Summary: Summary pending

Summary: ?The Company Court is concerned with the legality, fairness and statutory compliance of a Scheme of Arrangement; it is not required to substitute its own commercial judgment for the collective business wisdom of shareholders and creditors.? The essence of this case is that once the requirements of law have been duly complied with, the prescribed corporate approvals have been obtained, creditors and shareholders have consciously assented to the proposed arrangement, and no element of fraud, mala fide, unfairness, oppression, prejudice or violation of public policy is shown to exist, the Court should ordinarily accord due deference to the informed commercial decision of those whose rights and interests are directly affected. The jurisdiction of the Company Court is supervisory rather than managerial. Its duty is to examine whether the scheme is lawful, fair, bona fide and procedurally compliant, and whether it adequately safeguards the interests of stakeholders and the public. It is not the function of the Court to determine whether a different restructuring model would have been more beneficial, commercially advantageous or financially prudent. Questions of business expediency fall within the domain of corporate stakeholders, whereas the Court's concern remains confined to legality, transparency, fairness and compliance with the governing statutory framework. Consequently, where these legal requirements stand satisfied and no substantial prejudice is demonstrated, judicial restraint demands that the collective commercial wisdom of shareholders and creditors be respected and the scheme be accorded sanction.

Summary: (a) General Clauses Act, 1897----S. 8---Construction of references to repealed enactments---Scope---Repeal and re-enactment of Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 by Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020. Whether S. 8 automatically substituted the 2020 Rules for the Members of the Federal Investigation Agency (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, which had adopted the 1973 Rules---Disciplinary proceedings against members of the Federal Investigation Agency were taken under the 2020 Rules---Service Tribunal held that the 1978 Rules, framed under S. 9 of the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974, had adopted the 1973 Rules subject to specified modifications, had never been repealed, and therefore continued to govern members of the Agency, with the consequence that proceedings under the 2020 Rules were unlawful---Department contended that the 2020 Rules were a repeal and re-enactment of the 1973 Rules and that, by S. 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the reference in the 1978 Rules to the 1973 Rules had to be read as a reference to the 2020 Rules---Held, that S. 8 applied only where a provision of a former enactment was repealed and re-enacted, with or without modification, by another law, in which event references in any other enactment or instrument to the provision so repealed were, unless a different intention appeared, to be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted---Term "instrument" included subordinate legislation---Purpose of S. 8 was to preserve continuity, without breakage or gap, of the referring enactment (statute X) so long as the relevant provision remained on the statute book in some form in a statute lineally connected to the original enactment by repeal and re-enactment---Focus of S. 8 was always a "provision" of a statute in order to maintain its continuity in the referring instrument, and not the whole of the repealed and re-enacted statute in a manner that effaced or displaced the whole of the referring instrument itself---S. 8 could not be construed or applied so as to destroy the very thing to which it was to apply---1978 Rules did not refer to any particular provision of the 1973 Rules; they adopted the whole of the 1973 Rules subject to the amendments laid down therein, so that the amended 1973 Rules were the 1978 Rules---To hold that S. 8 "brought in" the 2020 Rules to replace the 1973 Rules would mean that the whole of the 1978 Rules were effaced or displaced, which would be a negation of the purpose of the section and tantamount to treating S. 8 as operating to repeal and replace the referring instrument itself, which could not be---S. 8 therefore had no application to the facts---Question whether S. 8 could apply if the 1978 Rules had referred to particular provisions of the 1973 Rules was left open. (b) Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974----S. 9---Civil Servants Act, 1973----S. 25---Distinct statutory sources of rule-making power---Members of the Federal Investigation Agency (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978, and Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 and 2020. The 1978 Rules were an exercise by the Federal Government of the statutory power conferred by S. 9 of the 1974 Act, whereas the 1973 Rules were an exercise by the President of the statutory power conferred by S. 25 of the 1973 Act, later exercised again in 2020 by the Prime Minister as delegate to frame the 2020 Rules---Subject-matter of both powers was the same, which enabled the Federal Government to enact the 1978 Rules by adopting (while adapting) the 1973 Rules, but that could not detract from the entirely separate legal genesis of the two sets of rules---To