Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ---- Art. 199; Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2; O. XLIII, R.1(r) Constitutional petition --- Maintainability --- Interlocutory orders --- Refusal of ad interim injunction --- Scope and bar under constitutional jurisdiction --- Petitioner challenged concurrent orders of civil and appellate courts whereby request for ad interim injunction was declined --- Held, constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 cannot be invoked to assail interlocutory orders which are not final or conclusive in nature --- Application under O. XXXIX Rr. 1 & 2 CPC for temporary injunction still pending before trial court --- Refusal of ad interim relief does not preclude adjudication on merits --- High Court observed that allowing constitutional petitions against such interim refusals would open floodgates and undermine hierarchy of legal remedies --- Petition dismissed in limine for being premature and not maintainable. Cited Cases: • Rashid Baig v. Muhammad Mansha 2024 SCMR 1385 • Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Muhammad Anwar Mandokhel 2024 SCMR 298 (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ---- Art. 199(1)(c) Extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction --- Scope and limitations --- Where alternate efficacious remedy exists or trial is pending, High Court must exercise restraint --- Held, High Court’s power under Art.199 is supervisory and not appellate in nature --- Interim orders passed with lawful discretion by subordinate courts are not to be interfered with unless shown to be passed without jurisdiction or involving gross miscarriage of justice --- Petition failed to establish such infirmities --- Expression “adequate” remedy under Art.199 interpreted in line with dictionary and judicial meanings as legally sufficient and minimally satisfactory --- Petition dismissed accordingly. Cited Cases: • Special Secretary-II (Law & Order) v. Fayyaz Dawar 2023 SCMR 1442 • Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Intizar Ali 2022 SCMR 472 • Province of Punjab v. Yasir Majeed Sheikh 2021 SCMR 624 • Messrs Fateh Yarn Pvt. Ltd. v. CIR Faisalabad 2021 SCMR 1133 (c) Easements Act (V of 1882); Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ---- Art. 9 Easement rights v. Ownership rights --- Registered sale deed excluded ownership of rooftop --- Petitioner claimed easement by necessity to prevent construction on rooftop --- Held, no easement rights established; right to easement cannot override ownership rights expressly excluded in sale deed --- Court found petitioner's claim amounted to interference with lawful property rights rather than enforcement of any easement --- Fundamental rights under Art. 9 of Constitution invoked by petitioner (right to quality life) found inapplicable where no legal entitlement to rooftop existed.----- "Invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be termed to be an "adequate remedy" to challenge grant or refusal of ad interim injunction being not final and conclusive in nature."

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940): ----S. 34—Stay of legal proceedings—Scope—Discretion of the Court—Joint Venture Agreement (JV Agreement) containing an arbitration clause—Plaintiff (PEB) filed a civil suit for damages against its JV partners and third parties (ERRA and PERRA)—Defendants (A&ACC and Buildcore) invoked S. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking stay of proceedings—Civil Court allowed the stay—Held, where parties to a contract have agreed to arbitration, the Court must ordinarily hold them to their bargain, but this rule is not absolute—Section 34 grants the Court discretion to stay proceedings or not, based on the peculiar facts of each case—Court must assess whether all conditions under S. 34 are satisfied and whether there exist sufficient reasons to refuse a stay—Where a party to an arbitration agreement is joined with non-parties in a suit and the claims are not severable, staying proceedings may lead to conflicting decisions by different forums—Civil Court erred in staying proceedings against all defendants, including those not party to the JV Agreement—Appeal allowed, order of stay set aside—Case law discussed: Eckhardt & Co. Marine GmbH v. Muhammad Hanif (PLD 1993 SC 42); Uzin Export Import Foreign Trade Co. v. Macdonald Layton & Co. Ltd. (1996 SCMR 690); Rachappa Gurudappa Bijapur v. Gurudiddappa Nurandappa (AIR 1989 SC 635). (b) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908): ----O. VII, R. 11—Rejection of plaint—Territorial jurisdiction—Suit filed at Islamabad—Defendants (ERRA and PERRA) contended that the Civil Court at Islamabad lacked territorial jurisdiction, as the contracts were executed and performed in Mansehra—Held, determination of