Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) — Art. 199 — Writ against NADRA in service matters — Maintainability — Where terms and conditions are governed by non-statutory service regulations framed by the Authority under s.45 of the NADRA Ordinance, 2000 (and not by the Federal Government), the relationship is that of master and servant; constitutional jurisdiction is not available to challenge disciplinary orders (removal from service, etc.). Reliance placed on Maj. (Retd.) Syed Muhammad Tanveer Abbas v. Federation of Pakistan (2019 SCMR 984), Chairman NADRA v. Muhammad Ali Shah (2017 SCMR 1979), Muhammad Zaman (2017 SCMR 571), PTCL v. Maqsood Ahmad Bhatti (2016 SCMR 1362), ZTBL v. Said Rehman (2013 SCMR 642), DHA v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmad (2013 SCMR 1707), PIAC v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman (PLD 2010 SC 676), PIAC v. Syed Suleman Alam Rizvi (2015 SCMR 1545), Abdul Wahab v. HBL (2013 SCMR 1383), Syed Nazir Gilani v. PRCS (2014 SCMR 982), and The General Manager, PPCBL v. Ghulam Mustafa (2024 SCMR 1458). (b) NADRA Employees (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Regulations, 2002 — Nature — Regulations issued by NADRA under s.45 of the Ordinance are non-statutory; hence violation thereof does not furnish a ground for a writ. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction — Scope — High Court will interfere in service matters only where statutory rules are violated or where lack of jurisdiction/ malice in law is shown; allegations regarding incompetence of disciplinary authority, denial of inquiry report, opportunity of defence, etc., need not be examined once the petition itself is not maintainable for want of statutory footing. (d) Result — Petition dismissed as not maintainable; no adjudication on merits (disciplinary due process) in view of the master-and-servant bar. Disposition: Writ petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 199---Writ of quo warranto---Appointment of Chairman NADRA---Caretaker Government’s powers---Judicial overreach---Scope of High Court’s jurisdiction. The respondent challenged the appointment of Chairman NADRA through a writ petition, contending that the appointment was ultra vires the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (Ordinance, 2000). The appointment was made by the Caretaker Government under Section 3(3) of the Ordinance, 2000, read with Rule 7A of the NADRA (Appointment and Emoluments of Chairman and Members) Rules, 2020. During the pendency of the writ petition, the elected Federal Government endorsed the insertion of Rule 7A and confirmed the appointment through notifications dated 28.03.2024. High Court, in suo motu exercise, struck down Rule 7A and declared the appointment of Chairman NADRA as without lawful authority. The Supreme Court held that High Courts have no suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The writ petition became infructuous as it did not challenge the subsequent notifications confirming the appointment, rendering the High Court’s decision beyond its lawful jurisdiction. Judicial overreach was evident as the High Court encroached upon the executive’s domain. ----Cited Cases: Federal Government Employees Housing Authority v. Ednan Syed (Civil Petition No.767 of 2022, SC, 20.11.2024) Dr. Imran Khattak v. Ms. Sofia Waqar Khattak (2014 SCMR 122) Jahanzaib Malik v. Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (2018 SCMR 414) Mian Irfan Bashir v. The Deputy Commissioner, Lahore (PLD 2021 SC 571) Messrs Sadiq Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (PLD 2023 SC 236) (b) Elections Act, 2017: ----S. 230---Caretaker Government’s powers---Limitations on policy decisions---Amendment of NADRA Rules, 2020---Effect. The Caretaker Government amended Rule 7A of the NADRA (Appointment and Emoluments of Chairman and Members) Rules, 2020, allowing appointment of a serving BPS-21 officer as Chairman NADRA. The amendment was later ratified by the elected Federal Government. The Supreme Court held that under Section 230 of the Elections Act, 2017, a Caretaker Government is restricted from making major policy decisions, but it may act in public interest if the action is reversible by an elected government. Since the elected government validated the amendment and appointment, the challenge against the initial appointment was rendered academic. (c) Judicial Review and Separation of Powers: ----Judicial overreach---Encroachment on executive functions---Scope of High Court’s interference in government appointments. Supreme Court reiterated that courts must not overstep their constitutional mandate by interfering in executive decisions, particularly regarding appointments. It held that appointments fall within the exclusive domain of the executive, and judicial intervention beyond statutory limits amounts to judicial overreach. A High Court cannot, on its own motion, invalidate rules or appointments that have been duly made and ratified by the competent authority. ----Disposition: Intra Court Appeal allowed, High Court’s judgment dated 06.09.2024 set aside, and Writ Petition No.12091/2024 dismissed.

