Summary: (a) Family Law—Recovery of Dower ----Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 (Art. 79)—Family Courts Act, 1964 (Sec. 17) Dower—Proof and enforceability—Petitioner (husband’s sibling) challenged High Court’s decision granting respondent (wife) recovery of dower, which included four tolas of gold, a five-marla constructed house, and Rs.5,000/-, as stipulated in dower deed (kabinnama)—Family Court and First Appellate Court dismissed claim for lack of two attesting witnesses under Art. 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984—High Court set aside these findings, holding that under Sec. 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, the strict requirements of Art. 79 did not apply to family matters—Testimony of one attesting witness, along with corroborative evidence, was sufficient—Petition for leave to appeal dismissed. Held, Family Courts operate outside the strict procedural confines of civil law—Sec. 17 of the Family Courts Act relaxes evidentiary requirements—Dower deed, once proved, raises an irrebuttable presumption regarding the agreed-upon dower—Failure of petitioners to disprove payment strengthened respondent’s claim—High Court rightly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution to correct a manifest error of law—Petition dismissed. Cited Cases: • Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal (31 All 116) • Mahunt Shatrugan Das v. Bawa Sham Das and others (AIR 1938 PC 59) (b) Family Courts—Relaxed Evidentiary Standards ----Competency of Witnesses—Presumption of Dower Payment Dower deed (kabinnama) signed by deceased husband and attested by two witnesses—One attesting witness (PW-3) testified, while the other (defendant No.1) abstained—Plaintiff supported claim through her testimony and corroboration from independent witnesses, including the scribe (PW-2) and record keeper (PW-5)—Family Courts Act allows broader evidentiary discretion—Failure of defendant No.1 to testify without justification gave rise to an adverse inference against petitioners—Once dower deed is proved, the presumption of non-payment stands unless rebutted by credible evidence—No rebuttal presented—Claim rightly allowed. (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction—Supervisory Role of High Court ----Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution—Certiorari—Correction of Legal Misapplication High Court’s power to set aside erroneous decisions—Family Court and First Appellate Court misapplied Art. 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, disregarding Sec. 17 of the Family Courts Act—Constituted an error apparent on the face of the record—High Court’s intervention was justified to prevent miscarriage of justice—Where subordinate courts misinterpret law, constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked to rectify the error—Findings of High Court upheld. Disposition: Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Arts. 9, 14 & 184(3) Fundamental rights—Right to life and dignity—State’s obligation to provide clean water and sustainable environmental infrastructure—Delay in execution of Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) project. Land measuring 6,937 kanals was acquired in 1991-92 for the establishment of a Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) by the Water and Sanitation Authority (WASA) for preventing untreated wastewater from entering the River Ravi. However, despite the lapse of three decades, the project remained unexecuted due to financial constraints. The Supreme Court underscored that access to clean water and environmental protection are integral to the fundamental rights to life and dignity enshrined in Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution. The Court urged WASA to explore alternative financing mechanisms, including Islamic climate finance, and to consider cost-effective, homegrown wastewater treatment technologies to expedite the project in the public interest. The delay in establishing the WWTP, despite its direct implications for environmental sustainability and public health, necessitated urgent governmental action. (b) Land Acquisition—Public Purpose and Reversion of Acquired Land: ----Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, R.14 Land acquired for public purposes—Non-utilization for an extended period—Possibility of reversion to original owners. Petitioners challenged the prolonged inaction of WASA regarding the acquired land, arguing that the failure to execute the WWTP project over 30 years contravened the principles governing land acquisition for public purposes. The Court acknowledged that, under Rule 14 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, land acquired for a public purpose that remains unutilized could be considered for reversion to its original owners. The Court directed that if substantive progress was not reported by September 2025, the question of reversion of the acquired land would remain open for determination. (c) Environmental Law and Climate Resilience: ----Global Climate Risk Index, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Pakistan’s climate vulnerability—WWTP’s role in mitigating water pollution and climate risks—International commitments. Pakistan ranks 8th on the Global Climate Risk Index and 23rd on the 2024 Inform Risk Index, reflecting its susceptibility to climate-induced challenges. The Court emphasized that the WWTP project aligns with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), SDG 13 (Climate Action), and SDG 14 (Life Below Water). Given the pressing environmental concerns associated with untreated wastewater contaminating the River Ravi, the Court highlighted the necessity of investing in climate-resilient wastewater treatment infrastructure. The