Summary: In presence of arbitration clause in lease agreement or agreement deed or contract deed, writ jurisdiction cannot lie.Contractual obligations and rights have to be enforced through Court of ordinary jurisdiction and should not be enforced through constitutional petition.Relief under Article 199 of constitution is discretionary, if petitioner conceal some facts, the court may discard relief, as it shows that petitioner has not come to the court with clean hands.

Summary: The brief facts of the case involved a financial facility extended by Respondent No.1 in the form of a "Sale & Lease Back Facility" to Respondent No.2, involving leased CNG station equipment as collateral. Various securities were provided for this facility, including a mortgage of a property owned by the appellant.However, Respondent No.2 failed to make the required lease payments, resulting in legal proceedings. Respondent No.1 filed a suit for recovery against the appellant and Respondents No.2 to 4. During the proceedings, the appellant filed an application under Section 10 of the Ordinance to defend the suit, but the application was dismissed. Subsequently, judgments and decrees were passed against the appellant and Respondents No.2 to 4, leading to this appeal.The primary argument of the appellant was that the Leased Assets constituted the main security for the facility, and their loss and misappropriation by Respondent No.1 should discharge the appellant's liability under Sections 139 and 141 of the Contract Act. Additionally, the appellant argued that since the value of the Leased Assets exceeded the outstanding debt, he should be discharged under Section 141 of the Contract Act.The court examined the legal provisions in question and noted that the Leased Assets legally belonged to Respondent No.1, making them the prime security. As such, Sections 139 and 141 of the Contract Act did not apply in this case. The court also reviewed previous judgments and highlighted that the surety's discharge would require an active act of negligence by the creditor, which was not present here. The court rejected the appellant's arguments on this ground.Regarding the objection to the revival of execution proceedings, the court found that while proper notice should have been given, the appellant was already involved in the proceedings, and no prejudice resulted from the lack of notice.

Summary: With all humility, the aforesaid dictums are distinguishable as on the face of it in the present case there is no change or conversion of amenity plot to commercial or residential use but throughout the pleadings, nothing has been surfaced that the defendant Nos.1 and 2 or the defendant Nos.8 to 10 are endeavoring to convert the use of land from amenity to commercial or residential use. ---- The Plaintiff sought a declaration to nullify a sale deed executed by Defendant No. 1 in favor of Defendant No. 2, asserting it was unlawful due to restrictions in the lease deed, and sought to prevent any construction on the plot by the defendants.Several interlocutory applications were filed by both parties, addressing issues ranging from suspension of lease and sale deeds to requests for expediting the case and lifting status quo orders. The court examined the legal and factual complexities, including the plaintiff's role as a whistleblower highlighting alleged legal violations in the transfer and intended use of the amenity plot.The court dismissed applications seeking to reject the plaint for lack of cause of action or being barred by law, recognizing the need for a full trial to explore the substantial questions raised. However, the court denied the plaintiff's request for an injunction to halt construction on the plot, allowing the defendants to proceed at their own risk, emphasizing the public interest in the proposed development of a hospital on the amenity plot.The decision to proceed with the case to trial underscores the court's commitment to thoroughly examining the issues at hand, balancing legal formalities with considerations of public interest and societal needs.

Summary: All allottees under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' launched by the Board of Revenue of the then West Pakistan were to be conferred proprietary rights, provided that they had fulfilled the terms and conditions on which temporary leases were granted----The case revolves around the allocation of land under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' and subsequent legal disputes over proprietary rights and land allotments. The petitioner was initially allotted land under a temporary lease in 1957, which expired in 1962, and the land reverted to the State. However, the petitioner applied for alternate land in 1984 and was granted proprietary rights in another piece of land in 1986. The respondent contested this allocation, claiming eligibility for proprietary rights themselves. Legal precedents and notifications issued in 1958, 1962, 1970, and 1971 outline conditions for granting proprietary rights and alternate land to lessees under the scheme. These notifications stipulate that lessees fulfilling certain terms and conditions, such as cultivation and dispossession circumstances, are entitled to proprietary rights or alternate land. The respondent filed applications and petitions seeking cancellation of the petitioner's allotment and restoration of their rights. The Board of Revenue ultimately declared the petitioner's allotment as ultra vires and restored the allotment in favor of the respondent, alleging fraud and misrepresentation by the petitioner. The petitioner challenged this decision in the Lahore High Court, which upheld the cancellation of the petitioner's allotment. However, the court did not thoroughly examine the case's applicability to the legal notifications and precedents. In response, the appellate court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case back to the Board of Revenue for reevaluation. The Board of Revenue is directed to determine whether the petitioner or the respondent is entitled to alternate land or if the land rightfully reverted back to the State, considering the conditions outlined in the relevant notifications.

