Summary: (a) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)- -S. 22 & Preamble-Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976-Liberal interpretation-Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 is a beneficial statute intended to provide security and old-age benefits to employees of industrial, commercial or other organizations covered by it and, therefore, its provisions have to be construed liberally in order to advance its objective. Don Basco High School v. The Assistant Director EOBI, PLD 1989 SC 128 and Lahore Race Club v. Deputy Director EOBI, 1998 SCMR 1571 ref. (b) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)- -S. 22(2)-Old age pension-Exception under Section 22(2) of the Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 (-the EOB Act, 1976)-Applicability-Stage when the exception under Section 22(2) of the EOB Act, 1976 becomes applicable-To avail the exception under Section 22(2) of the the EOB Act, 1976, the insured person must satisfy that he was in employment in the industry or establishment on the first day of July 1976 or on the day the Act became applicable to such an industry or establishment and was of the age mentioned in Section 22(2)(i) and (ii) of the Act. Section 22(1) of the Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 (-the Act-) provides that an insured person is entitled to monthly old-age pension if (i) he is over sixty years of age, or over fifty-five years of age in the case of a woman, and (ii) the contribution in respect of such insured person was paid by the employer for not less than fifteen years. It is only when both these conditions are fulfilled that an insured person is entitled to monthly old-age pension under the said provision. An exception is provided under Section 22(2) of the Act whereby the number of years of contribution paid by the employer on behalf of the insured person is reduced to seven and five years, respectively instead of fifteen years under section 22(2) if on the first day of July, 1976 or on any day thereafter on which the Act becomes applicable to an industry or establishment; (i) the insured person is over forty years of age, or over thirty-five years of age in the case of a woman or (ii) the insured person is over forty-five years of age, or over forty years in the case of a woman. The first cut-off date i.e., first day of July 1976 is the date when the Act was implemented. As per section 9 of the Act, the first contribution was paid by the employer on the said date. The second cut-off date is when the Act becomes applicable to an industry or establishment. Section 1(4) of the Act provides three different modes through which the Act becomes applicable to an industry or establishment. It is at these two points in time when the age of the insured person in terms of Section 22(2)(i) and (ii) becomes relevant for invoking the exception of reduced years of contribution under the said provision. The age of the insured person alone is not the determining factor for the case to fall within the exception under Section 22(2) but it is also that the age must be so at the relevant cut-off dates mentioned above. As such, an insured person cannot avail the exception under Section 22(2) if he was employed after the cut-off date, i.e., first day of July 1976 or after the date when the Act became applicable to the industry or establishment under Section1(4) of the Act. Therefore, to avail the exception under Section 22(2) of the Act, the insured person must satisfy that he was in employment in the industry or establishment on the first day of July 1976 or on the day the Act became applicable to such an industry or establishment and was of the age mentioned in Section 22(2)(i) and (ii) of the Act. Ch. Akhtar Ali (in C.P. No. 3531 of 2023). Barrister Abu Bakar along with Muhammad Amin, Deputy Director General, EOBI and Abdul Ahad, Director (Law) EOBI. Ghulam Muhammad, Director (Operations), EOBI (in C.P. No. 408 of 2023, C.P's Nos. 2451-2458 of 2023 and C.P's Nos. 2469-2473 of 2023). Raja Muhammad Rafiq Janjua, Advocate High Court along with Private Respondents (in C.Ps. Nos. 408, 2451-2458 and 2469-2473 of 2023).

