Summary: The petitioner (grandfather) was never party to the suit. There is no cavil that in terms of para 370 of Muhammadan Law by D.F Mulla's, a grandfather in certain circumstances is bound to maintain his grandchildren but obligation of the grandfather to maintain his grandchildren is hedged with certain conditions. In order to understand the matter in issue in better terms, para 370 of Muhammadan Law by D.F. Mulla's. Primarily it is the father who is bound to maintain his children, in case of son(s) until he (they) attain(s) the age of puberty and if there are daughters, till their marriage. In case, the father is poor and incapable of maintaining by his own, the mother would come into picture and if she is in easy circumstances, she would be bound to maintain her children in place of father. The liability of grandfather though starts when the father is poor and infirm and the mother is also not in a position to provide maintenance to her children but such liability of grandfather is dependent upon the fact that he should be in easy circumstances. After having a glimpse of the survey of law on the subject, I am of the firm view that Family Court can never be helpless to get its decree executed. The process of execution cannot shift towards the grandfather merely on the ground that decree could not be satisfied against the father (judgment debtor). The Family Court cannot assume the role of spectator rather it can adopt the procedure contained in "CPC" for the execution of the decree.

Summary: [Civil Procedure Code CPC (Order 20 Rule 13 CPC)] Keeping in view the above position, discussion and case law cited above, the suit of the plaintiffs is decreed to the extent of Mukaram Market constructed on Plot No. R-50, Sector 5-C/4, Karachi consisting with one house and 07 shops which is mutated in the name of deceased Mst. Shahida Begum, which supports the plaintiffs plea and direct the final decree be prepared accordingly. Nazir of this Court who has already been appointed as Commissioner is to act as an Administrator of Mukaram Market left by deceased Mst. Shahida Begum. The expenses will be met from the assets left by deceased Mst. Shahida Begum. The property is not partition-able horizontally or vertically to sell the same and distribute the shares amongst the legal heirs of deceased Mst. Shahida Begum. I therefore, pass decree as provided under Order 20 Rule 13 CPC read with Form-18 of Appendix-D to Schedule-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and appoint Nazir of this Court as Receiver with all powers to auction the said property. The plaintiffs and Defendants are allowed to participate in the same proceedings, distribute the sale price amongst all the Plaintiffs and defendants according to Mohammadan Law of Inheritance.

Summary: Suit filed by unauthorized person---Defect in filing proceeding was incurable, hence, suit was dismissed---The suit revolved around the non-payment of freight amounting to US $8900 for consignments of second-hand cellulose processing equipment imported from Italy. Despite delivering the goods to their Local Agent-Defendant No.2, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants failed to settle the freight charges despite repeated demands. The Plaintiff sought a decree against the Defendants for Rs. 190,638, equivalent to US $8,900, along with interest and any other deemed fit relief. Following the issuance of notices and the filing of written statements by the Defendants, various issues were framed, including jurisdiction, non-joinder of shippers, and the necessity of Defendant No. 2 in the suit. Witnesses were examined, and during cross-examination, the Plaintiff's witness (PW-1) admitted to the lack of a Board Resolution authorizing the filing of the suit. Defendants raised objections based on legal precedent regarding the lack of authorization and the legal status of Jugolinija and its Local Agent. Despite the Plaintiff's arguments and reliance on prior case law, the court dismissed the suit on grounds that it was filed by an unauthorized person, citing the absence of proper authorization or a valid Board Resolution. The court's decision highlighted the importance of proper authorization and adherence to legal procedures in filing suits, ultimately leading to the dismissal of Jugolinija's claim.

Summary: Custom Act, 1969 (147) Petition not maintainable against assessment proceedings.

Summary: ADR under Customs Act, 1969---In the order, Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry J. presented the context of the case. The petitioner challenged the higher duty on film-grade PET Resin in comparison to yarn-grade PET Resin. The petitioner had deposited a differential customs duty/taxes amount with the Nazir while securing consignments. Subsequently, the Finance Act, 2015, brought the duty on film-grade PET Resin at par with yarn-grade PET Resin. The petitioner sought disposal of the case and return of the deposited amount. The Division Bench dismissed the petition and the application for returning the deposit, stating that the deposit was made when the duty difference existed. The petitioner then filed a CPLA (Constitution Petition for Leave to Appeal) before the Supreme Court, but ultimately withdrew it and expressed intent to use Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) under section 195-C of the Customs Act, 1969. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner could avail of alternate remedies.Subsequently, the petitioner applied to the FBR for ADR, seeking the reduced duty on past consignments. However, the Customs sought release of the deposited differential duty, and this application followed.The petitioner's counsel argued that even though the judgment dismissing the petition held the field, a temporary injunction could be issued under Order XXXIX Rule 2 CPC (Civil Procedure Code) to preserve the deposit while ADR was considered. However, the court found that the petitioner did not demonstrate a prima facie case for an injunction. The court analyzed section 195-C of the Customs Act and concluded that ADR could only be invoked when a dispute remains under litigation, not when it has already been adjudicated and withdrawn. As such, the application to preserve the deposit was dismissed.

Summary: The perusal of Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and principles laid down in the afore-referred judgments make it clear that warrants of arrest of judgment debtor can only be issued in cases where the Court was satisfied that in order to obstruct or delay the execution of decree, the judgment-debtor is likely to abscond or leave the limits of Court or has after the institution of the suit in which decree was passed, dishonestly transferred, concealed or removed any part of his property, or committed any other act of bad faith in relation to his property, or the judgment-debtor has, or has had since the date of decree, the means to pay the amount of the decree or some substantial part thereof and refuses or neglects or has refused or neglected to pay the same, or the decree is for a sum for which the judgment-debtor was bound in a fiduciary capacity to account for, and without satisfaction of these pre-conditions no mechanical order for detention in prison can be passed. Although it can safely be pointed out here that the aforementioned pre-conditions are not complete and there may be other conditions and circumstances of exceptional cases, which could satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court to adopt such course of arrest and detention of the judgment-debtor in a given case yet where there was nothing attributable to the judgment-debtor to show that his acts were instrumental to frustrate the decree, which has caused prejudice to the other side and his property is available for satisfaction of the amount of decree, ordinarily warrants of arrest should not be issued.

Summary: Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 and the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 are not applicable to employees recruited on work-charge basis by Government Departments having statutory rules with respect to regularization.

Summary: Lahore Development Authority (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1978 (Regulations) are framed under Section 45 of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975 (Act), which do not require approval of the Government. However, vide letter dated 30.04.1978 (by the Government of Punjab), the said Regulations were approved on 16.04.1978 by the Martial Law Administrator, Punjab (MLA) who was exercising the powers of the Provincial Government for all intent and purposes under Proclamations, including the Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders, which were subsequently validated under Article 270A of the Constitution, therefore, the approval of MLA has the same status as approval of the Government. The necessary corollary and conclusion of the above discussion is that LDA Regulations are statutory in nature.

Summary: Where remedy of appeal is available before the same forum under any other law or provision of law instead of the law cited in the title of the appeal, the same could not be dismissed for the reason that incorrect law or provision of law had been referred to in the title of the appeal and any such reasoning given for dismissal of appeal as misconceived and not maintainable would not be based on correct interpretation of law for the reason that wrong mention of law or a provision of law would not be an illegality but a curable defect in view of principles laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Summary: NAB Matter - Appeal - Enhancement of Sentence