Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 100—Second appeal—Concurrent findings—Scope and interference— High Court, in second appeal, is limited to substantial questions of law and cannot reassess evidence to reach different conclusions unless findings are based on misreading, non-reading of evidence, or are perverse—In present case, concurrent findings of trial and appellate courts were held to be reasoned and well-founded on evidence—Second appeal dismissed as no substantial legal error was demonstrated—Relied on Muzafar Iqbal v. Mst. Riffat Parveen, PLD 2003 SC 676, and PLD 2017 SC 730. (b) Civil Law ----Title and ownership—Conflict in plot number and boundaries—Interpretation of instruments— Dispute involved rival claims over Plot No. 74/C in a housing society—Respondent No.1’s title traced to registered deeds from 1985 and 1987, with the schedule clearly describing Plot No. 74/C—Appellant claimed same plot via deed dated 1999—Held, in case of discrepancy in plot number, boundaries mentioned in registered documents prevail—Courts below correctly relied on boundary-based identification to uphold Respondent No.1’s title—Subsequent alienation in favour of appellant held void—Possession and title declared in favour of Respondent No.1. (c) Evidence Act, 1872 ----Registered documents—Evidentiary value—Where documents clearly identify property via boundaries, clerical error in number does not vitiate title—Mutation entry in appellant’s name rightly cancelled by revenue authorities and not interfered with by Board of Revenue. (d) Civil Law ----Remand—Additional issues—Effect—Upon remand, trial court correctly framed additional issues regarding authenticity of lease deeds and availability of plot for resale—Evidence led supported plaintiff’s case—Reliefs for declaration, possession and cancellation rightly granted. Disposition: Appeal dismissed—No substantial question of law involved—Concurrent findings upheld—Title and possession declared in favour of Respondent No.1—No order as to costs.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 173(1)(b)---Police Rules, 1934, R. 25.57---Final report---Notice to complainant before accepting cancellation report by Magistrate---Scope and requirements. Under S.173(1)(b), Cr.P.C., and Rule 25.57 of the Police Rules, 1934, the investigating officer is bound to inform the complainant about the final outcome of an investigation, including case cancellation. If the complainant is not present at the time of preparing the final report, notice must be given in writing, and such communication must be documented in the report. The Magistrate must ensure compliance with these provisions before agreeing to a case-cancellation report. If notice is not given, the Magistrate must issue such notice himself. In the present case, the Magistrate recorded that notice was issued, but the complainant failed to appear. However, the presumption of truth under Article 129(e) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, cannot conclusively apply in proceedings under S.173, Cr.P.C. ----Cited Cases: Bahadur and another v. The State (PLD 1985 SC 62) (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 173(1)---Police Rules, 1934, R. 24.7---Case-cancellation report---Scope and grounds for cancellation---Duty of Magistrate. Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934, outlines three grounds for case cancellation: (i) the offence is maliciously false or false owing to a mistake of law or fact, (ii) the matter is non-cognizable, or (iii) the matter pertains to a civil suit. While the Magistrate acts administratively when agreeing with a cancellation report, they must still ensure fairness, justice, and compliance with due process. Though the Magistrate is not obligated to provide detailed reasons for agreeing with a cancellation report, they must exercise this discretion judiciously and not treat the matter as routine. ----Cited Cases: Bahadur and another v. The State (PLD 1985 SC 62) (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Change of investigation---Scope---Pending application for change of investigation---Effect on cancellation report. When an application for change of investigation is filed, it must be processed through senior police officers who may direct the concerned investigator to seek permission from the Magistrate for reinvestigation. If the Magistrate refuses such permission and agrees with the cancellation report, it becomes final. However, the complainant retains the right to pursue private prosecution. ----Cited Cases: Wazir v. The State (PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lahore 405) Din Muhammad Shakir alias D.M. Shakir v. D.S.P., Ichhra, Lahore (PLD 1977 Lahore 180) Mehdi Hussain Shah v. Malik Khizer Hayat Khan (1983 PCr.LJ 1601) Asghar Ali v. The State (1983 PCr.LJ 2187) (d) Administration of justice---Finality of cancellation report---Alternate remedy---Private complaint. When a Magistrate agrees with a case-cancellation report, the complainant is not left without remedy. The complainant may initiate private prosecution based on the same facts, and the same Magistrate is competent to entertain such a complaint. Acceptance of the cancellation report does not render the Magistrate functus officio. ----Cited Cases: Bahadur and another v. The State (PLD 1985 SC 62) ----Disposition: Writ petition disposed of with observations and directions.