conflate two entirely distinct legal bases simply on account of subject-matter identity was a fundamental legal error---If the 1973 Rules, as applicable to the 1974 Act by way of the 1978 Rules, were to be displaced and replaced with the 2020 Rules, that would have required an express exercise by the Federal Government of the statutory power conferred on it by the 1974 Act, which was never done---At all material times there was only one exercise of the statutory power conferred by the 1974 Act, in 1978, while the statutory power conferred by the 1973 Act was exercised twice, in 1973 and 2020, each operating in its own field and scope, and the legal entities exercising the powers were also separate and distinct---To conclude that repeal and replacement of the 1973 Rules by the 2020 Rules automatically changed the 1978 Rules in their totality would mean that an exercise of the statutory power under the 1973 Act in and of itself amounted to, or automatically triggered, an exercise of the statutory power conferred by the 1974 Act, which could not be. (c) Service law----Disciplinary proceedings taken under inapplicable rules---Subsidiary plea of absence of material injury---Once the very legality of applying the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020 to members of the Federal Investigation Agency was decided against the Department, the subsidiary argument that application of the 2020 Rules caused no material injury because those rules were substantively the same as the 1973 Rules could not be sustained; the illegality effaced everything. Cited Cases: • Mohan Chowdhary v. Chief Commissioner, Tripura AIR 1964 SC 173 Disposition: Leave to appeal refused; Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal Nos.1048, 1091, 321, 322, 323 and 324 of 2025 dismissed; pending applications disposed of accordingly; conclusion of the Federal Service Tribunal affirmed. (C.P.L.As.1048, 1091, 321, 322, 323 and 324 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, announced in the Court on 19 May at Islamabad; hearing 22.01.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 212(3)---Civil Servants Act, 1973---Time scale promotion---Whether a term and condition of service---Policy-based benefit confined to specified categories---Federal Service Tribunal directing consideration for ante-dated time scale promotion in absence of applicable Recruitment Rules and in the face of a disputed policy---Respondent, serving in the National Language Promotion Department as Research Aide/Deputy Director in BS-18, filed a service appeal against non-consideration of his representation seeking time scale promotion to BS-19---He had joined the then National Language Authority on 30.06.1988 in BS-17, was ultimately promoted to BS-18 with effect from 01.06.2016, and claimed eligibility for time scale promotion to BS-19 under Notification dated 24.02.2014 with effect from 01.12.2016; representation dated 20.11.2020 was not considered---Department’s stance was that the policy was not applicable to it, Recruitment Rules were yet to be finalised, and the respondent had no vested right to promotion---Tribunal allowed the appeal, held that absence of Recruitment Rules could not impede time scale promotion, and directed the department to place the case before the competent forum for consideration of ante-dated time scale promotion to BS-19 from the date of eligibility---Held, that the Civil Servants Act, 1973 does not define “Time Scale Promotion”, therefore it cannot be considered a term and condition of service---Promotion on the basis of time scale is not a regular promotion but a matter of policy granted to specific categories of professions by the competent authority with the concurrence of the Finance Division, meant to grant benefits of higher pay scales to cadres which do not ordinarily get promotions to higher grades under the applicable rules---Monetary benefits under the time scale formula cannot be extended generally to all civil servants, but only to such class as are mentioned in the approved policy---Grant of time scale does not amount to promotion in terms of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973; it is simply a grant of higher scale without change in designation, and does not involve up-gradation of the post or amendment in the recruitment rules. Cited Cases: • Khushdil Khan Malik v. Secretary, Establishment Division Cabinet Block, Islamabad and others 2021 SCMR 1496 • Secretary Finance, Finance Division, Pak. Secretariat, Islamabad v. Muhammad Farooq Khan and others 2022 SCMR 381 (b) Service law---Time scale promotion---Assumed applicability of policy---Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal to direct even consideration---Held, that the respondent’s claim was founded solely upon the policy relied upon by him, whereas the department consistently maintained that the policy was not applicable and that Recruitment Rules were yet to be finalised---That position had not been shown to have been conclusively determined by the Tribunal---Notwithstanding this, the Tribunal assumed applicability of the policy and directed consideration for ante-dated time scale promotion---Such direction could not have been issued in the absence of a clear legal foundation establishing that the respondent was entitled in law to invoke the said policy---Time scale promotion being a policy-based benefit confined to specified categories, no direction for