Summary: (Against the judgment dated 05.6.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in M.R. No. 43 of 2021, Criminal Appeal No. 1413 of 2021 and Criminal Appeal No. 1410 of 2021). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 393, 449 & 109---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, house trespass, abetment---Reappraisal of evidence---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the paternal brother of the complainant by inflicting hatchet blows---Record showed that the role assigned to petitioner "R" alias "J" was merely that of a 'Jappah'---Not even a single witness had stated that petitioner "R" alias "J" inflicted any 'danda' blow on the deceased---No looted money or hens were recovered from his possession---Danda was not recovered on the pointation of the said petitioner rather the same was given to the prosecution side by the complainant himself---Moreover, it did not appeal to a prudent mind that petitioner "R" alias "J" would catch hold of the deceased when his co-accused was inflicting repeated hatchet blows on the body of the deceased because, in that case, there was every possibility to receive a fatal hatchet blow on his own body---Evidently, the role attributed to petitioner "R" alias "J" was that of 'Jappah' only, hence the other factors connecting him to the commission of the offence were obviously lacking---Hence, prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the petitioner "R" alias "J"---Thus, said petitioner was acquitted from the charges levelled against him by extending the benefit of doubt---Petition of "R" alias "J" was converted into appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Anwar v. The State 1981 SCMR 850; Ahmad Ali v. The State 2021 SCMR 470 and Zarin Shah and 2 others v. The State 1974 SCMR 376 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 393, 449 & 109---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, house trespass, abetment---Reappraisal of evidence---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the paternal brother of the complainant by inflicting hatchet blows---Record showed that the accusation levelled against petitioner "AA" was that he inflicted hatchet blows on the head of the deceased and that the hatchet recovered was bloodstained---Defence alleged that in the post-mortem report, which, although, attributed the cause of death to severe head injuries however, it did not specify the nature of the weapon used, as to whether it was a hatchet, a danda or any other incriminating object---Said report was not significant because the prosecution witnesses had not stated that petitioner "AA" used the right side of the hatchet---Lacerated wounds mentioned in the postmortem report of the deceased could be caused with the wrong side of the hatchet and as such there was no material contradiction between the ocular account and medical evidence of the prosecution---Petitioner "AA" was caught red handed at the spot by witnesses while carrying a bloodstained hatchet---Evidence of the prosecution eyewitnesses to his extent was confidence inspiring and trustworthy---Prosecution had proved its case to the extent of petitioner "AA" beyond the shadow of any doubt---Petition of said petitioner was converted into an appeal and was dismissed with modification in the sentence by commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 393, 449 & 109---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, house trespass, abetment---Reappraisal of evidence---Motive not proved---Sentence, quantum of---Mitigating circumstances---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the paternal brother of the complainant by inflicting hatchet blows---Record showed that the accusation leveled against accused "AA" was that he inflicted hatchet blows on the head of the deceased---As per prosecution case the accused persons came to the farm house of the deceased for dacoity on the instigation of one "GN", but the same proved to be incorrect---No looted money, article or hens were recovered from the possession of accused "AA" or his co-accused---No witness had stated that he had seen the petitioners while attempting to loot any article from the poultry shed of the deceased---While awarding death sentence and convicting an accused motive had to be given prime importance since without there being an un-shattered motive proved by the prosecution, death sentence could not be awarded, rather in such cases, death sentences were usually converted into sentences for life imprisonment---In the instant matter, the aspect of proving motive to the hilt was missing---Therefore, awarding death sentence or confirming the same would not only be harsh but also uncalled for, when admittedly no material had come on the record to prove the alleged motive---Moreover, it was not determinable in this case that as to what had actually happened immediately prior to the occurrence which resulted into present unfortunate incident---Likewise, if the motive of robbery punishable under Section 393, P.P.C., was not proved then offence of trespass punishable under Section 449, P.P.C., in order to loot any