Summary: NIRC Matter, Challenging the order of Full Bench NIRC.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the order dated January 9, 2024, by a Judicial Magistrate, which accepted the police case-cancellation report. The petitioner alleges deception by the respondents, leading to the registration of FIR No.1781/2023 under sections 420, 468, and 471 PPC at Police Station Ferozwala, District Sheikhupura. The petitioner claims he entered into an agreement to sell one acre of land, receiving partial payment, but later discovered that the agreement covered his entire land without his consent. The police recommended the case for cancellation, stating it was a civil dispute, which the Magistrate accepted without proper notice to the petitioner. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Magistrate erred in agreeing with the case-cancellation report without properly notifying the complainant/petitioner. 2- Whether the police and Magistrate followed the correct legal procedures in recommending and accepting the case-cancellation report. 3- Whether the petitioner has the option for change of investigation and subsequent legal remedies. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Issue No.1: Notice to the Complainant The court found that the Magistrate failed to ensure proper notice was given to the complainant before agreeing with the case-cancellation report. As per Section 173 of the Cr.P.C and Rule 25.57 of the Police Rules, 1934, the complainant must be informed of the investigation's outcome. The impugned order claimed the complainant did not appear, but the court noted this should not adversely affect the complainant's case. ---Issue No.2: Legal Procedures for Case-Cancellation The court examined the procedures under Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934, and found that the police followed the correct process in recommending the case for cancellation, identifying the matter as a civil dispute. The court also referenced the High Court Rules & Orders (1931), which outline the grounds for case cancellation. It was emphasized that the Magistrate acts administratively, not judicially, in agreeing with a cancellation report but must still ensure fairness and due process. ---Issue No.3: Change of Investigation and Legal Remedies The court acknowledged the petitioner's pending application for change of investigation. The police can consider such applications, and a senior officer can direct reinvestigation with the Magistrate's permission. If declined, the complainant can pursue alternate remedies, such as private prosecution, as highlighted in "BAHADUR AND ANOTHER Versus THE STATE AND ANOTHER" (PLD 1985 Supreme Court 62). -----Citations/Precedents: "BAHADUR AND ANOTHER Versus THE STATE AND ANOTHER" (PLD 1985 Supreme Court 62) "WAZIR Versus THE STATE" (PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lahore 405) "DIN MUHAMMAD SHAKIR alias D.M. SHAKIR versus D.S.P., ICHHRA, LAHORE" (PLD 1977 Lahore 180) "MEHDI HUSSAIN SHAH Versus Malik KHIZER HAYAT KHAN AND ANOTHER" (1983 P Cr. L J 1601) "ASGHAR ALI Versus THE STATE" (1983 P Cr. L J 2187) ----Quote: After cancellation of FIR, police can reinvestigate the case but with the permission of concerned Magistrate.

Summary: Bail granted --- Background: In the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the petitioners appealed against the Lahore High Court's denial of their pre-arrest bail concerning an FIR lodged for offenses under sections 420 (cheating), 468 (forgery for the purpose of cheating), and 471 (using as genuine a forged document) of the Pakistan Penal Code. The FIR alleged that the petitioners defrauded a complainant by converting a lease agreement into a sale deed without his consent. ---Issues: 1. Whether the delay in filing the FIR and the explanation provided were justifiable. 2. The authenticity of the transaction and the alleged forgery. 3. The applicability of pre-arrest bail given the circumstances and evidence presented. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court observed a significant delay of about five months in lodging the FIR, which was not satisfactorily explained by the complainant's counsel. Moreover, the matter of ownership and transaction validity was already under judicial review, with a status quo granted by a lower court. Citing precedents that emphasize the importance of individual liberty and the principle that it is preferable to err on the side of granting bail, the court converted the petitions into appeals, allowed them, and set aside the High Court's orders. The petitioners were granted bail upon furnishing bonds, with the Supreme Court clarifying that these observations were tentative and should not influence the trial's merits. ---Citations/Precedents: Chairman NAB [PLD 2022 SC 475]: Discussed the principle that granting bail is preferable to its refusal, as wrongful detention cannot be satisfactorily repaired even if the accused is later acquitted. Muhammad Nawaz alias Karo [2023 SCMR 734]: Reinforced the importance of liberty and cautioned against restricting it based merely on allegations.