delay in implementing the project not only affected environmental sustainability but also hindered Pakistan’s compliance with international climate commitments. (d) Judicial Oversight in Public Interest Litigation: ----Judicial intervention—Guidance without encroachment on policy-making. While policy-making remains within the domain of the executive, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its constitutional duty under Article 184(3) to safeguard fundamental rights. Without encroaching upon the executive’s prerogative, the Court provided recommendations for alternative financing, including Green Sukuk and Islamic finance models, and urged WASA to consider innovative wastewater treatment solutions. The Court directed the Planning and Development Working Party (PDWP), the Central Development Working Party (CDWP), and the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) to finalize financial arrangements by August 2025 and submit a report. Failure to reach a resolution would necessitate further judicial intervention. ----Disposition: The Supreme Court directed WASA and relevant governmental authorities to finalize financing and implementation strategies for the WWTP project by August 2025, with a compliance report to be submitted to the Court before the next hearing in September 2025. The matter was adjourned for further review.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 (XI of 1994)--- ----S. 14(5)---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Procedure Rules, 1998, R. 22(3)---Appeal before the Supreme Court, filing of---Certified copies of decree/decision, non-annexation of---Effect---Argument of the appellant (wife) was that the omission of the decree constitutes a procedural irregularity that may be overlooked---Validity-- -Provisions of S. 14(5) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 (‘the Act 1993’) and R. 22(3) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Procedure Rules, 1998, create a cohesive framework for appellate proceedings---Section 14(5) of the Act 1993 establishes the jurisdictional basis for appeals to the Supreme Court, while R. 22(3) operationalizes said framework by prescribing the procedural prerequisites, including the mandatory attachment of the decree---The decree serves as the formal embodiment of the judgment, delineating the precise rights and liabilities determined by the lower court; its annexation is not a mere technicality but a substantive requirement enabling the appellate court to ascertain the scope of the dispute and the legal questions involved---Thus, the requirement to annex a certified copy of the decree with the appeal is mandatory---The decree, as the formal and conclusive expression of the lower court’s decision, is an indispensable document for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under S. 14(5) of the Act 1993---Argument of the appellant (that the omission of the decree constitutes a procedural irregularity that may be overlooked) cannot be sustained in light of the explicit language of R. 22(3) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Procedure Rules, 1998; said provision leaves no room for discretion and unequivocally mandates the attachment of the decree, ensuring that the appellate court has a complete and authoritative record of the case---Appeal having been filed incompetently, was dismissed. (b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 (XI of 1994)--- ----S. 14(5)---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Procedure Rules, 1998, R. 22(3)---Appeal before the Supreme Court, filing of---Certified copies of decree/decision, non-annexation of---Effect---Contention raised by the appellant (wife) was that the certified copy of the decree had since been placed on record by filing an application---Validity---Significantly, the said application was not filed within the prescribed statutory period but was instead presented after an inordinate delay of one year---Such belated filing rendered the application time-barred and inadmissible under law---Thus, contention of the appellant was devoid of legal merit in view of the mandatory requirements under S. 14(5) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 and R. 22(3) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Procedure Rules, 1998---Failure to append the certified copy of the decree at the time of filing the appeal was a fatal defect---Appeal having been filed incompetently, was dismissed. Raja Khalid Mehmood Khan, Advocate for Appellant. Abdul Razzaq Chaudhary, Advocate for Respondent. Date of hearing: 28th January, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 561-A & 133---Quashing of order---Inherent power of High Court---Public nuisance---Scope---Application under S.133, Cr.P.C., was filed by private respondent against applicant, who was alleged to have disposed waste water from its factory which was injurious to health---Such allegations were challenged on the grounds inter alia that the matter was already addressed at various forums---Validity---Perusal of the record reflected that earlier identical applications under S.133, Cr.P.C., were filed against the same Mill of applicant by one “AWA” who later on also approached the High Court under Art.199, wherein Mukhtiarkar Revenue was appointed as Local Commissioner to inspect the site and report from concerned SHO Police Station were also called---Both such reports negated the allegations against the applicant and the petition was accordingly dismissed vide order dated 26.09.2018---Record further reflected that in the present case also, an application for appointment of Local Commissioner to inspect the site was made which was allowed and Report from the concerned SHO was also called, who in his report dated 