Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ? Art. 199. KP Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act, 1977---S. 3 --- Procedure for removal of encroachment from public property --- Issuance of order by the government, any authority or officer necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of tribunal--- Held. Where no order under section 3 of the Act read with rule. 3 of the Rules has been passed directing the petitioner to vacate any public property --- the tribunal established under the Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and therefore, the suit filed before the tribunal was not maintainable.

Summary: (Mining and Mineral Department is responsible for obtaining environmental approvals for small-scale mining licences and leases) The petitioner argued that the Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002 did not require environmental approval from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for small-scale mining operations, despite the Environmental Protection Act, 1997 mandating such approvals. The respondents informed the court that meetings were held to resolve the issue, and it was agreed that the Mines and Minerals Department (MMD) would submit Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports for each project, obtaining environmental approval before the bidding process. The Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2022 were also promulgated to clarify the projects requiring IEE or EIA. However, the petitioner argued that there was no enforcement procedure in place and requested guidelines and a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to ensure compliance. The court acknowledged the importance of considering environmental impacts in mining and emphasized the need for IEE and EIA reports, which assess and address such concerns. The court agreed with the petitioner that the MMD should obtain these reports before initiating the bidding process and suggested the provision of guidelines, SOPs, and penalties for non-compliance. The court emphasized the importance of responsible and sustainable mining practices for economic growth while protecting the environment. As a result, the petition was disposed of.

Summary: That the benchmark for valuation of stamp duty in term of S 27-A of the Act would be the nature & character of the property at the time of registration of the instrument & not its potential use.

Summary: (a) KP Payment of Wages Act, 2013 Section 15--- Application before the authority, Haripur, U/S 15(7) for recovery of wages --- Earlier writ petition of the petitioner was accepted on payment of cost. Record transpires that cost was paid before the date given to the petitioner --- Extract of cause list and parcha peshi reveals that date was adjourned to 6/07/2022, then passing the impugned order on 8/06/2022 and accepting the claim of respondents on the sole ground of non-deposit of cost amount. Held legally not sustainable --- Further Held. Petitioner having no other efficacious remedy. --- Their petition before this was maintainable hence allowed. Impugned order is set aside and case was remanded to the authority to be decided strictly in accordance with law. (b) S. 17, Filing of Appeal before the labour Court against the order of authority under the KP Payment of Wages Act, 2013, limited to orders passed by the authority U/S 15 Sub Section (3) (4), Appeal under S. 17 ibid only be filed in respect of the matter enumerated in S. 15 of the Act and it does not include an order or decision passed by the authority due to non-payment of cost imposed by the court. When no alternate of efficacious remedy is available then writ jurisdiction of High Court can be competently invoked in circumstances. Rel. 2019 SCMR 1653, 2003 SCMR 255

Summary: [Supreme Court does not readily interfere in interim orders] The petitioner, through a constitutional petition, contested the initiation of an inquiry against him by the Chief Minister's Inspection Team, claiming that he had already been exonerated in three previous inquiries on the same charges. The High Court issued notices to the opposing side and granted interim relief to respondent No.1, stating that no adverse orders should be passed against him. This interim relief was subsequently extended through an order dated February 4, 2020. The Supreme Court noted that it is generally hesitant to interfere with interim orders passed by the High Court, preferring that the court hearing the case reach a final decision before it is brought to the Supreme Court. However, exceptions can be made if the interim relief granted by the High Court is arbitrary, unreasonable, reflects an abuse of power, or results in a miscarriage of justice. Upon examination of the impugned interim order, the Supreme Court found no significant illegality, abuse of process, or gross injustice. Therefore, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order and dismissed the petition, refusing to grant leave.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199 & Art. 10-A---Right to fair trial---Input tax adjustment---Show-cause notice---Request for physical verification---Scope---Petitioners impugned issuance of show-cause notices under S.11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, for disallowance of input tax adjustment related to supply of equipment used at their other plant---Petitioners contended that the Respondents, while acting under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, failed to follow settled legal principles laid down by the Division Bench of the High Court in Nishat Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2020 PTD 1641), which required factual determination of input tax use in the context of taxable supplies---Petitioners specifically invoked their right under Art.10-A of the Constitution for fair trial and requested physical verification of input tax usage at their manufacturing premises prior to adjudication---High Court held that Respondents’ inaction on such request and lack of verification despite legal obligation warranted a direction for compliance. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----Ss. 2, 7 & 8---Adjustment of input tax---Statutory interpretation---Textual and holistic reading---Doctrine of Intertwined---Court held that Ss.2, 7, and 8 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 must be interpreted collectively rather than in isolation---Section 7 permits adjustment of input tax for taxable supplies while Section 8 lists disqualifying factors; both must be harmonized for legal clarity---Doctrine of Textualism and the “Doctrine of Intertwined” discussed and applied, holding that statutory interpretation must focus on the plain text while considering interconnected provisions---Case law including Coca-Cola Beverages Pakistan Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal (2017 PTD 2380) and Reliance Commodities (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 Lahore 632) affirmed. (c) Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007 ----S. 4(1)(a) & (k)---FBR as regulator---Function and responsibility---Court reiterated that FBR, under the 2007 Act, is the regulator of fiscal laws and must act transparently and fairly while implementing tax provisions---In tax-related disputes, the FBR’s statutory mandate includes record collection, policy issuance, and clear adjudication without violating procedural fairness. **(d) Constitutional jurisdiction---Exercise of discretion---Court’s role in directing fair procedure---Where an authority has failed to act in accordance with its statutory duty or judicial precedents, and a fair trial requires factual verification, High Court may exercise discretion under Art.199 to protect procedural rights---Petitioners’ request for on-site inspection was found lawful and conducive to the resolution of input tax dispute. Disposition: Petition disposed of with direction to Respondent No.4 to constitute a qualified verification team and complete on-site verification under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, prior to final adjudication. Cited Cases: • Nishat Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 PTD 1641 • Coca-Cola Beverages Pakistan Ltd. v. Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal 2017 PTD 2380 • Reliance Commodities (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2020 Lahore 632 = 2020 PTD 1464 • Tariq Iqbal Malik v. M/s Multiplierz Group (Pvt.) Ltd. 2022 CLD 468 • Chenab Flour and General Mills v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2021 Lahore 343 • Ramzan Sugar Mills Ltd. v. FBR 2021 PTD 1321

