Summary: (Dismissed) The case arose from a consolidated judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which dismissed a civil revision petition and a civil appeal filed by the parties. The Court examined the definition of "varied" as used in Article 185(2)(e) and concluded that if a judgment changes or alters the ruling of the lower court, it can be said to have varied the ruling. However, where a judgment is set aside or upheld, no modification occurs. In this case, the High Court had both varied and set aside parts of the judgment, and the appellants had only challenged the part that dismissed their claim. Therefore, the Court found that the appeals were not competent. The Court also considered the merits of the case and found that no case had been made out for interference. The appellants had failed to prove their claims through documentary or oral evidence, and there were concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts against them. As a result, the Court concluded that there was no basis for granting leave to appeal. Additionally, the Court noted that one of the appeals was filed 64 days after the prescribed period, and the appellant sought condonation of delay. However, the Court found that the reasons provided for the delay were not sufficient to warrant condonation. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the appeals were not competent and dismissed them accordingly.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908): ---- Art. 113, Schedule I -- Specific performance of contract -- Limitation -- A suit for specific performance must be filed within three years from the date fixed for performance or, if no such date is fixed, from the date the plaintiff gains notice of refusal of performance -- Plaintiff gained notice of refusal on 4th March 1991 but filed the suit on 26th September 1998, rendering the suit hopelessly time-barred -- Held, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, regarding exclusion of time spent in other proceedings, was not applicable as revenue authorities are not courts, and their proceedings are not judicial proceedings. Cited Cases: • Haji Abdul Karim and others v. Messrs Florida Builders (Pvt.) Limited, PLD 2012 SC 247 • Investment Corporation of Pakistan v. Jamaat Ali Shah, 1992 SCMR 1195 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877): ---- Ss. 12 & 22 -- Specific performance -- Equitable relief -- Plaintiff must demonstrate clean hands and fulfill all conditions of the contract -- Plaintiff failed to prove payment of the agreed consideration and concealed material facts -- Relief was denied as plaintiff's conduct, delay in instituting the suit, and failure to establish payment of consideration defeated equity -- Relief under Sections 12 and 22 is discretionary and requires sound judicial reasoning. Cited Cases: • Liaqat Ali Khan and others v. Falak Sher and others, PLD 2014 SC 506 (c) Revenue Proceedings vs. Judicial Proceedings: ---- Proceedings before revenue authorities do not qualify as "civil proceedings" under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, for the purpose of extending the limitation period -- Revenue authorities lack the status of a "court," and their proceedings are not equivalent to civil suits or appeals. Cited Cases: • Rehman Khan v. Asadullah Khan, PLD 1983 Quetta 52 (d) Concurrent Findings: ---- High Court's revisional jurisdiction -- When concurrent findings by lower courts are perverse, result from misreading or non-reading of evidence, or fail to align with legal principles, the High Court can interfere under Section 115, CPC, to correct the error -- Concurrent findings are not sacrosanct in such cases. Cited Cases: • Samar Gul v. Mohabat Khan, 2000 SCMR 974 (e) Equitable Principles in Contracts: ---- Specific performance as an equitable relief -- Courts are not bound to grant specific performance simply because it is lawful to do so -- Delay, inequitable conduct, or failure to fulfill contractual obligations by the plaintiff can justify the refusal of specific performance. -----Disposition: Civil revision allowed -- Judgments of lower courts set aside -- Plaintiff's suit dismissed as time-barred and lacking merit -- Parties to bear their own costs.