its grant or even consideration could be issued unless the respondent demonstrated that he fell within the ambit of such policy---Mere long service or completion of a particular length of service did not, by itself, confer a right to seek consideration dehors the applicable legal framework---Tribunal, while observing that the matter would be subject to recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee, failed to appreciate that such consideration presupposes the existence of a valid claim under the governing rules or policy, which was itself in dispute---Direction, even to the extent of consideration, could not be sustained---Findings of the Tribunal were not sustainable in law as premised on assumed applicability of a policy which had not been established. Disposition: Civil petition converted into appeal and allowed; judgment dated 23.01.2025 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, in Appeal No.143(R)CS/2021 set aside; CMA No.922 of 2025 disposed of. (C.P. No.1062 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad, decided 19.05.2026; Approved for Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 188 --- Supreme Court Rules, 2025, O. XXVI --- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- O. XLVII, R. 1 --- Review jurisdiction --- Scope --- Error apparent on the face of the record --- Petitioners sought review of the judgment dated 04.12.2025, whereby this Court, after examining the interplay between Appendix-E of the Import Policy Order, 2022, and S.R.O. 499(I)/2009, had held that vehicles imported beyond the prescribed age limit under Appendix-E were not entitled to release on redemption fine, set aside the judgments of the High Court and the Tribunal which had extended redemption upon payment of a fine, and restored the departmental orders of outright confiscation with penalty --- Review was sought on the solitary ground that the construction of S.R.O. 499(I)/2009 read with Appendix-E was allegedly at variance with certain earlier leave-refusing orders of this Court --- Held, that jurisdiction under Art. 188 of the Constitution, read with O. XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 2025, is a limited one, circumscribed by grounds analogous to those contained in O. XLVII, R. 1, C.P.C. --- Said jurisdiction is to be exercised with utmost caution and restraint and does not permit the Court to sit in appeal over its own judgment or to rehear and re-argue the matter already adjudicated --- Scope of review is confined to correction of a patent and self-evident error apparent on the face of the record, which does not require elaborate reasoning to be established --- Even where such an error is alleged, it must further be demonstrated that the same has had a substantial effect on the outcome of the case; mere irregularity or the possibility of a different view does not warrant interference in review jurisdiction --- Where the Court has consciously and deliberately taken a view on a question of law or fact, the same cannot be reopened in review merely on account of dissatisfaction with the result or repetition of earlier submissions. (b) Precedent --- Doctrine of per incuriam --- Leave-refusing orders --- Binding force --- Held, that per incuriam denotes a decision rendered in ignorance or forgetfulness of a relevant statutory provision or binding authority, such that the reasoning on which it is founded becomes demonstrably erroneous and the decision itself ceases to have precedential value --- Necessary consequence of such a declaration is that the judgment is to be treated as having no binding force and is liable to be ignored --- Earlier orders relied upon by the petitioners, being in the nature of leave-refusing orders, neither adverted to nor interpreted the governing provisions of Appendix-E of the Import Policy Order, 2022, read with S.R.O. 499(I)/2009, which formed the core statutory framework regulating the controversy --- Omission to consider those provisions struck at the very root of the reasoning, thereby attracting the doctrine of per incuriam --- Once so characterised, such orders cannot be relied upon to assert any conflict of legal position or to invoke review jurisdiction --- In Bashir Ahmad v. Director, Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (Customs), FBR, Peshawar (2025 SCMR 684), a three-member Bench, while interpreting S.R.O. 499(I)/2009, adopted the same construction as in the judgment under review; no inconsistency or divergence in judicial opinion arose so as to warrant interference in review. (c) Review --- Statutory interpretation --- Pure question of law --- Held, that where a judgment proceeds solely upon a pure question of law, particularly one involving statutory interpretation, it is not sufficient for a review petitioner merely to contend that the interpretation adopted by the Court is incorrect, for acceptance of such a plea would effectively convert review proceedings into a rehearing of the case --- Only viable ground for review in such circumstances would be to establish that the decision under review was rendered per incuriam --- Judgment dated 04.12.2025 was rendered after a conscious examination of the governing statutory framework, whereas the earlier leave-refusing orders were found to be per incuriam for having failed to consider the same --- No error apparent on the face of the record was pointed out, nor did the case fall within any of the recognized