article from the poultry shed of the deceased was also not proved---Thus, the conviction and sentence of accused "AA" under Sections 393 & 449, P.P.C., were set-aside and he was acquitted of the said charges---However, the sentence awarded to the accused "AA" under Section 302(b), P.P.C., was modified from death sentence to life imprisonment---With said modification in sentence, petition was converted into an appeal and was dismissed, in circumstances. Arshad Beg v. The State 2017 SCMR 1727; Allah Wasaya and another v. The State 2017 SCMR 1797 and Muhammad Yasin and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 128 rel. Hameed uz Zaman, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Irfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State. Jalil ur Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court along with Complainant for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 16.09.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in High Court Appeals Nos. 107 of 2012, 114 of 2012 and 109 of 2012). Per Yahya Afridi, CJ; Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting. (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 76---Secondary evidence---Scope---Failure to ensure compliance with Article 76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 vitiates evidentiary basis upon which findings of Courts below were rendered, necessitating intervention by Supreme Court. (b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--- ----Ss. 7, 9, 148, 290 & 291---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 76---Corporate affairs---Oppression and mismanagement---Proof---Summary proceedings---Secondary evidence---Non-seeking of permission---Effect---Proceedings under sections 290 and 291 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 were initiated against respondents for inquiry into mismanagement and oppression in corporate affairs---Company Judge allowed the petition and Division Bench of High Court dismissed the appeal---Objection was raised by appellant on admissibility of secondary evidence---Validity---Company Judge erred in proceeding summarily in a dispute that required a full evidentiary examination---Nature of the controversy, involving serious allegations of forgery and fabrication, necessitated framing of issues and recording of evidence; procedural safeguards that were improperly bypassed---Statutory prohibition under section 148 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 (section 121 of Companies Act, 2017) precluded recognition of a trust over shares in the company's register, reinforcing the principle that the company was not bound to take notice of any alleged trust arrangement---Claim of trust, as asserted by respondents, was legally untenable---Improper admission of secondary evidence in violation of Article 76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 undermined validity of proceedings---Failure to establish preconditions for admissibility of secondary evidence rendered reliance on disputed documents unsustainable---Discretion of Company Judge in treating the Shareholders' Agreements as genuine was exercised in disregard of established legal principles, given the absence of a proper evidentiary inquiry---Division Bench, in upholding such finding, failed to recognize procedural and substantive irregularities in the adjudication of the case---Parties could pursue their respective claims in pending civil suits, wherein all matters in controversy, including validity of Shareholders' Agreements and legitimacy of meeting in question of Board of Directors were to be adjudicated---Supreme Court set aside judgments passed by Company Judge as well as by Division Bench of High Court---Appeal was allowed. [Majority view] Platinum Insurance Company Limited, Karachi v. Daewoo Corporation, Sheikhupura PLD 1999 SC 1; Mian Javed Amir v. United Foam Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. 2016 SCMR 213; Enviroco Ltd. v. Farstad Supply A/S [2011] UKSC 16; Bland and Anor v. Keegan [2024] EWCA Civ 934; Perkins and others v. Mexican Santa Barbra Mining Co. (1890) 24 QBD 613 and Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik PLD 2021 SC 715 ref. Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting (Minority view) (c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--- ----S. 7---Original civil jurisdiction---Corporate affairs---Jurisdiction specifically vested with Company Judge under Section 7 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 cannot be ousted merely on the pretext of a factual dispute---Provision of Section 7 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 specifically provides that Company Judge has jurisdiction---Statute has authorized Company Judge to exercise jurisdiction under Companies Ordinance, 1984---Jurisdiction vested with the Court by way of statute cannot be ousted merely because the parties contend that dispute involves complicated facts, the law does not provide so. (d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--- ----Ss. 7 & 9---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 72, 74, 75 & 76---Corporate affairs---Standard