constitutional petition does not, of itself, stay execution or implementation of the order assailed---Such principle is expressly embodied in Order XX Rule 1 of Supreme Court Rules, 1980---Administrative inaction premised on mere pendency of further proceedings, without any lawful restraint, is both unjustified and impermissible---Revenue Authority placed on record the order passed by Deputy Commissioner/District Collector, which showed that remanded matter had since been disposed of in accordance with law---Petition was disposed of. Rashid Baig v. Muhammad Mansha 2024 SCMR 1385 rel. Rana Shamshad Khan, Additional Advocate General, Punjab along with Nabeel Javed, SMBR for Petitioners (in all cases). M. Usman Arif, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (in all cases). Salman Mansoor, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 2, 3(b), 6-12, 14, 16-20, 24, 25 and 27 (in C.P. No. 2915-L of 2015). Date of hearing: 24th June, 2025. ORDER YAHYA AFRIDI, CJ.--- These petitions arise out of remand orders passed by the Lahore High Court over a decade ago, directing revenue authorities to re-decide the matter in accordance with law. Despite such clear directions, the Deputy Land Commissioner, Bahawalpur, failed to act, resulting in unreasonable and unexplained delay. 2. When questioned in Court, the learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab, confirmed that there was no injunctive or restraining order passed by any Court that could justify the failure to act on the remand. This admission demonstrates that such failure was without any lawful justification. 3. This Court finds it necessary to address the disturbing practice of treating remand orders as optional or capable of indefinite suspension. A remand is not an invitation to delay and when superior courts issue remand directions, they are to be complied with faithfully and expeditiously. Such failure is contrary to the constitutional duty of all authorities to act in aid of judicial orders. 4. For clarity, it bears emphasis that the mere pendency of any appeal, revision, or constitutional petition does not, of itself, stay the execution or implementation of the order impugned. This principle is expressly embodied in Order XX Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, which provides: The filing of a petition for leave to appeal or an appeal shall not prevent execution of the decree or order appealed against, but the Court may, subject to such terms and conditions as it may deem fit to impose, order a stay of execution of the decree or order, or order a stay of proceedings, in any case under appeal to this Court. In reference to the above-stated rule, this Court has already recently clarified in the case of Rashid Baig v. Muhammad Mansha (2024 SCMR 1385) that mere pendency of a petition before this Court does not, by itself, operate as a stay of proceedings, which may only be lawfully restrained by an express injunctive order of the Court. Thus, administrative inaction premised on the mere pendency of further proceedings, without any lawful restraint, is both unjustified and impermissible. 5. It is particularly regrettable that despite the clear pronouncement of this Court in Rashid Baig's case (supra) expressing disapproval of such misuse of procedural pendency, the same practice continues unabated. This reflects not merely individual lapses, but a persistent pattern of administrative disregard for binding remand orders, which in itself constitutes systemic failure requiring urgent redress. 6. To address this matter, the Court required the personal attendance of the Senior Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab. He assured the Court that clear and comprehensive policy guidelines would be issued at the provincial level, directing all relevant authorities to implement remand orders promptly and without delay, unless expressly restrained by an injunctive order of a competent Court. He further undertook to ensure monitoring of compliance and to submit a report on the current status of all such pending remanded cases under his jurisdiction. Such measures are essential to uphold the foundations of lawful governance, and it must be reiterated that failure by the relevant authorities to observe established principles requiring prompt compliance with remand orders would frustrate the administration of justice and violate their constitutional duty. 7. As for the present matters, the Senior Member, Board of Revenue, has placed on record the order dated 05.11.2024 passed by the Deputy Commissioner/District Collector, Bahawalpur, which shows that the remanded matter has since been disposed of in accordance with law. These petitions have therefore become infructuous. 8. In view of the above, these petitions are disposed of as having become infructuous. However, before parting with this order, we direct the Board of Revenue, Punjab, to ensure that the promised policy guidelines are finalized, circulated to all relevant authorities, and strictly implemented. A compliance report, along with an updated status of all pending remanded cases in the province, shall be submitted to the Registrar of this Court within three months of this order. MH/C-17/SC Order accordingly.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 22.11.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Tax Reference Nos. 22-P to 24-P of 2019). Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 2(13AB), 113, 122(5) & 177---Consumer goods---Turnover---Determination---Amendment of assessment---Tax liability, demand of---Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG)---Packing material---Authorities revised the assessment of respondent / taxpayer considering packing material as consumer goods for the use of end user---Validity---Products in question were primarily used as a material for packing other products for various consumer goods and were not typically sold directly to consumers as a stand-alone product---Consumer could buy products packed in such films but would not typically purchase goods in question---Subject goods in their form as described in orders of lower fora were utilizable predominantly by end consumers---These were not directly considered as consumer items but had formed a key component for many consumer products and were meant primarily for an industrial / commercial use---Fast Moving Consumer Goods were those which were supplied in retail market as per "their" daily demand and did not qualify to form part of definition provided in section 2 (13AB) and (22A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Insertion of phase 'durable' which excludes such product was additionally applied for tax return in question---All such products described as durable were excluded via Finance Act, 2017---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court---Appeal was allowed. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Petitioner (in all cases). Muhammad Tariq, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (in all cases) (via video-link from Peshawar). Date of hearing: 23rd May, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 22.11.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Tax Reference Nos. 22-P to 24-P of 2019). Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 2(13AB), 113, 122(5) & 177---Consumer goods---Turnover---Determination---Amendment of assessment---Tax liability, demand of---Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG)---Packing material---Authorities revised the assessment of respondent / taxpayer considering packing material as consumer goods for the use of end user---Validity---Products in question were primarily used as a material for packing other products for various consumer goods and were not typically sold directly to consumers as a stand-alone product---Consumer could buy products packed in such films but would not typically purchase goods in question---Subject goods in their form as described in orders of lower fora were utilizable predominantly by end consumers---These were not directly considered as consumer items but had formed a key component for many consumer products and were meant primarily for an industrial / commercial use---Fast Moving Consumer Goods were those which were supplied in retail market as per "their" daily demand and did not qualify to form part of definition provided in section 2 (13AB) and (22A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Insertion of phase 'durable' which excludes such product was additionally applied for tax return in question---All such products described as durable were excluded via Finance Act, 2017---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court---Appeal was allowed. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Petitioner (in all cases). Muhammad Tariq, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (in all cases) (via video-link from Peshawar). Date of hearing: 23rd May, 2025.