25.02.2021 reported that no nuisance had been caused by the applicant but there was some dispute between some local community and the applicant over some agricultural land---Concerned Mukhtiarkar also filed his inspection report---Considering the said facts, the application under S.133, Cr.P.C., was dismissed by the Magistrate after hearing the parties---Moreover, it appeared that in the Criminal Revision Application, a statement dated 09.08.2021 was filed by the private respondent for withdrawal of revision application and based whereon vide order dated 09.08.2021 the revision was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn by the Court---It was alleged by applicant that once the revision application was dismissed as withdrawn, the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to pass any further order in the same case, yet the impugned order dated 27.04.2022 was passed---Study of the subject showed that principle of functus officio had been strictly followed in every variety of law, as for instance, a Magistrate became functus officio once the Sessions Court took cognizance of the matter---Upon dropping of proceedings also the Magistrate became functus officio and lacked power to subsequently issue orders for attachment of property under S.145, Cr.P.C.----With respect to powers under S.561-A, Cr.P.C., it had been held that although legislature had equipped the High Court with ample inherent power under S.561-A, Cr.P.C., however after disposal of a criminal matter, it became functus officio; it could not review or sit in appeal against its own orders passed in criminal jurisdiction, except correction of clerical errors---Even under the constitutional jurisdiction this principle was followed that after passing of an order for withdrawal of a petition as not pressed, the Court became functus officio and correction of the same on merits under S.151 or 152, C.P.C, was not permissible---On the other hand, perusal of reports from the concerned Mukhtiarkar and SHO also did not point towards any illegality being committed by the applicant whereas a complete mechanism for protection of environment was also available under the Sindh Environment Protection Authority Act, 2014---Further, it was clearly reported that no particular incidence of nuisance caused due to water ponds or storage of black mud by the mill to any person was found---Petition was allowed, accordingly. Munir Ahmad v. State 1993 MLD 537; Khalida Rehman v. Muhammad Aqil 1990 MLD 60; Muhammad Afzal, S.H.O. v. Abdul Hafeez Qazi 1986 PCr.LJ 1651; Israr Ahmed v. The State 2022 YLR Note 139; Master Gul Hassan v. Government of Sindh PLD 2015 Sindh 226; Iqbal v. The State 2001 PCr.LJ 1634; Fatima Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Government of Punjab 2010 YLR 904; Reckitt Benckiser Pakistan Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2009 PTD 642; Rana Abdul Rasheed v. Chaudhry Nusrat Ali 2009 CLC 948 and Mumtaz Construction Company v. MFC (Pvt.) Ltd. 2010 MLD 327 rel. Ashfaque Nabi Qazi for Applicant. Irfan Ali Talpur Assistant Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State. Date of hearing: 30th January, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment of the High Court dated 20.10.2023 in Writ Petition No. 288 of 2017). Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act (XII of 1957)--- ----Ss.18-A(2) & 25(2)(p), (q)---Evacuee Property Allottees (Compensation) Order, 1967, Para-3---Evacuee property---Transfer of proprietary rights from refugee/allottee to transferees through gift deed---Award of compensation after acquisition---Custodian Evacuee Property ordered deduction of cost of property and service charges from the compensation amount from transferees in terms of S.18-A(2) of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957 (Act)---Transferees challenged such order through writ petition, which was accepted in terms of proviso to Para-3 of the Evacuee Property Allottees (Compensation) Order, 1967 (Order)---Validity---Proviso to Para-3 of the Order relates to allottee, whereas, the land was transferred through gift-deed and the deduction had been made from transferees and not the allottee, and in view of S.18-A(2) of the Act in case of transfer of property by the allottee, the transferees shall pay to the Custodian the prescribed cost of property---Transferees had already paid the amount, thus, requirement of S.18-A(2) of the Act had been complied with and deduction of amount by the Custodian in lieu of compensation of proprietary right was not just---Under S.25(2)(p) & (q) of the Act the Custodian was vested with the powers to create a charge on evacuee property, incur or allow any expenditure to be incurred in the prescribed manner, thus, service charges had rightly been deducted before making of payment of compensation to the transferees---Appeal was accepted, in circumstances, however, deduction of amount to the extent of cost/compensation of proprietary rights was partly set aside. Ghulam Sarwar v. Fateh Muhammad and others 2017 SCR 1283 rel. Syed Nazir Hussain Shah Kazmi, Advocate for Appellant. Raja Zaffar Hussain Khan, Advocate for Respondents. Date of hearing: 23rd January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 18---Constitutional guarantee of freedom of trade, business and profession---Scope---Right to freedom of trade, business or profession under Art.18 of the Constitution is not an absolute right but is subject to “qualifications” and restrictions prescribed by the law---Such restrictions have to be reasonable and the Courts are competent to review such restrictions on the touchstone of reasonability. Messrs 3N-Lifemed Pharmaceuticals v. Government of Punjab through Primary and Secondary Healthcare Department and others 2023 CLC 