Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: (a) Companies Act, 2017 (XIX of 2017): ----S. 132---- Obligation to convene Annual General Meeting (AGM) within 120 days—Delay in holding AGM—Imposition of penalty—Appellant failed to convene AGM for financial year ended June 30, 2018, despite multiple extensions granted by SECP—Appellant argued delay was caused by Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) not approving final revenue requirement (FRR) on time—Held, Section 132 of the Act overrides OGRA Ordinance, 2002, as the latter does not contain any provisions regarding AGMs—Delay in submitting FRR petition to OGRA reflected negligence on part of the Appellant—Penalty of PKR 150,000 upheld. (b) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 (XLII of 1997): ----S. 33---- Appeal against imposition of penalty—Failure to convene AGM—Appellant contended that OGRA Ordinance, 2002, being a special law, supersedes the Companies Act, 2017—Held, no conflict exists between OGRA Ordinance and Section 132 of the Companies Act, 2017—Appellant’s failure to comply with statutory obligation under the Act constituted negligence—Appeal dismissed. (c) OGRA Ordinance, 2002 (XVII of 2002): ----S. 6(2), S. 8(2)---- Special law versus general law—Determination of FRR by OGRA—Appellant argued that OGRA’s authority over financial matters delayed the AGM—Held, OGRA Ordinance does not govern AGMs, and delay in FRR approval due to late submission by the Appellant cannot justify non-compliance with Section 132 of the Companies Act, 2017—Principle of special law prevailing over general law inapplicable—Companies Act, 2017, enacted later, overrides in case of any inconsistency. (d) Companies Act, 2017 (XIX of 2017): ----Ss. 4 & 505(1)(d)---- Overriding effect and application to companies governed by special enactments—Act applies to companies governed by special laws unless provisions conflict with the special enactment—No inconsistency found between Section 132 of the Act and OGRA Ordinance, 2002—Companies Act, 2017 holds overriding effect per Section 4. -----Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Impugned Order imposing a penalty of PKR 150,000 upheld. No order as to costs.

Summary: Background: Al-Baraka Bank (Pvt.) Ltd. filed an appeal seeking the release (superdari) of a vehicle seized by the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) in a narcotics case involving Mohammad Usman, who defaulted on a Musharakah Agreement with the bank. The vehicle, registered in Mohammad Usman’s name, was being held as case property in an ongoing trial. -----Issues: 1- Can a vehicle seized under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (CNSA) be released on superdari before being presented as case property in court? -----2- Does a financial institution with a lien on a vehicle, such as under a Musharakah Agreement, qualify as the "owner" eligible for superdari during a criminal trial? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Release on Superdari: The court found that under CNSA provisions, a vehicle cannot be released on superdari before being presented as evidence. Preserving the vehicle’s condition is crucial to the administration of justice, and releasing it prematurely could compromise its evidentiary value. --Bank’s Ownership Claim: The court held that the bank, as a lienholder rather than a registered owner, does not qualify as the "innocent owner" eligible for superdari. The purpose of repossession under a financial agreement is typically to enable sale for debt recovery, which is incompatible with the vehicle's legal status as case property during trial. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the trial court’s decision to retain the vehicle as case property pending trial. -----Citations/Precedents: Niazullah v. The State (2002 PCr.LJ 97) Abdul Hamid v. The State (2002 PCr.LJ 666) State v. Rashid (PLD 2003 Peshawar 87) Abdul Salam v. The State (2003 SCMR 246) Allah Ditta v. The State (2010 SCMR 1181) Amjad Ali Khan v. The State and others (PLD 2020 SC 299)