Summary: [Maintainability of petitions before the Supreme Court without filing an ICA before the High Court] The respondents' counsel objected to the maintainability of the petition, stating that the petitioners had not exhausted the available remedy of filing an Intra Court Appeal (ICA) before the High Court. The counsel cited several case laws to support their contention. The petitioners' counsel, on the other hand, argued that the petition was maintainable and referred to a case called Media Network to support their claim. The Supreme Court, after hearing the arguments and reviewing the case laws, noted that the filing of an ICA before the High Court is generally a prerequisite before approaching the Supreme Court. However, the Court has entertained such petitions in exceptional circumstances involving important questions of law, constitutional interpretation, validity of statutes, and fundamental rights. Additionally, the objection of maintainability should be raised at an early stage. In this case, the Supreme Court found no exceptional circumstances and noted that the objection of maintainability was raised in a timely manner. The reliance on the Media Network case was considered misconceived as it involved different circumstances. The current matter was related to the adjustment of input tax for services received by the respondent against sales tax on services. Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondents' counsel, ruling that the instant petition was not maintainable. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Summary: (Only NEPRA can determine the tariff and adjust electricity based subsidies in the tariff) This judgment pertains to the rationalization of electricity tariffs in Pakistan. The Federal Government sought to establish a uniform tariff throughout the country, applying the same price to electricity for all consumers. Initially, the government determined the tariff for each distribution company (DISCO) and applied to the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) to devise a uniform tariff. However, the government deviated from the established process by independently determining the Schedule of Tariffs (SOT) for K-Electric, instead of NEPRA. To rectify this deviation, the Federal Government issued a corrigendum to adjust the tariff. However, this decision faced legal challenges from consumers who had been enjoying a subsidized rate during off-peak hours. The consumers questioned the withdrawal of the subsidy and contested the corrigendum while simultaneously accepting the uniform tariff determined by the government. In its judgment, the court held that the petitions filed by the consumers were without merit. It emphasized that the determination and adjustment of tariffs should be within the authority of NEPRA, not the Federal Government. The court acknowledged that subsidies are based on government policies and are subject to modification or withdrawal. Therefore, it upheld the corrigendum issued by the government and recommended that future adjustments adhere to the proper process, ensuring NEPRA's involvement in tariff determinations.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: The case involves a dispute over the subdivision of a plot of land, the Supreme Court after hearing both sides, addressed two main issues. Firstly, it emphasized that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan cannot be used to resolve factual controversies. Secondly, it examined the authority of the Cantonment Board regarding Class "C" land and concluded that the Board does not have the power to change the classification or lease or transfer such land without the prior approval of the federal government. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to entertain the writ petition and grant relief without recording evidence was misconceived. It ruled that the disputed road/lane and the classification of the land required factual determination, which falls outside the purview of constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the parties to pursue their claims in a civil court for a resolution of the factual issues involved in the case.