Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 211 & 215---Attorney and principal---Fiduciary obligation---Transfer of principal’s property by attorney in favour of his own sons---Validity---Attorney, acting under registered general power of attorney, transferred principal’s inherited property in favour of his own sons through registered sale deed and mutation---Principal subsequently revoked power of attorney and sought cancellation of sale deed and mutation on ground of misuse of authority, fraud and absence of consent---Held, that attorney stands in fiduciary relationship with principal and cannot validly transfer principal’s property in favour of himself or his close relatives without prior permission, approval and consent of principal after full disclosure of material circumstances---Transfer in favour of sons of attorney, without proof of express consent of principal, was legally unsustainable. Cited Cases: • Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan PLD 1985 SC 341 • Maqsood Ahmad v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Jamil Akhtar v. Las Baba PLD 2003 SC 494 • Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Malik PLD 2008 SC 389 • Allah Bakhsh v. Muhammad Riaz PLD 2025 SC 63 (b) Power of attorney--- ----General power of attorney---Authority to alienate immovable property---Scope---General power of attorney does not, merely by reason of being described as “general”, automatically include authority to sell or alienate property of principal---Such authority must be contained in a clear and specific clause, and even then Court must examine whether principal’s knowledge, intention and consent are clearly established---Held, that implied authority to alienate property is not readily deducible from vague or general words, particularly where principal alleges fraud or misrepresentation. Cited Case: • Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan PLD 1985 SC 341 (c) Power of attorney--- ----Attorney purchasing or transferring property for his own benefit or for benefit of close relatives---Special permission of principal---Requirement---Attorney transferred suit property in favour of his own sons---Held, that where attorney intends to deal with principal’s property for his own benefit or in favour of close fiduciary relations, he must obtain special permission/prior approval of principal---Failure to obtain such consent entitles principal to repudiate transaction---Burden lies heavily upon attorney and beneficiaries to establish valid consent and lawful authority. Cited Cases: • Maqsood Ahmad v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Jamil Akhtar v. Las Baba PLD 2003 SC 494 • Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Malik PLD 2008 SC 389 • Allah Bakhsh v. Muhammad Riaz PLD 2025 SC 63 (d) Sale by attorney--- ----Transfer in favour of attorney’s sons---Absence of express written consent---Effect---No cogent or reliable evidence was produced to prove that principal had granted express consent or prior approval for transfer of suit property in favour of attorney’s sons---Held, that in absence of such consent, transaction was hit by settled principles governing fiduciary obligations of attorney and could not be sustained. (e) Sale transaction--- ----Payment through cheque---Proof of sale consideration---Evidentiary value---Attorney/brother relied upon alleged cheque payment in favour of principal/sister to support sale transaction---Held, that payment through cheque, by itself, was not conclusive proof of valid sale transaction, particularly where no agreement to sell or independent corroborative evidence existed to show lawful bargain---Mere production of payment, without proof of underlying transaction and principal’s informed consent, did not satisfy legal standard required to validate alienation of immovable property. (f) Fraud and misuse of authority--- ----Power of attorney executed due to close familial relationship---Subsequent sale in favour of attorney’s sons---Material alteration in written statement regarding consideration---Effect---Principal had executed power of attorney in favour of appellant due to close familial relations for management of suit property---Attorney later transferred property in favour of his sons---Appellants initially pleaded purchase for valuable consideration, but later materially altered alleged sale consideration in amended written statement without explanation---Held, that surrounding circumstances, fiduciary relationship, absence of proven consent and inconsistency regarding consideration supported conclusion that authority had been misused and transaction was not legally sustainable. (g) Civil suit--- ----Cancellation of sale deed and mutation---Attorney’s unauthorized transfer---Trial Court decree restored by High Court---Supreme Court refusal to interfere---Trial Court decreed suit for cancellation; appellate Court reversed; High Court restored Trial Court decree---Supreme Court held that core question was whether attorney could validly transfer principal’s property to his own sons without express written consent and whether such consent had been proved---No reliable evidence of prior approval or express consent having been produced, High Court rightly restored decree of Trial Court---Appeal was dismissed. Disposition: Appeal was dismissed. Supreme Court upheld High Court judgment dated 06.10.2025 whereby decree of Trial Court cancelling the impugned sale deed and mutation was restored. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Concurrent findings of lower courts—Judicial review—Scope of interference—Held, concurrent findings of facts recorded by courts below are not sacrosanct and can be interfered with where found to be arbitrary, perverse, or contrary to law. Reliance placed on Hajid Wajdad v. Provincial Government (2020 SCMR 2046) and Subedar (Retd.) Jamil Khan v. Salim Khan (2017 SCMR 860). (b) Power of Attorney—Revocation ----Attorney's authority—Condition of prior permission—Held, an attorney acting on a General Power of Attorney cannot transfer property in favor of themselves or their kith and kin without obtaining specific written permission from the principal. Failure to meet this condition renders such transactions invalid. Relying on Mst. Naila Kausar v. Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh (2016 SCMR 1781) and Mst. Shumal Begum v. Mst. Gulzar Begum (1994 SCMR 818). (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O.VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Effect—Dismissal of a prior suit for injunction or related proceedings does not bar subsequent suits seeking relief for distinct causes of action, such as cancellation of fraudulent transactions. Held, the doctrine of election or res judicata does not apply in such cases. (d) Fraudulent transactions ----Fraud—Effect on transactions—Fraudulent transfer of property by an attorney in favor of their real brother based on a revoked General Power of Attorney. Held, fraud vitiates even solemn proceedings, and a transaction executed in such circumstances cannot sustain. (e) Sale Deeds ----Proof of consideration—Burden of proof—Beneficiary of a sale deed is required to establish the validity of the transaction, including proof of consideration and transfer of possession. In the absence of evidence of consideration, the transaction is deemed invalid. Cited Cases: • Mst. Naila Kausar v. Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh (2016 SCMR 1781) • Mst. Shumal Begum v. Mst. Gulzar Begum (1994 SCMR 818) • Hajid Wajdad v. Provincial Government (2020 SCMR 2046) • Subedar (Retd.) Jamil Khan v. Salim Khan (2017 SCMR 860) ----- Disposition: Petition allowed. Concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below set aside. Suit for cancellation of the sale deed decreed in favor of the petitioners. No order as to costs.

Summary: '' i). Distinction between a suit for cancellation and suit for declaration. ii). Applicability of Articles 91 and 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "Act 1908") iii). Scope and import of Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1872"). iv). Agreement to sell (Exhibit-P1) which was produced in the statement of learned counsel for the "appellant" is not permissible at all.'' Background:The case involves Abdul Ghafoor (appellant) against Babar Sultan Jadoon (respondent) and three other respondents in a legal dispute concerning property transactions that stem from a power of attorney and subsequent sales agreements. Abdul Ghafoor, through a general power of attorney, authorized Babar Sultan Jadoon, who subsequently executed sale deeds of the said property in favor of his brothers (respondents No.2 & 3). Ghafoor contested these deeds and sought their cancellation, claiming misrepresentation and fraud, leading to the initial suit's dismissal by a Civil Judge, prompting the appeal to the Lahore High Court.----Issues:Validity of the sale deeds and general power of attorney based on claims of fraud and misrepresentation.Whether the plaintiff (Ghafoor) was entitled to various compensations and recoveries as outlined in his suit.Applicability of statutes from the Limitation Act concerning the timing of the suit.The legitimacy of Ghafoor's claims under specific articles of the Contract Act regarding the irrevocability of the power of attorney.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial court's judgment. It was determined that:The power of attorney was legitimately executed and became irrevocable because it was coupled with an interest, confirmed by payment and agreements related to the property.The suit filed by Ghafoor was time-barred under the applicable statutes from the Limitation Act.There was overwhelming evidence supporting the respondents' execution of the sale agreements as per the authorized power of attorney.Claims of fraud and misrepresentation brought by Ghafoor were not substantiated adequately, thus affirming the legal standing of the sale deeds.----Citations/Precedents:Mst. Izzat vs. Allah Ditta (PLD 1981 Supreme Court 165)Fida Muhammad vs. Pir Muhammad Khan (Deceased) Through Legal Heirs and Others (PLD 1985 Supreme Court 341)Muhammad Ajaib vs. Mughal Hussain and 2 others (2004 YLR 690)Media Max (Pvt) Ltd. through Chief Executive vs. Army Communication Pvt. Ltd. through Chief Executive and another (PLD 2013 Sindh 555)Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi vs. Syed Rashid Arshad and others (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 212)Imam Din and 4 others vs. Bashir Ahmed and 10 others (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 418)S.K. Shah through LRs vs. Jamaluddin and others (2017 SCMR 626)Muhammad Aslam vs. Mst. Ferozi and others (PLD 2001 Supreme Court 213)Manzoor Hussain (deceased) through L.Rs. vs. Misri Khan (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 749)