Summary: [Argument of limitation does not apply to co-sharers--West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948---West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962. The Court held that the termination of Mst. Noor Bibi's limited interest in the property took the matter back to 1922, the year of her father's death, and that all legal heirs became owners/co-sharers since 1922, regardless of the non-updated revenue records. The Court rejected the argument of limitation, stating that it does not apply against co-sharers in matters of inheritance, as they are considered in possession of the joint property. The Court distinguished previous cases where limitation was applied due to delayed challenges to property transfers. In this case, the Court found that the dispute was a simple matter of inheritance, and each case should be examined on its unique facts and circumstances.] The dispute revolves around the inheritance of agricultural land left by a person named Alia, recorded in the revenue records as Ali Bakhsh. Upon his death, his three sons, namely Imam Din, Karim Bakhsh, and Rahim Bakhsh, inherited the property equally. Imam Din died in 1922, and his widow, Mst. Amina Bibi, succeeded him as a limited owner under customary law until her remarriage. Mst. Noor Bibi, daughter of Imam Din and mother of the appellants, then succeeded Mst. Amina Bibi as a limited owner of the property until her marriage.After Mst. Noor Bibi's marriage in 1944-45, her limited interest in the property legally terminated, but this change was not reflected in the revenue record. The plaintiffs filed a suit claiming that after Mst. Noor Bibi's marriage, the property should revert to the actual legal heirs, Karim Bakhsh and Rahim Bakhsh, as the brothers of Imam Din. The suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiffs by the trial court, and subsequent appeals upheld the decision. Mst. Noor Bibi, the appellant, argued that the suit was time-barred due to the law of limitation.The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant laws, particularly the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, and the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962. The Court held that the termination of Mst. Noor Bibi's limited interest in the property took the matter back to 1922, the year of her father's death, and that all legal heirs became owners/co-sharers since 1922, regardless of the non-updated revenue records. The Court rejected the argument of limitation, stating that it does not apply against co-sharers in matters of inheritance, as they are considered in possession of the joint property. The Court distinguished previous cases where limitation was applied due to delayed challenges to property transfers. In this case, the Court found that the dispute was a simple matter of inheritance, and each case should be examined on its unique facts and circumstances.

Summary: Background: The appellant, National Highway Authority (NHA), filed a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, challenging an award dated 03.07.1998. The reference was filed almost 12 years later, on 28.01.2010. The respondents moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, contending that the reference was time-barred. The Referee Court framed the issue of limitation and ultimately dismissed the reference as barred by time. NHA appealed the decision. -----Issues: 1- Whether the reference filed by the National Highway Authority was barred by limitation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. ----2- Whether the Referee Court was competent to adjudicate on the issue of limitation. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Limitation Period: The court held that the reference was filed almost 12 years after the award, far exceeding the maximum six-month limitation period prescribed under Section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. NHA failed to provide any valid reason or explanation for such a long delay. --Jurisdiction of the Referee Court: The court affirmed that the Referee Court had the authority to determine whether the reference was time-barred. The Referee Court acted within its jurisdiction in dismissing the reference based on the limitation issue. The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Referee Court and ruling that the reference was barred by time. -----Citations/Precedents: Nazar Muhammad Khan v. Collector (NLR 1980 Revenue Lahore 36) Govt. of West Pakistan v. Land Acquisition Collector (PLD 1979 Lahore 54) The Addl. Chief Secretary v. Assistant Commissioner and Others (1993 MLD 635) Land Acquisition Collector & Others v. Mst. Fareena Shaukat & Others (2005 MLD 1530) Ghulam Muhammad v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1967 SC 191) Atta Muhammad v. Assistant Commissioner (PLD 1961 BJ 69) Province of Punjab v. Sher Muhammad & Another (PLD 1983 Lahore 578) Muhammad Afzal & Others v. Government of Sindh (1993 MLD 414) Port Qasim Authority v. Executive District Officer (Revenue) Karachi & Others (2017 YLR Note 14) Abdul Malik & Others v. Province of Punjab & Others (2019 MLD 39)