of proof---Principle---Standard of proof required in company matters is that of balance of probabilities rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt---In civil matters, this standard requires Court to assess whether, on the evidence as a whole, a fact is more likely than not to be true---It is neither necessary nor appropriate to frame formal issues or conduct a full trial to determine veracity of documents such as Shareholders Agreements---Court must evaluate totality of material, including primary and secondary evidence, where particularly in the context of secondary evidence the documents are reasonably credible, without strict insistence on original proof and reach a conclusion accordingly. (e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--- ----Ss. 7, 9, 148, 290 & 291---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 76---Corporate affairs ---Oppression and mismanagement---Proof---Summary proceedings---Secondary evidence---Non-seeking of permission---Effect---Proceedings under Sections 290 and 291 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 were initiated against respondents for inquiry into mismanagement and oppression in corporate affairs---Company Judge allowed the petition and Division Bench of High Court dismissed the appeal---Objection was raised by appellant on admissibility of secondary evidence---Validity---Issues arising in the present case had brought into sharp focus the fundamental role of corporate governance in ensuring that companies act with transparency, fairness, and accountability---Protection of shareholder rights, obligation of disclosure, and adherence to ethical governance practices were not optional aspirations; they were indispensable pillars upon which trust in corporate structures was built---It was by steadfast commitment to such principles that corporations earn legitimacy, foster sustainable growth, and contribute to economic and social well-being of wider community---Corporate governance was, in its essence, a framework designed not merely to direct corporate conduct but to safeguard interests of all stakeholders through structured, principled oversight---Supreme Court accordingly reaffirmed that transparency, good faith disclosure, and protection of shareholders must remain at the heart of all corporate endeavors, for it was only through such adherence that confidence in corporate sector and by extension, in rule of law itself, could be maintained and strengthened---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Appeal was dismissed. Brother Steel Mills Ltd. v. Ilyas Miraj PLD 1996 SC 543; Platinum Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Daewoo Corp. PLD 1999 SC 1; Javed Amir v. United Foam Industries (Pvt) Ltd. 2016 SCMR 213; Omar Masood v. Amir Hussain Naqvi 2019 CLD 931; Messrs Ammonia Supplies Corporation (Pvt) Ltd. v. Messrs Modern Plastic Containers Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1998 SC 3153; Shri Gulabrai Kalidas Naik v. Laxmidas Lallubhai Patel of Baroda (1978) 48 Comp Cas 438 (Guj) and E.V. Swaminathan v. K.M.M.A. Industries and Roadways Private Ltd. (1993) 76 Comp Cas 1 (Mad) ref. Haider Waheed, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As.Nos. 1843 and 1846 of 2019). Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1844 and 1845 of 2019). Wasim Sajjad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Shah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Masood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 4 to 6. Omer Azad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 7 (SECP). Farooq H. Naek, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (in C.M.A. No. 1138 of 2020). Date of hearing: 11th February, 2025. (g) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Order, or by any other law in force in Pakistan, to be given in evidence;

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.IX, Rr.8 & 9---Dismissal of a suit for non-prosecution when the case was fixed for recording of evidence---Discretion of court to dismiss suit once ripe for hearing---Settlement of issues, effect of---The moment issues are framed in a suit, it becomes ripe for hearing---Distinction between pre-issues and post-issues proceedings stated---The petitioner filed civil suit wherein issues were framed and when the case was fixed for recording evidence, it was adjourned due to the absence of the defendants---However, on next date, though respondents/ defendants Nos. 1 to 7 were present, the petitioner failed to appear, resulting in dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution---Subsequently, the petitioner filed an application for restoration, citing his father's illness as the reason for absence---The application was dismissed for failure to justify the delay or providing sufficient cause---An appeal against this decision was also dismissed by the district court, subsequently, the petitioner then approached the Supreme Court---Held: In the suit the issues were framed and the moment issues were framed, the suit became ripe for hearing---Notwithstanding the listed applications on the fateful day, the suit was also