948 rel. (b) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014--- ----Rr. 4, 8, 9 & 67---Punjab Procurement Regulations, 2024, Regln.5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 18---Mis-procurement---Grouping of works---Splitting of tendered work---Petitioners assailed procurement process carried out by authorities---Validity---In terms of Regln.5 of Punjab Procurement Regulations 2024 and R.8 of Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014 annual development plan by each procuring agency with respect to procurement to be carried out in that fiscal year has to be devised within one month of the beginning of fiscal year and the same must be made public---Such procurement plan would rule out possibility of tinkering and/or manipulation in any tender at the time of inviting bids---There is an administrative and executive discretion vested in the procuring agency to formulate and design procurement plan by grouping and/or splitting the works for the purposes of ensuring widest possible competition and obviating the possibility of favouritism---Once such discretion is exercised, through an annual development plan, the procuring agencies are obligated to adhere to the same without splitting and/or regrouping the same in terms of R.9 of Punjab Procurement Rules 2014---Adherence to R.8 of Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014 as to announcement of proposed annual procurement plan in a financial year is a legal obligation which stands as a bar and check upon procuring agency to arbitrarily split and/or regroup the subject matter of procurement to tailor make the same to extend favouritism---Procuring agency should at least, at the planning stage, consider splitting of the work when it is tendering the same that are comprised of different geographical locations and different types of services/activities and if it still decides to group them together in one contract then it should, at a minimum, state its reasons for doing so---This should be encouraged as a “best practice” amongst the procuring agencies to avoid any challenges during procurement process---High Court declined to interfere in procurement process, as the authorities had not committed any mis-procurement---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. Kitchen Cuisine (Pvt) Ltd v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and others PLD 2016 Lah. 412; Messrs Muhammad Hanif and Co. through Authorized representative and another v. Chief Engineer North, Pak PWD and 3 others 2023 CLC 443; Messrs Mohammad Ramzan and Company v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Communication, Islamabad and 4 others 2024 CLC 1394; Adam Sugar Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Commerce and 2 others 2012 CLD 1734; In the Alleged Corruption in Rental Power Plants etc. 2012 SCMR 773 and Reliance Energy Limited and another v. Maharashtara State Road Development Corporation Ltd. and others (2007) 8 SCC 1 rel. Malik Sultan Amir Awan for Petitioner. Imran Khan and Mohammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocates General for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3. Iftikhar Ahmed Mian, Ghulam Hamza, DMO (E&M), MCL and Zulfiqar Ahmed, A.D. Legal, MCL for Respondents Nos. 4 to 7. Syed Shahab Qutab: Amicus Curiae. Dates of hearing: 28th and 30th January, 2025.

Summary: Core legal question is to examine whether there is any prohibition in the law against the splitting of works in a tender or the procuring agency is under an obligation to consider the division of the tendered works into smaller contracts and if the procuring agency has chosen to club or bundle different works in different sites, in one contract, is it obliged to give reasons for doing so? Held that there is no legal obligation on the procuring agency to split the work into smaller parts rather the obligation is otherwise under the law. Following directions were passed to the procuring agencies for the purpose of bringing transparency and fairness in the procurement process: (i) It is imperative in terms of Regulation 5 of the Regulations 2024 and Rule 8 of the Rules 2014, that annual development plan by each procuring agency with respect to the procurement to be carried out in that fiscal year is devised within one month of the beginning of fiscal year and the same must be made public. This would rule out possibility of tinkering and/or manipulation in any tender at the time of inviting bids; (ii) There is an administrative and executive discretion vested in the procuring agency to formulate and design the procurement plan by grouping and/or splitting the works for the purposes of ensuring widest possible competition and obviating the possibility of favouritism, however, once the said discretion is exercised, through an annual development plan, the procuring agencies are obligated to adhere to the same without splitting and/or regrouping the same in terms of Rule 9 of the Rules 2014; (iii) Adherence to Rule 8 of the Rules 2014 as to announcement of proposed annual procurement plan in a financial year is a legal obligation which stands as a bar and check upon the procuring agency to arbitrarily split and/or regroup the subject matter of procurement to tailor-make the same to extend favouritism; and (iv) A procuring agency should at least, at the planning stage, consider splitting of the work when it is tendering the same that are comprised of different geographical locations and different types of services/activities; and if it still decides to group them together in one contract then it should, at a minimum, state its reasons for doing so. This should be encouraged as a "best practice" amongst the procuring agencies to avoid any such challenges during the procurement process.

