Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 185(3), 199(1)(b)(ii) & (5), 184(3) & 187—Quo warranto against Judges of Superior Courts—Scope; interim restraint—Maintainability to the extent of seeking information/examination of personal qualification to hold office distinguished from challenge to judicial acts—Held, while a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto may lie to examine a Superior Court Judge’s qualifications, a High Court cannot—in such proceedings under Art. 199—pass an interim order restraining the Judge from performing judicial functions, in view of Art. 199(5) and the settled law in PLD 1998 SC 161—Power to so restrain, if at all, lies only with the Supreme Court in exceptional circumstances in proceedings under Art. 184(3), aided by Art. 187. (b) High Courts—Practice & Procedure ----Interim order restraining a sitting Judge from “holding Court” during pendency of quo warranto petition—Illegality—Order set aside—Respondent No.1 (writ-petitioner) himself did not defend the restraint upon appreciating PLD 1998 SC 161; Attorney-General also supported the settled position—Impugned restraining portion held unsustainable. (c) High Court Office Objections / Registry Process ----Lahore High Court Rules & Orders, Vol. V, Ch. 1-A (as adopted by IHC)—Rules 9 & 9-A—Office objections must be decided first, through a speaking administrative order; only thereafter does the matter mature onto the judicial side—Bench directed that the Division Bench of the IHC shall first decide office objections and then proceed in accordance with law. (d) Administrative law—Reasoned orders ----S. 24-A, General Clauses Act, 1897—All administrative orders must be in writing and supported by reasons—“Verbal” or unreasoned directions lack legal sanctity—Principle reaffirmed. (e) Notice to Law Officers ----Order XXVII-A, C.P.C.—Matters involving interpretation of constitutional provisions—Notice to Attorney-General/Advocate-General—Compliance emphasized. (f) Additional note (concurring) by Shahid Bilal Hassan, J. ----Registry objections: nature and consequence—Proceedings on office objections are administrative; court must record reasons when overruling/sustaining them; ministerial staff cannot determine fate of petitions—Cited case law reiterating (i) written, reasoned administrative orders (S. 24-A GCA), and (ii) that deficient filings be placed before a Judge per Rules 9 & 9-A for appropriate orders (overrule; grant time; or dismiss, as the case may be). While concurring with the result, his Lordship underscores that bypassing the objection mechanism renders such orders legally infirm and the proper course is to restore status quo ante and decide objections first. (Concurring note; not a separate disposition.) Held: (i) High Court’s interim restraint preventing a sitting Judge from performing judicial functions in a quo warranto petition is without lawful authority and is set aside in light of PLD 1998 SC 161 and Art. 199(5); (ii) Division Bench of the Islamabad High Court shall first decide office objections by a speaking order and then proceed in accordance with law. Cited Cases: • Malik Asad Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1998 SC 161 (paras 77, 84) • Zahid Hussain v. The State, 1998 SCMR 611 • CDA v. Shaheen Farooq, 2007 SCMR 1328 • Farman Ali v. Muhammad Ishaq, PLD 2013 SC 392 • Muhammad Boota v. Basharat Ali, PLD 2014 Lahore 1; 2014 CLD 64 (Lahore) • Rana Naveed Ahmad Khan v. Province of Punjab, PLD 2014 Lahore 436 • Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2005 Lahore 107 • Tahira Naseem v. Arshad Mehmood, 2021 PCr.LJ 682 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed to the extent indicated—Impugned IHC order set aside insofar as it restrains the petitioner-Judge from holding Court; Division Bench of IHC directed to decide office objections first by a speaking order and thereafter proceed according to law.