listed for hearing as the issues had been framed and case was adjourned for evidence of petitioner/plaintiff---The argument that suit was not ripe for hearing or that it should not have been dismissed for non- prosecution and/or at the most the application fixed could have been dismissed, was not convincing---It was well within the discretion of court to dismiss the suit if it was ripe for hearing i.e. after settlement of issues---There was, however, a distinction between date of hearing of suit and date of appearance of parties before settlement of issuesand the later could not be at par with date of hearing which was not the case in the present matter---Leave to appeal was declined and the petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Asghar Ali, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Respondents not represented. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.188---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3(2)---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O. XXVIII, R.3---Review petition before the Supreme Court---Filing of frivolous petitions by public functionaries in order to insulate themselves, practice of---Supreme Court deprecated such practice by imposing costs---Review petition before the Supreme Court was barred by 204 days and sufficient cause was disclosed for condonation of delay---Nevertheless, the judgment of the High Court challenged in earlier round before the Supreme Court merely held that Intra-Court Appeal filed by the petitioner-institution before the High Court was not maintainable in terms of section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 as an appeal was provided under the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 against the original order---This conclusion was upheld by Supreme Court through the impugned order under review---Supreme Court noted with grave concern that present petition, filed by a statutory institution, was not only legally untenable and devoid of merit, but also reflective of a deeper, disturbing culture of risk-averse governance---The conduct of public officers of resorting to filing petitions before the highest court of the land merely in order to insulate themselves from accountability was deprecated in the strongest terms---Courts are not to be approached mechanically or defensively, especially by those entrusted with public functions and legal stewardship---To mark Supreme Court's disapproval and to deter the continuation of irresponsible and obstructive practices by public bodies, exemplary cost of Rs.100,000/-was imposed on the petitioner-institution under Order XXVIII, Rule 3 of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 as the review petition was not only vexatious, frivolous and squandered valuable time of the court but was also reflective of institutional abdication and poor governance---Petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)--- ----S. 3(2)---Intra Court Appeal---Maintainability---If a law dealing with original proceedings offers a remedy of appeal, revision, or review, then the right to file Intra Court Appeal (ICA) before the High Court is barred---It is immaterial whether the aggrieved person actually availed the remedy or not, what matters is the legal availability of such remedy under the law. Syed Asif Raza v. Pakistan International Airlines PLD 2001 SC 182 rel. (c) Public functionaries--- ----Filing of frivolous petitions by public functionaries in order to insulate themselves---Supreme Court deprecated such practice---While the right to access to courts is a cornerstone of the Constitutional framework, it is not an unqualified or limitless right---Such access must be exercised with responsibility and in a manner that upholds the dignity and finality of judicial proceedings---When public institutions initiate repetitive and meritless petitions they erode the integrity of the judicial process---Frivolous litigation not only clogs judicial dockets but also drains public resources and delays justice for genuine litigants---This become more concerning when such frivolous claims are filed by government or public statutory functionaries, who are expected to act with higher responsibility and to protect, rather than squander, public resources and judicial time---When public bodies initiate litigation, they do so not as private litigants pursuing personal interests, but as custodians of the law and fiduciaries of the public interest and they are under an onerous obligation to act fairly, responsibly, and in accordance with the Constitution--- Public statutory functionaries should exercise greater legal discipline and internal scrutiny before invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. District Education Officer (Female) Charsadda v. Miss Sonia Begum 2025 SCP 160 (SCP citation); Javed Hameed v. Aman Ullah 2024 SCMR 89; Lutfullah Virk v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh PLD 2024 SC 887 and Zakir Mehmood v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence 2023 SCMR 960 rel. Rana Asadullah Khan, Addl. AGP for Petitioner. Shehryar Kasuri for Respondents. Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 16.09.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in High Court Appeals Nos. 107 of 2012, 114 of 2012 and 109 of 2012). Per Yahya Afridi, CJ; Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting. (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 76---Secondary evidence---Scope---Failure to ensure compliance with Article 76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 vitiates evidentiary basis upon which findings of Courts below were rendered, necessitating intervention by Supreme Court. (b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--- ----Ss. 7, 9, 148, 290 & 291---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 76---Corporate affairs---Oppression and mismanagement---Proof---Summary proceedings---Secondary evidence---Non-seeking of permission---Effect---Proceedings under sections 290 and 291 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 were initiated against respondents for inquiry into mismanagement and oppression in corporate affairs---Company Judge allowed the petition and Division Bench of High Court dismissed the appeal---Objection was raised by appellant on admissibility of secondary evidence---Validity---Company Judge erred in proceeding summarily in a dispute that required a full evidentiary examination---Nature of the controversy, involving serious allegations of forgery and fabrication, necessitated framing of issues and recording of evidence; procedural safeguards that were improperly bypassed---Statutory prohibition under section 148 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 (section 121 of Companies Act, 2017) precluded recognition of a trust over shares in the company's register, reinforcing the principle that the company was not bound to take notice of any alleged trust arrangement---Claim of trust, as asserted by respondents, was legally untenable---Improper admission of secondary evidence in violation of Article 76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 undermined validity of proceedings---Failure to establish preconditions for admissibility of secondary evidence rendered reliance on disputed documents unsustainable---Discretion of Company Judge in treating the Shareholders' Agreements as genuine was exercised in disregard of established legal principles, given the absence of a proper evidentiary inquiry---Division Bench, in upholding such finding, failed to recognize procedural and substantive irregularities in the adjudication of the case---Parties could pursue their respective claims in pending civil suits, wherein all matters in controversy, including validity of Shareholders' Agreements and legitimacy of meeting in question of Board of Directors were to be adjudicated---Supreme Court set aside judgments passed by Company Judge as well as by Division Bench of High Court---Appeal was allowed. [Majority view] Platinum Insurance Company Limited, Karachi v. Daewoo Corporation, Sheikhupura PLD 1999 SC 1; Mian Javed Amir v. United Foam Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. 2016 SCMR 213; Enviroco Ltd. v. Farstad Supply A/S [2011] UKSC 16; Bland and another v. Keegan [2024] EWCA Civ 934; Perkins and others v. Mexican Santa Barbra Mining Co. (1890) 24 QBD 613 and Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik PLD 2021 SC 715 ref. Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting (Minority view) (c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--- ----S. 7---Original civil jurisdiction---Corporate affairs---Jurisdiction specifically vested with Company Judge under Section 7 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 cannot be ousted merely on the pretext of a factual dispute---Provision of Section 7 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 specifically provides that Company Judge has jurisdiction---Statute has authorized Company Judge to exercise jurisdiction under Companies Ordinance, 1984---Jurisdiction vested with the Court by way of statute cannot be ousted merely because the parties contend that dispute involves complicated facts, the law does not provide so. (d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--- ----Ss. 7 & 9---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 72, 74, 75 & 76---Corporate affairs---Standard of proof---Principle---Standard of proof required in company matters is that of balance of probabilities rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt---In civil matters, this standard requires Court to assess whether, on the evidence as a whole, a fact is more likely than not to be true---It is neither necessary nor appropriate to frame formal issues or conduct a full trial to determine veracity of documents such as Shareholders Agreements---Court must evaluate totality of material, including primary and secondary evidence, where particularly in the context of secondary evidence the documents are reasonably credible, without strict insistence on original proof and reach a conclusion accordingly. (e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)--- ----Ss. 7, 9, 148, 290 & 291---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 76---Corporate