Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----Ss.42, 53 & 172---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 175F (1)(c) & 199---Entries in revenue record, assailing of--- Jurisdiction---Title, determination of---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Petitioners were aggrieved of order passed by High Court maintaining refusal of revenue authorities to implement an old mutation in their favour---Validity---Revenue entries do not by themselves confer title but carry a presumption of correctness until rebutted in accordance with law---Where correctness, validity or enforceability of old mutations is disputed, particularly when such mutations have remained unimplemented for decades, the matter inevitably involves disputed question of facts and title requiring proper adjudication and cannot be determined by revenue authorities---Extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is intended to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy in cases where illegality or impropriety of action in question is apparent on the face of record and can be determined without undertaking an elaborate inquiry or recording evidence---Where controversy involves intricate disputed or contentious questions of fact, the resolution of which necessitates recording an appraisal of evidence by parties, such matters fall within the domain of Court of plenary jurisdiction and High Court in exercise of its Constitution jurisdiction cannot assume the role of fact-finding forum or enter into such factual controversies---Revenue officer is not competent to decide questions of title and Civil Court alone is competent to decide it---Findings recorded by revenue authorities were based on plausible appreciation of record and did not suffer from any legal infirmity---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs 1992 SCMR 2334; Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another 2013 SCMR 906; Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh 1987 SCMR 61; Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa 2011 SCMR 1990 and Waqar Ahmed and others v. The Federation of Pakistan 2024 SCMR 1877 rel. Ch. Muhammad Masood Jahangir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Waseem Mumtaz Malik, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 28th January, 2026.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: i. Where a suit is founded upon an oral agreement to sell, the plaint must explicitly contain specific and material particulars relating to the exact date, time, place of the agreement, and the names of witnesses to support the alleged transaction. ii. The evidence was recorded by the Local Commission and duly subjected to cross-examination by the contesting party. After an adverse decision, appeal was filed, in the memorandum of appeal no specific ground was raised regarding the recording of evidence by the Local Commission, rather, the primary contention was that the learned trial Court had misread the evidence. Moreover, it has not been demonstrated as to how any prejudice was caused, therefore, the said evidence can be legally considered.

Summary: Court has set aside an order de-notifying a member of the Dispute Resolution Council (DRC) without a fair hearing. The petitioner was removed from the DRC without being issued a show-cause notice or given an opportunity to defend himself against allegations of misconduct. The court held that this action was violative of natural justice and due process, as the allegations against the petitioner were stigmatic and affected his reputation. Although holding a DRC position is a privilege, the court emphasized that principles of natural justice and fair hearing still apply. The authorities can initiate action against the petitioner, but must follow due process and provide a fair hearing.

Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----Ss. 6 & 7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.173---Murder case transferred from Sessions Court to Anti-Terrorism Court---Legality---Petitioner was facing trial under S.302, PPC before Sessions Judge; charge had been framed and prosecution evidence was near completion when prosecution moved application for transfer of case to Anti-Terrorism Court---Sessions Judge allowed application on ground that murder had taken place in Court premises and was heinous/sensational---High Court held that jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court cannot be invoked mechanically and must strictly flow from statutory requirements of ATA, 1997. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----Third Schedule, Entry No.4---Firing or use of explosives in Court premises---Meaning and scope---Occurrence allegedly took place in front of chamber of an Advocate situated in a public alley/semi-commercial area while deceased was being escorted to Court---Place of occurrence was neither Court building nor its immediate vicinity recognizable as Court premises---Mere fact that deceased was being taken to Court and was killed near an Advocate’s chamber did not ipso facto convert incident into firing “in Court premises” within meaning of Entry No.4 of Third Schedule. (c) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----S. 6---Definition of terrorism---Essential ingredients---For an act to constitute terrorism, it must fall within S.6(2) and must also be committed with design or purpose mentioned in clauses (b) or (c) of S.6(1), namely coercing, intimidating or overawing Government/public/community, creating fear or insecurity in society, or advancing religious, sectarian or ethnic cause etc.---Mere gravity, brutality, sensational nature or heinousness of offence does not by itself make offence terrorism. Cited Case: • Ghulam Hussain and others v. The State and others PLD 2020 SC 61 (d) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----S. 6---Personal enmity/private vendetta---Murder simpliciter---Effect---Record showed petitioner allegedly stated upon arrest that he had killed deceased due to personal enmity---There was no material showing that occurrence was designed to create terror, panic, fear or insecurity among public or section of public---High Court held that act arising out of personal enmity or private vendetta, even if heinous, falls outside scope of terrorism under ATA, 1997. (e) Anti-Terrorism Court---- ----Jurisdiction---Heinous or sensational offence---Not sufficient---Sessions Judge described offence as heinous and sensational while transferring case to Anti-Terrorism Court---High Court held that such characterization, howsoever grave, cannot confer jurisdiction upon Anti-Terrorism Court unless essential ingredients of terrorism under S.6, ATA, 1997 are established from record---Perception or severity of offence is not substitute for statutory jurisdiction. (f) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----Special law---Strict construction---Purpose of enactment---ATA, 1997 was promulgated to control acts of terrorism, sectarian violence and other heinous offences falling within its statutory framework---Being special law with drastic consequences, its provisions must be construed strictly and not expansively---Casual or mechanical application of ATA provisions burdens Anti-Terrorism Courts and delays trial of actual terrorism cases. (g) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---- ----Murder between Sessions Court and canteen / near Court premises---Personal revenge---Analogy---Supreme Court had held that where accused killed deceased near Sessions Court area to avenge earlier murder and record did not show intent to create fear, insecurity or terror in or around Court premises, case did not fall within S.6, ATA, 1997---High Court applied same principle to present case where motive appeared personal enmity. Cited Cases: • Farooq Ahmed v. The State and another 2020 SCMR 78 • Bashir Ahmed v. M. Siddique PLD 2009 SC 11 • Ahmad Jan v. Nasrullah and others 2012 SCMR 59 (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 190(2)---Taking cognizance, framing of charge and recording of evidence by Sessions Court---Subsequent transfer to Anti-Terrorism Court---Effect---FIR, challan under S.173, Cr.P.C., cognizance, charge and prosecution evidence did not attract provisions of ATA, 1997---Case had proceeded substantially before Sessions Court and evidence was near completion---Transfer order was set aside and Sessions Judge was directed to decide case expeditiously. (i) Criminal revision---- ----Transfer of murder trial to Anti-Terrorism Court---Interference by High Court---Where Sessions Court transferred case to Anti-Terrorism Court on erroneous assumption that place of occurrence fell within Court premises and offence was heinous/sensational, High Court in revisional jurisdiction could set aside such order to correct jurisdictional error. Disposition: Criminal Revision No.175 of 2025 was allowed; order dated 08.11.2025 passed by Sessions Judge, Islamabad (West), transferring FIR No.254 dated 19.04.2023 under S.302, PPC, Police Station Margalla, Islamabad to Administrative Judge Anti-Terrorism Courts, Islamabad, was set aside; Sessions Judge was directed to decide the case expeditiously; copy of judgment was directed to be sent to Administrative Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Islamabad for return of case file to Sessions Judge (West), Islamabad.