grounds warranting exercise of review jurisdiction --- Contentions amounted to a re-agitation of issues already considered and decided, which is clearly impermissible in law. Cited Cases: • District Education Officer (Female), Charsadda v. Sonia Begum PLD 2025 Supreme Court 720 • Government of Balochistan v. Muhammad Yasir 2025 SCMR 367 • Bashir Ahmad v. Director, Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (Customs), FBR, Peshawar 2025 SCMR 684 • Suo Moto Regarding Pensionary Benefits of the Judges of the Superior Courts PLD 2013 SC 829 • Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority v. Gas and Oil Pakistan Ltd. PLD 2025 SC 351 Disposition: Civil Review Petitions Nos.4 to 33 of 2026 dismissed. (Supreme Court of Pakistan, order by Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J. (Yahya Afridi, C.J. and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J. on the Bench), Islamabad, 19.05.2026; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 4, 10-A, 175(2) & 191---Supreme Court Rules, 1980---O. XXVI, R. 8 & O. XXVII, R. 7---Review petition of a death convict---Disposal in chambers pursuant to Full Court/office arrangement dated 22.10.1990---Condemned unheard---Audi alteram partem---Order declared non-existent---Appellant's criminal review petition against the order dated 25.07.2011 in Criminal Petition No.157 of 2011 was returned by the Institution Officer/Registrar vide order dated 07.03.2017 as not entertainable, on the footing that it was a second review---First review, Criminal Suo Moto Review Petition No.45 of 2011, had been dismissed vide order dated 26.04.2012 separately by the author Judge and the other Member Judge in chambers, without marking presence of any advocate or of the appellant in person---Registrar's report referred to a Full Court meeting of 20th October, 1990, expressed through office order dated 22.10.1990, that a review petition of a person who had been represented by counsel at the previous stage be placed before the author Judge in chambers for examination whether the matter was fit for suo motu review, and thereafter before the remaining Judges of the Bench in circulation---Held, that the said Full Court decision had no blessing of the law and rules on the subject---Powers conferred under Art. 191 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, were framed accordingly, but no change was made in those Rules to the effect that a review petition of a death convict shall be placed before the author Judge in chambers, or that such a petition can be dismissed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the convict---No provision in O. XXVI, R. 8, or in any other order or rule, authorised hearing and decision of a first review petition of a death convict in the chamber of the author Judge, or dismissal without affording opportunity of hearing to the appellant or his counsel---Facility of defence counsel at State expense under O. XXVII, R. 7, was not provided---Under Art. 175(2), no Court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law---Jurisdiction exercised while passing the order dated 26.04.2012 was not available under the relevant law and rules, hence that order was patently illegal and void---Appellant was condemned unheard, in violation of the principle of natural justice that no one should be condemned unheard, and was not dealt with in accordance with law or afforded due process and fair trial guaranteed by Arts. 4 and 10-A of the Constitution---Order dated 26.04.2012 declared non-existent in the eyes of law; the instant review petition could not be termed a second review petition and was treated as the first review petition---Criminal miscellaneous appeal allowed; office objection overruled; Office directed to entertain the criminal review petition and fix it before the Court. (b) Review petition---Withdrawal of connected compromise petitions---Order dated 09.05.2017---Maintainability---Objection that even the second review had been dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 09.05.2017---Held, that only CPs-200 and 2011 of 2017, which concerned permission to the appellant for compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased, were dismissed as withdrawn by that order, whereas the criminal miscellaneous appeal in the criminal review petition against the order dated 25.07.2011 was not dismissed as withdrawn, and the miscellaneous appeal was ordered to be relisted. (c) Pakistan Penal Code----S. 302(b)---Code of Criminal Procedure----S. 382-B---Murder---Unseen occurrence---Retracted judicial confession corroborated by recovery of pistol on pointation and positive FSL report---Motive not proved---Quantum of sentence---Death altered to imprisonment for life---Petitioner Sher Azam was convicted under S. 302(b), PPC, and sentenced to death with compensation of Rs.200,000/- to the legal heirs of the deceased, in FIR No.184/2009 dated 04.09.2009 registered at Police Station Ghazi, District Haripur, under Ss. 302/109, PPC, while co-accused Mst. Farah Naz was acquitted---Occurrence was unseen; the petitioner had made a judicial confession which was later retracted, but the retracted confession was corroborated by recovery of a pistol at his pointing out and the positive report of FSL---Prosecution produced reliable evidence and proved its case beyond the shadow of any doubt, and the conviction was maintained---Motive of friendship of the petitioner with the