affairs ---Oppression and mismanagement---Proof---Summary proceedings---Secondary evidence---Non-seeking of permission---Effect---Proceedings under Sections 290 and 291 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 were initiated against respondents for inquiry into mismanagement and oppression in corporate affairs---Company Judge allowed the petition and Division Bench of High Court dismissed the appeal---Objection was raised by appellant on admissibility of secondary evidence---Validity---Issues arising in the present case had brought into sharp focus the fundamental role of corporate governance in ensuring that companies act with transparency, fairness, and accountability---Protection of shareholder rights, obligation of disclosure, and adherence to ethical governance practices were not optional aspirations; they were indispensable pillars upon which trust in corporate structures was built---It was by steadfast commitment to such principles that corporations earn legitimacy, foster sustainable growth, and contribute to economic and social well-being of wider community---Corporate governance was, in its essence, a framework designed not merely to direct corporate conduct but to safeguard interests of all stakeholders through structured, principled oversight---Supreme Court accordingly reaffirmed that transparency, good faith disclosure, and protection of shareholders must remain at the heart of all corporate endeavors, for it was only through such adherence that confidence in corporate sector and by extension, in rule of law itself, could be maintained and strengthened---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Appeal was dismissed. Brother Steel Mills Ltd. v. Ilyas Miraj PLD 1996 SC 543; Platinum Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Daewoo Corp. PLD 1999 SC 1; Javed Amir v. United Foam Industries (Pvt) Ltd. 2016 SCMR 213; Omar Masood v. Amir Hussain Naqvi 2019 CLD 931; Messrs Ammonia Supplies Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Modern Plastic Containers (Pvt.) Ltd. AIR 1998 SC 3153; Shri Gulabrai Kalidas Naik v. Laxmidas Lallubhai Patel of Baroda (1978) 48 Comp Cas 438 (Guj) and E.V. Swaminathan v. K.M.M.A. Industries and Roadways Private Ltd. (1993) 76 Comp Cas 1 (Mad) ref. Haider Waheed, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As.Nos. 1843 and 1846 of 2019). Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1844 and 1845 of 2019). Wasim Sajjad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Shah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Masood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 4 to 6. Omer Azad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 7 (SECP). Farooq H. Naek, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (in C.M.A. No. 1138 of 2020). Date of hearing: 11th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Islamic Law – Nikah – Competence of sui juris woman – Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, Ss. 11 & 16 – Cr.P.C., S. 561-A – A Muslim woman of sound mind and full age (sui juris) possesses legal autonomy to contract a valid marriage of her own free will without requiring the consent of a wali (guardian) – Marriage voluntarily contracted by an adult woman cannot be criminalized or treated as illicit merely for contravening familial wishes – Registration or family objection does not affect validity of Nikah under Islamic or statutory law – Followed Hafiz Abdul Waheed v. Mrs. Asma Jehangir & another (PLD 2004 SC 219). (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 – S. 561-A – Quashment of FIR – Abuse of process – FIR lodged under Ss. 11/16 Zina Ordinance against legally married couple – High Court quashed FIR on finding marriage valid and voluntary – Held, once existence of lawful Nikah is established, presumption of zina is fully negated and continuation of proceedings constitutes abuse of process – Courts are empowered to exercise inherent jurisdiction to prevent misuse of criminal law for personal or familial vengeance. (c) Islamic Jurisprudence – Proof of Zina – Standard of evidence – Under Quranic injunctions and Hudood framework, offence of zina requires testimony of four eyewitnesses to the actual act; conviction cannot rest on suspicion, conjecture, or familial disapproval – False accusation of zina is itself a punishable offence under Qur’an (Surah Al-Noor 24:4). (d) Constitutional Law – Fundamental rights – Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, Art. 3-G – Protection of dignity, privacy, and liberty – Husband and wife, being lawfully wedded, entitled to full protection of constitutional guarantees against harassment or false prosecution. (e) Administration of justice – Judicial duty – Scope of interference at investigation stage – Exceptional circumstances exist where prosecution is manifestly mala fide or devoid of legal foundation – Quashment justified to prevent miscarriage of justice and uphold sanctity of lawful marriage. Disposition: –– Petition for leave to appeal dismissed. –– High Court’s judgment quashing FIR No. 30/2025 under Ss. 11/16 Zina Ordinance upheld as lawful and justified.