Summary: The petitioner planned to develop this land into a housing scheme named "Mubarak Town." However, issues arose when the local Patwari refused to issue Fard Malkiat necessary for plot sales, citing unpaid Capital Value Tax (CVT) on a general power of attorney from 2016 between respondents no. 4 and 5. The petitioner, not being a party to that power of attorney, contested the legal basis for this refusal through a writ petition. ----Issues: 1. Whether the notice to recover CVT from respondent no. 4 affects the petitioner's right to Fard Malkiat despite him not being involved in the original power of attorney transaction. 2. Whether the petitioner qualifies as an "aggrieved party" under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, enabling him to challenge the notice. ---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court determined that the petitioner qualifies as an "aggrieved party" because the refusal to issue Fard Malkiat directly impacts his property rights, even though the tax demand was originally against another party (respondent no. 4). It was ruled that the notice and subsequent refusal to issue Fard Malkiat were without lawful authority, thus granting the petitioner the right to have Fard Malkiat issued. The court also noted that respondents no. 1 to 3 are still free to pursue recovery of CVT as applicable, but not at the expense of the petitioner’s rights. ---Citations/Precedents: Civil Petition No.2926 of 2016 - Supreme Court upheld levy of CVT on power of attorney executed in favor of strangers. Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust and another (PLD 1969 SC 223) - Expanded the interpretation of "aggrieved person." Hafiz Hamdullah v. Saifullah Khan and others (PLD 2007 SC 52) - Defined "aggrieved person" as someone who has suffered a legal grievance due to wrongful action against his legal rights. Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Range and others (PLD 1978 SC 151) - Discussed the importance of clear and unambiguous language in statutes imposing financial obligations. Sub-Registrar (Rural), Tehsil and District Rawalpindi, etc. v. Muhammad Ilyas (C.P. No.2926 of 2016) - Discussed the application of CVT to power of attorney. Bisvil Spinners Ltd. v. Superintendent, Central Excise & Land Customs Circle, Sheikhupura and another (PLD 1988 SC 370) - Highlighted the need for strict construction in tax statutes.

Summary: Quashment of FIR, FIR No. 293/2023 dated 04.08.2023 U/s 420,468,471 PPC P.S. Secretariat, Islamabad

Summary: ''1. After introduction of new amendment in The CPC through The Act No. XLIX of 2020 namely The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2020 in a suit in which an amount or the value of the subject matter of the suit is below fifty (50) million, then such suit shall be filed in the Civil Court and in a suit where an amount or value of the subject matter of fifty (50) million or above is involved then such suit shall be filed in the Court of District Judge and the appeal thereof would lie to the District Judge where the Civil Judge has acted as a trial Court and to the High Court where the District Judge has acted as a trial Court.2. Before the amendment, the forum of appeal in a suit was to be determined by Section 18 of The West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 where a specific amount was to be notified by the High Court under Section 9 of the ibid Ordinance for the pecuniary limits of the District Court of appeal, however, since after The Amendment Act of 2020 the necessary amendment has been brought in section 96 of The CPC to specify the forum of appeal for any eventuality as described in the amended Section 6 of The CPC and no amendment has been brought in Section 18 of The West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 which were earlier regulated the forum of appeal but since amended Section 96 of The CPC is having a non abstante clause and is a statute later in time, therefore, the provision of Section 96 of The CPC would prevail over the provision of Section 18 of The West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 19623. Where the plaintiff/s himself/themselves has/have fixed a specific amount for the purpose of affixing the court fee and jurisdiction, however, such amount could be adjudged by the trial Court that as to whether the suit has properly been valued or not and if the trial Court is prima facie of the opinion that the suit has not been properly valued then it could fix an amount for such purpose and then it would be the amount determined by the trial Court which shall be taken into consideration for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction and the amount so mentioned by the plaintiff/s would be immaterial. '' ---- Procedural History:The Senior Civil Judge's decision to transfer the case due to jurisdictional concerns was challenged in revision and review petitions, which were dismissed. These dismissals led to the filing of the instant writ petitions.Issues:Whether the Senior Civil Judge, Abbottabad or the Additional District Judge-VI, Abbottabad has the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the case.Holdings:The Peshawar High Court dismissed the writ petitions, affirming that the Additional District Judge-VI, Abbottabad has the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case based on the pecuniary value involved.Legal Reasoning:The court analyzed the legal framework concerning the pecuniary jurisdiction of civil courts, specifically the amendments made to the Code of Civil Procedure by The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2020. The amendments clearly delineated the pecuniary jurisdictions of Civil Judges and District Judges, establishing that suits involving amounts or values below fifty million rupees fall under the jurisdiction of Civil Judges, while those involving amounts or values of fifty million rupees or above fall under the jurisdiction of District Judges. Given the claims in the plaint exceeded fifty million rupees, the court found the case properly belonged before the Additional District Judge-VI, Abbottabad.