Summary: The case involves a dispute over the ownership and sale of commercial property No.B-2(b) in Liaquat Market, Iqbal Road, Rawalpindi. The property was originally rented out to Raja Ali Zaman and Raja Muhammad Banaras by the Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB). The appellants sought outright sale of the property, which was initially approved by the Federal Minister for Social Welfare & Rural Development but later restrained by the Federal Government. The ETPB filed a suit against the appellants for declaration, cancellation of the sale deed, and injunction. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-objection of the appellants on Issue No. 1. The High Court, however, set aside the judgments of the lower courts and decreed the suit of the ETPB. The main argument raised by the appellants is that the High Court erred in heavily relying on a judgment passed by the Supreme Court in a different case (Messrs. Mustafa Impex, Karachi & others v. Govt. of Pakistan thr. Secretary Finance, Islamabad & others). They argue that the constitutional provision cited in that judgment does not apply to their case as it was enacted after the sale deed was executed. On the other hand, the ETPB argues that the sale deed was executed incompetently and in violation of relevant ETPB laws and rules. They contend that no approval was granted by the Federal Government for the sale and that the entire process was initiated through an unauthorized memorandum. They emphasize that the sale of ETPB-owned land can only proceed with proper authorization and approval. The Supreme Court is tasked with determining the following questions:1) Under what law or rules is ETPB authorized to sell property under its ownership? 2) How can authorization be granted for the sale of land under ETPB's management/control by the Federal Government or ETPB itself? 3) If there is a violation of law, rules, or procedure, what effect would it have on the parties' rights? During the pendency of the appeal, an application was filed to implead various persons who had subsequently purchased shops in the suit property. Supreme Court stated that if there was no approval from the Federal Government, the Sale Deed itself would be considered illegal and ineffective because, according to Article 173 of the Constitution, the President would not be deemed to have approved the sale of the suit property through the Federal Government. The High Court correctly concluded that the Sale Deed was obtained without the approval of the Federal Government, rendering it illegal and void from the beginning. Based on the discussion above, Supreme Court stated that the High Court's judgment is well-reasoned and has reached the correct conclusion after considering all the available evidence. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants has not identified any misinterpretation or omission of evidence, nor has he provided any grounds to support a different perspective from that of the High Court. Therefore, this appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.

Summary: [Specific Relief Act, (Section 27 - Relief against subsequent buyer )] Sale deed of appellant as being enjoyed by appellant cannot be set-aside automatically as the defence of the appellant isprotected being buyer without notice of any dispute. As stated above it has tobe proved independently through impartial evidence failing whereof theaforesaid provisions of law would protect the title of appellant. Section 27(b) isfor enforcing performance against those who acquired title with knowledge ofprevious agreement/contracts, whereas section 41 of Transfer of Property Actprotect title for those who acquired title without knowledge of previous litigation.Since it is a case of cancellation of sale deed I am of the view that section 41 ofTransfer of Property Act is more appropriate for its application

Summary: (a) Limitation Act, 1908 –– Arts. 142, 120 & S. 18 –– Suit for cancellation of sale-deed executed in 1953 –– Challenge raised after more than 50 years –– Duty to plead fraud with specific particulars –– Applicability of limitation - The Supreme Court held that a challenge to a sale-deed executed on 06.09.1953 on the ground of minority must be instituted within 12 years from attaining majority, under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The plaintiff, having filed the suit on 01.12.2005, failed to disclose how and when he allegedly acquired knowledge of the transaction, thereby falling afoul of Order VII, Rule 6, C.P.C. and Section 18 of the Limitation Act. –––Held, plaint lacked sufficient grounds for exemption from limitation and failed to disclose the circumstances under which the plaintiff came to know of the sale-deed. Suit was hopelessly time-barred and liable to be dismissed. [Raja Muhammad Aftab Ahmed v. Raja Muhammad Iftikhar Khan (Civil Appeal No.117/2019, decided 28.01.2020) followed.] (b) Guardianship –– Applicability of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 in AJ&K in 1953 –– Execution of sale-deed by sibling in absence of formal guardianship certificate –– Effect The appellant contended that at the time of the disputed transaction, the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 was not in force in AJ&K and that an application was made before the Sub-Registrar for appointment of a guardian, which became part of the sale-deed. –––Held, even if the legal requirement of formal guardianship certificate did not apply, the suit remained barred by limitation and failed on procedural non-compliance. (c) Procedural Law –– C.P.C., 1908 –– O. VII, R. 6 –– Failure to state grounds for exemption from limitation in plaint –– Consequence The Court