Summary: -----Documents in proof of juvenility must pass through the test of scrutiny before acceptance. -----Background: The petitioner challenged two orders passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, which relied on a medical report/ossification test and rejected documentary evidence submitted by the petitioner to establish his status as a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice System Act (JJSA) 2018. The petitioner argued that the documents, including a birth certificate, Form-B from NADRA, and a school-leaving certificate, should have been given precedence over the medical report. -----Issues: 1- Does the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 mandate the acceptance of documentary evidence over medical reports in determining an accused’s juvenility? -----2- Did the trial court err in rejecting the documentary evidence and relying on the medical report? -----3- Are documents provided by the accused for juvenility claims admissible without verification? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The petition was dismissed, and the trial court’s reliance on the medical report to determine the petitioner’s age was upheld. --Requirements of JJSA 2018: Section 8 requires the determination of age through documentary evidence (birth certificates, educational records) or, in their absence, a medical examination. However, the court clarified that "absence of documents" includes situations where submitted documents lack authenticity. --Burden of Proof: The petitioner bore the burden to establish juvenility with authentic documents, which he failed to meet. The trial court found the submitted documents unreliable, citing: The birth certificate was obtained after the alleged crime and lacked corroborating evidence. The NADRA Form-B and school-leaving certificate contained volunteered entries without independent verification. --Reliance on Medical Report: With unreliable documents, the trial court appropriately relied on the ossification test conducted by a panel of five medical specialists, which determined the petitioner’s age to be 21–22 years. --Judicial Precedents: The court cited rulings emphasizing that documents submitted to prove juvenility must be scrutinized for authenticity, and medical evidence may be preferred when doubts persist. Role of Police and Court: The police failed to properly investigate the petitioner’s age during the investigation, leaving the court to conduct an inquiry. This was in line with the JJSA 2018 and precedent cases, which mandate thorough judicial scrutiny of juvenility claims. The trial court’s decision to prioritize the medical report over dubious documents was upheld, and the petition was dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: Saleem Khan vs. The State (PLD 2020 SC 356): Courts must conduct an inquiry into juvenility claims when the police fail to fulfill their duty. Muhammad Aslam vs. The State (PLD 2009 SC 777): Verification of documents is essential before accepting claims of juvenility. Muhammad Anwar vs. Muhammad Suffiyan (2009 SCMR 1073): Birth certificates based on volunteered entries cannot be considered conclusive proof of age. Om Prakash vs. State of Rajasthan (2012 SCMR 1400): Medical reports may be relied upon in the absence of credible documentary evidence. Mehran vs. Ubaid Ullah (PLD 2024 SC 843): Courts must ensure fair application of JJSA 2018 to protect juveniles’ rights, but not at the cost of authenticity. Muhammad Ishaq vs. Muhammad Nadeem (2002 SCMR 440): Documents must be genuine and free from fraud to be relied upon for age determination.

Summary: Majida Naz, a Pakistani citizen, filed a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, seeking the issuance of Pakistan Origin Cards (POC) for her two minor daughters, Javeria Inam Khan and Maryam Inam Khan. The minors were born to a Pakistani mother and an Afghan father on September 22, 2013, and April 12, 2015, respectively. The application for POCs was denied by the respondents, NADRA and the Ministry of Interior, citing security concerns and rules regarding List-B countries. Majida Naz challenged this decision, asserting that her daughters were entitled to Pakistani citizenship under Section 5 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, and thus eligible for POCs. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether the minors, being born to a Pakistani mother and an Afghan father, are entitled to Pakistani citizenship by descent under Section 5 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951. ------ 2) Whether the denial of POCs based on security concerns related to the father's nationality (Afghan) is legally justified. ------ 3) Whether the discretionary powers of NADRA and the Ministry of Interior under Rule 13 of the National Database and Registration Authority (Pakistan Origin Card) Rules, 2002, were exercised lawfully. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Citizenship by Descent: The court held that under Section 5 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, the minors were citizens of Pakistan by descent, as their mother is a Pakistani citizen. The Act allows for children born to a Pakistani parent to acquire citizenship by descent. The father’s Afghan nationality does not affect this right. The court emphasized that the minors, being born after the substitution of the word "father" with "parent" in the Act, were entitled to citizenship by descent. ------ Denial of POC Based on Security Concerns: The court found the denial of POCs on the basis of the father’s Afghan nationality and the lack of security clearance to be unjustified. The court noted that the authorities failed to provide any concrete reasons or evidence that the issuance of POCs to the minors would harm Pakistan's sovereignty, security, or public interest. The mere association with an Afghan national does not justify such denial, especially when the minors are recognized as Pakistani citizens by law. ------ Discretionary Powers and Rule 13: The court ruled that while Rule 13 of the Pakistan Origin Card Rules, 2002, grants NADRA discretionary powers to deny POCs based on security concerns, this discretion must be exercised fairly, reasonably, and transparently. In this case, the discretion was exercised arbitrarily, without proper justification. The court reiterated that no subordinate rule, SOP, or discretion can override the statutory provisions of the parent law, in this case, the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951. The court allowed the petition and directed the respondents to issue POCs to the minors in accordance with the law. ------ Citations/Precedents: Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, Section 5 (Citizenship by descent) National Database and Registration Authority (Pakistan Origin Card) Rules, 2002, Rule 13 Suo Moto Case No.11 of 2011 (PLD 2014 Supreme Court 389): Clarified the limits of discretionary powers under statutory law. Khawaja Ahmad Hassaan v. Government of Punjab and others (2005 SCMR 186): Rules cannot override statutory provisions. Messrs. Mehraj Flour Mills and others v. Provincial Government and others (2001 SCMR 1806): Rules must be consistent with the parent statute. Muhammad Uneeb Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan (2019 MLD 1347): Subordinate rules cannot contradict statutory law. Malik Munsif Awan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 379): Emphasized the necessity of fair and reasonable exercise of discretionary powers. Suo Moto Case No.18 of 2010 (PLD 2011 Supreme Court 927): Public functionaries must act in accordance with law. Tariq Aziz-ud-Din and others (2010 SCMR 1301): Arbitrary exercise of discretion is not permissible under law.

