Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964 — S. 25A(2b) — Transfer of cases — Scope of Supreme Court's power — Jurisdiction to transfer family matters from one province to another Applicant-mother sought transfer of guardianship petition and respondent-father's appeal from Islamabad to Karachi, citing hardship. Held, that under S. 25A(2b), the Supreme Court has the authority to transfer any suit, appeal, or other proceedings under the Family Courts Act, 1964, from one province to another. Such transfer is permissible upon application by any party, after notice and hearing, or suo motu. The instant application fell within the ambit of S. 25A(2b), and the Supreme Court was competent to grant relief. (b) Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 — S. 4A — Transfer of guardianship cases — Competence of courts — Distinction between transfer of guardianship cases under GWA and FCA Respondent-father contended that only High Courts are empowered to transfer guardian proceedings under S. 4A, GWA. Held, that while S. 4A empowers High Courts to transfer guardianship cases within a district, S. 25A(2b) of FCA provides an overriding jurisdiction to the Supreme Court for inter-provincial transfers of family matters. Guardianship proceedings, being a subject under the Family Courts Act, 1964, fell within the Supreme Court’s purview under S. 25A(2b). (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction & Article 175(2) of the Constitution — Jurisdictional bar under the Constitution — Whether Supreme Court can transfer guardianship cases Respondent-father argued that neither the Constitution nor the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, vests the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to transfer guardianship matters. Held, that Article 175(2) bars courts from exercising jurisdiction not conferred by law. However, the Family Courts Act, 1964, specifically confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to transfer cases under S. 25A(2b). Since the Family Court is deemed to be a District Court for GWA purposes (per S. 25, FCA), the Supreme Court’s authority to transfer family matters under S. 25A(2b) overrides any conflicting interpretation of GWA. (d) Welfare of Minors & Judicial Precedent — Consideration of hardship — Principle of welfare of minors Applicant-mother faced difficulties due to the absence of family support in Islamabad. Respondent-father was a permanent resident of Karachi and could conveniently follow proceedings there. Reliance was placed on Anne Zahra v. Tahir Ali Khilji (2001 SCMR 2000), affirming that matters related to minor custody fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts under FCA. Held, that transfer of proceedings to Karachi was justified in the best interest of minors. Disposition: Application allowed — Guardianship petition and family appeal transferred from Islamabad (East) to Karachi (East).

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 403---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 13---Qatl-i-amd---Sentence---Question of expectancy of life---Plea of double jeopardy---Scope---Principle of expectancy of life is relevant in the context of section 302(b), P.P.C., when the convict who has been handed down sentence of death has served equal to or more than the term of other prescribed legal punishment i.e. imprisonment for life during pendency of legal remedies provided under the law---Such question also becomes relevant when enhancement of sentence to death has been sought while the convict has already served out the sentence of imprisonment for life and has been or is yet to be released---In the latter case the discretion must be exercised in favour of the principle of life expectancy and, therefore, against enhancement, keeping in view the spirit of Article 13(a) of the Constitution---In case of former eventuality, principle of expectancy of life can be considered as a crucial mitigating or extenuating circumstance for considering modification of sentence from death to imprisonment for life---Such principle by itself and as a sole mitigating factor is not sufficient for a Court to exercise its discretion by commuting sentence of death to imprisonment for life---This is one of the factors to be taken into consideration along with some other or more than one mitigating factors---There is no general rule that serving out one of the legal sentences provided under section 302 (b), P.P.C., while pursuing legal remedies by itself entitles a convict to seek alteration of his or her sentence---Principle enshrined in section 403, Cr.P.C., is not attracted nor does the principle of expectancy of life entitle a convict to claim protection of guaranteed right under Article 13 (a) of the Constitution for the purposes of seeking modification of the sentence of death to imprisonment for life as of right. Abdul Malik and others v. The State and others PLD 2006 SC 365; Dilawar Hussain v. The State 2013 SCMR 1582; Shahid Ali v. The State PLD 1970 SC 447; Hassan and others v. The State and others PLD 2013 SC 793; Khalid Iqbal and others v. Mirza Khan and others PLD 2015 SC 50; Ghulam Rasool v. The State 2025 SCMR 74; Khalid v. The State 2024 SCMR 1474; Sikandar Hayat and another v. The State and others PLD 2020 SC 559 and Khadim Hussain v. Secretary, Ministry of Human Rights, Islamabad and others PLD 2020 Isl. 268 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302 (b)---Qatl-i-amd---Punishment---Death row phenomenon---Scope---Legislature while prescribing two alternate punishments under section 302(b), P.P.C., did not intend that a convict in addition would also be subjected to torture by treating him or her, as the case may be, in a cruel, inhumane and degrading manner---Condemned convict has no option and is, therefore, compelled to suffer agony of unauthorized punishment---Such an unauthorized punishment amounts to a penalty greater than or of a kind different from the penalty prescribed by law for the offence at the time it was committed---When death sentence confirmed under section 302(b), P.P.C., is executed after the convict has served prescribed term for imprisonment for life then such a condemned prisoner has suffered and is inflicted with three distinct punishments not envisaged under section 302(b), P.P.C.