Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 12(2) --- Suit for specific performance --- Consolidation of suits --- Effect of lis pendens --- Appellants filed a suit for specific performance, claiming an agreement to sell dated 18-6-1988, while respondent No.1 claimed a prior agreement dated 7-6-1988 --- During pendency of the litigation, the vendors executed a compromise with the respondent, leading to a consent decree and subsequent sale deed in his favor --- Appellants challenged the decree under S. 12(2), C.P.C., leading to consolidation of suits --- Held, that the sale deed in favor of respondent No.1, executed during the pendency of the suit, was subject to the principle of lis pendens and its validity depended on the final adjudication of the case --- However, the appellants failed to prove their own agreement and readiness to perform, making the principle of lis pendens inapplicable in their favor --- Appeal dismissed. Cited Cases: Muhammad Ashraf Butt v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti (PLD 2011 SC 905) (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) ---- S. 22 --- Discretionary relief --- Grant of specific performance not a matter of right --- Appellants sought specific performance of an agreement that was neither signed by them nor proved in accordance with law --- Vendors initially admitted the agreement but later changed their stance, alleging appellants' failure to fulfill their obligations --- Supreme Court held that specific performance is a discretionary relief and courts are not bound to grant it merely because it is lawful to do so --- Conduct of the parties, readiness and willingness to perform, and totality of circumstances must be considered --- Given the appellants' failure to demonstrate good faith and lack of proactive steps to complete the transaction, the court declined to exercise discretion in their favor. Cited Cases: Liaqat Ali Khan v. Falak Sher (PLD 2014 SC 506) Mst. Mehmooda Begum v. Syed Hassan Sajjad (PLD 2010 SC 952) Shakeel Ahmed v. Mst. Shaheen Kousar (2010 SCMR 1507) (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ---- Arts. 17 & 79 --- Proof of agreement to sell --- Attesting witnesses --- Admissibility of evidence --- Appellants relied on an agreement to sell that was not signed by them --- Held, that an agreement to sell immovable property requires attestation by two witnesses under Article 17(2), Q.S.O., 1984, and must be proved in accordance with Article 79 --- Appellants examined only one attesting witness, failing to meet the evidentiary requirement --- Furthermore, a scribe of the document is not a substitute for an attesting witness --- Given that the respondent had denied the execution of the agreement, the burden was on the appellants to prove it through proper attestation, which they failed to do. Cited Cases: Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2011 SC 241) Mst. Gulshan Hamid v. Kh. Abdul Rehman (2010 SCMR 334) (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 115 --- Revision petition against a deceased person --- Effect --- Maintainability --- Respondent No.1 filed a civil revision before the High Court, but one of the respondents (Shaukat Ali) was deceased at the time of its institution --- Appellants contended that the revision was a nullity in law --- Supreme Court held that failure to implead legal heirs of a deceased party does not automatically render proceedings void, as such defects are curable --- Since Shaukat Ali’s legal heirs were already involved in the litigation and had full opportunity to present their case, the objection was technical and lacked merit. Cited Cases: Malik Bashir Ahmed Khan v. Qasim Ali (PLD 2003 Lah 615) Muhammad Yar v. Muhammad Amin (2013 SCMR 464) (e) Administration of Justice ---- Discretionary powers of the court --- Balancing competing claims --- Rival claims of specific performance were made by appellants and respondent No.1 regarding the same property --- Supreme Court held that courts must assess competing interests based on conduct, equities, and readiness to perform contractual obligations --- Appellants' lack of proactive efforts, failure to prove their agreement, and inability to demonstrate readiness to perform were key factors in denying them relief --- Appeal dismissed. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgment of the High Court upholding the dismissal of the appellants' suit for specific performance was maintained.

Summary: Art. 199 Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.S.12(2) CPC, 1908.Court of law is supposed to decide the cases through speaking reasoned judgment.