Summary: Background: Imran Haider, the petitioner, filed a criminal revision against the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Shorkot, District Jhang, dated November 30, 2023. The order declared Muhammad Hussain (respondent No. 2) as a juvenile in the case involving the abduction and murder of the petitioner’s 14-year-old son, Hassan Raza. Hassan was abducted by Muhammad Hussain and his co-accused, Asim Ali, and was later found dead, with evidence of sodomy. Initially charged under section 363 PPC (kidnapping), additional charges of sections 302, 375-A, and 34 PPC were added during the investigation. The trial court declared Muhammad Hussain a juvenile based on his Form-B issued by NADRA, showing his date of birth as May 20, 2006, making him 17 years old at the time of the crime. ----Issues: 1) Whether the trial court erred in declaring Muhammad Hussain a juvenile based on the Form-B issued by NADRA. ---2) Whether an ossification test should have been ordered due to conflicting documents regarding the accused’s age. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Holding: The Lahore High Court upheld the trial court’s decision to declare Muhammad Hussain a juvenile, dismissing the criminal revision. ----Reasoning: No Need for Ossification Test: The court held that under Section 8 of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, the age of the accused should be determined based on documentary evidence (such as birth certificates and Form-B). Since there were valid public documents (Form-B issued by NADRA and a birth certificate), there was no need for an ossification test. The school leaving certificate presented by the petitioner was deemed unreliable due to inconsistencies in the name and educational details. ----Preference to Public Documents: The court found that the NADRA-issued Form-B and the birth certificate, being official records, should take precedence over private documents like school leaving certificates. The court emphasized that the principle of law requires reliance on documentary evidence first, and only in its absence should medical reports be sought. ----Juvenility at Time of Offense: The court concluded that Muhammad Hussain was indeed a juvenile at the time of the offense based on his official date of birth (May 20, 2006), as stated in the NADRA documents. ----Outcome: The criminal revision was dismissed, and the trial court’s decision to declare Muhammad Hussain a juvenile was affirmed. ----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Anwar vs. Muhammad Sufiyan and Another (2009 SCMR 1073) Oam Parkash vs. The State of Rajistan and Another (2012 SCMR 1400) Sultan Ahmad vs. ASJ-I, Mianwali, and Two Others (PLD 2014 Supreme Court 758) Saleem Khan vs. The State and Others (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 356) Manzoor Hussain vs. The State and 8 Others (2013 P.Cr.L.J. 18) Nasreen Akhtar vs. Mian Abbas, SHO, and 7 Others (2016 P.Cr.L.J. 578) Zahida Parveen Alias Gooma and Another vs. The State and Others (2019 P.Cr.L.J. 1491) Adil Khan vs. The State and Another (2020 P.Cr.L.J. 729) Muhammad Zubair vs. The State (2010 SCMR 182) Ijaz Hussain vs. The State (2002 SCMR 1455) Umar Hayat vs. Jahangir (2002 SCMR 629) Sohail Iqbal vs. The State (1993 SCMR 2377)