---This is a grave travesty of justice and an affront to the administration of criminal justice system and amounts to violation of right guaranteed under Article 12(b) of the Constitution---In such an eventuality, execution of sentence of death would mean serving out other alternate legal punishment of imprisonment for life and in addition enduring unauthorized penalty of being subjected to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Principle of expectancy of life---Mitigating circumstances---Converting death sentence into imprisonment for life---Accused was young in the year 1991 when the occurrence had taken place; he was accompanying his father and the motive was attributed to his father and not to him---Accused was convicted and sentenced to death on five counts---Validity---It could not be ruled out that accused might have acted under the influence of his elders, particularly his father---Accused did not have any criminal record prior to the occurrence and, therefore, he was a first time offender---Recovery of fire arm weapon was not free from doubt and evidence brought on record in such regard was not safe to be relied upon---In addition to such recognized mitigating factors, accused had served full term prescribed for alternate punishment of imprisonment for life without benefit of remissions---Supreme Court on account of such mitigating and extenuating circumstances, converted sentence of death on five counts to imprisonment for life on five counts---Supreme Court also extended benefit under section 382-B, Cr.P.C., in favour of accused---Appeal was allowed accordingly. Shahid Azeem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Sajjad Hussain, D.P.G. for the State. M.Ahsan Bhoon, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant. Date of gearing: 29th January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the accused-applicant was that he along with others committed murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Murder of deceased remained un-witnessed---On same set of evidence, the nominated accused persons were granted bail and after full-fledged trial they were acquitted of the charge by the Trial Court; whereas co-accused was also discharged during course of investigation---There was no direct evidence available in this case connecting the applicant in the alleged murder---Prosecution mainly relied upon the alleged confession made by the applicant before the Police---Mere abscondence of an accused is not conclusive proof of his guilt; it is only a suspicious circumstance against an accused that he is found guilty of the offence which cannot take the place of evidence; the value of abscondence, therefore, depends on the facts of each case---Abscondence is supporting evidence of the guilt of the accused, which is to be decided keeping in view the facts of the case---Mere abscondence is no ground to decline bail if, otherwise, the case of the accused is fit for bail on merits---Criminal trial's object is to make the accused face the trial and not punish an under trial prisoner for the offence alleged against him---Basic idea is to enable the accused to answer the criminal prosecution against him rather than rot behind bars---Bail cannot be withheld as punishment on an accusation of non-bailable offences against an accused---Application for bail was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations, if any, made in bail order shall not influence the case's merit at the trial. Zainatullah Tareen for Applicant. Abdul Kareem Malghani, State Counsel for the State. Date of hearing: 24th January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Sindh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----Ss. 44, 45 & 164(3)---Alteration/modification/cancellation of entries in revenue record---Scope---Suo motu jurisdiction to initiate such proceedings---Scope---Absence of proper inquiry and procedural safeguards---Effect---Challenge thrown to orders passed by the Member (Judicial-II), Board of Revenue, Sindh, being violative of Ss. 44, 45 & 164(3) of the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967 (Act)---Validity---Orders transgressed the jurisdictional bounds of the Member Judicial-II due to the absence of a proper inquiry as enjoined by S. 44 of the Act; also due to inadequate evidence to support the annulment as necessitated by S. 45 of the Act and failure to comply with the procedural safeguards enshrined in S. 164 of the Act---While assuming such jurisdiction, the Member (Judicial-II), BoR, Sindh, passed the orders without adhering to the procedural safeguards mandated by the Act, thereby acting ultra vires and failing to conduct a proper inquiry. rendering the orders void ab initio---Member (Judicial-II), BoR, Sindh, not only assumed jurisdiction illegally but also acted with material irregularity in promulgating the orders, which exceeded his scope and authority---Any deviation from the established procedural and statutory provisions constitutes a violation of law and procedure, consequently rendering the order illegal and mala fide---Impugned orders were held to be passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Mala