emphasized the mandatory nature of Order VII, Rule 6, C.P.C., which requires a plaintiff instituting a time-barred suit to disclose the grounds for exemption from limitation. Failure to comply renders the plaint materially defective. –––Held, in absence of specific averments showing fraudulent concealment or how knowledge was acquired, the plea of limitation exemption could not be sustained. Disposition: Appeal accepted; judgments and decrees of High Court and trial Court set aside to the extent of challenge to sale-deed dated 06.09.1953; suit held to be time-barred and dismissed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XVII, Rr. 2 & 3 & O. IX---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 39---Suit fordeclaration and cancellation of sale-deed---Dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution and lackof interest---Effect---Appellate Court upheld the Trial Court's view---Validity---Held, thatthere was distinction between R.2 & R.3 of the O.XVII, C.P.C.; in R. 2 of the said Order,where the suit was adjourned, the parties or any of them failed to appear, the Court couldproceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes prescribed under O.IX, C.P.C. or couldmake such order as it thought fit; while under R. 3, when time was granted and any partyfailed to produce his evidence or to cause the attendance of his witnesses or to perform anyother act, which was necessary for further progress of the suit, on default, the Court wouldproceed to decide the suit forthwith---To attract the procedure laid down under O.XVII, R.3of the C.P.C.; firstly adjournment must have been on the instance of a party and secondlythere must be material on record for the Court to peruse and decide the case---Forproceedings under O. XVII, R. 3, C.P.C., there had to be material to decide the suitforthwith---Trial Court, in the present case, proceeded to decide the suit forthwith, withouthaving any material before it, and thus, had acted in its jurisdiction illegally and withmaterial irregularity---Trial Court, in the present case, had not even discussed the materialavailable on record and dismissed the suit for lack of interest and non-prosecution, which didnot fulfil the requirement of O. XVII, R. 3, C.P.C.---While Appellate Court decided the caseon merit and suit was dismissed on the ground that land-in-question was unsettled one,therefore, the plaintiff had no title---Said judgment of the Appellate Court was not accordingto the law as there was no provision in the law where the settlement having not beenconducted by the concerned state functionaries, the inhabitant(s) of the Unsettled Areaswould lose his/their title---High Court set aside the decrees and judgments passed by both theCourts below and remanded the case to the Trial Court with direction to provide twoopportunities to the petitioner/plaintiff to produce his evidence---Revision was allowed, incircumstances.Muhammad Haleem v. H. H. Muhammad Naim PLD 1969 SC 270 and TanzeemCorporation Gupis/Yasin v. Momin Shah 2016 CLC 1490 ref.(b) Title-------Property---Title was to be decided on the basis of evidence and not on presumptions andconjunctions.

Summary: The petitioner had filed a suit seeking the cancellation of a sale deed, executed in favor of the respondent/defendant No.1. The petitioner claimed ownership of 55-Kanals of land in Khewat No. 373, Khatoni Number 489, located in village Karbath, Lahore Cantt, based on a sale deed and mutation No. 1 sanctioned. The respondent No.1/defendant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C for the rejection of the plaintiff's suit. The trial court dismissed the application, but the Additional District Judge accepted the revision petition filed by the respondent No.1/defendant. Dissatisfied with this decision, the petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the judgment, relying on legal precedents, including cases such as S.M. Sham Ahmad Zaidi through Legal Heirs Vs Malik Hassan Ali Khan (2002 SCMR 338) and Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation Ltd Vs Mian Abdul Latif and others (PLD 2008 SC 371). The petitioner's argument centered on the contention that, while applying Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the court should confine itself to the averments in the plaint and not go beyond its contents. However, the court, after considering the arguments and examining the record, found that the defendant/respondent No.1 had purchased land through a sale deed in 2003, but the revenue authorities failed to enter/sanction the purchase in the revenue record through mutation. The court noted that the mutation is not a document of title but for fiscal purposes only. It further revealed that the sellers and the present buyer/plaintiff had fraudulently obtained the "Fard" of the sold land and executed a sale deed in 2014, mutating it through collusion with the revenue authorities. The court found the petitioner's claim of purchasing the land with possession to be implausible, as the respondent No.1 had already taken possession in 2003, carried out development works, and allotted plots to various individuals. In conclusion, the court upheld the decision of the revisional court, stating that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any legal infirmity in the judgment and decree. As a result, the writ petition was dismissed, and the rejection of the plaintiff's suit was affirmed, with the court having relied on the available legal precedents and the factual details presented in the record.