wife of the deceased, Mst. Farah Naz, was not believed, because she had already been acquitted by the Trial Court and that acquittal had attained finality---Case was not based on evidence of eyewitnesses; FIR was lodged against unknown accused and the petitioner was later implicated; the prosecution case hinged upon circumstantial evidence---As the motive had not been proved, it was not determinable what had actually happened immediately prior to the occurrence---Sentence of death was quite harsh and the sentence of life imprisonment shall meet the ends of justice---Conviction under S. 302(b), PPC, maintained; sentence altered from death to imprisonment for life; direction regarding compensation and sentence in default thereof maintained; benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. extended---Judgment under review dated 25.07.2011 modified in those terms. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A---Review and recall---Capital sentence---Hearing of review in chambers without right of audience---Super due process---Circumstantial evidence and retracted confession---Supplementary observations of Shakeel Ahmad, J., agreeing with the conclusions---Where life and liberty hang in the balance, procedural fairness assumes the character of a substantive guarantee---Review jurisdiction is corrective, rooted in the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, and exists to correct manifest error, prevent miscarriage of justice and rectify procedural unfairness; finality cannot be allowed to perpetuate an obvious injustice---Disposal of a review petition in chambers, pursuant to an administrative or Full Court arrangement, without affording a right of audience to a death convict, offends Arts. 4 and 10-A and, where consequences are irreversible, engages Art. 9---Hierarchy of law is the Constitution, followed by statutes and rules having statutory force, and thereafter administrative instructions; an administrative direction contrary to natural justice is void to the extent of inconsistency, and such chamber disposal would be coram non judice, procedurally illegal and constitutionally infirm---Capital punishment, unique in its irrevocability, necessitates a heightened "super due process" threshold---Prosecution case rested substantially upon circumstantial evidence coupled with a retracted judicial confession, and the Additional Advocate General fairly conceded that the case did not warrant the death penalty---Where the earlier review proceedings themselves were conducted in disregard of natural justice, the bar ordinarily applicable to successive reviews cannot be treated as an absolute impediment; recall proceeds on the premise that the order suffers from a fundamental procedural defect affecting its validity, as distinct from conventional review---Court's recall jurisdiction, exercised to remedy a fundamental procedural defect and prevent an irreversible miscarriage of justice, was directly attracted---Law leans in favour of life where any reasonable doubt or mitigating circumstance emerges. Cited Cases: • Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976) • People v. Moran 246 N.Y. 100 Disposition: Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal No.9 of 2017 allowed; office objection overruled; criminal review petition directed to be entertained and fixed. Criminal Review Petition No.173 of 2017 in Criminal Petition No.157 of 2011 partly allowed; conviction of petitioner Sher Azam under S. 302(b), PPC, maintained, but sentence altered from death to imprisonment for life; compensation and default sentence maintained; benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. extended; judgment under review dated 25.07.2011 modified accordingly. Order by Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J.; supplementary observations by Shakeel Ahmad, J. (Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, J. agreeing). Islamabad, 19th of May, 2026. Majority order not approved for reporting; supplementary observations approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2018----Ss. 3, 4, 5 & 6---Regularization of project employees---Deemed regular appointment from date of commencement of the Act---Belated publication of regularization notifications in the Official Gazette---Whether seniority runs from commencement of the Act or from date of gazette publication---Petitioners were initially appointed against project posts vide Notification dated 30.06.2016---Act of 2018 was promulgated on 07.03.2018---Their services were regularized vide Notifications dated 28.08.2018 and 17.10.2018 with effect from commencement of the Act, i.e. 07.03.2018---Due to delay of lower staff of the Department and the Government Printing Press, the Notifications were belatedly published in the Official Gazette on 21.08.2024, though with retrospective effect from 07.03.2018, stating that inter se seniority shall be maintained as per the rules---Department determined inter-se seniority in accordance with S. 6 and issued Final Seniority List vide Notification dated 13.02.2019, and thereafter other lists---When the Final Seniority List for 2024 was issued vide Notification dated 14.03.2024, private respondents preferred departmental representation which was rejected, and their service appeals were allowed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, Peshawar, on the premise that, in terms of S. 5 of the Act, until gazette publication