Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss.15, 19 & 25---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Rules, 2018, Rr.3 & 4---Eexecution of a banking case---Decree holder bank seeking to sell mortgaged properties itself without intervention of Banking Court---Permissibility---Legality---Brief facts of the matter were that the execution proceedings were pending before the Banking Court, whereby, notices were issued and court auctioneers were appointed to proceed with the court auction, however, before any meaningful auction steps were taken, the decree holder bank filed an application under S.19(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read with Rr. 3 & 4 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Rules, 2018, seeking leave to sell the mortgaged/charged properties itself through public auction without court intervention, while the judgment-debtors objected that once C.P.C. mode was adopted the bank could not switch---Therefore, the issue requiring determination before the Court was “whether the Banking Court was precluded to grant permission to the decree holder to sell the charged property by itself through public auction or sealed tenders after it had commenced execution proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the C.P.C. under S. 19 of the Ordinance?”---Held: The Ordinance, 2001 has endeavored to provide for multiple options regarding execution of a banking Decree so that the same is satisfied within a reasonable time---Section 19 of the Ordinance was a complete code for execution of a banking decree and granted certain definite and substantive rights to a financial institution, subject to the conditions prescribed under S. 19 read with relevant and applicable provisions of S. 15 of the Ordinance, 2001---Financial institution could sell or cause to be sold, the charged properties of the judgment debtor subject of decree either with or without the intervention of the Banking Court either by public auction or by inviting sealed tenders and appropriate the proceeds towards total or partial satisfaction of the decree---The decree constituted and conferred sufficient power and authority to a financial institution qua sale of charged assets and a financial institution could transfer marketable title subject to the remedies extended in terms of relevant and applicable provisions of Ss.15 & 19 of the Ordinance, 2001---In the present case, the sale of charged properties by the decree holder bank through public auction without intervention of the Court was likely to complete at a faster time track and could save precious time of the Court---Mortgaged properties were allowed to be sold through public auction by the decree holder bank without intervention of the Court in accordance with prescribed procedure---Application filed by the decree holder bank was allowed, in circumstances. Shahida Bibi and others v. Habib Bank Limited and others PLD 2016 SC 995 rel. (b) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss.15 & 19---Decree holder bank seeking to sell the mortgaged properties itself through public auction without intervention of the Banking Court---Validity---Banking Court is empowered to grant permission to the decree holder at any stage of execution proceedings to exercise the option to sell charged property by way of mortgage, pledge or hypothecation without intervention of the Court either by sealed tenders or public auction subject to conditions and a conscious order passed in this respect under S. 19(1) read with S. 19(3) of the Ordinance, 2001. (c) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.19(2)---Execution of a banking decree---Modes of execution available to Banking Court stated---Section 19(2) of the Ordinance, 2001 provides three explicit modes to the Banking Court to execute a banking decree, (a) in accordance with the provisions of the C.P.C; or (b) in accordance with any other law for the time being in force; or (c) in such manner as the Banking Court may at the request of the decree holder consider appropriate, including recovery as arrears of land revenue. (d) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.19(1)---Automatic conversion of suit into execution---Requirement of instituting separate execution application and issuing notices to judgment debtor, exception to---Section 19(1) of the Ordinance, 2001 provides for automatic conversion of suit into execution proceedings without the need to file a separate application and issue fresh notice to the judgment debtors. Syed Muhammad Kaswar Gardezi for Applicant. Mughees Aslam Malik for Judgment Debtors Nos.1 to 5 (a & b).