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Ss. 42, 44, 52, 53, 166 & 172(2)(vi)—Specific Relief Act, 1877—S. 42—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 175F(1)(c) & 199—Revenue record—Old sanctioned mutations—Non-implementation for over a century—Correction of entries—Clerical or arithmetical mistake—Contentious dispute—Jurisdiction of revenue authorities—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the alleged non-implementation of Mutation No. 117 dated 29.12.1907 and Mutations Nos. 401 and 402 dated 30.01.1913 could not be treated as a mere clerical or arithmetical mistake capable of correction by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967. The Court observed that where implementation of century-old mutations would potentially disturb long-standing revenue entries, affect possible intervening alienations, and prejudice third parties not before the forum, the matter plainly assumes a contentious character. In such circumstances, the limited power of correction available to revenue authorities cannot be invoked for deciding substantive controversies affecting proprietary rights. The Court further held that the discretion under S. 166 is not unbridled and is confined to cases free from factual controversy and incapable of adversely affecting vested rights without proper adjudication. Revenue law—Record-of-rights—Presumption of correctness—Remedy against adverse entry—The Court held that Ss. 42, 44, and 52 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 collectively regulate the preparation, evidentiary value, and correction of the record-of-rights, and once entries are incorporated therein, a presumption of truth attaches to them until the contrary is proved or lawful substitution is made. To dislodge such presumption, the law itself provides a remedy through S. 53 of the Act, enabling an aggrieved person to institute a suit for declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, where he is prejudiced by an entry in the record-of-rights or periodical record relating to a right of which he is in possession. The Court reaffirmed that the statute does envisage an appropriate remedy even where summary correction before revenue authorities is unavailable. In this regard, reliance was placed on Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334). Jurisdiction—Civil court and revenue authorities—Section 172(2)(vi), Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Bar of jurisdiction not absolute in contentious matters—The Federal Constitutional Court examined the petitioners’ contention that, because S. 172(2)(vi) bars civil court jurisdiction regarding correction of entries in the record-of-rights, periodical record, or register of mutations, only revenue authorities could grant relief. Rejecting the broad proposition, the Court held that the exclusion recognized in S. 172(2)(vi) operates in matters of correction that are not controversial in nature. Where, however, the dispute involves contentious questions, competing rights, and possible effect on absent parties, the matter cannot be summarily resolved by revenue authorities. The Court relied upon Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906), wherein the Supreme Court clarified that only non-controversial corrections in revenue record fall within the exclusive domain of revenue authorities to the exclusion of civil courts. Delay and equity—Laches and acquiescence—Unexplained silence for more than a century—The Court held that the petitioners’ claim was hopelessly belated, having been raised for the first time in the year 2020 in relation to mutations sanctioned in 1907 and 1913. It was observed that the petitioners had failed to produce any material explaining why their predecessors-in-interest did not seek implementation during their lifetime, or why the petitioners themselves remained silent for decades. Such inordinate and unexplained delay attracted the principles of laches and acquiescence with full force. The mere existence of old sanctioned but unimplemented mutations did not automatically entitle the petitioners to their implementation after a lapse of over one hundred years, particularly in the face of possible competing claims and long-standing contrary entries in the revenue record. Constitutional jurisdiction—Article 199—Disputed questions of fact and title—Scope of writ jurisdiction—The Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 is meant to provide prompt relief where illegality or impropriety is apparent on the face of the record and can be determined without elaborate inquiry or recording of evidence. Where, however, the controversy involves disputed or intricate questions of fact, title, or enforceability of old mutations, requiring proper evidence and adjudication, the High Court cannot assume the role of a fact-finding forum. Such matters fall within the domain of courts of plenary jurisdiction. In support of this proposition, the Court referred to Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61), Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990), and Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). The Court accordingly held that the Lahore High Court rightly declined to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction. Natural justice—Affected third parties—No adverse order behind the back of interested persons—The Court observed that during the extraordinarily long interregnum between the sanction of the mutations and the filing of the petitioners’ application, it was highly probable that various transactions, alienations, or changes in possession had taken place, and that third parties may have acquired rights on the basis of the existing revenue entries. Any order directing implementation of the old mutations without impleading such persons or affording them opportunity of hearing would violate the principles of natural justice and risk grave miscarriage of justice. This consideration further demonstrated that the matter was not one of a simple ministerial correction but of substantive adjudication. Case references—Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334); Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906); Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61); Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990); Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the controversy regarding implementation of