Summary: i. When these circumstances are taken into consideration, no ambiguity is left that the complainant had suppressed the material facts. Though this Court is not in a happy mood to accept that the incident did not occur and this Court is not inclined to hold that the complainant did not witness the incident, but this Court is confident in holding that the prosecution case is based on the concealment of facts. This Court is to determine that once the facts were concealed, whether the defense would get the benefit and that whether the accused would be entitled for acquittal. ii. We are conscious of the fact that the complainant is the sole eyewitness and to place reliance on his testimony, would require much care and would require much caution. True that conviction can be awarded on the strength of a sole eyewitness, but equally true that the witness must convince his credibility, his truthfulness and his presence on the spot. There is no cavil with the preposition that the quality of evidence would determine the fate of an accused and not the quantity. iii. The spot arrest of the appellants is a circumstance which the defense, despite efforts, could not get rid of and even the recoveries, more particularly, the pistols used in the tragic incident, could not be disputed. iv. As the appellant Fazal-e-Wahid, could not be arrested on the spot, so this Court is anxious to know that what evidence was brought against him and that what evidence is to be taken into consideration to assess his involvement and to assess his participation in the instant case. In our understanding, the presence of the appellants who were arrested on the spot, is not disputed, but the presence of the appellant Fazal-e-Wahid disturbs the judicial mind of this Court, as soon after the occurrence, the gates were closed with no chance to leave. v. This conflict between the report and the confessional statement has increased our anxiety to determine that who was telling the truth. If, this Court would accept the report of the complainant, which this Court is constrained to accept, then the confessional statement would lose its efficacy, but at the same time the report does not contain the real facts, rather we found the facts concealed, now to choose one out of the two, would need judicial prudence. vi. It is not the causalities that would determine the involvement of the accused, rather it is the evidence which must point towards the accused and which must convince the participation of the accused in the tragic incident. If, on one hand we are to rescue the prosecution, then on the other, this Court is under the obligation to extend the same treatment to the accused, as after maintaining equilibrium we would be in a better position to pick the guilty and to rescue the innocent. It is the complex situation of this case which demands a caution of a great degree from us, so we are inclined to apply the required caution. vii. We are to look into the matter independently, as not only the complainant, but also the appellant while confessing his guilt twisted the circumstances and to untwist the twists, we are to appreciate the evidence and we are to see the cumulative effect of the mysterious circumstances that has surrounded the case. viii. When both the parties twisted the facts and when both the parties concealed and exaggerated the number of accused, then this Court is left with no other option but to determine the involvement of the accused on the strength of the circumstances that were holding the field. viii. It is the uncertainty of events which invite the attention of this Court to the innocence of the appellant Fazal-e-Wahid, so the prosecution failed to connect him with the tragic incident and as such, the learned trial Court fell into error while holding him responsible for the commission of the offence. It is pertinent to mention that the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced this appellant under section 302(c) PPC, extending him the benefit of the circumstances, but such benefit was wrongly extended, as the Court had the only choice of either to acquit or to convict him, so the learned trial Court failed to take this particular aspect of the case, into consideration. The impugned judgment to his extent is set aside and he is acquitted of the charge. He shall be released forthwith if, not required to be detained in connection with any other criminal case. ix. We do not doubt the involvement of the appellants in the commission of the offence, but as both the parties put appearance before the Court, as both the parties tendered sworn affidavits expressing their consent to the confirmation of their Bail Before Arrest, so no ambiguity is left that till that time, the situation was calm and the parties were at ease. It was after getting their Bails confirmed that the unfortunate incident occurred, so the concealment of facts from both the sides has created an atmosphere of uncertainty regarding the exactness of the situation that prevailed before and after the occurrence, so these circumstances by itself are sufficient to call for interference, so the awarded sentence is harsher than the needed.

Summary: Court has dismissed a civil revision filed by Mst. Siyasat Bibi, who had challenged the judgments and decrees of the Additional District Judge and the Civil Judge. The petitioner had sought declaration-cum-perpetual injunction and possession of a suit property against the respondents, Gul Shah Zada and others. The court found that the suit property was given to the respondents No.1 & 2 by their father, Shah Zarin, in his lifetime, and was partitioned between them. The property was recorded in the revenue record in the names of respondents No.1 & 2 during the first settlement in 1981-86. The court noted that the petitioner had received her Shari shares in the legacy of her father through previous litigation. The court relied on the principle that strong presumption of truth is attached to the settlement entries, particularly the first settlement entries. The court also observed that the petitioner`s suit was patently time-barred, as the suit property was entered in the names of respondents No.1 & 2 in the revenue record during the first settlement, and the petitioner had not objected to these entries until the institution of the present suit in 2017. In view of the above, the court dismissed the civil revision, finding no merit in the petitioner`s claims and upholding the judgments and decrees of the learned fora below.