on 21.08.2024 the petitioners were not regular civil servants and hence not entitled to seniority---Respondents before the Supreme Court had been appointed freshly on 13.08.2018---Held, that Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act, each with a non-obstante clause, provide that specified adhoc employees against civil posts and contract employees against project posts, holding such posts till commencement of the Act, shall be deemed to have been validly appointed on regular basis from the date of commencement of the Act, subject to verification of qualifications and credentials---S. 5(iv) provides that services of such employees shall be deemed to have been regularized only on the publication of their names in the Official Gazette---S. 6(2) provides that inter-se seniority of employees whose services are regularized under the Act, within the same service or cadre, shall be determined on the basis of their continuous officiation in such service or cadre, and if the date of continuous officiation is the same, the older in age shall rank senior---Moment the statute was enacted, the legal right to be regularized accrued to the eligible employees---Ensuing notification was merely a formal ratification to fulfil a statutory requirement---Formal date of publication cannot serve as the sole litmus test; the overarching scheme, legislative intent and foundational philosophy of the law must be kept in view---Employees regularized from the effective date of the Act were not new or fresh entrants but were already officiating their duties prior to promulgation---Delayed published notification itself scribbled the date of regularization as the effective date of the Act---There was no showing that, pending gazette publication, the petitioners sat idle or were treated and paid as project employees---Respondents appointed much after the petitioners could not claim seniority over employees who had been performing duties initially as project employees and were regularized by fiction of law. (b) Interpretation of statutes---Gazette publication---Directory or mandatory---Beneficial and remedial notification---No adverse consequence of delayed publication---Where the parent law commands publication of a notification but does not unequivocally proclaim that non-publication will render the action null and void or unenforceable, such clause by and large may be construed as directory---Notification bestowed a beneficial right rather than levying any adverse liability, penalty or tax; lag in publication could be treated as mere procedural delay---Due to inter-departmental slip-ups or administrative lapses under the doctrine of indoor management, fundamental rights of the petitioners could not be compromised, they having had neither control over executive delays nor ability to approach the Government Printing Press---Maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is equally applicable to the State, which has an onerous duty to ensure that its acts shall prejudice no one and shall not take advantage of its own wrong---"No prejudice" rule is designed to protect citizens from secret laws, sudden taxes or penalties; here regularization of adhoc or contract employees was a beneficial, favourable and remedial action, and delay in publication created no adverse harm to the public at large---Provisions of a statute for publication of a notification in the Official Gazette are generally regarded as directory where strict non-compliance does not provide any consequences---Legal certainty requires that ordinarily a statutory instrument should not be treated as invalid because of failure of public functionaries to publish it in the Official Gazette---Employee cannot be made a victim or scapegoat due to delay in publication; government is under executive responsibility to process paperwork timely---Watchword of "Model Employer" requires the State and public authorities to act fairly without exploiting technicalities---No prejudice should be caused to an employee on account of administrative delays or inefficiency. (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2018----S. 6(2)---Inter-se seniority---Continuous officiation---Earlier seniority lists---Private respondents, who were appointed after the petitioners, for the first time in 2024 filed representation against the seniority list, though in seniority lists compiled for the years 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023 the petitioners were shown senior---Procedure of determining inter-se seniority is itself provided under S. 6(2): seniority of employees whose services are regularized under the Act shall be determined on the basis of continuous officiation in such service or cadre---Tribunal travelled beyond the scope of the Act by giving prominence to belated gazette publication, which was the responsibility of officers of the Department or Government Printing Press and could not outweigh the effect of regularization conferred by the Act---Petitioners successfully made out a case for interference---Impugned judgment of the Tribunal set aside and seniority of the petitioners restored to its original condition. Cited Cases: • Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Jamil Ahmed PLD 1961 SC 145 • Manzur-ul-Haq v. Controlling Authority, Local Councils, Montgomery PLD 1963 SC 652 • Muhammad Suleman v. Abdul Ghani PLD 1978 SC 190 • Muhammad Siddique v. Market Committee, Tandlianwala 1983 SCMR 