Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.): ----S. 161, 265-C & 172—Right to Fair Trial—Disclosure of Witness Statements—Accused’s Access to Investigation Records—Scope and Limitations. The petitioners, accused of murder, sought copies of witness statements recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., containing signatures and thumb impressions, during cross-examination of the Investigation Officer. Both the trial court and the High Court denied their request, arguing that such records were not part of the official case file and were privileged under Section 172, Cr.P.C.. The Supreme Court of AJ&K held: Right to Fair Trial: Under Article 19 of the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, every accused is entitled to a fair trial and due process, which includes access to material relied upon by the prosecution. Scope of Section 265-C, Cr.P.C.: The provision mandates the supply of statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164, Cr.P.C., including witness statements, FIR, and inspection notes, to ensure transparency and enable the accused to prepare their defense effectively. Privilege under Section 172, Cr.P.C.: While case diaries maintained under Section 172 are privileged, statements recorded under Section 161 do not enjoy this privilege even if included in case diaries. They remain public documents under Article 49 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. Access to Investigation Records: If the prosecution relies on any recorded witness statement, whether formally included in the charge sheet or not, the accused has the right to access it unless it falls under the exception of public interest as outlined in Section 265-C, Proviso. Purpose of Disclosure: Ensuring access to witness statements supports the principles of natural justice, prevents prejudice to the accused, and reinforces transparency in criminal proceedings. The court emphasized that denying such access infringes on the constitutional right to a fair trial. Disposition: Revision petition allowed; trial court directed to provide copies of the requested statements containing signatures and thumb impressions. ----Cited Law: Criminal Procedure Code, Sections 161, 265-C & 172 Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, Article 49 AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, Article 19 ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Riaz v. The State (PLD 2003 Lahore 290) Muhammad Tahir v. The State

Summary: Ss of Law: S. 172 CrPC, 561-A CrPC, Art: 155, 156 QSO, 1984.Scope of Article 155 QO, 1984.Guidelines and Pre-requisities.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Cr.P.C.)—S. 94, S. 172 ----Summoning of police registers—Scope of privilege under S. 172 Cr.P.C. The petitioner, standing trial under Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, sought summoning of Registers No. 2, 19, and 21 maintained at the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD), Lahore—Trial court rejected the request holding the registers privileged under Section 172 Cr.P.C.—Held, Section 172 Cr.P.C. applies only to police case diaries—Registers maintained under Police Rules, 1934, including Station Diary (Register No. II), Property Register (Register No. XIX), and Road Certificate Book (Register No. XXI), are not privileged documents—Denial of access to these registers violated the accused’s fundamental right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution—Trial court's order set aside, and it was directed to summon the requested registers. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Idrees v. The State (2021 SCMR 612) • Queen Empress v. Mannu (ILR Allahabad Vol XIX 390) (b) Right to Fair Trial—Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Accused’s right to obtain relevant police documents—Judicial duty to ensure a fair trial Held, Article 10-A of the Constitution guarantees fair trial and due process—The Police Rules, 1934 mandate maintenance of police registers to ensure transparency and accountability—Restricting access to such records violates the accused’s constitutional rights—Trial courts must play a participatory role to ensure justice and prevent miscarriage of justice—Reliance placed on international fair trial standards under UDHR, ICCPR, and ECHR—Courts have a duty to summon any document necessary to ascertain the truth, as per Section 94 Cr.P.C. Cited Cases: • Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600) • Muhammad Bashir v. Rukhsar & Others (PLD 2020 SC 334) • Shivani Sharma v. Ram Chander & Ors (2015 ACJ 1547) (c) Criminal Procedure—S. 94 Cr.P.C.—Scope & Interpretation ----Power of courts to summon documents necessary for justice Under Section 94 Cr.P.C., courts have broad discretionary powers to summon documents necessary for the just decision of a case—Held, any police record necessary for the defense must be produced—Registers maintained at police stations are public documents, and their production does not fall under the scope of privilege—Failure to summon relevant documents violates principles of due process—Court reiterated that trial courts must ensure the accused’s right to confront evidence against him and avoid mechanical rejection of defense requests. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Shafi v. The State (2017 PCrLJ 2089) • Earl T. Crawford’s The Construction of Statutes (Sec. 254, p. 496) (d) Judicial Role in Criminal Trials—Active Duty to Ensure Fairness ----Courts should not act as mere umpires—Duty to ensure just proceedings Reaffirming judicial responsibility, the Lahore High Court emphasized that trial courts must not remain passive spectators—Courts must ensure full access to relevant evidence—It is a court’s duty to explore all avenues to discover the truth, and denial of documentary evidence undermines the right to fair trial—Fair trial not limited to statutory provisions but extends to internationally recognized human rights standards. Cited Cases: • Selvi J. Jayalalithaa v. State of Karnataka (2014 PLJR SC 531) • State v. Anwar Saif Ullah Khan (PLD 2016 SC 276) (e) Disposition Revision allowed—Impugned trial court order set aside—Trial court directed to summon the requested registers—Admissibility and evidentiary value of the registers to be determined separately by the trial court in accordance with the law.

