Summary: Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----S.140(3)---Election Tribunal, appointment of---Consultative process---Scope---Petitioner / candidate was aggrieved of refusal of Election Commission to appoint Judges of High Court so nominated by Chief Justice of High Court to act as Election Tribunals---Validity---Provision of S. 140(3) of Elections Act, 2017 refers to a stage prior to appointment of Election Tribunals by Election Commission---Such stage contemplates appointment of a sitting Judge as Election Tribunal in consultation with Chief Justice of High Court concerned---Consultative process has to precede appointment to be made by Election Commission---Election Commission is not tasked with determining their fitness and suitability and has no power at all to pick and choose Judges out of a panel which suits its cause---Such act of Election Commission is not only offensive but strikes at the concept of judicial integrity and comity---In matters of appointment of Election Tribunals under S. 140 of Elections Act, 2017 the opinion of Chief Justice of a High Court had pre-eminence over a contrary view of Election Commission, which was bound to appoint Judges nominated by the Chief Justice---High Court set aside notification issued by Election Commission assigning areas of jurisdiction to Election Tribunals---Territorial jurisdiction and areas to be assigned was exclusive domain of Chief Justice of a High Court---High Court declared letter issued by Election Commission requiring Chief Justice of High Court to provide panel of Judges to Election Commission for their appointment as Election Tribunals, as unlawful and beyond its powers---High Court also set-aside notification issued by Election Commission assigning territorial jurisdictions of Election Tribunals---Election Commission was under obligation to appoint as Election Tribunals all Judges of High Court who were nominated by Chief Justice unless the Chief Justice would withdraw any name or substitute it---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Gul Taiz Khan Marwat v. The Registrar, Peshawar High Court PLD 2021 SC 391; Al-Jehad Trust through Raeesul Mujahideen Habib-ul-Wahab-ul-Khairi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 324; Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts by Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner; Shapiro v. United States 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948); [1870] L.R. 5 Ch. App. 703 and Sh. Ria ul Haq and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and others PLD 2013 SC 501 rel. Sameer Khosa and Ms. Momal Malik for Petitioners. Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G. for Respondent. Sikandar Bashir Mahmood for Respondent-ECP with Khurram Shahzad, Addl. D.G. Law, Haroon Kasi, Director (Law), Ms. Bushra Rasheed, Deputy Director (Law) and Imran Arif Ranjha, Legal Advisor for ECP. Date of hearing: 27th May, 2024.

Summary: Interim order--- ----Modification of---Scope---Appellant assailed an interim order which essentially had modified earlier ad-interim orders in previous civil suits passed by Trial Court (Single Bench of High Court) ('modified impugned order')---Case of the appellant was that there were some bunch of cases of like nature and earlier ad interim orders were being observed in two suits, however, when all said suits were clubbed together, the ad interim order in latest suit passed on CMA was modified---Claim being that it could not have been done unless the office had fixed the application on that day---Validity---Appellant may be right in understanding that the earlier ad interim orders passed in the referred suits and the one modified in one of those suits have overlapped each other but there is no dispute that these were only interim/ad-interim orders---Present appeal was only against a modified impugned order which was of interim nature, which might have overlapped the earlier one in another similar nature suit clubbed together---Appeals against ad-interim/interim orders are not to be entertained unless exceptional circumstances and serious injustice is shown---Grievances of appellant could be remedied once the application is heard and decided finally---The suit is ripe for hearing only when the issues are framed and not otherwise---In the present case, the consideration is totally different; it was only an ad-interim order which was modified and is still an interim order---If an ad-interim order could be granted after hearing a counsel, it can always be modified if the circumstances require so, subject to final conclusion to be drawn after hearing---Since it is only an interim order, the appellant / counsel may assist the Trial Court (Single Bench of High Court ) in reaching to a just and lawful conclusion and seek disposal of the pending application as required under the law---Appeal was disposed of accordingly. Qazi Muhammad Tariq v. Hasin Jahan and 3 others 1993 SCMR 1949 and Karachi Fisheries Harbour Authority v. Messrs Hussain (Pvt) Ltd. 2016 MLD 1037 distinguished. Rajesh Kumar Khagija along with Sandeep Kumar for Appellant. Muahammad Humayon Khan for Respondent No. 4 along with Munir Khan. Arshad Hussain Lodhi for Respondent No. 5. Abdul Jaleel Zebedi, Additional Advocate General.