785 • Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Late Ch. Muhammad Ahsan 1991 SCMR 2180 • Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee PLD 1995 SC 423 • Bahadur Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 SCMR 2066 • Government of Sindh v. M/s Khan Ginners PLD 2011 SC 347 • Saghir Ahmed v. Province of Punjab PLD 2004 SC 261 Disposition: Civil Petitions Nos.5091 to 5093 of 2025 and Civil Petitions Nos.986-P to 988-P of 2025 converted into appeals and allowed; consolidated judgment dated 12.09.2025 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, Peshawar, in Service Appeals Nos.1427-1429 of 2024 set aside; seniority of the petitioners restored to its original condition. (Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 19th May, 2026, by Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J.; Islamabad; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Service matter---Regularization of contract employees---Cabinet Decision Case No.76/10/2008 dated 4.6.2008 (Establishment Division O.M. No.10/30/2008-R.II dated 29.8.2008)---Employees of erstwhile FATA---Termination on closure of project---Respondents were appointed as Dispensers (BS-6) on contract basis in erstwhile FATA w.e.f. 28.11.2002 and 6.3.2007 and terminated w.e.f. 30.6.2010 consequent upon deletion of health facilities from ADP 2010-11; Peshawar High Court allowed their writ petition directing reinstatement and issuance of regularization orders strictly in accordance with law, treating the interregnum as extra-ordinary leave without pay---Held, case of respondents fell within the ambit of the Cabinet Decision dated 4.6.2008 and O.M. dated 29.8.2008, whereby Government of Pakistan regularized all contract employees in BS-1 to BS-15 working prior to 4.6.2008, including employees of FATA; respondents should have been regularized under the said policy but were illegally deprived of their right---Neither the advertisement nor the appointment letters mentioned that the appointments were for particular project(s); termination of services on closure of project(s) was therefore illegal and not tenable in law. (b) Service matter---Precedent---Deputy Director Finance and Administration FATA v. Lal Marjan (2022 SCMR 566) distinguished---Held, though petitioners in Lal Marjan were FATA employees, they did not claim regularization under the Federal Government decision/policy but under KP Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009, which was obviously not applicable to FATA cases, so their cases were bound to fail---Prima facie, it seemed that the Supreme Court was not adequately assisted in this regard at the time of hearing of those appeals---Reliance placed on Lal Marjan by the Law Officer for the contention that contract employees have no vested right to regularization did not assist the petitioners. Cited Cases: • Deputy Director Finance and Administration FATA v. Lal Marjan 2022 SCMR 566 (c) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 9 & 25---Right to life and livelihood---Equality before law---Regularization of contract employees performing permanent duties---Held, regularization of contract employees is not merely a matter of service jurisprudence but is linked with enforcement of fundamental rights; Art. 9 has been expansively interpreted to include right to livelihood and job security, and concept of "life" must be given broad and purposive interpretation, necessarily including assurance of stable employment where nature of work is permanent---Continued retention of employees on contract basis for years together, despite existence of permanent posts and continuous need for their services, reflects arbitrary exercise of power not sustainable in law---After issuance of the O.M., termination of respondents instead of regularization was also hit by Art. 25, as persons similarly placed must be treated alike---Regularization is not strictly dependent on existence of statutory service rules but is linked with length of service and enforcement of fundamental rights under Arts. 9 and 25; it is not part of terms and conditions of service requiring statutory rules but depends on length of service and equity---Widespread practice of engaging employees on temporary or contract basis for prolonged periods, often by giving artificial breaks in service, with sole object of depriving them of regularization, has always been deprecated and condemned by superior Courts---Continued retention of employees on contract basis for years, particularly where work is permanent and services continuously required, constitutes a form of economic exploitation and administrative arbitrariness violative of the Constitution and the law; principle of regularization is grounded not only in equity and fairness but also in enforcement of fundamental rights. Cited Cases: • 2015 SCMR 1257 (right to life under Art. 9 includes right to livelihood) • 2018 SCMR 1181 • 2018 SCMR 1405 Disposition: Petition dismissed and leave to appeal refused; judgment dated 31.5.2018 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Writ Petition No.4147 of 2010 (directing reinstatement and regularization strictly in accordance with law) left undisturbed. C.P.L.A. No.632-P of 2018, judgment dated 19.5.2026 (Syed Arshad Hussain Shah, J.). Approved for Reporting.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Service/ Whether s.8 of General Clauses Act applies to Rules made under FIA Act, 1974.