Summary: Background:Muhammad Tariq Khan and Tahir Zaman, both employees of the National Bank of Pakistan (N.B.P.), were implicated in a robbery and murder incident at the Rawat Branch, Islamabad, where they were posted. Following the incident, they were suspended, criminally charged, and subjected to departmental proceedings. Despite being acquitted in the criminal case, they faced departmental actions resulting in their dismissal. After exhausting various legal avenues, including the Federal Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court of Pakistan, they approached the Lahore High Court for relief, leading to a directive for a fresh departmental inquiry. However, the subsequent inquiry again concluded with their dismissal.----Issues:The maintainability of the petitions, including questions about territorial jurisdiction, the statutory nature of N.B.P. rules, and the availability of alternative remedies under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012.The propriety and fairness of the departmental proceedings against Khan and Zaman, particularly in light of their acquittal in the criminal case and the principles of natural justice.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, allowed the petitions, reinstating Khan and Zaman with all permissible back benefits. The court addressed the maintainability concerns by affirming its territorial jurisdiction based on the location of the departmental proceedings and the statutory nature of the N.B.P. rules governing the petitioners' employment. It also ruled out the applicability of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, to their case, as they did not qualify as "workmen" under the Act.Regarding the departmental proceedings, the court found significant irregularities and a lack of transparency, determining that the proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated the principles of natural justice. The court emphasized that the right to a fair trial and the right to earn a livelihood are fundamental rights protected under the Constitution.----Citations/Precedents:The Federal Government through Secretary Interior, Government of Pakistan v. Ms. Ayyan Ali and others (2017 SCMR 1179): On territorial jurisdiction and the functioning of the Federal Government across the country.LPG Association of Pakistan through Chairman v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Islamabad and 8 others (2009 CLD 1498): On the concurrent jurisdiction of High Courts in matters involving the Federal Government.Muhammad Tariq Badr and another v. National Bank of Pakistan and others (2013 SCMR 314): On the statutory nature of N.B.P. rules and the preservation of employees' rights under such rules.National Bank of Pakistan and another v. Anwar Shah and others (2015 SCMR 434): On the distinction between "workmen" and employees in managerial or administrative capacities under the Industrial Relations Act.Habib Bank Limited v. Gulzar Khan and others (2019 SCMR 946): Further clarification on the definition of "workmen" under the Industrial Relations Act.

Summary: Eligibility for allotment of official accommodation:It is settled law that when an order itself is violative to the law, rules or regulation then by the mere facts that the decisive step has been taken could not provide any justification to remain in field because one wrong cannot justify the other as held by the apex Court in the case of ?Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore and another vs. Muhammad Akhtar Sherani and others? (PLD 2001 SC 1032) wherein, their lordships have enunciated the principle that one wrong cannot justify another. This principle is based upon a simple phrase that two wrongs do not make a right, i.e., someone has done something unjust or dishonest is no justification for acting in a similar way.

Summary: Issue:Whether the petitioner was unjustly denied the appointment to the post of Naib Qasid despite being top on the merit list due to the department's failure to verify his additional qualifications within the validity period of the merit list.---Judgment:The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to the extra marks at the time of the merit list preparation as he had not passed the requisite examination for the additional subjects needed for his qualification (Al-Shahadat-us-Sanwiya Al-Aama) to be equivalent to Matric. The awarding of 20 extra marks was deemed unlawful and discriminatory against other candidates. The validity of the merit list expired, and the petitioner's subsequent acquisition of the required qualifications could not be considered retrospectively. The court dismissed the petition, stating no vested right for the petitioner to be appointed based on the additional qualification he did not possess at the relevant time.---Rationale:The court emphasized the principle that the qualifications for a post must be complete by the cut-off date of the job application. Subsequent improvements or acquisitions of qualifications cannot be considered retrospectively unless specified by law or policy, which was not the case here.000Conclusion:The writ petition was dismissed with no order as to costs, affirming the appellate authority's decision and underscoring the importance of meeting all qualification requirements by the specified cut-off date in recruitment processes.