century-old mutations was contentious in nature, could not be resolved by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, and was not amenable to determination in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution. Finding no legal infirmity in the orders of the Member Board of Revenue, the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), and the Lahore High Court, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 405 & 406---Criminal breach of trust---Ingredients---Property transaction---Mortgage agreement---Mere use of word “Amanat” in FIR---Effect---Complainant alleged that petitioner, being property dealer, showed him a house for mortgage owned by co-accused and, along with co-accused, received Rs.700,000 as advance out of total mortgage amount of Rs.1,200,000, but neither delivered possession nor returned amount---Supreme Court held that amount was paid in connection with a property/mortgage deal and a written agreement of mortgage had also been executed between parties---Dispute, at most, related to specific performance of mortgage agreement or recovery of amount and was of civil nature---Ingredients of S.405, PPC punishable under S.406, PPC were not attracted because neither any trust was created nor was it specified in what manner such trust was to be discharged---Mere mention of word “Amanat” in FIR would not attract S.406, PPC if ingredients of offence were otherwise absent. Cited Cases: • Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmad and 03 others 2000 SCMR 122 • Muhammad Ali and another v. Assistant Commissioner, Narowal and another 1987 SCMR 795 • Shaukat Ali Sagar v. Station House Officer, Police Station Batala Colony, Faisalabad and 5 others 2006 PCrLJ 1900 • Abdul Razzaq v. The State 1977 PCrLJ 52 • Umair Aslam v. Station House Officer and 7 others 2014 PCrLJ 1305 (b) Criminal proceedings---- ----Civil dispute converted into criminal offence---Abuse of process---Property/mortgage agreement---Complainant had paid Rs.700,000 as advance under written mortgage agreement while Rs.500,000 remained outstanding---Parties disputed which side failed to perform its obligations under agreement---Supreme Court held that proper forum for determination of such dispute was civil Court, where it could be decided which party failed to specifically perform his part of agreement---Machinery of criminal law had been mala fidely set into motion to blackmail and pressurize petitioner and co-accused by converting civil dispute into criminal offence---Such criminal proceedings amounted to abuse of process of law. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 406---Contractual liability---Pledged property / commercial transaction / property deal---Criminal breach of trust not made out---Where dispute arises from contractual liability or performance of agreement, criminal proceedings under S.406, PPC are not attracted merely because money or property was delivered under transaction---In analogous cases relating to pledged jewellery, cinema canteen contract, and property sale transaction, FIRs under Ss.406/420, PPC were quashed because disputes were contractual/civil in nature and proper remedy lay before civil Court---Same principle applied to mortgage/property deal between parties in present case. Cited Cases: • Abdul Razzaq v. The State 1977 PCrLJ 52 • Muhammad Ali and another v. Assistant Commissioner, Narowal and another 1987 SCMR 795 • Umair Aslam v. Station House Officer and 7 others 2014 PCrLJ 1305 (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 249-A---Application before Trial Court---Not mandatory where no probability of conviction---Quashment of FIR---State contended that petitioner should first approach Trial Court through application under S.249-A, Cr.P.C.---Supreme Court held that where facts show no probability of conviction, directing accused to first approach Trial Court under S.249-A, Cr.P.C. would itself amount to sheer abuse of process of law and Court---FIR could be quashed in such circumstances without requiring accused to exhaust remedy under S.249-A, Cr.P.C. Cited Case: • Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmad and 03 others 2000 SCMR 122 (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 561-A---Quashment of FIR---Civil nature of dispute---Scope---Where allegations in FIR, even if accepted, disclosed only a civil dispute regarding recovery of amount or specific performance of agreement and no ingredients of criminal breach of trust were made out, continuation of criminal proceedings would be abuse of process---In such circumstances, High Court’s inherent power to quash FIR under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. could be invoked, and Supreme Court could approve/undertake quashment to prevent misuse of criminal process. (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 187---Complete justice---Petition seeking pre-arrest bail converted into appeal for quashment of FIR---Petitioner had approached Supreme Court for pre-arrest bail, but upon examination of record Supreme Court found that no criminal offence was made out against accused---There was no bar in converting petition into proceedings for quashment of FIR where continuation of criminal case would be abuse of process---Supreme Court exercised power under Art.187 of Constitution to do complete justice, converted petition into appeal, allowed same and quashed FIR. Cited Case: • The State through D.G., ANF Rawalpindi v. Muhammad Saleem Khan 2011 SCMR 863 (g) Criminal law---- ----Property dealer---Role of intermediary---Criminal liability under S.406, PPC---Petitioner was property dealer who introduced complainant to owner of house for mortgage transaction---There was no allegation that co-accused was not owner of house or that transaction was fake from inception---Written mortgage agreement existed between parties---Dispute regarding non-delivery of possession/non-return of advance was to be resolved through civil remedies and did not constitute criminal breach of trust against petitioner merely because he participated in property deal. Disposition: Criminal Petition No.10-L of 2026 was converted into appeal and allowed; order dated 06.01.2026 passed by Lahore High Court and order dated 09.12.2025 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore were set aside; FIR No.3299 dated 17.10.2025 registered under S.406, PPC at Police Station Islampura, District Lahore was quashed.