Summary: The petitioner filed a series of legal challenges regarding employment benefits following dismissal from service. This included appeals and review petitions at various judicial levels, focusing here on a review petition against an administrative order that dismissed the petitioner's appeal related to the non-entertainability of a restoration application for a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal (CPLA). ----Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner's series of applications for restoration and the subsequent review petition are maintainable under any legal or constitutional provision. 2. The role of the court's administrative office in accepting or rejecting petitions not covered by constitutional or legal provisions. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court held that the review petition filed was neither maintainable nor entertainable under any constitutional or legal provision. The Court found that: The actions challenged were administrative rather than judicial in nature. The petitioner failed to cite any constitutional or legal provision that would allow a review of the administrative orders in question. The Court criticized the administrative office for accepting the review petition despite clear precedents that such actions should not be entertained. The petition was dismissed on the grounds that it did not fall within the scope of any constitutional or legal provision for review, categorizing it as "frivolous." ----Citations/Precedents: Fazal Muhammad v. State, PLD 1987 SC 273: Established that petitions outside the scope of the Constitution or rules are frivolous and should not be entertained. Qausain Faisal v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2022 SC 675: Highlighted the non-entertainability of frivolous petitions on the administrative side. Ahsan Abid v. Khusru Bakhtiar, PLD 2022 SC 712: Reinforced the responsibilities of the Registrar in not entertaining frivolous petitions.

Summary: Background: The case involved a dispute between an insurance company (petitioner) and an insured outlet owner (respondent No.3) regarding a burglary claim. The outlet, located on Talagang Road, Chakwal, insured under a Fire Policy by the petitioner, experienced a burglary on November 10, 2018. A surveyor, appointed by the petitioner and authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, confirmed the incident but noted discrepancies in the security requirements stipulated by the policy and the claimed amount. The surveyor's report eventually led to a significant reduction in the claimed amount. Following this, respondent No.3 filed a complaint with respondent No.2, which was decided on merits, leading to an appeal by the petitioner against the decision up to the President's office, which was also turned down. Consequently, the petitioner approached the Islamabad High Court challenging the jurisdiction and decisions of respondent No.2. ----Issues: 1. Did respondent No.2 have jurisdiction to decide on the matter involving disputed questions of fact? 2. Was there mal-administration by the petitioner that justified respondent No.2's intervention? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that: Disputed questions of fact inherent in the insurance claim necessitated adjudication by a judicial body capable of evidentiary review, specifically the Insurance Tribunal as per the Insurance Ordinance, 2000. Respondent No.2 lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter as the issues involved required detailed evidentiary proceedings, which are beyond the scope of the Insurance Ombudsman’s powers aimed primarily at addressing mal-administration. The nature of the dispute, centered around the factual correctness and entitlement under the insurance claim, could not be settled without formal evidence, making it inappropriate for resolution by the Insurance Ombudsman. The petition was allowed, and the decisions made by respondent No.2 were set aside. The complaint filed by respondent No.3 was dismissed, underscoring the necessity for such disputes to be resolved within the judicial system, specifically the Insurance Tribunal. ----Citations/Precedents: M/s Capital Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and 4 others (2013 CLD 1075) Atlas Insurance Limited Vs. Federal Insurance etc. (W.P. No.23312 of 2014) Shafaatullah Qureshi Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2001 Supreme Court 142) Regional Manager, Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Lahore and 3 others (2012 CLD 846) Judicial Review of Public Actions by Justice Fazal Karim (PLD 1975 SC 49) Mehram Ali etc. Vs. Federation of Pakistan etc. (PLD 1998 SC 1445) Dr. Zahid Javed Vs. Dr. Tahir Riaz Chaudhry etc. (PLD 2016 SC 637) Habib Bank Limited Vs. Federation of Pakistan etc. (2022 CLD 769) Shafaat Ullah Qureshi Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 142) Mst. Parveen Akhtar Vs. Subash Chandar and others (2016 MLD 1596) United Bank Limited through Manager Vs. Banking Mohtasib Pakistan and another (2006 CLD 1226)