Summary: Background: M/s Travel Waljis (Pvt) Limited, a private company, challenged an assessment order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Income Tax and Wealth Tax, Islamabad, under Section 12(12) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The dispute centered around the addition of Rs. 3,539,410 related to fourteen vehicles transferred to the applicant upon maturity of lease agreements. The assessment order was appealed to the Commissioner Income Tax (Appeals) Zone-I, Islamabad, and subsequently to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad. The Tribunal upheld the addition, leading the applicant to file a Tax Reference under Section 133(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. ----Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the proviso to Section 12(12) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 was not curative/remedial in nature. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the income tax proceedings had attained finality before the insertion of the proviso. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the proviso to Section 12(12) was not applicable retrospectively. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Nature of the Proviso: The court held that the proviso inserted in Section 12(12) through the Finance Act, 1998, was remedial and curative in nature. It aimed to clarify and explain the treatment of assets leased by financial institutions, thereby correcting any anomalies in the existing law. Finality of Proceedings: The court found that the assessment order had not attained finality as the applicant's appeal was pending when the proviso was inserted. Therefore, the benefit of the proviso should be extended to the applicant. Retrospective Application: The court determined that remedial and curative amendments are generally applied retrospectively, especially when the proceedings are pending. The proviso in question was intended to be applied retrospectively to ongoing cases to align with the legislative intent. ----Outcome: The court decided in favor of the applicant, M/s Travel Waljis (Pvt) Limited, holding that the applicant was entitled to the benefit of the proviso inserted in Section 12(12) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, through the Finance Act, 1998. The Tax Reference was decided in favor of the applicant, and the order was to be communicated to the Appellate Tribunal, Inland Revenue. ----Citations/Precedents: Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-II, Regional Tax Office, Multan vs Mrs. Ambreen Fawad Co. Pak Arab Fertilizers Limited, Multan, 2014 PTD 320 Commissioner of Income Tax vs Shahnawaz Ltd and others, 1993 SCMR 73 Commissioner of Income/wealth Tax Companies Zone-I, Lahore vs Hafeez Valqa Industries (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore, 2005 PTD 2403 C.I.T./W.T., Faisalabad Zone vs Shahzad and Company, Faisalabad, (2007) 95 Tax 57 (H.C. Lah.) Dawood Cotton Mills vs Commissioner of Income Tax, 2000 PTD 285 Commissioner of Income Tax vs Nasir Ali and Another, (1999) 79 Tax 428 (S.C.Pak.)

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 19(1), 19(2), 4 & 9---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2) & O.XXIII, Order XXI---Interpretation of S. 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Execution of decree---Power of Banking Court---Applicability of provisions of C.P.C. to execution of decrees under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Scope---Execution of decree and sale of mortgaged property---Judgment-debtor sought setting aside of order of Banking Court whereby application for execution of decree was allowed to be withdrawn and permission for filing a fresh application was given to the decree holder bank---Contention of judgment-debtor was inter alia that impugned order violated O.XXIII, Rule 4, C.P.C.---Held, that the Banking Court derived its power for execution of its decree from S. 19(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and not from S. 19(2) of the Ordinance---Reference to provisions of the C.P.C. in said S. 19(2) of the Ordinance was for the purpose of adopting a "procedure" for execution of the Banking Court's decree---Procedure to be followed by a court and exercise of its authority were two different things---Powers conferred on an ordinary court under the C.P.C. were alien to the powers conferred on the Banking Court---Authority/power of Banking Court was not subservient to powers conferred on a Civil Court under provisions of the C.P.C.---Banking Courts, as a practice, allowed the plaintiff Financial Institution to file a formal execution application in terms of O.XXI, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. for sake convenience for satisfaction of decree passed by the Banking Court and merely accepting such an application under any provision of the C.P.C. did not mean that such proceedings were converted into execution of a decree in an ordinary suit and did not therefore entail that power conferred on Banking court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 stood compromised or nullified---Subsections (1) and (2) of S. 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 were to be read together---Any embargo in terms of O.XXIII, Rule 4, C.P.C. regarding applicability of provisions of O. XXIII, C.P.C. in the execution proceedings had no bearing on power of Banking Court in execution of a decree---Irrespective of fact that certain provisions of C.P.C. were mentioned in execution application of decree-holder Bank, Banking Court under S.19(1) of the Ordinance had power to allow decree-holder to withdraw earlier application and file a fresh one---Power of Banking Court in terms of S.19(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 was protected by section 4 of the Ordinance whereby provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had an overriding effect on provisions of C.P.C.---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Interpretation of Statutes--- ----All provisions of a statute were to be read together and any particular provision of a statute was not to be considered in isolation unless and until there was a clear-cut conflict, which was irreconcilable.