Summary: This writ petition challenged an order in which the Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, canceled a sale deed for land allotted to the petitioner by the Chief Minister for establishing an Art Academy. The petitioner argued that the Chief Minister had the authority to sell state land through private treaty, making the cancellation illegal. However, the court noted that the Chief Minister, as the custodian of state assets, cannot sell state land through private treaty. Referring to legal precedents, the court emphasized that state land must be disposed of through fair and transparent means, such as public auction, to prevent favoritism and nepotism. Additionally, the court highlighted that actions beyond legal jurisdiction, against public policy, or involving fraud are considered void. The writ petition was dismissed, affirming the cancellation of the sale deed by the Board of Revenue.

Summary: (a) Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967) – Section 147, Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Section 44, and Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Sections 42 & 39 – Suit for declaration regarding a sale deed by a co-sharer within the context of private and family partition – The plaintiff argued that they were the owner in possession of the disputed land through a private partition, and the sale deed executed by the defendant exceeded the latter's fractional share. The suit was dismissed by both lower courts. Legal Validity – A co-sharer can alienate a particular portion of land, provided it does not exceed their overall share in the Khewat (a unit of joint property). A co-sharer cannot transfer land from a Khewat beyond their proportional share. In this case, the plaintiff and defendant, being brothers and co-sharers, were bound by these principles. The sale deed executed by the defendant exceeded his share and was, therefore, not legally sustainable. The courts below failed to correctly interpret the evidence, leading to a misapplication of the law. The Khewat remains a separate entity, and shares within different Khewats cannot be consolidated or transferred indiscriminately. The law dictates that no party can transfer the interest of other co-sharers, even if they are not physically in possession. Each co-sharer is considered in possession of every portion of the joint property. A private or family partition is only recognized if it is approved by a Revenue Officer, and there was no evidence in this case that such a partition had occurred. Without an official partition, no exclusive rights to a specific portion of the land can be claimed. A co-sharer, even in exclusive possession of part of the property, cannot transfer that land in a way that alters its joint nature or affects the rights of other co-owners. Therefore, the impugned sale deed and the judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the appeal was allowed. Relevant Case Law: Mst. Nazir Begum v. Muhammad Ayyub and another, 1993 SCR 321 Syed Musarrat Shah and another v. Syed Ahmed Shah alias Lal Bacha and others, PLD 2012 Pesh.151 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – Section 100 – The scope of second appeals allows interference with concurrent findings of lower courts if such findings result from misreading or non-reading of evidence, or if they lead to incorrect conclusions or are contrary to law. Relevant Case Law: Mst. Nazir Begum v. Muhammad Ayyub and another, 1993 SCR 321 ----- (c) Co-sharer – A co-sharer is deemed to be in possession of every portion of joint land, irrespective of physical possession. ----- (d) Co-sharer – The mere possession of a co-sharer does not extinguish the rights of other co-sharers, regardless of the duration of that possession. ---- Background: The case involves an appeal against the judgments of the District Judge and the Civil Judge, Muzaffarabad, regarding a dispute over a sale deed executed on 31.08.2010. The plaintiff/appellant filed a suit seeking a declaration, perpetual injunction, and revocation of the sale deed. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the suit land by private partition, and alleged that the sale deed exceeded the defendant's fractional share in the land. The trial court and appellate court dismissed the plaintiff's suit, prompting this second appeal. ---- Issues: 1) Whether the sale deed dated 31.08.2010 was executed beyond the defendant's fractional share in Khewat No. 7. ---2) Whether the sale of land measuring 8 Kanals, 6 Marlas, 2 Sarsai, beyond the defendant’s share, is legally sustainable. ---3) Whether concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts can be disturbed on second appeal. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the defendant/respondent exceeded his share in Khewat No. 7, as his share amounted to only 6 Kanals, 14 Marlas, 7 Sarsai. The sale deed was therefore invalid to the extent that it transferred land beyond the defendant’s lawful share. The principle was reiterated that a co-sharer cannot alienate land from a particular Khewat beyond his share in that Khewat, and any such sale is inoperative with respect to the rights of the other co-sharers. The court also determined that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on a misreading and non-reading of evidence, particularly concerning the extent of the defendant’s share. The sale deed dated 31.08.2010 was set aside to the extent of 8 Kanals, 6 Marlas, 2 Sarsai, which was executed beyond the defendant’s lawful share. The appeal was allowed, and the judgments of the lower courts were set aside. ---- Citations/Precedents: Mst. Nazir Begum v. Muhammad Ayyub (1993 SCR 321) Syed Musarrat Shah and another v. Syed Ahmed Shah alias Lal Bacha and 8 others (PLD 2012 Peshawar 151)