Summary: The Banking Court is empowered under Section 19(2) read with Section 19(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to grant permission to a financial insitution to sell mortgaged, pledged or hypothecated property either by public auction or sealed tenders without intervention of the Court at any stage of execution proceedings thorugh a conscious order. As such, any mode of execution provided under Section 19(2) of the Ordinance can be adopted to execute the banking Decree as the circumstances may warrant by departing from one mode and switching to another mode.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302 (b)---Qatl-e-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Prompt F.I.R.---Single accused----Clear motive of a property dispute---- The prosecution evidence is consistent and free from doubts. Although the eyewitness was subjected to lengthy cross-examination yet his credibility remained intact, and his testimony on all material particulars could not be shaken. The FIR was lodged promptly, soon after the deceased was shifted to KDA Hospital, Karak, leaving no room for deliberation or false implication. The record is also silent regarding any mala fide, ill will, or animosity significant enough to falsely implicate the accused---- According to the post-mortem report Ex.PM, the deceased sustained a single entry wound on the medial aspect of the left thigh, measuring 1 × 1 cm, about 0.30 cm below the iliac crest—a non-vital part of the body. This constitutes a mitigating circumstance, raising the question of why the accused did not target a vital part if his exclusive intention was to commit murder. The fact that only one injury was inflicted also supports the presence of mitigating circumstances warranting reduction of sentence--On such factor alone, capital punishment of accused could not be sustained---Prosecution had fully proved its case against accused---Appeal against conviction, in circumstances, was partially allowed and death sentence of accused was commuted to imprisonment for life---With such modifications, Murder Reference was replied in the negative.

Summary: Writ Petition Held: Constitution of Pakistan, Articles 4, 9, 10A, 14 & 18 — Police Clearance Certificate — Distinction between Internal Retention and Outward Disclosure — Minor Convictions & Dignity— The State cannot use a routine administrative document (Police Clearance Certificate) to impose a “Civil Law death” or permanent disability on a citizen for a minor, concluded error. Article 14 (Dignity) is not merely about physical custody; it includes the right to reputation and social reintegration. When the State discloses a minor, spent conviction (e.g., a small fine for a regulatory offence) to an employer or foreign visa officer, it is effectively labeling the citizen as a Criminal Law in perpetuity. This “labeling” is a disproportionate state action that violates Article 9 (Right to Life/Livelihood). While the police may keep records for internal surveillance, they cannot outwardly certify a citizen as having a “Criminal Law record” for ordinary Civil Law purposes (jobs, travel) if the offence was minor and the sentence has been served. Section 243 Cr.P.C. — Article 10A (Fair Trial) — Validity of Guilty Pleas in Petty Cases — A Guilty Plea in a summary trial must be informed and voluntary, especially when it carries long-term Civil Law consequences like a stained police record. Magistrates often record guilty pleas mechanically in petty cases where the accused pays a small fine (e.g., Rs. 500) to end the matter quickly. The Court held that this practice is dangerous if the accused does not realize this "small fine"" will permanently appear on their Police Character Certificate. Under Section 243 Cr.P.C. and Article 10A

Summary: The Video Analytics Rules (“Rules”) establish a precisely defined scope of application that operationalizes the board authority granted under Section 40C. The Rules apply specifically to "specified goods"" as defined in Rule 150 ZQR

Summary: Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976—S. 22(1)(b), S. 22A, Ss. 2(e), 2(g), 2(q), 33, 34, 35 & Schedule, Cl. 1—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Art. 185(3)—Old-age pension—Qualifying period of fifteen years’ insurable employment—Rounding off of fractional service—Beneficial legislation—Administrative circulars vis-à-vis statute—Legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel—The controversy before the Federal Constitutional Court was whether insured employees who had completed more than fourteen years and six months of insurable employment, but less than fifteen full calendar years, were entitled to monthly old-age pension under S. 22(1)(b) of the Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, by applying the rule in Cl. 1 of the Schedule that a period of six months or more of insurable employment shall be treated as one full year. The Court held that the Act created two distinct benefit regimes: monthly old-age pension under S. 22(1) and lump-sum old-age grant under S. 22A; however, the statutory requirement of fifteen years’ insurable employment could not be read in isolation from the Schedule, which formed an integral part of the Act. The Schedule was not merely a computational appendage but a substantive legislative mechanism intended to account for fractional periods of insurable employment and to prevent denial of pension on account of marginal shortfalls. Therefore, where an insured person had completed fourteen years and six months or more of insurable employment, such