Summary: Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)--- ----Ss. 2(12a) & 3(1)(d)---Federal Excise Rules, 2005, R.43A---“Franchise”---Federal Excise Duty, levy of---Shareholding between Independent Power Plant and its associated company---Bi-partite services contracts---Stance of the Department was that from Hub Power Company Limited (HPCL), an Independent Power Plant (IPP), the Federal Exercise Duty (FED) should be recovered, for tax years 2010 to 2013, on account of “Franchise Service, Royalty or Technical Services Fee” in respect of the services obtained by HPCL from its associated company, International Power Global Development Limited (IPGDL), under an Operations and Maintenance (O&M) contract between the two---This stance was acknowledged up to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---Question whether the O&M Agreement between the Applicant and IPGDL creates a "franchise" as defined under S. 2(12) of the Act, 2005, between the parties, thus attracting the levy of FED, under S. 3(1)(d) of the Act, on the payments made by the Applicant to IPGDL under the O&M Agreement?---Held: Applicant / HPCL is an independent power project set up pursuant to an Implementation Agreement with the Government of Pakistan---It is the industry norm for the operations and maintenance of a power plant to be carried out, for consideration, by a separate company qua an O&M contractor, who may or may not be an associated company of the power plant owning company---The O&M cost is one of the major cost components for an IPP, which is a cost borne to operate and maintain the power plant----The tax years-in-question (2010 to 2013) fall after S.2(12a) of Federal Excise Act, 2005 was added in 2008, and the reliance by the adjudicating forums below on R. 43A of Federal Excise Rules, 2005, was not valid, given that the statutory definition of the term "franchise' was to prevail over its sub-statutory definition that existed prior to the insertion of the statutory definition---It’s sheer absurdity of inferring a franchise relationship solely for the reason of one company's shareholding in another---Besides , the commercial relationship between IPGDL and HPCL does not constitute a franchise by any principle known to law---Neither in the impugned orders nor in the argument / stance of the Respondent /Department was it clarified as to how the O&M services of a coal-fired power plant were marketed by either IPGDL or HPCL ; no rights to sell or market electricity (the product manufactured by HPCL) are given by HPCL to IPGDL under the O&M contract ; nor has the converse been shown as to how any services are sold or marketed by IPGDL which can be identified with HPCL's services---If the absurd argument that prevailed with all the three forums below is countenanced, then all bi-partite services contracts between any two companies will become a franchise contract ; a construction contract between an employer and its contractor, a transportation contract between a haulage company and a company wanting to move its goods from one spot to another, a distributorship contract between an importer and the exporter, and a whole gamut of other bi-partite which do not result in any sale of any goods or services by one of the two parties to third parties branding such goods or services so that they can be identified with the franchisor would all become a franchise, which is obviously neither the letter nor the intent of the definition of “franchise” under the Federal Excise Act, 2005---Thus, the O&M agreement between IPGDL and HPCL did not create a franchise for the purposes of the Federal Excise Act 2005---Therefore, answer to proposed question was in the negative, that is, against the Department and in favour of Applicant---Federal Excise Reference Application, filed by Independent Power Plant (IPP), was allowed. Pakistan Television Corporation v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2023 PTD 102 ref. Makhdoom Ali Khan and Saad M. Hashmi for Applicant. Babar Bilal for Respondents. Date of hearing: 28th February, 2023. SARDAR EJAZ ISHAQ KHAN, J.---- By this common judgment, we decide the above mentioned reference applications filed under section 34A of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, for the tax years 2010 to 2013. The following questions of law were framed vide order dated 23.02.2016:

Summary: Summary pending