Summary: [Bail Denied]The petitioner, Ghazan Khan, had been seeking bail but was unsuccessful in his attempts. He had approached the Peshawar High Court, but his plea for bail was turned down by a learned Judge-in-Chamber through an impugned order dated April 12, 2021. Ghazan Khan was one of the accused in a case of murderous assault, which had been registered with Police Station Katlang in District Mardan.According to the allegations, on February 10, 2021, Ghazan Khan, along with his co-accused, attacked Sannan Ahmad, who sustained five entry wounds as confirmed by a medico-legal certificate. The motive behind the crime was cited as a monetary dispute. The accused, however, attempted to present a different version of events, claiming that the injured party was the aggressor and that they acted in self-defense after one of their animals was injured by the injured party.The Court heard the arguments and examined the record. It noted that the petitioner had relied on a statement allegedly made by the injured party and recorded by the Investigating Officer in the case diary dated February 11, 2020. However, the Court found this reliance to be inappropriate and a violation of subsection 2 of section 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Due to this ground alone, the Court determined that the petition should be dismissed.Furthermore, the Court considered the totality of circumstances, including the active participation of the petitioner in the alleged occurrence, which fell under the offense of mischief as per section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. This offense carries a punishment of imprisonment for up to ten years, and in such cases, the law provides for restrictions on granting bail, except under specific "reasonable grounds" as mentioned in section 497 of the Code. Since the courts below had already evaluated the case and found no such reasonable grounds for bail, the Supreme Court upheld their decision.

Summary: Reliance on Police Diary ---- Acquittal granted ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Cr.P.C.)—S. 172, S. 173(3)—Police Diary—Scope and Admissibility ----Use of police diary in judicial proceedings—Prohibition against reliance on investigation officer’s opinion The Lahore High Court, while deciding upon the guilt of the accused, relied on the police diary and the opinion of the investigating officer—Held, a police diary under Section 172 Cr.P.C. is inadmissible as evidence and can only be used to aid the court in trial, not as a basis for a conviction or acquittal—Court reaffirmed that investigating officers are not judicial authorities and their opinion regarding guilt or innocence of the accused is not admissible—It is the exclusive function of the trial court to determine culpability based on legally admissible evidence—Reliance on the investigating officer’s findings by the High Court was legally untenable and contrary to settled principles of law. Cited Cases: • Queen v. Mannu (1897 ILR 19 All 390) • Muhammad Ahmed v. State (PLD 2006 SC 316) • Muhammad Arshad v. State (PLD 2011 SC 350) (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984—Article 59—Expert Evidence—Non-expert opinions inadmissible ----Investigating officer’s assessment of guilt—Legal incompetence to render such an opinion Held, opinion of the investigating officer regarding the accused’s guilt is inadmissible under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, as he is not an expert witness within the meaning of Article 59—A police officer’s duty is limited to collection of evidence, and his conclusions have no binding effect—A court cannot base its judgment on the investigation officer’s opinion but must rely solely on evidence produced in accordance with law—Any reliance on a police officer’s findings to establish guilt renders the conviction legally unsound. Cited Cases: • Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad (AIR 1954 SC 51) • Muhammad Ahmad v. State (2010 SCMR 660) • Fazal-Ur-Rehman v. Federation (PLD 2014 FSC 15) (c) Criminal Law—S. 302(b) PPC—Benefit of Doubt—Effect of Discrepancies in Evidence ----Discrepancy between ocular and medical evidence—Acquittal granted due to reasonable doubt According to the ocular account, six gunshots were fired on the deceased’s left and right thighs—However, the medical report revealed three entry wounds on the right thigh with one exit wound, and only two gunshot wounds on the left thigh—Held, when ocular testimony is inconsistent with medical evidence, it creates a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case—Since Muhammad Saleem (co-accused) was acquitted on the same evidence, the principle of parity applied, requiring that Muhammad Idrees be acquitted as well—Prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Cited Cases: • Tordi Khan v. State (2005 PCrLJ 1970) • Allah Yar v. State (1984 PCrLJ 2934) • Subhanuddin v. State (1976 SCMR 506) (d) Criminal Law—S. 544-A Cr.P.C.—Compensation to Legal Heirs—Effect of Acquittal ----Compensation under S. 544-A Cr.P.C. stands nullified upon acquittal The trial court imposed a Rs. 100,000/- compensation penalty on the accused under S. 544-A Cr.P.C., payable to the legal heirs of the deceased—Held, where a conviction is overturned, all attached penalties, including compensation under S. 544-A Cr.P.C., also stand nullified—Since Muhammad Idrees was acquitted, the compensation amount became unenforceable. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Arshad v. State (PLD 2011 SC 350) ------ (e) Disposition Criminal Petition No. 742-L of 2019 (filed by Muhammad Idrees) converted into appeal and allowed. Conviction and life sentence set aside. Muhammad Idrees acquitted and ordered to be released immediately, unless required in another case. Criminal Petition No. 629-L of 2019 (filed by complainant against acquittal of Muhammad Saleem) dismissed. Leave to appeal refused.