Summary: Background: The petitioner, Ashba Kamran, challenged the appointment of Lieutenant General Muhammad Munir Afsar (Respondent No. 6) as Chairman of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). The challenge was made under Article 199(1)(b)(ii) of the Constitution, questioning the authority of the appointment by the caretaker government and the subsequent confirmation by the elected government. The petitioner argued that the appointment violated the prescribed qualifications under the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000, and did not follow a competitive recruitment process. ----Issues: 1) Whether the caretaker government had the authority to appoint Respondent No. 6 as Chairman NADRA under Rule 7A of the NADRA Appointment and Emoluments Rules, 2020. ---2) Whether the appointment process was legally valid, considering the lack of public advertisement and competitive evaluation. ---3) Whether Rule 7A of the NADRA Appointment and Emoluments Rules, 2020, is consistent with the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Holding: The court held that the appointment of Respondent No. 6 was invalid and without lawful authority. The Federal Government's reliance on Rule 7A of the Rules, 2020, was misplaced as it conflicted with the parent legislation, the NADRA Ordinance, 2000, which required the appointment of a qualified professional through a merit-based process. The appointment made without public advertisement or competitive recruitment violated Articles 18 and 27 of the Constitution, which guarantee equality of opportunity in employment. The court emphasized that the Federal Government could not bypass the qualification-based evaluation process mandated by the NADRA Ordinance. The insertion of Rule 7A, which allowed for the direct appointment of a serving officer in the "national interest," was found inconsistent with the statutory requirements and the principle of merit. The court further rejected the argument that the national interest justified such an appointment, emphasizing that any exercise of delegated authority must be consistent with the primary enactment. The court declared the appointment of Respondent No. 6 as Chairman NADRA to be without lawful authority and struck it down. The appointment was found to be in excess of the delegated authority, and Respondent No. 6 was ordered to vacate the office. ----Citations/Precedents: MUSHTAQ AHMAD MOHAL and others Vs. Honourable Lahore High Court, Lahore and others (1997 SCMR 1043) ZAFARAN KHAN and others. Vs. NIZAM ULLAH and others (PLD 2023 SC 371) JAWAD AHMAD MIR v. Prof. Dr. IMTIAZ ALI KHAN, VICE CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF SWABI, DISTRICT SWABI, KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA and others (2023 SCMR 162) MALIK NAWAB SHER v. Ch. MUNEER AHMAD and others (2013 SCMR 1035) MUSHTAQ AHMAD KHAN v. PAKISTAN TOBACCO BOARD (2007 SCMR 97) Pir ILLAHI BAKSH v. MUHAMMAD AYOOB KHUHRO (PLD 1956 Sind 101) Baz Muhammad Kakar and others Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2012 SC 870) ZAFARAN KHAN and others. Vs. NIZAM ULLAH and others (PLD 2023 SC 371)

Summary: National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000)--- ----Ss. 17(1) & 30(1)(d)---Non-Surrendering of CNIC of the deceased---Penal consequences--- Scope---Petitioner under constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court had sought directions to NADRA to get recovered original CNIC of his deceased father from the possession of his brother/respondent---Respondent (brother) denied possession of original CNIC of their late father---Father of petitioner and respondent was undisputedly, holding a CNIC---Section 17(1) of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 provided that in case of death of holder of a Card, inter alia, the heirs were bound to surrender Card of deceased within 60 days of such death---Refusal or failure to produce or surrender the card entailed penal consequences under S.30(1)(d) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 and in view of clear provisions of Ss. 17(1) and 30(1)(d) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000, it was the legal duty of NADRA to direct the concerned person to surrender the original CNIC of the deceased, if same was not already produced---If the legal heirs were not in possession of original Card of deceased, they might satisfy the concerned Authority to that effect---NADRA was directed by the High Court to proceed in the matter strictly in accordance with provisions of National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance 2000---Intra-court appeal was allowed accordingly.

Summary: If the date mentioned on the Primary School Certificate was to be believed by the Applicant/Plaintiff when he applied for CNIC and furnished his information on Form A submitted to NADRA, he would be underage at the time of issuance of his CNIC (less than 18 years). Further, the Applicant/Plaintiff filed the same claim twice, first in 2015 and then again in 2020. Each application to NADRA does not constitute a fresh cause of action. Revision dismissed.

Summary: Judgment in NADRA case passed by Division Bench comprising Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Mr. Justice Arshad Hussain Khan whereby the show cause notices issued under Section 18 of NADRA Ordinance, 2000 are quashed. The blocking of CNICs of the petitioners was declared illegal.

Summary: National Database and Registration Authority Regulations, 2002 (Redesignation of declaration of faith form)