period had, by legislative deeming fiction, to be treated as fifteen years, thereby satisfying the mandatory threshold under S. 22(1)(b). The Court emphasized that beneficial and social welfare legislation must receive a liberal, purposive and equitable construction to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief, and that a rigidly literal interpretation defeating pensionary entitlement because of negligible deficiency would be unjust and contrary to legislative intent. Administrative law—Executive circulars—Statute overriding administrative instructions—Legitimate expectation—Promissory estoppel—The petitioner Institution relied on Circular No. 1/2022 dated 17.02.2022 to contend that service of 14.5 years or more could not be rounded off for pension eligibility and that rounding off applied only after eligibility had independently been established. Rejecting that contention, the Court held that an executive circular could not override, curtail or dilute the parent statute or the Schedule appended thereto. The Court further noted that the Institution itself had earlier, through Circular dated 03.09.2019, acknowledged that shortfall of six months or less was to be treated as one full year for purposes of old-age pension, and that no material had been produced to show that the decisions forming the basis of that earlier circular had ever been set aside or displaced by a competent forum. In such circumstances, the subsequent executive attempt to undo an accrued and settled legal position was held ineffective. The Court also observed that where a public authority, by representation or consistent practice, creates rights or legitimate expectations in favour of beneficiaries under a social welfare scheme, such expectation cannot be arbitrarily defeated, and promissory estoppel restrains the authority from resiling from a consciously adopted position to the detriment of vested rights, absent overriding public interest sanctioned by law. Statutory interpretation—Schedule as integral part of enactment—Mandatory requirement and deeming fiction—The Court clarified that the High Court’s result was correct, though one aspect of its reasoning required refinement. The condition of fifteen years’ service in proviso (b) to S. 22(1) remained mandatory and had to be adhered to strictly; however, the Schedule did not negate or relax that requirement but supplied the legislatively sanctioned method of determining when that requirement stood fulfilled in cases involving fractional service. Thus, an employee who had not completed fifteen years in strict arithmetical terms could nevertheless be deemed, by force of the Schedule itself, to have completed fifteen years where the shortfall was six months or less. The respondents were therefore to be treated as having fulfilled all statutory conditions for monthly old-age pension. Case references—Colony Sarhad Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi v. Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1976 SC 227); Abdus Salam Khan v. Salim-Ud-Din Ahmad Siddiqui and two others (PLD 1979 Lah. 85); Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division and another v. Abdul Rasheed Memon (2025 SCMR 532); State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Tiwari and others (AIR 2005 SC 658); Messrs MCB Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2014 PTD 1874); Mars, Incorporated through Authorized Signatory and others v. the Registrar of Trade Marks and others (2019 CLD 27); Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi (PLD 1969 SC 407). Petitions dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court were legally correct, suffered from no illegality, perversity, misreading or non-reading of evidence, and rightly directed grant of monthly old-age pension to the respondents. Consequently, leave was refused and the petitions were dismissed, with all pending applications also disposed of.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The Banking Court is empowered under Section 19(2) read with Section 19(3) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 to grant permission to a financial insitution to sell mortgaged, pledged or hypothecated property either by public auction or sealed tenders without intervention of the Court at any stage of execution proceedings thorugh a conscious order. As such, any mode of execution provided under Section 19(2) of the Ordinance can be adopted to execute the banking Decree as the circumstances may warrant by departing from one mode and switching to another mode. 83Crl. Appeal 1504170.581-

Summary: (a) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 ----S. 22(1)(b) proviso; S. 22A; Sch., Cl. 1(b)---Old-age pension---Qualifying period---Fifteen years’ insurable employment---Fractional shortfall---Rounding off---Scope of Schedule---Respondents completed 14.50+ years of insurable employment but fell marginally short of fifteen years---EOBI declined pension and offered only old-age grant---High Court directed grant of pension relying on Sch. Cl.1(b) (six months or more treated as one full year)---Held, requirement of “not less than fifteen years” in S.22(1)(b) is mandatory; however, Schedule forms integral part of Act and provides the legislatively sanctioned method to determine when the fifteen-year threshold is deemed fulfilled in cases of fractional periods---Schedule does not override or dilute S.22(1)(b); it complements and operationalizes it through deeming fiction---Where insured employment exceeds fourteen years and six months (i.e., 14.5 years), rounding off lawfully