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Acquittal granted ----- On September 10, 2020, at approximately 11:30 a.m., a contingent of Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) officials intercepted a public transport vehicle at Exit-M1, Islamabad, Motorway link road. Rawaiz Khan, the appellant, was driving the vehicle, while a co-accused, acting as the cleaner, was also on board. During the search, 1200 grams of charas was discovered on the dashboard. The appellant was convicted by the Special Court (CNS) for trafficking and sentenced to 4 years and 6 months in prison with a fine of Rs. 50,000. He challenged his conviction in this appeal. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Possession and Knowledge of Narcotics: Did the appellant have conscious possession and knowledge of the charas found in the vehicle? ------ 2) Evidentiary Sufficiency: Was the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt? ------ 3) Burden of Proof: Does the prosecution have the burden to prove the driver’s knowledge and intent, and if so, was it met? ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome Possession and Knowledge: The court held that since the charas was not in the exclusive physical possession of the appellant and was instead lying openly on the dashboard, which could have been accessed by passengers, the appellant’s conscious possession was not established. ------ Evidentiary Sufficiency: The court found that there was no incriminating evidence connecting the appellant directly to the narcotics, especially given the presence of 19 passengers on board. The court emphasized that the substance was not recovered from a hidden cavity or the appellant’s personal effects, undermining the prosecution's claims. ------ Burden of Proof: The court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was knowingly in possession of the contraband. As such, the court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellant and acquitted him. ------ Citations/Precedents: Malik Feroz Khan Noon vs. The State (PLD 1958 SC 333) Mian Jamal Shah vs. Member Election Commission (PLD 1966 SC 01) Gul Tez Khan Marwat vs. Registrar Peshawar High Court (PLD 2021 SC 391) Muhammad Saleem vs. Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division (PLD 1976 Lahore 1233) Federal Government of Pakistan vs. Mst. Zakia Begum (PLD 2023 SC 277) Land Acquisition Collector vs. Mst. Surraya Mehmood Jan (2015 SCMR 28) Suo Moto Case No.13 of 2009 (PLD 2011 SC 619) Noman Ahmed vs. Capital Development Authority (PLD 2021 Islamabad 75) Syed Azam Shah vs. Federation of Pakistan (2022 SCMR 201) Shams ur Rehman vs. Military Accountant General (2020 SCMR 188)

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Background: This case involves the appeal by the Government of Pakistan and the Ministry of Defence against the judgment of the Senior Civil Judge-1, Kasur, which partially accepted the Reference Applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, filed by the landowners. The landowners sought enhanced compensation for the land acquired by the government for shifting the Ammunition Depot from Thokar Niaz Baig to Wan Khara. The Referee Court set the compensation at Rs.15,00,000/- per acre for on-road land and Rs.11,00,000/- per acre for off-road land, with additional charges and interest. Both the government and the landowners appealed the decision, with the former seeking to restore the original award and the latter seeking further enhancement. ----Issues: 1- Whether the compensation determined by the Land Acquisition Collector (LAC) was adequate and whether the enhancement by the Referee Court was justified. 2- Whether the land should be valued as industrial, commercial, or agricultural. 3- Whether the Referee Court followed the legal parameters in Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 4- Whether the documentary evidence presented was properly considered. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Issue No.1: Adequacy of Compensation The Referee Court determined that the compensation awarded by the LAC was inadequate. Evidence showed higher market values for similar lands, and the court considered the delay in acquisition proceedings and the price escalation during that period. The Referee Court’s enhancement to Rs.15,00,000/- per acre for on-road land and Rs.11,00,000/- per acre for off-road land was found justified based on the provided evidence. ---Issue No.2: Nature of Land The land was classified by the Referee Court as industrial, considering its potential value and proximity to infrastructure projects like Balloki Power Plant. The court rejected the government’s claim that the land was agricultural and not close to major roads or developments. ---Issue No.3: Legal Parameters in Sections 23 and 24 The Referee Court properly applied the criteria in Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. These sections outline factors such as market value, the purpose of acquisition, and the time taken for acquisition, all of which were duly considered. ---Issue No.4: Documentary Evidence The Referee Court carefully considered the documentary evidence, including mutations and sale deeds that indicated higher land values than those initially assessed by the LAC. Objections to the documentary evidence by the appellants were not substantiated with credible counter-evidence. ----Citations/Precedents: Federation of Pakistan v. Ghulam Mustafa (RFA No.74504 of 2019): Addressed the importance of documentary evidence in determining fair compensation. Muhammad Ramzan & Others v. Govt. of Pakistan: Confirmed the necessity of considering the potential value and market trends in land acquisition cases.