Summary: PLJ 2024 TrC (Services) 1 ----Case Details: Service Appeal No. 1006 of 2016, decided on 31-05-2023 ---Relevant Law: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1989 - Rule 17(a) ----Legal Issues: ---Determination of Seniority - The appellant, a selectee in a later selection process, contended that he should be considered senior. He participated in two separate advertisements and interviews, with no recommendation in the first merit list but was selected in the subsequent process. Seniority Based on Selection Process - The Commission argued that seniority should be assigned based on the order of selection processes, where those selected in earlier processes rank higher than those in later ones. ---Ruling: The Tribunal held that since the appellant was selected in the second process and not recommended in the first, the merit order from each selection process should stand for seniority determination. Consequently, individuals selected in the earlier process were entitled to seniority over those selected in subsequent processes, as the two selections were distinct and not combined. ---Cited Precedents: 2002 SCMR 889, 2002 PLC (CS) 780, PLJ 2002 SC 234, PLC 1993 (CS) 116 ---Judgment Result: Appeal dismissed. ------Background: The appeal addresses the legality of a seniority list of Assistant Engineers/SDOs (BPS-17) in the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The appellant, a candidate in both advertisements issued by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission, was successful only in the second advertisement. He challenged his placement in the seniority list, arguing for a combined merit list and claiming seniority based on his performance and age relative to others. ------Issues: 1- Whether a combined seniority list should be created for candidates selected from two separate advertisements. -----2- Whether the appellant's seniority should be adjusted above another candidate due to age and equal marks. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The appeal was dismissed, with the tribunal finding that: The appellant was appropriately assigned seniority based on the second advertisement, as separate selection processes were conducted for each advertisement. Seniority was correctly determined by the order of selection, with candidates from the earlier advertisement ranked above those from the latter, in line with regulatory guidelines. The appellant's claim of seniority based on age was invalid as he was selected in the later batch. -----Citations/Precedents: 2002 SCMR 889 2002 PLC (CS) 780 PLJ 2002 SC 234 PLC 1993 (CS) 116 1993 PLC (C.S.) 52 1998 SCMR 633

Summary: The PROVINCE OF SINDH and others-Respondents (Against the order dated 28.01.2021 passed by the Sindh Service Tribunal, at Karachi in Appeals Nos. 19 and 20 of 2020). Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1975 (V of 1976)- -Ss. 2(x), 2(xii) & 2(xiv)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 25-Persons working in the Government departments, autonomous bodies, local authorities and private firms or companies-Whether provisions of Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1975 [‘PEC Act’] are applicable to such persons-Conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court-Post of Executive Engineer (BS-18)-Case reported as Fida Hussain v. The Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division, Islamabad (PLD 1995 SC 701) [‘Fida Hussain’s case’] provides that if the Government employs a professional engineer as defined in the PEC Act for performing professional engineering work as envisaged by the PEC Act in section 2, the provisions of the PEC Act would be attracted and not otherwise-Whereas the case reported as Maula Bux Shaikh v. Chief Minister Sindh and others (2018 SCMR 2098) [‘Maula Bux Shaikh’s case’] introduces a cautionary note and explicitly dictates the Government regarding postings and transfers of Executive Engineer (BS-18) and directs that the Government shall not allow or permit any person to perform professional engineering work as defined in the PEC Act, who does not possess accredited engineering qualification from the accredited engineering institution and his name is not registered as a registered engineer or professional engineer under the PEC Act-This cautionary note raises critical concerns about the permissibility of employing engineers not licensed by the PEC for professional engineering tasks, which, according to the PEC Act, should only be undertaken by licensed professionals-Effect of these cases creates a scenario: where a person, on the one hand, is eligible to be promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (BS-18), but on the other hand, is denied to perform professional engineering works entailed for an Executive Engineer (BS-18)-This raises a very serious issue that may lead to creating different classes of employees within the same cadre, one who is eligible to perform professional engineering works, while the other is denied the same, and thus, exposing the current position to be against the principle of equality and nondiscrimination provided under Article 25 of the Constitution-Accordingly, it would be safe to hold that, while both cases, Fida Hussain’s case and Maula Bux Shaikh’s case, affirm that it is the domain of the Government concerned to decide, whether a particular academic qualification of a civil servant employee is sufficient for promotion from one Grade to another higher Grade-However, the questions which still alludes a definite determination are: whether any governmental policy regarding promotion can be given effect if the same can lead to the violation of the PEC Act or any other statute or expose the person who benefited from such policy to a criminal liability; and whether denying an Executive Engineer (BS-18) to perform professional engineering works entailed for an Executive Engineer (BS-18) creates different classes of employees within the same cadre, thereby violating the principle of equality and nondiscrimination provided under Article 25 of the Constitution-In the circumstances, the present case warrants further consideration but before a larger bench of the Supreme Court-Supreme Court directed Office to place the present case before the Committee constituted under section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 for fixation of the case before an appropriate bench.