Summary: Background: The appellant filed an execution petition seeking enforcement of a judgment and decree passed by the Modaraba Tribunal in 2009. The decree had been challenged by the respondents in an appeal before the Lahore High Court, but no stay order was granted. After the appeal was dismissed in 2015, the appellant filed the execution petition, which was dismissed by the Banking Court as being time-barred. The appellant challenged this dismissal, arguing that the limitation period for filing the execution petition started when the appeal was dismissed. -----Issues: 1- Whether the execution petition was filed within the limitation period as per Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908. -----2- Whether the appeal filed by the respondents continued the proceedings of the suit, thus delaying the start of the limitation period for filing the execution petition. -----3- Whether the rule of merger applied to the case, such that the limitation period commenced only after the dismissal of the appeal. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Limitation Period for Filing Execution Petition: The court held that the execution petition was time-barred. It reasoned that no stay order was issued by the appellate court, and thus the decree passed by the Modaraba Tribunal could have been executed immediately after it was issued in 2009. The mere filing of an appeal does not stay the execution of the decree unless a specific stay order is granted, as per Order XLI Rule 5 CPC. --Continuity of the Suit in Appeal: The court rejected the appellant's argument that the appeal continued the suit, thus delaying the limitation period for execution. It emphasized that the decree was executable from the day it was issued unless stayed by the court, which did not happen in this case. --Rule of Merger: The court also addressed the rule of merger, which states that a lower court’s decree merges into the appellate court’s decree. However, it noted that the appellant sought execution of the decree issued by the Tribunal, not the decree issued by the appellate court. Even if the rule of merger applied, the appellant did not seek to execute the appellate decree, making the execution petition non-maintainable. As a result, the court upheld the Banking Court's decision and dismissed the appeal, finding the execution petition was not filed within the prescribed time limit. -----Citations/Precedents: Maulvi Abdul Qayyum v. Syed Ali Asghar Shah and 5 others (1992 SCMR 241) Muhammad Nazir and another v. Qaiser Ali Khan and 4 others (2003 SCMR 436) Bakhtiar Ahmed v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others (2013 SCMR 5)

Summary: Background: The plaintiff filed a suit seeking specific performance and permanent injunction regarding a property transaction involving Plot No. 5-C, Itehad Lane-7, Phase-6, DHA, Karachi. The property was originally allotted to Mr. A.M. Qureshi and, after his death, his legal heirs entered into a sale transaction with the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed to have received a General Power of Attorney (GPA) from the legal heirs to act on their behalf. The plaintiff later sold the property to another party but faced issues in getting the property mutated in the records. The defendants sought rejection of the plaint, arguing that the suit was barred by limitation and the GPA was unregistered and thus unenforceable. ----Issues: 1- Whether the suit is barred by limitation. 2- Whether the purported General Power of Attorney (GPA) constitutes a contract for which specific performance can be sought. 3- Whether the purported GPA is coupled with interest as required under the law. 4- Whether the GPA stands revoked by the death of the executants/principals. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Limitation: The suit is barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which provides a three-year period for filing a suit for specific performance from the date fixed for performance or from the date when performance is refused. The purported GPA was executed on 18.04.1988, and the suit was filed on 26.03.2021, a lapse of approximately thirty-three years. Even considering other potential dates of refusal mentioned in the case, the suit is time-barred. ---GPA as a Contract: A power of attorney is a written authorization by which the principal assigns authority to an agent to act on their behalf. It is not a contract and does not confer any right, title, or interest in the property. The GPA in this case did not constitute a contract for which specific performance could be sought. ---GPA Coupled with Interest: The GPA was neither registered nor sufficiently stamped as required by law for an instrument given for consideration. The GPA did not create any legal authority to transfer or alienate the suit property and was not coupled with interest. ---Revocation of GPA by Death: The GPA stands terminated by the death of the executants/principals as per Section 201 of the Contract Act, 1872. The GPA was not coupled with interest, and the death of the executants/principals resulted in its revocation. ----Citations/Precedents: Imam Din v. Bashir Ahmed [PLD 2005 SC 418] Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited v. State of Haryana & Anr. [AIR 2012 SC 206] State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nehata [2005] Zafarul Islam v. Mrs. Azra Malik [PLD 1991 Karachi 377] Ilyas Ahmed v. Muhammad Munir and 10 others [PLD 2012 Sindh 92]