Summary: Bail granted ---- the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the purpose of Juvenile Justice System Act was rehabilitation not punishment and was designed to consider the best interest of the child.; the court held that the a juvenile who commits heinous crimes was still entitled to bail if it was filed on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of his trial Background --- Petitioner was charged with offenses under Sections 302, 324, 392, 427, 201, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013. Petitioner and co-accused allegedly fired upon the complainant and the deceased, resulting in death of Shafiq Ur Rehman. Petitioner was arrested on February 23, 2023, and declared a juvenile by the trial court, which determined his age to be 14 years and 5 months at the time of the offense. ----Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner, a juvenile accused of committing a heinous offense, is entitled to post-arrest bail on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of his trial. 2. Whether the delay in the trial's conclusion was attributable to the petitioner. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail due to the delay in the conclusion of his trial. The Court reasoned that: The juvenile justice system emphasizes rehabilitation over punishment, especially for juveniles, and is designed to consider the best interest of the child. The 2018 Juvenile Justice System Act provides that a juvenile detained for a continuous period exceeding six months without trial conclusion is entitled to bail unless the delay is caused by the juvenile or their representative. The High Court erred in attributing the delay to the petitioner for filing an application to determine his age, which is an essential procedural step. The delay caused by the frequent absence of co-accused cannot be attributed to the petitioner. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and granted bail to the petitioner, subject to furnishing a bail bond. ----Citations/Precedents: Kathleen Daly, ‘Restorative versus Retributive Justice’ (2002) 4(1) Punishment and Society Sage Publications 55. Anees Jillani, Cries Unheard: Juvenile Justice in Pakistan, Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (1999). Article 3, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Cox, S.M., Conrad, J. J., and Allen, J. M., Juvenile Justice: A guide to theory and practice, McGraw-Hill Humanities, Social Sciences and World Languages (2003). Pakistan ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on 12 November 1990 which provided broader guidelines for the promotion and protection of child rights. David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1(1) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 220-236. Patrick H. Tolan and Jennifer A. Titus, ‘Therapeutic jurisprudence in juvenile justice’ in G.S. Goodman, Children as victims, witnesses, and offenders: Psychological science and the law, New York: Guilford Press, p. 313-333. Khawar Kayani v. State PLD 2022 SC 551. Saleem Khan v. State, PLD 2020 SC 356; See also Section 7, The Rights of the Child, International Human Rights and the Criminal Justice System in Pakistan, Benchbook, Justice Project Pakistan. Himesh Khan v. NAB 2015 SCMR 1092. Khursheed Shah v. State PLD 2022 SC 261. Saleem Khan v. State PLD 2020 SC 356.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, seeks an order for his sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently, which were awarded in two different trials. He was convicted and sentenced to death in two separate cases: FIR No. 72 dated 26.06.2005 under Section 302 PPC and FIR No. 145 dated 30.09.2006 under Sections 302 and 34 PPC, both from the P.S. Jand, Attock. The death sentence in FIR No. 72 was converted to life imprisonment by the Lahore High Court, while the death sentence in FIR No. 145 was confirmed by the Lahore High Court but later converted to life imprisonment by the Supreme Court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the sentences of imprisonment awarded in two different trials should run concurrently or consecutively. 2- Whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which allows for the concurrent running of sentences. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Concurrent Running of Sentences: The court held that Section 397 Cr.P.C. provides the discretion to direct that subsequent sentences run concurrently with previous sentences. This discretion should be exercised judiciously, especially in cases of hardship, to avoid unnecessary and prolonged imprisonment. Benefit of Section 397 Cr.P.C.: The court emphasized that Section 397 Cr.P.C. allows the court to order that the sentences run concurrently, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. Denying this benefit would amount to unjust treatment and defeat the legislative intent behind this provision. The petition was allowed, and the court directed that the sentences of life imprisonment awarded to Sher Afzal in both cases (FIR No. 72 dated 26.06.2005 and FIR No. 145 dated 30.09.2006) shall run concurrently. Additionally, the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. (regarding the period of detention to be counted towards the sentence) was also granted to the petitioner. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 397 Cr.P.C.: Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence. 2018 SCMR 418 “Rahib Ali v. The State”: Emphasized the court's discretion under Section 397 Cr.P.C. Section 561-A Cr.P.C.: Inherent powers of the court to ensure justice. ----Quote: Sentences of the appellant in different cases shall run concurrently.

Summary: Liaquat Ali appealed against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Vehari, which decreed a suit for the recovery of Rs.1,100,000 based on a cheque issued by him to Noor Ahmad. The cheque in question was torn and mutilated, and the trial centered on whether such a condition of the cheque could undermine the presumption of its correctness under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. ---Issues: 1. Whether a mutilated cheque can form the basis of a recovery suit and if the presumption of correctness applies to such a cheque. 2. Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in their findings by not specifically addressing the mutilated condition of the cheque in their judgments. 3. The credibility of the appellant's claim that the cheque was given as a guarantee to arbitrators and was subsequently misused by the respondent post-arbitration. ---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court held that the suit does lie on the basis of a mutilated cheque, and such a condition does not inherently affect the presumption of correctness unless crucial information on the cheque is damaged. In this case, despite the cheque being torn, essential details like the payee’s name, amount, and date were intact, preserving the presumption of correctness. The court also found inconsistencies in the appellant’s narrative regarding the circumstances under which the cheque was torn and noted a lack of credible evidence to support his claims. As a result, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the original decree for the recovery of the disputed amount. ---Citations/Precedents: Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 118. Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Legal maxim: “Allegans Contraria Non Est Audiendus” (A person who alleges contradictory things is not to be heard), applied in assessing the credibility of the appellant's claims.