deems completion of fifteen years---Respondents thus entitled to monthly old-age pension under S.22(1), not lump-sum grant under S.22A. (b) Statutory interpretation ----Beneficial legislation---Purposive and harmonious construction---Avoiding harshness and technical forfeiture---EOBI Act being social welfare statute to secure economic protection in old age---Rigid literal interpretation denying pension for negligible shortfall (even one day) would defeat legislative object and cause manifest injustice---Courts to construe beneficial statutes liberally while still giving effect to mandatory text---Schedule expressly addresses hardship by treating six months or more as a full year---Construction adopted gives efficacy to all provisions and avoids surplusage (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). (c) Schedule to statute ----Legal effect---Integral part of Act---Not subordinate to body provisions---Schedule appended to Act carries same force as substantive provisions and cannot be treated as mere computational appendix divorced from eligibility---Rounding-off clause in Schedule applicable at threshold-determination stage, otherwise provision becomes otiose---Schedule operates as extension of the section it serves and must be read with S.22 as a single scheme. (d) Executive instructions ----Circulars---Cannot override statute---EOBI Circular No.1/2022 dated 17.02.2022 restricting rounding-off for eligibility---Held, administrative circular cannot curtail statutory rights under Act/Schedule---Earlier Circular dated 03.09.2019 acknowledged rounding-off for shortfall of six months or less---Even if later withdrawn, statutory mandate prevails; circulars cannot be retrospectively applied to defeat accrued rights. (e) Administrative law ----Legitimate expectation; promissory estoppel---Public authority consistency---Where authority’s representation/practice under welfare scheme creates legitimate expectation, departure cannot be arbitrary and must conform to law---Rights crystallized under statutory scheme cannot be defeated merely through executive volte-face; orders creating vested rights not rescindable to detriment once legal effect taken. (f) Constitutional/precedential support (illustrative) ----Rounding off principle recognized in Pakistani jurisprudence and comparative authority---Referenced: PLD 1976 SC 227; PLD 1979 Lah 85; 2025 SCMR 532; AIR 2005 SC 658 (India)---Purpose: demonstrate rounding off as accepted legal/accounting principle; however, entitlement here rests primarily on express deeming clause in Schedule. Disposition: Leave refused; petitions dismissed; all CMAs (including stay application) disposed of. (C.P.L.As. 2199-L & 2211-L/2024 and 1567–1569/2025; order dated 09.12.2025)

Summary: a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 175E(1), 184(1) & 199---Original jurisdiction in disputes between Governments---Scope---Mischaracterization of dispute as inter se between Federal and Provincial Governments---Writ petition dismissed by High Court for want of jurisdiction on premise that dispute lay between two Governments attracting original jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art.184(1)---Held, Constitution recognizes only Federal and Provincial Governments; dispute between a federal statutory corporation and a provincial department does not, by itself, constitute a “dispute between two Governments”---Original jurisdiction under Art.184(1) (now under Art.175E(1) after 27th Constitutional Amendment) attracted only where parties are Governments in constitutional sense---High Court erred in declining jurisdiction merely on basis of nomenclature and concession made at bar. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Railways v. Karachi Development Authority 2003 SCMR 563 (b) Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975 ----Ss. 3(1), 3(2) & 4(2)(s)---Status and legal personality of Evacuee Trust Property Board---Body corporate---Power to sue and be sued---Board constituted by Federal Government but statutorily recognized as separate juristic person with perpetual succession and common seal---Expressly empowered to institute and defend suits and proceedings in courts of law---Held, Board was proper litigating entity in matters concerning evacuee trust property and could not be equated with Federal Government for purposes of constitutional jurisdiction. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art.199---Writ jurisdiction of High Court---Effect of misdescription of parties---Petitioner described as “Central Government through Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board”---Held, no constitutional entity known as “Central Government”; misdescription in memo of parties could not divest High Court of jurisdiction otherwise vested under Art.199---Jurisdiction determined by substance of dispute and legal status of parties, not by erroneous nomenclature or concessions made by counsel. (d) Administration of justice ----Concession at bar---Jurisdiction---Principle---Concession or admission by counsel on question of law or jurisdiction not binding on court---Jurisdiction cannot be conferred or taken away by consent, waiver or erroneous concession---High Court obliged to independently determine its jurisdiction on constitutional and statutory footing. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal; appeal allowed; impugned order dated 17.04.2024 set aside; case remanded to Lahore High Court, Lahore for fresh decision in accordance with law, preferably within three months. (C.P.L.A. No. 1451-L/2024, order dated 09.12.2025)