Summary: (a) The scope of bail in the case of a female accused is wider compared to that of a male accused. A woman accused/petitioner’s case is covered by the first proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. This proviso equates the court’s power to grant bail in offences falling under the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) to its power under the non-prohibitory clause when the accused is under the age of sixteen years, a woman, or is sick or infirm. It means that in cases involving women accused, as mentioned in the first proviso to Section 497(1), bail is to be granted as a rule and refused only as an exception—just as it is in cases not falling under the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. For the purpose of deciding a bail application under Section 497(1), Cr.P.C., the existence of sufficient incriminating material connecting the accused to the offence is not, by itself, a determinative factor. (b) The basic idea is to enable the accused to face criminal prosecution rather than to confine him behind bars unnecessarily. Every accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the benefit of doubt can be extended even at the bail stage, if warranted by the facts of the case. The fundamental philosophy of criminal jurisprudence is that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and this principle applies at all stages, including the pre-trial stage and while deciding the question of bail.

Summary: (a) Contract Act, 1872 —- Ss. 2(g), 13, 14 — Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(2)(d) Contract executed under police custody — Validity — Free consent — Burden of proof — Legal consequence — Agreement dated 04.12.2015 executed by Altaf Hussain, predecessor of respondents No.1 to 6, while in police custody in connection with FIR No.161/2015 — Held, transaction was executed under circumstances of duress and lacked free consent, rendering the agreement void under S. 2(g) of the Contract Act, 1872 — Under Ss. 13 and 14 of the Act, consent must be free and not induced by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake — Agreement was executed while Altaf Hussain was under arrest, in physical custody of law enforcement, and prior to his grant of post-arrest bail — Burden lay on the appellants to prove that transaction was entered into voluntarily, which they failed to discharge — No evidence produced to show that consideration was paid or benefit received by respondents — Held, where an agreement is executed in custody and there is dominance of will, such consent is presumed vitiated. Cited Cases: • Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum (PLD 1975 SC 624) • Pakcom Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 44) • Pak Gulf Construction Co. v. MCB, Quetta Branch (2001 SCMR 265) (b) Evidence Law — Coercion — Undue Influence — Legal burden — Contractual presumption Presumption against voluntariness — Agreement by accused while in custody — Evidentiary threshold — Held, a person in police custody is presumed to be in a vulnerable state and particularly susceptible to coercion or undue influence — Where a contract is executed under such circumstances, courts must scrutinize the existence of free consent and consensus ad idem — Unless the party relying on the document proves that the transaction was fair, informed, and voluntary, such contracts are presumed invalid — No material produced by the appellants to prove that transaction was not influenced by duress or coercion — Agreement dated 04.12.2015 was therefore rightly held void. (c) Agency — Termination on death — General Power of Attorney — Posthumous execution — Legal validity Termination of agency on death — Effect of acts performed after death of principal — General Power of Attorney in favour of respondents No.1 to 6 stood terminated upon the death of Salma Sultana on 13.01.1999 — Mutation No.926 and all subsequent transactions based on agency post-death were void ab initio — Held, any action taken under terminated authority has no legal effect — High Court rightly restored Mutation No.428 and cancelled void mutation based on invalid agreement. Statutory Reference: Agency under general principles of the Contract Act and civil jurisprudence is extinguished upon death of principal. (d) Civil Procedure — Challenge to mutation — Delay — Legal consequence Timing of challenge — Mutation challenged within limitation — Delay not fatal — Appellant contended that challenge to Mutation No.926 was delayed and hence invalid — Held, suit was filed within prescribed limitation period — Delay in filing not sufficient to cure an inherently void transaction — Mere lapse of time does not validate a void agreement — Trial and appellate courts rightly found agreement void; High Court lawfully reversed lower findings based on legal scrutiny and evidentiary evaluation. (e) Constitution of Pakistan — Art. 185(2)(d) Appeal to Supreme Court — Scope of interference in concurrent factual findings — Standard of review — Held, where High Court judgment is based on correct legal principles and appreciation of evidence, Supreme Court does not interfere under Art. 185(2)(d) — Findings of High Court that agreement was void due to duress and agency had terminated were supported by record — Civil appeal dismissed. Final Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgment of High Court upheld. Agreement dated 04.12.2015 declared void and Mutation No.926 set aside; original Mutation No.428 restored.