Summary: Issue:Whether the respondent is entitled to dower as decreed by the lower courts, considering the marriage was dissolved without consummation or valid retirement.---- Judgment:The petition was allowed. The High Court set aside the lower courts' decisions, holding that the respondent was not entitled to any dower. The suit for recovery of dower filed by the respondent was dismissed.---- Reasoning:The Court noted the established facts of non-consummation of marriage and dissolution via decree under section 10(4)(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The Court relied on Islamic law principles and precedents, including "Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique" (PLD 2007 SC 45) and "Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another" (2023 SCMR 246), to conclude that since the marriage was dissolved at the respondent's instance without consummation or valid retirement, she was not entitled to any dower. The Court also highlighted that the petitioner did not pronounce divorce, and the dissolution was through a court decree on the basis of Khula.---- Precedents Cited:"Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique" (PLD 2007 SC 45)"Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another" (2023 SCMR 246)Principles of Muhammadan Law by D.F. MullaAnglo-Muhammadan Law by Sir Roland Knyvet Wilson---- Legal Principles:Judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution is limited to instances of misreading or non-reading of evidence leading to miscarriage of justice.---- Dower entitlement is governed by consummation of marriage or valid retirement, with specific conditions applied when divorce is pronounced by the husband.--- In cases of dissolution by Khula without consummation or valid retirement, the wife is not entitled to any dower.This case underscores the application of Islamic law principles in determining dower rights, particularly in the context of non-consummated marriages dissolved at the wife's instance. The High Court's reliance on established precedents and Islamic jurisprudence illustrates the integration of religious law within Pakistan's legal framework.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Companies Act, 2017: ----Section 132; Obligation to hold Annual General Meetings (AGMs)---Failure to convene AGM within the statutory period---Appellant failed to hold AGM within 120 days of the financial year-end as required by Section 132 of the Act, despite multiple extensions granted by the SECP---Claimed delays in obtaining approval of Final Revenue Requirement (FRR) from OGRA---Bench rejected the excuse, noting that the appellant submitted its FRR petition to OGRA with delay, reflecting negligence on its part. (b) OGRA Ordinance, 2002: ----Sections 6(2) and 8(2); Applicability in relation to AGMs---Appellant argued that the OGRA Ordinance, as a special law, overrides the Companies Act---Bench held that there was no conflict between the OGRA Ordinance and Section 132 of the Act---Section 505(1)(d) of the Act specifies that the Act applies unless inconsistent with special enactments, which was not the case here---Act's overriding effect affirmed under Section 4. (c) Legal Principles: ----Conflict between special and general laws---Bench reaffirmed the principle that, in the absence of inconsistency, later enactments prevail over earlier ones---Companies Act, 2017, as the later enactment, held to have overriding authority in matters concerning AGMs. (d) Corporate Governance: ----Statutory compliance by listed companies---Bench emphasized the obligation of listed companies to adhere strictly to statutory timelines for AGMs under the Act, irrespective of external factors such as regulatory delays. -----Disposition: Appeal dismissed; impugned order upheld with no order as to costs.

Summary: The petitioners, failing to show that application for allocation of specific symbols was filed within time before the last date of its allocation, were not entitled to any relief.