Summary: Challenge to a s.37 STA notice couched in quo warranto-----The petitioners challenged the authority of an officer who issued notices (Impugned Notices) under section 37 of the Sales Tax Act 1990. The main contention revolves around the appointment of the issuing officer and whether they were authorized to hold office. The petitioners' contention is that the issuing officer wasn't appointed in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act. However, the respondents argued that the officer was duly appointed by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and that the appointment doesn't necessarily involve fresh recruitment. The court examined the jurisdiction, powers, and functions of the Directorate General Intelligence & Investigation ? Inland Revenue, under the Sales Tax Act 1990. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petitions, stating that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a valid cause of action for setting aside the notices. The court emphasized that the challenge to the officer's appointment seems to be a means to evade compliance with the inquiry process rather than a legitimate challenge. ----

Summary: (a) Balochistan Local Government Act (V of 2010)-------S. 24---Balochistan Zakat and Ushr Act (I of 2012), S. 23---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Local bodies elections---Qualification for candidates and electedmembers---Chairman District Zakat Committee---Public servant---Writ of quo warranto---Scope---Laches, principle of---Applicability---Contention of petitioner was that respondent beinggovernment contractor as well as Chairman of Local Zakat Committee was not eligible to contestlocal bodies election---Respondent contended that he had resigned from the post of ChairmanDistrict Zakat Committee---Validity---Nothing was on record that petitioner had any mala fideon his part or he was exploiting the process for personal gain---Principle of laches did not applyto writ of quo warranto as the cause of action was a recurring one---Chairman District ZakatCommittee being public servant would be barred from contesting the local bodies election---Respondent being Chairman of Local Zakat Committee was disqualified from being elected orchosen as a member of Municipal Committee---Notification of respondent as member ofMunicipal Committee was set aside and Election Commission was directed to delete his name from the list of validly returned candidates for Municipal Committee---Constitutional petitionwas accepted in circumstances.Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division,Islamabad and others PLD 2012 SC 132; PLD 2010 Lah. 625; 2010 PLC (C.S) 731; 2002 PLC(C.S) 274; Malik Umar Aslam v. Mrs. Sumaira Malik and others 2014 SCMR 45; MuhammadKhan v. Amanullah PLD 2014 Bal. 128 and Mirza Muhammad Tufail v. District ReturningOfficer PLD 2007 SC 16 rel.(b) Balochistan Zakat and Ushr Act (I of 2012)-------S. 23---Chairman of District Zakat Committee---Status---Chairman District Zakat Committeebeing nominated by the Government in consultation with the Provincial Council would bedeemed to be a public servant.(c) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199---Writ of quo-warranto---Laches, principle of---Applicability---Principle of lachesdid not apply to writ of quo-warranto, cause of action being recurring one.

Summary: Dismissed---The law on the scope of writ of quo warranto is based upon the illuminating judgments given by the august court. In the case, PLD 1965 Supreme Court 52, it was held that to invoke jurisdiction under Article 199 for quo warranto a person is not required to establish his locus standi. Scanning of the above referred judgements and applying the dicta laid down therein, it is safely concluded that the peition was motivated, therefore, the writ of quo warranto could not be issued. However, respondent was directed to re-scrutinize the qualification and grade of Principal Medical Officers already posted in District Headquarter Hospitals throughout Province of the Punjab as per their eligibility criteria and intimate this Court through the Deputy Registrar of the court.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (Interim Constitution, 1974) –– Art. 44(2)(b)(ii) –– Writ of quo warranto –– Nature and scope –– Exercise of discretion by High Court. Petition filed by former Prime Minister sought issuance of writ of quo warranto against the incumbent Prime Minister, challenging his authority to hold office. Court reaffirmed that writ of quo warranto lies to determine whether a person holding a public office is legally authorized to do so. Such proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial; the petitioner acts merely as a relator or “whistle-blower.” Relief under quo warranto is discretionary and not to be issued as a matter of course on technicalities or political motivations. Petitioner must demonstrate bona fides and approach the Court with clean hands. Judicial review, while available, remains subject to prudence and respect for constitutional boundaries governing political questions and internal proceedings of the Assembly. — The Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah (AIR 1962 SC 584); Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. v. Said Rehman (2013 SCMR 642); Dr. Kamal Hussain v. Muhammad Siraj-ul-Islam (PLD 1969 SC 42); Barrister Sardar Muhammad v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 Lahore 343) ref. (b) Doctrine of laches and acquiescence –– Delay in invoking constitutional jurisdiction –– Conduct of petitioner. Petition was filed nearly two years after election of the incumbent Premier. Although there is no estoppel against law, the doctrine of laches applies where petitioner’s conduct indicates acquiescence or undue delay. Extraordinary relief such as setting aside election of a sitting Prime Minister requires timely, clean-handed invocation and qualitative proof. Delay and participation in the earlier election process were material factors to be examined at hearing. — Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani v. Sain Mullah, Advocate (PLD 1993 SC AJK 12); Muhammad Tahir v. Chairman Board of Governors (2022 MLD 1294) ref. (c) Art. 29(6) & (7) –– Office of Speaker –– Vacancy –– Resignation –– Constitutional construction. High Court observed that under Article 29(7) the office of Speaker or Deputy Speaker becomes vacant only if (i) the incumbent ceases to be a member of the Assembly or (ii) he is removed through a resolution of the Assembly. No provision exists for vacation of office by resignation, unlike corresponding Articles 53(7) of the Constitution of Pakistan and 94 of the Constitution of India. Legislature’s deliberate omission of “resignation” in Article 29(7) signifies intent; the provision must be harmoniously construed with Article 29(6) to determine whether a resigning Speaker continues until successor’s election. (d) Art. 34(1) & (4) –– Internal proceedings of the Assembly –– Bar of judicial interference –– Maintainability of writ. Question framed whether High Court can intervene in matters constituting “internal proceedings” of the Assembly, given the express constitutional bar in Article 34. Judicial review is permissible only where constitutional provisions are violated or where acts are performed without lawful authority; otherwise, Courts refrain from interfering with internal management of legislative business. (e) Art. 17(2) –– Session of Assembly –– Election of Prime Minister –– Constitutional compliance. Court noted the necessity to determine whether Assembly was lawfully in session at the time of ouster of former Premier and whether President summoned the Assembly within fourteen days as mandated for election of a new Prime Minister. Validity of the election depends upon strict observance of procedural requirements in Article 17(2). (f) Art. 42-B –– Binding effect of Supreme Court decisions –– Limitation for filing constitutional petitions. Reference made to Syed Altaf Hussain Bukhari v. Zeeshan Shaukat (2022 SCR 1088) where Supreme Court emphasized that petitions filed after inordinate delay without explanation are barred by laches. High Court directed that this ratio decidendi must guide all subordinate courts in view of Article 42-B making Supreme Court judgments binding throughout AJ&K. (g) Proceedings –– Admission of petition for regular hearing –– Framing of questions of law. Given constitutional significance, petition admitted for regular hearing. Six law points formulated concerning judicial review, Assembly procedure, Speaker’s resignation, validity of Prime-Ministerial election, and delay. Office directed to array all 48 Members of the Legislative Assembly who voted for the incumbent as necessary respondents to ensure full representation. Respondents ordered to file written statements and supporting documents before next date. Held: Writ petition admitted for regular hearing to determine constitutional questions relating to validity of the election of the Prime Minister, interpretation of Articles 17, 29, 34 and 44, and applicability of doctrines of laches and internal-proceedings bar. Notices issued to all concerned Members of Legislative Assembly for response.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 199---Writ of quo warranto---Appointment of Chairman NADRA---Caretaker Government’s powers---Judicial overreach---Scope of High Court’s jurisdiction. The respondent challenged the appointment of Chairman NADRA through a writ petition, contending that the appointment was ultra vires the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (Ordinance, 2000). The appointment was made by the Caretaker Government under Section 3(3) of the Ordinance, 2000, read with Rule 7A of the NADRA (Appointment and Emoluments of Chairman and Members) Rules, 2020. During the pendency of the writ petition, the elected Federal Government endorsed the insertion of Rule 7A and confirmed the appointment through notifications dated 28.03.2024. High Court, in suo motu exercise, struck down Rule 7A and declared the appointment of Chairman NADRA as without lawful authority. The Supreme Court held that High Courts have no suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The writ petition became infructuous as it did not challenge the subsequent notifications confirming the appointment, rendering the High Court’s decision beyond its lawful jurisdiction. Judicial overreach was evident as the High Court encroached upon the executive’s domain. ----Cited Cases: Federal Government Employees Housing Authority v. Ednan Syed (Civil Petition No.767 of 2022, SC, 20.11.2024) Dr. Imran Khattak v. Ms. Sofia Waqar Khattak (2014 SCMR 122) Jahanzaib Malik v. Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (2018 SCMR 414) Mian Irfan Bashir v. The Deputy Commissioner, Lahore (PLD 2021 SC 571) Messrs Sadiq Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (PLD 2023 SC 236) (b) Elections Act, 2017: ----S. 230---Caretaker Government’s powers---Limitations on policy decisions---Amendment of NADRA Rules, 2020---Effect. The Caretaker Government amended Rule 7A of the NADRA (Appointment and Emoluments of Chairman and Members) Rules, 2020, allowing appointment of a serving BPS-21 officer as Chairman NADRA. The amendment was later ratified by the elected Federal Government. The Supreme Court held that under Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017, a Caretaker Government is restricted from making major policy decisions, but it may act in public interest if the action is reversible by an elected government. Since the elected government validated the amendment and appointment, the challenge against the initial appointment was rendered academic. (c) Judicial Review and Separation of Powers: ----Judicial overreach---Encroachment on executive functions---Scope of High Court’s interference in government appointments. Supreme Court reiterated that courts must not overstep their constitutional mandate by interfering in executive decisions, particularly regarding appointments. It held that appointments fall within the exclusive domain of the executive, and judicial intervention beyond statutory limits amounts to judicial overreach. A High Court cannot, on its own motion, invalidate rules or appointments that have been duly made and ratified by the competent authority. ----Disposition: Intra Court Appeal allowed, High Court’s judgment dated 06.09.2024 set aside, and Writ Petition No.12091/2024 dismissed.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974): ----Ss. 43(2-A) & 44----Elevation of Judges to High Court----Requirement of consultation----Maintainability of writ of quo-warranto----Petition challenging the appointment of respondents as Judges of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir on the ground that consultation required under S. 43(2-A) of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 was not duly conducted----Held, consultation process was completed before the issuance of notification, and both consultees/authorities were consistent in their stand----Even if any irregularity in the process of consultation occurred, it was an act of the appointing authority and not a ground to declare the appointments illegal----Petitioners failed to establish that respondents were not holding office under lawful authority. (b) Constitutional Law----Quo-warranto: ----Issuance of writ of quo-warranto----Necessity to prove unlawful occupation of office----Petitioners were not required to be aggrieved persons in a writ of quo-warranto, but they had to establish that the respondents were holding office without lawful authority----Held, burden to prove that appointment was illegal rested on the petitioners, which they failed to discharge----Court found that the appointment process had been conducted as per constitutional provisions and no illegality was found in the impugned notification----Petition was dismissed. (c) Laches----Delay in filing writ petition: ----Unexplained delay of over four years in challenging appointments----Petitioners had been appearing before the respondent Judges without raising any objection----Court held that inordinate delay without plausible explanation militated against the bona fides of the petitioners----Writ of quo-warranto cannot be issued as a matter of course where laches and questionable intent are evident. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984): ----Art. 87(2)----Filing of certified copies of impugned notification----Maintainability of writ petition----Petitioners failed to annex certified copies of the impugned notification with the writ petition as required under law----Held, under Art. 87(2) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, read with Rule 32(2) of the AJK High Court Procedure Rules, 1984, such a petition was not maintainable----Petition dismissed on this ground alone. (e) Independence of Judiciary: ----Appointment of Judges----Judicial impartiality----Court held that the petitioners had failed to establish any mala fide in the appointment of the respondents----The mere fact that the petitioners had appeared before the respondents as lawyers for several years without raising objections indicated that their petition lacked bona fides----Petition appeared to be vexatious rather than aimed at upholding the rule of law. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Rafiq & Others v. Muhammad Pervaiz & Others [2005 SCMR 128] Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan [PLD 2009 Kar. 408] PLD 1993 SC (AJK) 12 Ghulam Mustafa v. AJK Govt. & Others [1991 MLD 2681] P.L. Lakhanpal v. Ajit Nath Ray, Chief Justice of India & Others [AIR 1975 Delhi 66] Masud ul Hassan v. Khadim Hussain [PLD 1963 SC 203] M. Manohar Reddy & Anr v. Union of India & Ors [AIR 2013 SC 795] S.P. Gupta & Others v. President of India & Others [AIR 1982 SC 149] ----Disposition: Writ petition dismissed in limine due to non-maintainability, laches, lack of bona fides, and failure to establish unlawful occupation of office.