Summary: Core legal question is to examine whether there is any prohibition in the law against the splitting of works in a tender or the procuring agency is under an obligation to consider the division of the tendered works into smaller contracts and if the procuring agency has chosen to club or bundle different works in different sites, in one contract, is it obliged to give reasons for doing so? Held that there is no legal obligation on the procuring agency to split the work into smaller parts rather the obligation is otherwise under the law. Following directions were passed to the procuring agencies for the purpose of bringing transparency and fairness in the procurement process: (i) It is imperative in terms of Regulation 5 of the Regulations 2024 and Rule 8 of the Rules 2014, that annual development plan by each procuring agency with respect to the procurement to be carried out in that fiscal year is devised within one month of the beginning of fiscal year and the same must be made public. This would rule out possibility of tinkering and/or manipulation in any tender at the time of inviting bids; (ii) There is an administrative and executive discretion vested in the procuring agency to formulate and design the procurement plan by grouping and/or splitting the works for the purposes of ensuring widest possible competition and obviating the possibility of favouritism, however, once the said discretion is exercised, through an annual development plan, the procuring agencies are obligated to adhere to the same without splitting and/or regrouping the same in terms of Rule 9 of the Rules 2014; (iii) Adherence to Rule 8 of the Rules 2014 as to announcement of proposed annual procurement plan in a financial year is a legal obligation which stands as a bar and check upon the procuring agency to arbitrarily split and/or regroup the subject matter of procurement to tailor-make the same to extend favouritism; and (iv) A procuring agency should at least, at the planning stage, consider splitting of the work when it is tendering the same that are comprised of different geographical locations and different types of services/activities; and if it still decides to group them together in one contract then it should, at a minimum, state its reasons for doing so. This should be encouraged as a "best practice" amongst the procuring agencies to avoid any such challenges during the procurement process. 741Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 583-23 SAJID ALI VS THE STATE ETC Mr. Justice Sadiq Mahmud Khurram 29- 01- 2025 2025 LHC 1689 2025 PCr.LJ 1412 [Lahore (Rawalpindi Bench)]

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5---Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), S. 25---Custody and guardianship of minor---Family Court, jurisdiction of---Scope---Matters of custody and guardianship both are also governed under Family Courts Act, 1964---Family Court is only bound by section 25 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 to follow procedure during trail of guardian and custody matters. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 25A(2b)---Family suits---Inter-Provincial transfer---Applicant/ mother of minors sought transfer of guardianship proceedings and family appeal pending before Lower Appellate Court at place "I" to place "K" in another province---Held, that guardianship and custody cases which were instituted in Family Court would be treated as proceedings under Family Courts Act, 1964---In absence of any specific provision in Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, regarding transfer of matters from one province to another, guardianship and custody cases could be transferred according to section 25A(2b) of Family Courts Act, 1964---Minors' welfare would follow their mother's residence---It was not necessary for applicant/mother to attach documents proving her residence and minors' enrolment in school at place "K"---Supreme Court transferred the proceedings pending before Courts at place "I" to place "K"---Application was allowed. Anne Zahra v. Tahir Ali Khilji 2001 SCMR 2000; Muhammad Khalid Karim v. Saadia Yaqub PLD 2012 SC 66; Ihsan-ur-Rehman v. Najma Parveen PLD 1986 SC 14; Sakhawat Ali v. Shui Khelay PLD 1981 SC 454; The State v. Naeemullah Khan 2001 SCMR 1461 and Rabia Ahmad v. Bilal Ejaz 2022 SCMR 733 rel. Muhammad Habib Ullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants. Dr. Babar Awan, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 2nd January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Public Procurement—Maintainability of Constitutional Petitions ----Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Arts. 9, 18 & 25---Judicial review of public procurement decisions---Maintainability---Petitioners challenged procurement tenders issued by the Metropolitan Corporation, Lahore (MCL), alleging that the grouping of works in a manner that exceeded their bidding capacity under PEC Category ‘C-6’ was discriminatory and constituted mis-procurement---Respondents contended that the petitioners had an alternate remedy before the Grievance Redressal Committee (GRC) under Rule 67 of the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014 ("Rules 2014")---Held, that where a procurement decision is challenged on the grounds of arbitrariness, favoritism, or discriminatory