Summary: Facts:Ghulam Abbas Soomro, holding a B-Tech (Hons.) Civil degree, served as an Executive Engineer (BS-18) in the Civil Works & Services Department, Government of Sindh. He challenged the frequent transfers and postings imposed by the respondents, particularly the cancellation of his transfer order without any performance complaint. The appellant argued that his postings should not be denied solely based on his lack of registration as a professional engineer with the Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC).Issues:Whether the frequent transfers and postings of the appellant were justified.Whether the appellant could be denied postings based solely on the lack of registration with the PEC as a professional engineer.----Holding:The Court found the frequent transfers and postings of the appellant to be unjustified and directed the Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, to ensure compliance with the law in future postings, avoiding discrimination.The Court observed a conflict between previous judgments regarding the applicability of PEC registration requirements. While Fida Hussain?s case emphasized government control over promotion policies, Maula Bux Shaikh?s case cautioned against employing engineers without PEC registration for professional engineering tasks. The Court decided that the matter required further consideration by a larger bench.---Conclusion:The case was referred to a larger bench for further consideration, particularly regarding the conflict between previous judgments on PEC registration requirements and their implications for government promotion policies.

Summary: Issue: Whether Mukaram Khan, employed on a daily wage basis since 2016, is entitled to be declared a permanent employee of WAPDA.---Holding: The appeal and the CMA were dismissed, upholding the Single Bench's decision to declare Mukaram Khan a permanent employee.---Reasoning: The commission observed that Mukaram Khan's continuous service since 2016 and the nature of his post warranted permanent employment status under the Pakistan Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The Ordinance stipulates that a workman engaged in work of a permanent nature for more than nine months and having satisfactorily completed a probationary period of three months acquires the status of a permanent workman. The commission referenced various Supreme Court decisions supporting the principle that employees serving in a capacity for more than nine months against a regular post should be considered for regularization. The commission found no substantial grounds in WAPDA's appeal to overturn the Single Bench's well-reasoned order.---Significant Legal Principles Applied:Pakistan Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968: Defines the criteria for a workman to be considered permanent based on the nature of work and duration of service.---Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Multan et al. vs. Muhammad Sajid and others (2019 PIC [CS] 539): The Supreme Court held that employees working continuously, even with artificial breaks to disrupt service continuity, are performing jobs of a permanent nature and are not serving in casual positions. Such employees are entitled to regularization.---Province of Punjab through Secretary Communication and Works Department and others vs. Ahmad Hussain (2013 SCMR 1547): The Supreme Court declared that employees serving continuously for more than six months are governed by the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, and should be considered permanent employees.Abdul Ghaffar vs. President National Bank of Pakistan et al. (2018 PLC [CS] 383): The Court ruled that employees engaged for manual jobs and compensated monthly, who have served for more than one year (or several 8-9 month stints), are entitled to the regularization of their services.Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, DG Khan vs. Muhammad Altaf et al. (2018 PLC [CS] 647): The Supreme Court found that employees working in various capacities for a considerable period, on a daily wage basis, against regular posts, and with artificial breaks in service, are entitled to regularization.Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, DG Khan and another vs. Muhammad Altaf and others (2018 SCMR 325): The Court dismissed an appeal against the regularization of daily wage employees who had served for not less than nine months, noting that the employer had created artificial breaks in service to avoid regularization.These precedents collectively emphasize the judiciary's stance on the rights of employees to be regularized when they have served in positions of a permanent nature for a significant duration, highlighting the principle of fairness and continuity in employment practices.