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: ----Arts. 85, 78 Registered Sale Deed—Proof of execution—Burden of proof—Fraud—Undue influence—Obligations of the beneficiary of a registered document. The dispute arose between a father (plaintiff) and son (defendant) over the ownership of a house allegedly transferred via a registered Sale Deed (Exh.D1). The plaintiff asserted that his signatures on blank papers were deceitfully procured, and no sale transaction or consideration ever took place. While the defendant claimed the sale was genuine, he failed to provide essential details regarding the transaction, including time, venue, and witnesses. Despite examining marginal witnesses, no evidence was produced to establish the actual sale transaction or payment of consideration. The Stamp Vendor, Deed Writer, and Sub-Registrar, who could have validated the Sale Deed, were deliberately withheld. The burden of proving the due execution of a contested registered document, especially when fraud is alleged, lies with the beneficiary. In cases involving aged and vulnerable individuals, heightened scrutiny and convincing evidence are required to establish a valid transaction. The defendant failed to meet this burden, and the Sale Deed was declared fraudulent and void. ----Cited Cases: Sh. Muhammad Sarif Uppal v. Sh. Akbar Hussain and others (PLD 1990 Lahore 229) Siraj Din v. Mst. Jameelan and another (PLD 1997 Lahore 633) Muhammad Tufail v. Abdul Aziz through legal heirs (PLD 1998 Lahore 137) Abdul Majeed and 6 others v. Muhammad Subhan and 2 others (1999 SCMR 1245) Noor Begum v. Abdul Ghaffar (2003 YLR 1494) Abdul Ghafoor and others v. Mukhtar Ahmed Khan and others (2006 SCMR 1144) (b) Contract Act, 1872: ----S. 16 Undue influence—Old age—Absence of independent advice—Burden of proof on the beneficiary. Where a transaction involves an elderly and vulnerable party, and there is an absence of independent advice at the time of execution, the burden of proof shifts to the beneficiary to establish the validity of the transaction. Undue influence is presumed where one party holds a dominating position over the other, especially in familial relationships involving aged individuals. The defendant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff fully understood the implications of the Sale Deed, nor was there evidence to refute claims of undue influence. ----Cited Case: Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum and others (PLD 1975 SC 624) (c) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Fraudulent document—Effect on limitation—Time-barred suit. Fraudulent documents cannot gain legal sanctity merely by invoking the bar of limitation. Fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings, and no lapse of time can validate a forged or fictitious document. In such cases, the law of limitation cannot act as a shield to perpetuate fraud. ----Cited Cases: Khair Din v. Mst. Salaman and others (PLD 2002 SC 677) Rehmatullah and others v. Saleh Khan and others (2007 SCMR 729) Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others (2011 SCMR 986) Ghulam Farid and another v. Sher Rehman through LRs (2016 SCMR 862) Al-Meezan Investment Management Company Ltd. and 2 others v. Wapda First Sukuk Company Limited, Lahore and others (PLD 2017 SC 1) (d) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908): ----S. 115 Revisional jurisdiction—Findings of Appellate Court—Preference over Trial Court—Scope of interference. When findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court conflict, the judgment of the Appellate Court is given preference unless it is shown to suffer from jurisdictional defects, misreading, or non-reading of evidence. In this case, the Appellate Court's findings were consistent with the evidence and legal principles, leaving no room for interference in revisional jurisdiction. ----Cited Cases: Madan Gopal and 4 others v. Maran Bepari and 3 others (PLD 1969 SC 617) Muhammad Nawaz through LRs v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through LRs and others (2013 SCMR 1300) Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asya Kausar and 2 others (2015 SCMR 1) ----Disposition: The Civil Revision was dismissed. The findings of the Appellate Court were upheld, and the Sale Deed (Exh.D1) was declared fraudulent and void.

