Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199— Constitutional petition—Quashing of FIR—Scope and limitations—Petitioners sought quashing of FIRs registered under Section 25-D of the Telegraph Act, 1885 and Sections 354, 506, 337-H(2), and 34, P.P.C.—Held, that Article 199 of the Constitution affords a discretionary and summary remedy which is not meant for determination of disputed facts or factual controversies requiring recording of evidence—Where FIRs disclose commission of cognizable offences, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to quash the same—Remedy under Article 199 cannot be used to obstruct or preempt investigation and trial—Such intervention by High Courts has consistently been deprecated by the superior judiciary—Jurisdiction under Article 199 must be exercised only where no adequate alternate remedy is available— Cited Cases: • Amir Jamal v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq 2011 SCMR 1023 • Muhammad Younas Khan v. Government of N.W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Mst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim 2001 SCMR 1493 • Muslimabad Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mrs. Siddiqa Faiz PLD 2008 SC 135 • President, All Pakistan Women Association v. Muhammad Akbar Awan 2020 SCMR 260 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 63, 190, 249-A & 551— Alternative remedies—Exhaustion of statutory avenues before invoking writ jurisdiction—Accused person seeking quashing of FIR must first avail statutory remedies—Held, that a person aggrieved by registration of an FIR has multiple remedies: (i) before the Investigating Officer, (ii) before supervisory police officers under Section 551, Cr.P.C., (iii) before a Magistrate under Section 63, Cr.P.C. for discharge, (iv) under Rule 24.7 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, (v) before a Magistrate under Section 190, Cr.P.C., and (vi) acquittal under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C.—Only after exhaustion of such remedies can constitutional jurisdiction be invoked. Cited Case: • Qaisar Mahmood v. Muhammad Sham PLD 1998 Lahore 72 **(c) Criminal Procedure—Investigation— ----Quashing of FIR— Disputed questions of fact—Scope of interference by High Court—Held, that investigation of criminal offences falls within the exclusive domain of the Investigating Officer and the Trial Court—High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, cannot act as a fact-finding forum or interfere in ongoing investigations—Where FIRs contain allegations attracting cognizable offences, any interference at pre-trial stage is unwarranted and amounts to judicial overreach—Such interference has been disapproved in multiple precedents— Cited Cases: • Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 • Shahnaz Begum v. Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Baluchistan PLD 1971 SC 677 • Brig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan 1994 SCMR 2142 • Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq 2006 SCMR 276 • Dr. Ghulam Mustafa v. The State 2008 SCMR 76 • Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim PLD 2009 SC 102 (d) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10-A— Fair trial—Direction to Investigation Officer—Petitioners urged the Court to direct the Investigating Officers to conduct investigation in a fair and impartial manner—Held, that Investigation Officers are legally bound to investigate fairly and transparently—Court expressed confidence that Investigating Officers shall proceed without fear or favour and in accordance with law to protect petitioners' rights under Article 10-A of the Constitution. Disposition: Petitions dismissed—High Court declined to quash FIRs in constitutional jurisdiction—Held that factual controversies and ongoing investigations are beyond the scope of Article 199—Petitioners advised to pursue statutory remedies and let investigation and trial take their lawful course.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – Bail in Bailable Offences: ----Ss. 496, 497 & 498—Right to bail in bailable offences—Distinction between bail in bailable and non-bailable offences—Court’s discretion in granting pre-arrest bail. A person accused of a bailable offence has an indefeasible right to bail, which is not a mere privilege but a fundamental right under the law. The grant of bail in such cases is mandatory rather than discretionary, and courts have no option but to grant bail to the accused. Conversely, in non-bailable offences, bail is a matter of judicial discretion rather than an absolute right. (PLD 1963 SC 478, PLD 1995 SC 34, PLD 1997 SC 545, 2001 PCrLJ 1082, PLD 2014 SC 760 applied). (b) Bail – Courts must follow the law, not emotions: ----Role of the judiciary—Judicial officers bound by law—Emotions, sympathy, and subjective considerations have no place in dispensation of justice. The judiciary is bound to decide cases in accordance with the law, regardless of the emotional gravity of the allegations. A judge must not let sympathy or public sentiment influence the outcome, especially in matters where the law clearly provides for bail as a matter of right. In the present case, the Additional Sessions Judge erred by denying pre-arrest bail despite the fact that the alleged offences were bailable. (PLD 2014 SC 760 followed). (c) Pre-Arrest Bail – No discretion to refuse in bailable offences: ----Pre-arrest bail—Bailable offences—Courts cannot refuse bail in bailable offences, whether pre-arrest or post-arrest. The court misapplied legal principles by treating pre-arrest bail differently from post-arrest bail in a bailable offence. The law makes no such distinction. The High Court reaffirmed that once an offence is categorized as bailable, courts have no discretion to refuse bail, whether pre-arrest or post-arrest. The Sessions Court’s refusal of bail in a bailable offence was thus a misinterpretation of law. (PLD 2014 SC 760, PLD 1963 SC 478, PLD 1995 SC 34 applied). (d) Cancellation of Bail in Bailable Offences – Not Permissible: ----Indefeasible right—Once granted, bail in a bailable offence cannot be canceled. The cancellation of bail in a bailable offence is not permissible, even if the accused engages in misconduct, intimidates witnesses, or attempts to influence the trial. Other legal remedies, such as contempt proceedings or preventive measures, may be invoked in such cases, but bail cannot be revoked in bailable offences. (PLD 1963 SC 478, AIR 1958 SC 376 followed). (e) Disposition – Confirmation of Pre-Arrest Bail: ----Final decision—Pre-arrest bail granted—Directions issued to lower courts. The Lahore High Court confirmed the interim pre-arrest bail granted to the accused, directing him to furnish fresh bail bonds of Rs. 50,000 with one surety. The Additional Sessions Judge was also instructed for future guidance to ensure that in bailable offences, bail must be granted as a matter of right. ----Cited Cases: Alam Zeb & another v. The State (PLD 2014 SC 760) Mst. Zeenat Begum v. Sadaqat Sagheer & another (2020 PCrLJ Note 4) Mian Mahmud Ali Qasuri v. The State (PLD 1963 SC 478) Tariq Bashir v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 34) Imtiaz Ahmad & another v. The State (PLD 1997 SC 545) Allah Bachaya & 3 others v. The State (2001 PCrLJ 1082)