Summary: Background:The petition for leave to appeal challenges the decision of the Lahore High Court's Division Bench in an Intra Court Appeal No.128925/2018, which itself was against an order from 4 December 2017 by a single Judge in Writ Petition No.292/2017. The ICA was not entertained on grounds of improper filing by an unauthorized person. The petitioners argued that the Secretary Population Department, being directly affected by the WP order, was competent to file the ICA.---Legal Issues:Whether the ICA was filed by a competent person.--The maintainability of a subsequent writ petition (WP No.292/2017) on a matter previously decided (WP No.13784/2010).--The applicability of the Punjab Service Tribunal's jurisdiction over the respondents after their employment regularisation.---Arguments:The petitioners argued that the ICA's filing was acknowledged by the Province's representation in court, and any discrepancies should have been allowed correction.The respondents had previously succeeded in WP No.13784/2010 for service regularisation but filed another WP (No.292/2017) without seeking implementation of the earlier order through appropriate means, which was argued as impermissible.The petitioners contended that the subsequent WP was not maintainable as it sought relief on a matter already adjudicated and did not present a new cause of action.----Decision:The Supreme Court held that the ICA was maintainable and that the principles from Province of Punjab v Murree Brewery Company Limited applied. However, it deemed the subsequent WP (No.292/2017) not maintainable, referencing the rule against splitting claims (Order II, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908). Consequently, the judgments of the Lahore High Court in both the ICA and the WP were set aside, the petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, and WP No. 292/2017 filed by the respondents was dismissed.----Rationale:The Court found that the second WP was not maintainable as it did not present a new cause of action and effectively sought to relitigate an issue already decided, violating principles against splitting claims and relitigating decided matters.---Judgment: The appeal was allowed, and the WP filed by the respondents was dismissed.

Summary: (a) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)- -Ss. 2(xxxiii) & 33-Individual grievance of a worker, who has been terminated, removed, retrenched, discharged, or dismissed from employment in a trans-provincial establishment-Redressal-Competent forum-Appropriate forum of redressal for a workman who is terminated, removed, retrenched, discharged, or dismissed from service in a trans-provincial establishment is NIRC, as provided under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA of 2012)-Said provision states that a ‘worker’ may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law-Competent forum for the redressal of personal grievance of a ‘worker/ workman’ of a trans-provincial establishment is NIRC, and the mode and manner of enforcing any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law has been provided under section 33 of the IRA of 2012. (b) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)- -Ss. 2(xxxiii) & 33-Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S.2(i) & Sched., S.O. 12(3)- Individual grievance of a worker, who has been terminated, removed, retrenched, discharged, or dismissed from employment in a trans-provincial establishment-Redressal-In case a ‘workman’ is terminated, removed, retrenched, discharged, or dismissed from service in a trans-provincial establishment, he would be required to first prove that he fulfills the conditions precedent of a ‘workman’ provided under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA of 2012), to render his individual grievance maintainable under Section 33 of the IRA of 2012-Once, the grievance petition is held to be filed by the legally competent person, then in order to enforce his rights under Standing Order 12(3) of Schedule to the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), the aggrieved petitioner would have to prove that he is a ‘workman’ envisaged under section 2(i) of the said Ordinance. (c) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)- -Ss. 2(xxxiii) & 33-Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S. 2(i)-Grievance of an aggrieved worker-Whether a worker-Onus of proof-Regarding the onus of proof, it is trite law that the initial onus is on the person asserting a fact for seeking a relief-In the present case initial onus was upon the aggrieved ‘worker’ to prove that he was a ‘workman’ under both statutes i.e. the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 and the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Shahi Bottles (Pvt.) Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1993 PLC 587; National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court 1993 PLC 595; Sadiq Ali Khan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1994 PLC 211; Granulars (Pvt.) Limited v. Muhammad Afzal 2002 PLC 1; Muslim Commercial Bank v. Ehtasham ul Hassan 1997 PLC 24 and MCB v. Rizwan Ali 2024 SCMR 360 ref.