Summary: i. Moreover, the Court is curious to understand the rationale behind the presence of three individuals from Kohistan accompanying the deceased to Mansehra, and their collective journey to the doctor. Keeping in view the respective engagements of these witnesses, it is difficult to accept their presence with the deceased or their alleged role in escorting him for medical treatment. Furthermore, the complainant failed to mention the name of the clinic or the doctor who was supposed to treat the deceased ii. This Court must further assess whether the statements of the eyewitnesses were recorded on the day of occurrence or subsequently. When examined on this aspect, the eyewitness admitted that after receiving the deceased's body, he transported it to Kohistan and returned, along with others, to the Investigating Officer, who then recorded their statements. The record corroborates that the statements of the eyewitnesses were recorded on 10.07.2021, several days after the occurrence, when they arrived from Kohistan. Had they been present with the deceased at the hospital, their statements would have been recorded immediately, which was not the case, indicating their absence iii. Of particular interest is the statement of the eyewitness who, when questioned, claimed that soon after the incident, he chased the appellant and the absconding accused in a hired taxi towards Abbottabad but failed to apprehend them. This conduct is highly abnormal and inconsistent with the natural reaction expected of a brother under such circumstances. It is implausible that he would abandon the dead body at the scene and pursue the accused to a distant location like Abbottabad, which lies at a considerable distance from the place of occurrence iv. Furthermore, it is significant to note that the Investigating Officer had moved for the collection of Call Data Records (CDRs) for the SIMs in the use of the witnesses. The records were verified, and the data speaks volumes. The SIMs bearing numbers 0310-5349400 and 0346-4677374, used by the complainant on the day of the occurrence, showed tower locations at Mohallah Channai and Mufti Abud, Mansehra. Similarly, the SIM No. 0344-9196369, used by eyewitness Abdul Sattur, was traced to Thakot, Kohistan. Another SIM No. 0344-9155311, used by eyewitness Abdul Hameed, was traced to Komila Dasu on the relevant day and time . v. When confronted with this evidence before the learned trial Court, and a specific question was put to the witness regarding the verification of the SIMs and the locations of their users, the witness admitted that the SIMs were indeed located at the places shown in the CDRs. If this particular aspect is read together with the statement of the eyewitness, who had earlier admitted that only after the burial of the deceased did he and the other witnesses return to Mansehra and have their statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., no ambiguity remains. It becomes abundantly clear that the witnesses were not present at the place of occurrence on the day and time in question, but were instead present at their respective places of work in Kohistan . v. in our considered view, the net of implication has been cast too wide, resulting in the enrobing of nearly all male members of the complainant party's opposing hunily, which weakens the credibility of the prosecution's case.

Summary: i. In cases of inheritance amongst siblings, the plaintiff is only required to prove two facts firstly, his/ their relationship with the common predecessor and with the defendants and secondly, that the suit property was or is part of the legacy, whereas, in such suit if the defendant has taken any plea of dis-inheritance on the basis of any mode of transfer then, such defendant has to prove such instrument of transfer through the required standard of proof. ii. In case of inheritance if any legal heirs has taken the plea of a gift mutations) in his favor then such legal heir has not only to prove the valid execution of the gift mutations) but he has also to prove the original incident of gift to the effect that as to when, where and in whose presence their predecessor has made an offer of gift of the suit property, its acceptance by such legal heir and of course, delivery of exclusive possession to him/ them. iii. Whenever, the authenticity of a document is challenged by a party on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation, then, the onus to prove such documents lies on the beneficiary and the said onus could not be shifted to the person who has challenged the same. iv. Mutation by itself could not be considered as deed of title and even in the presence of mutation, requirements of original transaction of being a gift or sale deed or exchange etc. has to be proved through an independent and trustworthy evidence. v. In the recent past, the Supreme Court has shown a serious displeasure and dismay over the conduct of male legal heirs who usually joined hands and pitched up against female legal heirs to deprive them of their share in the legacy, therefore, all the Courts of law should be vigilant and they must ensure that due rights of female legal heirs as enshrined in the Holy Quran, Sunnah and as enrooted in the law of the land to be protected and enforced. vi. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence and when any party who succeeds to slightly tilts the scale in his favour would be entitled for the grant of desired relief.

Summary: Drugs Act, 1976 - S. 31(7) --- Appeal - Maintainability --- Locus standi --- Conviction of individual employee --- Appeal filed by company --- Incompetent --- Held, only a person who is convicted or duly authorized representative can file appeal against conviction--- Where conviction is passed against an employee in his personal capacity, company not being aggrieved person or authorized representative, cannot maintain appeal - Appeal dismissed as not maintainable.