fides--- ----Any deviation from the established procedural and statutory provisions constitutes a violation of law and procedure, consequently rendering the order illegal and mala fide. Zaman Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and others 2017 SCMR 1249 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Sindh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), Ss. 44, 45 & 164 (3)---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Error of law apparent on the face of the record---Board of Revenue, statutory duty of---Board of Revenue, at the top of the revenue hierarchy, has a statutory duty to interpret the law, apply it to individual cases that come before it and establish legal precedents for its subordinates to follow---Any errors in its understanding or application of the law, or in setting legal precedents, can and must be corrected within the constitutional jurisdiction---Failure to address these errors could undermine the rule of law. Haji Noorwar Jan v. Senior Member, Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P. Peshawar and others PLD 1991 SC 531 rel. Nazeer Hussain Jarwar, Assisted by: Maisum Hussain Sahar for Petitioner. Ayaz Ali Rajpar, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 15th January, 2025. (a) Declare the Impugned Order dated 12.9.2024 as null, void, and ab initio, as the learned Member Judicial-II of the Board of Revenue, Hyderabad, lacked the jurisdiction to entertain such Suo-Motu proceedings. (b) Declare that the initial proceedings initiated by the learned Member Judicial-II, Board of Revenue, Hyderabad, and the Order dated 24.6.2024 are null, void, and ab initio, as the learned Member Judicial-II, Board of Revenue, Hyderabad, lacked the jurisdiction to entertain such Suo-Motu proceedings.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 12.10.2022 of the High Court of Sindh Circuit Court Hyderabad passed in Crl. A. No. D-118 of 2020). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 367(5)---Qatl-i-amd---Quantum of sentence---Determining factor---Expression "having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case" is of significance in the context of exercising discretion by Court in handing down one of the two prescribed punishments---If accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death and Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, then under S. 367(5), Cr.P.C. the reason why sentence of death was not passed has to be recorded in the judgment. Dadullah and another v. The State 2015 SCMR 856; Khurram Malik and others v. The State and others PLD 2006 SC 354; Muhammad Aslam and another v. The State 2007 SCMR 1412; Ms. Najiba and another v. Ahmed Sultan and others 2001 SCMR 988; Khalid Mehmood and others v. The State 2011 SCMR 664; Asad Mahmood v. Akhlaq Ahmed and another 2010 SCMR 868 and Nadeem alias Nanha alias Billa Sher v. The State 2010 SCMR 949 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Mitigating circumstances---Motive not proved---Effect---Accused and three co-accused persons were convicted by Trial Court for committing Qatl-i-amd of wife of accused and were sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court acquitted three co-accused persons while sentence of accused was enhanced to death---Validity---Factum of motive was not proved by prosecution by bringing on record reliable and confidence inspiring evidence---All mitigating factors justified not handing down the sentence of death---Trial Court mentioned mitigating factors which had led to awarding sentence of life imprisonment---High Court had erroneously assumed that Trial Court did not record reasons---High Court enhanced sentence because, in its opinion, a harsher sentence should have been awarded---Supreme Court maintained conviction of accused as the prosecution had proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt but sentence of death was reduced to imprisonment for life as awarded by Trial Court---Appeal was partly allowed. Dilawar Hussain v. The State 2013 SCMR 1582; Hassan and others v. The State and others PLD 2013 SC 793; Ghulam Mohyuddin alias Haji Babu and others v. The State 2014 SCMR 1034; Muhammad Asif v. Muhammad Akhtar 2016 SCMR 2035; Zafar Iqbal v. The State 2017 SCMR 1721; Hassan v. The State PLD 2013 SC 793; Abdul Haque v. The State PLD 1996 SC 1; Amjad Shah v. The State PLD 2017 SC 152 and Haji Muhammad Ilahi and others v. Muhammad Altaf alias Tedi and others 2011 SCMR 513 rel. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 417---Appeal against acquittal---Scope of interference with acquittal is narrow---There is a heavy burden on prosecution as there is a presumption of double innocence. Ghulam Sajjad Gopang and Qari Abdul Rasheed, Advocates Supreme Court for Appellant. Ghulam Shabbir Shar, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant (though video link from Karachi) Saleem Akhtar, Additional Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 29th January, 2025.

Summary: Once a matter has been decided by a 'judicial' or 'quasi-judicial' authority, it will become 'functus officio' and on its own cannot modify the adjudicated matter subsequently.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Once a matter has been decided by a 'judicial' or 'quasi-judicial' authority, it will become 'functus officio' and on its own cannot modify the adjudicated matter subsequently. 744C.O. (Commercial) 6-21 IMRAN AHMED MALIK ETC VS SOHAWA FLOUR & GENERAL MILLS ETC Mr. Justice Jawad Hassan 28- 01- 2025 2025 LHC 2634 2025 CLD 884 [Lahore (Rawalpindi Bench)]

Summary: 743Tax (Writ) 44573/24 Amir Khan & 1 Other Vs Addl Collector of Customs etc Mr. Justice Abid Aziz Sheikh 29- 01- 2025 2025 LHC 131 2025 PTD 490 (Lahore High Court)