Summary: Against impugned judgement and decree dated 05.03.2020 and 12.12.2019 whereby learned district judge while affiriming the judgement and decree dismissed the appeal

Summary: Bail PetitionHeld: (i) it is yet to be established at trial that when the abductee was available in her house on the date when the FIR was lodged by her father, then why she did not report the matter herself.(ii) there is no legal or moral compulsion to keep an accused in jail on mere allegations, unless reasonable grounds to exist to believe that the accused is prima facie connected with the commission of offence.(iii) The medico-legal report of the victim does not support the allegations contained in the FIR for the reason that the concerned doctor did not notice any scratch mark on perineum or other body parts nor any opinion was given with regard to commission of fresh intercourse, rather 14 weeks pregnancy was notice.

Summary: Bail granted--- When business dispute between the parties is admitted one and there is nothing on record to establish that the cheque in question was issued for repayment of any loan or fulfillment of any financial obligation, which is sine qua non to attract the provisions of Section 489-F PPC, bail was allowed----Khizar Hayat has filed a petition for bail following his arrest in connection with FIR No. 313 dated 21-07-2020, registered under Section 489-F PPC at Police Station Civil Line, Lahore. The FIR alleges that Khizar Hayat owes Rs. 8,177,251 to Nizami Feed (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore and issued a bounced cheque for the repayment. The court considered several factors, including the delay in FIR registration, absence of original documents during investigation, discrepancies in the ledgers provided by both parties, and the absence of evidence showing the cheque was issued to repay a loan or fulfill a financial obligation. The court also emphasized that the offense under Section 489-F PPC is punishable for three years but does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C., citing legal precedents such as "Shemeel Ahmad vs. The State" (2009 SCMR 174). Moreover, the court highlighted that the case relies heavily on documentary evidence possessed by the prosecution, making the possibility of tampering by the petitioner unlikely. It cited cases like "Saeed Ahmed vs. The State" (1996 SCMR 1132) to support the argument that bail is generally granted when the case relies on documentary evidence. The court also rejected the argument that the petitioner's involvement in other similar cases should affect his bail status, citing "Qurban Ali vs. The State" (2017 SCMR 279). The court further addressed the argument that the petitioner's status as a fugitive from the law should affect his right to claim discretionary relief, emphasizing that mere absconsion does not impede the grant of bail if the case warrants further inquiry. Legal precedents such as "Muhammad Sadiq vs. Sadiq" (PLD 1985 SC 182) were cited to support this stance. Finally, the court granted post-arrest bail to Khizar Hayat upon the condition of furnishing bail bonds and emphasized the need for expeditious trial proceedings.