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Azad Jammu & Kashmir— ----Sections 3, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44 & 56-C— Vires of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Shariat Court (Amendment) Ordinance XVIII of 2014 challenged—Ordinance promulgated contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bashir Ahmed Mughal v. Azad Govt. (PLD 2015 SC (AJ&K) 31)—Failure of the official respondents to provide constitutional cover to the Shariat Court as directed by the apex Court—The Ordinance, instead of amending the Constitution Act, was issued to circumvent the judgment—Held, under Section 41(1) of the Constitution Act, 1974, an Ordinance cannot be promulgated when the Assembly is in session—The Ordinance was placed before the Legislative Assembly but was subsequently promulgated after prorogation of the session, making it an act of mala fide intent—Further, appointments made under the impugned Ordinance were non-transparent, against the principle of judicial independence, and in violation of precedent. ----Cited Cases: • Bashir Ahmed Mughal v. Azad Govt. (PLD 2015 SC (AJ&K) 31) • Muhammad Younas Tahir v. Shoukat Aziz (PLD 2012 SC (AJ&K) 42) • Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 483) • S.P. Gupta v. President of India (AIR 1982 SC 149) (b) Judiciary—Independence of Judiciary—Appointments of Judges— ----Consultation process for appointments—Principle of effective and meaningful consultation— Recommendations and appointment notifications for Judges of the Shariat Court were issued in contravention of Supreme Court directives—Failure to consult the Chief Justices in a meaningful and result-oriented manner—Judges appointed under the impugned Ordinance were previously removed by the Supreme Court for political favoritism and lack of merit—Held, independence of the judiciary requires a transparent, merit-based, and non-political appointment process—Appointments made under the Ordinance lacked essential procedural safeguards and were, therefore, void ab initio. ----Cited Cases: • Muhammad Younas Tahir v. Shoukat Aziz (PLD 2012 SC (AJ&K) 42) • Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 483) (c) Writ of Quo Warranto—Maintainability— ----Challenge to the appointment of Judges of the Shariat Court through writ petition— Respondents contended that under Section 44(5) of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974, recommendations of Chief Justices were immune from judicial review—Held, writ of quo warranto was maintainable as the Supreme Court and High Court were excluded from the definition of "person" under Section 44(5), but the Shariat Court was not—Appointments could be reviewed by the High Court to ensure compliance with constitutional provisions—Fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings; therefore, even appointments made through recommendations can be challenged when procured through misrepresentation or undue political influence. ----Cited Cases: • Ghulam Mustafa Mughal v. The Azad Govt. (1992 MLD 2083) • Amjad Hussain v. Ghulam Rasool Mir (1991 PCr.LJ 685) • Dr. Azim-ur-Rehman Khan Meo v. Government of Sindh (2004 SCMR 1299) (d) Ordinance-Making Power—Scope & Limitations— ----Legislative process and procedural irregularities— The impugned Ordinance was promulgated despite the fact that a Bill on the same subject had already been placed before the Legislative Assembly—Held, Ordinance-making power under Section 41(1) of the Constitution Act, 1974, is subject to preconditions, including the absence of a session of the Assembly—Promulgation of an Ordinance after placing a Bill before the Assembly undermines legislative authority and constitutes an act of bad faith—Where an Ordinance is promulgated a day before or after an Assembly session, it raises serious questions about its legality and necessity. ----Cited Cases: • Bidya Chaudhary v. Province of Bihar (AIR 1950 Patna 19) • Reference No.01 of 2012 by the President of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 279) -----Disposition: The writ petition was accepted—The impugned Azad Jammu and Kashmir Shariat Court (Amendment) Ordinance XVIII of 2014 was declared unconstitutional and set aside—Appointments of respondents No. 5 and 6 to the Shariat Court were declared void—The respondents ceased to hold office forthwith.

Summary: The DOW University of Health Sciences Act, 2004 (Dow Employees (Service) Statute, 2007) - The caption petition has raised substantial questions of law involving interpretation of the certain provisions of The DOW University of Health Sciences Act, 2004 (`Act-2004`) and the Dow Employees (Service) Statute, 2007, and the principles governing the Writ of Quo Warranto as well as the power of the syndicate/competent authority of respondent-University to make a contractual appointment under the Act-2004 as amended up-to-date and Service Statute 2007--In our view, the evaluation made by an Expert Committee of respondent-university ought not to be easily interfered with by this Court which does not have the necessary expertise to undertake the exercise that is necessary for such purpose. It is a settled proposition that the competent authority, within its power to make its assessment, has to assess the candidature of a candidate for regular appointment or on contract basis, on case to case basis. On the aforesaid proposition, we are fortified with the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Ashraf Sangri v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2014 SCMR 157). In the instant case, prima-facie, the competent authority has assessed the candidature of the private respondents and appointed them in the respondent-university, which does not require interference at our end.

Summary: Service Matter; Quo Warranto1. Appointment of an ad hoc appointee / Professor as Principal of a Medical College challenged; Held No2. Exercise of Discretion in such matter; guidelines