treatment, constitutional courts have jurisdiction to review such decisions to ensure transparency and competition in the procurement process---While government entities have discretion in structuring tenders, judicial interference is warranted where procurement rules are violated or where competitive neutrality is compromised---Fundamental right to a level playing field under public procurement law is protected under Articles 9, 18, and 25 of the Constitution---Constitutional petitions were maintainable. Cited Cases: Messrs Mohammad Ramzan & Company v. Federation of Pakistan (2024 CLC 1394) Kitchen Cuisine (Pvt) Ltd v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PLD 2016 Lahore 412) In the Alleged Corruption in Rental Power Plants (2012 SCMR 773) Reliance Energy Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation Ltd. (2007 8 SCC 1, India) (b) Public Procurement—Principles of Openness, Transparency, and Competition ----Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014, R. 4, R. 9, R. 34---Grouping of works in public procurement---Fair competition and transparency---Held, that under Rule 4, a procuring agency must ensure that procurement is conducted fairly, transparently, and in a manner that promotes competition---Rule 9 prohibits arbitrary splitting or regrouping of procurements after the procurement plan for the financial year has been announced---Rule 34 prevents the introduction of discriminatory conditions that limit participation by eligible bidders---Held, that there was no evidence that the grouping of works in the impugned tenders was tailored to favor any specific contractor or restrict competition---Tenders were structured as part of an approved government initiative to improve civic infrastructure, and multiple contractor categories were eligible to participate---Thus, the tenders did not violate procurement laws or transparency requirements. (c) Freedom of Trade and Business—Right to Participate in Public Procurement ----Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Arts. 18 & 25---Government contracts---Freedom of trade, business, and profession---Limitations under law---Petitioners contended that the grouping of works in the impugned tenders unfairly restricted their right to participate, thereby violating Article 18 of the Constitution---Held, that the right to carry on trade or business is not absolute and can be subject to reasonable restrictions prescribed by law---Procurement laws permit the structuring of tenders to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness, provided such structuring is not arbitrary or discriminatory---In the absence of evidence that similarly placed contractors were treated differently, no violation of Article 18 or Article 25 was established. Cited Case: Messrs 3N-Lifemed Pharmaceuticals v. Government of Punjab (2023 CLC 948) (d) Public Procurement—Splitting of Works and International Best Practices ----Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014, R. 9---Punjab Procurement Regulations, 2024, Reg. 6(3)---Contract splitting and procurement planning---International best practices---Held, that while there is no explicit requirement under local procurement laws mandating the splitting of contracts for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), Regulation 6(3) of the Punjab Procurement Regulations, 2024, allows a procuring agency to create "LOTS" or decide whether procurement should be made as a whole or item-wise---Global procurement standards, including the European Union Procurement Directive, 2014 (Art. 46), and the UK Procurement Act, 2023 (Sec. 18), emphasize a “divide or explain” principle, requiring contracting authorities to consider splitting works to promote competition while balancing operational efficiency---Court observed that while MCL had not violated local laws, procuring agencies should adopt international best practices and document their rationale when opting for bundled tenders. Cited International Sources: Directive 2014/24/EU on Public Procurement (EU) UK Procurement Act, 2023 (Sec. 18—Duty to Consider Lots) Contract Splitting in Public Procurement—OECD & EU Joint Report (2016) (e) Directions for Future Public Procurement ----Procurement oversight and transparency---Court issued directions to all procuring agencies in Punjab to enhance transparency and accountability in public procurement, including: (i) Mandatory Public Procurement Plans: Agencies must publish annual procurement plans within one month of the fiscal year’s commencement, as required under Regulation 5 of the Punjab Procurement Regulations, 2024. (ii) Compliance with Planned Procurements: Once an annual procurement plan is announced, agencies must adhere to it without arbitrary splitting or regrouping, in line with Rule 9 of the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014. (iii) Prevention of Tailored Bids: Agencies must ensure that procurement structuring does not unfairly favor specific contractors or limit competition. (iv) Consideration of Work Splitting: While procurement agencies have discretion, they should document reasons for grouping or splitting works to ensure competitive fairness. Disposition: Writ Petition No. 69497/2024 and connected Writ Petition No. 76292/2024 dismissed. Directions issued for improving transparency in public procurement.