Summary: The petitioner had previously filed a suit for permanent injunction that was decreed. However, the respondent filed an application under section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) against the decree, which was dismissed for non-production of evidence. Subsequently, an appeal was filed before the Additional District Judge, which was accepted. The petitioner's counsel contended that the appeal filed by the respondent was not maintainable, as it should have been filed as a revision. The court examined the facts and legal options available, including the powers under Article 203 of the Constitution, which empowers the High Court to supervise and control all courts subordinate to it. After considering the matter, the court found that the trial court's order dismissing the application under section 12(2) CPC was not in accordance with the law and set it aside. The court endorsed the reasons given by the Additional District Judge for providing another opportunity to the respondent to produce evidence. The writ petition was dismissed, and the court's observations and findings were recorded in the order sheet.

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S. 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Eviction order, setting aside of---Misrepresentation and fraud---Ingredients--Scope of S.12(2), C.P.C.---Applicant had failed to point out any fraud or misrepresentation to the court in obtaining the ejectment order---None of the ingredients of fraud and misrepresentation were mentioned in the application---Provisions of S. 12 (2), C.P.C. could not be extended to include the claim of ownership by the aggrieved party while challenging judicial orders passed by competent court---Remedy to the applicant was a civil suit to claim his title on the property and not the provisions of S.12(2), C.P.C. which had a limited scope of examining the validity of a judgment/ decree on the plea of lack of jurisdiction, fraud and misrepresentation---Applicant had not alleged any fraud against the respondent in obtaining the orders rather the facts were otherwise---Applicant had failed to point out any mis-reading and non-reading of evidence while in passing the impugned order---No jurisdictional defect was found in the impugned order---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Summary: he revision petition challenged the order dated 31.10.2009 passed by the Additional District Judge, Kasur, which dismissed the application filed under section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) by the petitioners.The background of the case involved the purchase of 16 kanals of agricultural land by the petitioners from respondent No. 2 through sale deed No. 471 on 06.02.2003. Subsequently, respondent No. 1 filed an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 01.02.2003, which had dismissed the suit titled "Khushi Muhammad Vs. Rehmat Ali" for declaration. The appellate court accepted the appeal on 05.05.2003, decreeing the suit in favor of respondent No. 1 and declaring the impugned gift mutation No. 1353 dated 08.07.1995 null and void.The petitioners claimed to be bona fide purchasers of the suit land and argued that no lis (legal dispute) was pending between the respondents at the time of their purchase. They further contended that the respondents, being father and son, colluded to obtain the decree through fraud and misrepresentation. The petitioners asserted that they were not made parties to the appeal and revision despite the respondents having knowledge of the sale, which indicated mala fide on the respondents' part.However, the court rejected the petitioners' arguments, citing the principle of "lis pendens" from the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which states that during pending litigation involving an immovable property, no party can alienate or deal with the property to the detriment of the opponent. The court held that since the appeal was filed within the limitation period after the petitioners' purchase, the rule of lis pendens applied, and the petitioners' claim as bona fide purchasers without notice was not valid.In conclusion, the court found no irregularities or illegality in the lower court's decision, and the revision petition was dismissed. The judgment was given by Judge Shahid Bilal Hassan.

Summary: This order dismissed a civil revision filed by Sabir Ali, challenging the consent judgment and decree dated 24.01.2013, which was issued in a suit for Specific Performance of an agreement to sell titled "Aurangzeb etc vs. Sabir Ali."The petitioner, Sabir Ali, contended that the judgment and decree were the result of fraud, forgery, and misrepresentation, as someone else illegally recorded his statement of compromise during the trial court proceedings. He had previously filed an application under section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) before the trial court to set aside the consent judgment and decree, but it was dismissed on 21.06.2013.Afterwards, Sabir Ali filed a civil revision before the District Judge of Bahawalnagar, which was also dismissed on 11.12.2013. Feeling aggrieved, he approached the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, through the present writ petition.However, both the trial court and the District Judge's court found no merit in Sabir Ali's contentions. They observed that the petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and did not provide specific details to support his claims. The courts also noted that during the trial, Sabir Ali had received money from the plaintiffs as part of the compromise, and his counsel was present during the recording of the statement of compromise.Based on these findings, the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, dismissed the writ petition, stating that it lacked merit and that the lower courts' orders were neither perverse nor illegal.

Summary: S.12(2) CPC:Misrepresentation & misguided the court by revenue officials regarding Evaluation Report

Summary: S. 11, 12(2), O.IX R. 13 CPC conversion of suit into 12(2) application allowed by High Court allowed.