Summary: Background: Petitioner challenged the order dated 8th February 2014, passed by Additional Sessions Judge-III (West), Islamabad. The petitioner is the complainant in case FIR No. 301, registered on 28th December 2010 under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) at Police Station Industrial Area, Islamabad. During the trial, the defense counsel asked the Investigating Officer (IO) to refresh his memory from the case diary, to which the petitioner objected, citing Article 155 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. ----Issues: Whether the defense counsel has the right to compel the Investigating Officer to refresh his memory from the case diary during cross-examination. The interpretation and application of Article 155 and 157 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and Section 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.). ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The petition was disposed of, with the court affirming the legal principles concerning the use of case diaries during the trial. Article 155 & 157, Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: Article 155 allows a witness to refresh their memory using any writing made at the time of the event, but it is at the court's discretion. Article 157 permits the defense to inspect the document only if it is used to refresh the witness's memory. Section 172, Cr.P.C.: This section mandates that the IO maintain a case diary documenting the investigation's progress. The court can refer to these diaries for clarification but not as evidence. Section 172(2) specifically restricts the defense from accessing the diaries unless used by the court for clarification. The court concluded that the defense counsel cannot compel the IO to use the case diary to refresh his memory, as this contravenes the limited scope prescribed by the law. The case diary is for aiding the court, not for the defense's use during cross-examination. The petition was disposed of in accordance with the discussed legal provisions, upholding the trial court's handling of the situation. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 172, Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.): Details the maintenance and use of case diaries during criminal investigations and trials. Article 155, Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: Relates to the witness's ability to refresh their memory. Article 157, Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: Pertains to the defense's rights regarding documents used to refresh a witness's memory.

Summary: Background: The petitioner challenged Section 172(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which prevents the accused from accessing police diaries, claiming that this violates the principles of Islamic justice. The petitioner argued that Islamic law mandates equality and fairness, and the inability to access police diaries before the submission of the challan in court is contrary to these principles. ----Issues: 1- Is Section 172(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which restricts access to police diaries by the accused, against the Injunctions of Islam? 2- Can the police diary be considered evidence, and does withholding it from the accused infringe upon Islamic principles of justice? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The petition was dismissed. The court reasoned that police diaries under Section 172(2) are not considered evidence but are merely procedural records for investigative purposes. These diaries cannot be used against the accused and are not treated as substantive evidence during trials. The court further clarified that these diaries can only be used to aid the court, not as a basis for judgment, and that they serve a lesser role than statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The petitioner’s arguments based on general Islamic principles of justice were deemed irrelevant to the specific legal nature of the police diaries. The court found no repugnancy to Islamic injunctions and dismissed the petition. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 172(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Sections 145 and 161 of the Evidence Act, 1872