Summary: ''Time-barred case--Petitioners could not complete their course and passed their exam of eight semesters within requisite time with additional four semester (two years)--Petitioners submitted their form for repeating in failed subjects, as time barred case--Student of an institution cannot be allowed to set up case on ground of unawareness of law because ignorance of law is of no excuse at all--A plea of ignorance of law could not be construed or sustained as a bona fide excuse--When a thing is required to be done in particular mode and procedure, same must be done in that mode and manner, and not otherwise--Petitioners have not been able to point out any violation of their rights or statute or regulations rather they have admitted at bar that they remained unable to complete their studies for award of degree--Petition dismissed.''---- Quote ''In accordance with the statute of the university, the petitioners were required to complete their course within the period commencing from 2013-17, however, in case of any shortcoming further 02 years could be granted to them but in no way, one could be allowed to avail more than 12 semesters. It is indisputable that the petitioners could not complete their course and passed their exam of eight semesters within the requisite time i.e., batch of 2013-17 with additional four semester (two years) for 2018-19. The regulations provided sufficient time for completion of course earlier within the period, for which they were admitted but in case of failure further period of four semester (two years) were provided for completion of course but even then the petitioner could not clear their course. The petitioners cannot allege estoppel against the college administration or university firstly, it is settled law that there can be no estoppel against law. ''

Summary: (Civil Revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908)Held: (i) Law of limitation is a harsh law and the Court cannot award any relaxation in this regard unless provided by the statute. The passage of time set the law of limitation in operation.(ii) Fraud and forgery must be proved by producing unimpeachable, impartial and confidence inspiring evidence. Mere allegations in the pleadings cannot partake proof required under the law.(iii) The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that both the mutations did not contain the thumb impressions of the ladies is based on misconception as requirement of vendor or donor to sign or thumb impress the mutation was introduced by the Land Revenue Act, 1967, and a vendor/donor was not required to sign or thumb impress the mutation during the decade of 1950.(iv) In both the mutations, despite two different names, legacy of Chiragh was devolved upon one and a single lady, therefore, it is an established fact that Ghulam Zainab and Allah Wasai were two names of the same lady.(v) Authenticity and validity of mutation No.2832 could not be rebutted by plaintiffs particularly when they themselves are beneficiaries through said mutation as well as subsequent mutation No.2866.(Petition was dismissed in the circumstances).

Summary: The case revolves around Haji Muhammad Yunis and his wife, Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar, who initially lived in South Africa and later settled in the United Kingdom. The couple purchased a house in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on a 4-kanal and 7-marla land. The property was bought from Mst. Suriyya Ashraf in 1989. After Mst. Ashraf's demise, her legal heirs, including Mst. Farukh Sultan and Syed Faisal Shah, contested the ownership of the property. Mst. Farukh Sultan, one of the legal heirs of Mst. Suriyya Ashraf, filed a suit seeking a declaration that she and her siblings were the co-owners of the property. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but Mst. Sultan appealed the decision. Eventually, the High Court reversed the previous judgments, decreeing in favor of Mst. Sultan. Civil Appeals No. 152 and 153 of 2019 were filed by the appellants as a result. In parallel to the civil appeals, Haji Muhammad Yunis and Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar filed a complaint against Syed Faisal Shah under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005, accusing him of illegally occupying the property. The trial court temporarily halted the proceedings until the civil suit was decided. After the civil suit's conclusion, the trial court resumed the proceedings, leading to a series of legal battles between the parties. The High Court eventually dismissed the appellants' complaint, which prompted them to file Civil Petition No. 472 of 2019. During the case, the appellants raised concerns regarding the conduct of Syed Faisal Shah. They accused him of introducing a fictitious attorney, misrepresenting the death of Haji Muhammad Yunis, and filing a written statement on behalf of the appellants through the fictitious attorney. Additionally, it was alleged that Shah had obtained a sale mutation for half of the property through the same fabricated attorney. These claims were substantiated when the appellants appeared before the trial court to expose the fraud. The Supreme Court meticulously evaluated the facts presented and the arguments put forth by all parties involved. They considered the authenticity of the sale mutation, the legal rights of the legal heirs, and the conduct of Syed Faisal Shah. The court notes that during the trial proceedings, the appellants (Haji Muhammad Yunis and Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar) appeared in person and exposed the fraud committed by Syed Faisal Shah regarding the fictitious attorney and the misrepresentation of the death. However, despite this exposure, Syed Faisal Shah proceeded with obtaining half of the suit property through the fictitious attorney.The court also addresses the issue of limitation, stating that the suit filed by Mst. Farukh Sultan (respondent No.1/plaintiff) was time-barred, as it was filed beyond the prescribed period. The court finds that Mst. Farukh Sultan failed to discharge the initial burden of rebutting the legal presumptions of regularity and truth attached to the sale mutation and the revenue entries, which favored the appellants.The High Court's judgment, which favored Syed Faisal Shah, is reversed by the appellate court, restoring the concurrent judgments of the trial court and appellate court.Finally, the judgment calls for affirmative actions to address the grievances of overseas Pakistanis in pursuing their legal rights in courts, as they face disadvantages due to their absence from the country.The court also examined the judgments of the trial court and the appellate court, which were reversed by the High Court. The supreme court after thorough analysis, allowed the appeal and restored the judgement by the trial court.