Summary: (a) Balochistan Cancellation of Illegal Allotments of State Land Act (V of 1996)-------Ss. 3, 4 & 5 (2)---Balochistan Land Lease Policy, 1988, Cls. 5, 7 & 12---Transfer of PropertyAct (IV of 1882), S. 41---Allotment of land---Cancellation of---Plea of bona fide purchaser---Scope---Contention of plaintiffs was that they had purchased the suit land from the originalallottees---Suit was decreed by the Trial Court but same was dismissed by the Appellate Court---Validity---Allotment or lease by itself did not create ownership rights---Allottee or lessee wasrequired to remain in possession for 45 year to acquire right of ownership and fulfilled therequirement as determined by Balochistan Land Lease Policy, 1988---Plaintiffs could not claimownership rights on the basis of such transfer as it could not create ownership/title in favour ofso called transferee and subsequent purchaser---Lessee/allottee could not sublet, mortgage andtransfer in any manner the leased land---Allotments/transfers in question were in violation ofBalochistan Land Lease Policy, 1988 which stood automatically cancelled---Seller could nottransfer a title better than that he himself had---Original allottees were neither owner nor couldhave transferred any ownership and title to the plaintiffs---Plaintiffs could not claim to be bonafide purchasers when illegal allotment/lease stood refundable---Plaintiffs had got no locus standi to call in question the orders passed by the competent authority with regard to terms andconditions of an allotment/lease---Revision was dismissed with costs throughout incircumstances.(b) Balochistan Land Lease Policy, 1988-------Cl. 13(4)---Allotment of property situated on Highway---Any property situated on Highwaycould not be allotted or leased out.

Summary: ''A lease which is not in consonance with section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 cannot at all be held to be permanent in nature under any circumstances and since the lease in question was not in perpetuity, the Tax department has no lawful authority to demand/levy property tax from the lessee in term of section 4 (a) & (b) of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958.'' ---- Issues:Is the property leased by The Board to Muhammad Shafi exempt from tax under Section 4(a) of The Act?Did the High Court correctly apply legal principles from the case of Mehran Associates Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi?Judgment:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the property in question is not subject to property tax. The Court clarified that the lease does not constitute a lease in perpetuity as it contains a fixed term of 30 years with conditions for the constructed property to revert to The Board, making it exempt under Section 4(a) of The Act.Reasoning:The Court determined that a lease in perpetuity implies an irreversible or non-returnable transaction, which was not the case here. The lease contained specific conditions, including the return of constructed property to The Board, approval requirements for construction and sub-leasing, and a termination clause, all indicating the lease was not in perpetuity. The Court also differentiated this case from Mehran Associates Ltd., as it involved the interpretation of lease under The Act rather than income tax laws.Conclusion:The Supreme Court concluded that the lease arrangement between The Board and Muhammad Shafi does not make the property liable for property tax under The Act due to its non-perpetual nature and specific conditions that align with an exemption under Section 4(a) of The Act.

Summary: S.42,54 SRA,S.3 GDA Act 1996:Suit for declaration & perpetual injunction--lease property,granted by unauthorized authority--effects

Summary: West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-------S.13---Rent deed---Extension of lease period with mutual consent of parties---Scope---Contention of plaintiffs was that lease period was extended with mutual consent of parties,therefore rent was to be enhanced according to rent deed---Suit was decreed concurrently---Validity---Premises was rented out to the defendant through rent deed for a period of nine years---Lease period was extended with mutual consent of parties after expiry of earlier term oftenancy---Defendant itself requested for extension of tenancy which was accepted by theplaintiffs---Extended period of tenancy should be deemed to be governed by the rent deed---Iftenant remained in possession of the property without consent of landlord after expiry of tenancyagreement then tenancy would continue to be governed by the terms and conditions of expiredrent agreement---Mutual consent between the parties for extension of tenancy period wouldmake rent agreement alive and both the landlord and tenant were bound by its terms andconditions---Rent of premises was to be enhanced @ 15% after every three years as per rentagreement, therefore defendant was bound to act upon it---Both the courts below after appraisalof evidence and material available on the record had recorded correct conclusion---Defendant had failed to point out any illegality or irregularity in the concurrent findings of fact recorded bythe courts below---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Summary: Lease of land--Default in payment of lease money--order for ejectment of tenants---validity

Summary: Specific Performance----Lease----Dismissed.