territorial jurisdiction requires evidence and cannot be decided at the preliminary stage—ERRA’s role in project meetings at Islamabad established some connection to the forum—Application for rejection of plaint dismissed—Case law discussed: Tradesmen International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2005 MLD 541); National Development Leasing Corporation Ltd. v. Chairman, Banking Tribunal (2000 YLR 1769). (c) Contract Law—Joint Ventures— ----Arbitration clause and multi-party litigation—Scope—Plaintiff’s claims against JV partners intertwined with claims against a non-party to the arbitration agreement—Held, where claims against multiple defendants arise from a common transaction and are not severable, bifurcation of proceedings is improper—Allowing arbitration for some claims while continuing a civil suit for others risks contradictory findings—Arbitration clause in a JV Agreement does not bind a non-party (ERRA, PERRA) absent a clear contractual obligation—Court exercised discretion correctly in refusing to reject the plaint—Appeal allowed, suit to proceed before Civil Court. (d) Administration of Justice— ----Stay of proceedings and multiplicity of litigation—Scope—Courts must avoid a situation where disputes are split between different forums leading to conflicting decisions—Where third parties are impleaded in a suit alongside parties to an arbitration agreement, Courts must carefully assess whether the joinder is genuine or aimed at evading arbitration—In the instant case, PEB’s claim against ERRA and PERRA was integral to its claims against the JV partners, making arbitration an inadequate remedy—Appeal allowed, revision petition dismissed. ----Disposition: Appeal allowed, stay of proceedings set aside—Civil Court directed to continue proceedings—Revision petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ---- O. XL, R. 1 & O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 Appointment of Receiver—Principles governing exercise of discretion—Temporary Injunction—Scope and limitations—Respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration, rendition of accounts, recovery, and permanent and mandatory injunction against the appellant and others, along with an application for temporary injunction under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, CPC, which was dismissed by the Trial Court—Subsequent appeal against the dismissal was also rejected by the High Court, directing the Trial Court to decide the application for appointment of a receiver within a month—Trial Court, upon hearing the parties, allowed the application and appointed a receiver—Appellant challenged this order on the ground that there was no justification for such appointment, and that the partnership deed provided for the continuation of the firm even after the death of a partner—High Court held that appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary remedy and must be exercised sparingly, only when the subject matter of the suit is at imminent risk of waste or mismanagement—Further held, mere apprehension of loss, without tangible evidence, does not justify the appointment of a receiver—Order appointing the receiver was set aside, and application for such appointment was dismissed. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Hussain v. Muhammad Asghar 2004 MLD 1624 Mst. Azra Parvez v. Sheikh Ashfaq Hussain 2015 CLC 1695 Latif-ur-Rehman v. Haji Farmanullah PLD 2014 Peshawar 1 (b) Partnership Act, 1932: ---- Dissolution of partnership—Effect of death of a partner—Continuity of partnership under specific clauses of partnership deed—It is settled law that in absence of any contrary provision in a partnership deed, a partnership consisting of two partners dissolves upon the death of a partner—However, if a specific clause in the deed provides for continuation of the firm, such provision carries legal weight unless declared invalid by a competent court—In the present case, Clause 12 of the partnership deed provided that the firm would continue despite the death of a partner—Held, the partnership remains in force until the legality of Clause 12 is determined by the Trial Court—Any claim by legal heirs of the deceased partner must be adjudicated in light of this clause—Appointment of receiver based on an unverified claim of partnership dissolution was unwarranted. ---Cited Cases: Muhammad Ashraf Khan v. Abdul Qadar 1995 SCMR 296 Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Ganeshi Lal & Sons 2000 PTD 677 Malik Muhammad Ishaque v. Messrs Erose Theatre PLD 1977 SC 109 (c) Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002 & Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: ---- Articles 46-A & 78-A Admissibility of electronic evidence—E-mails as evidence—Requirement of proper verification—Trial Court, while appointing receiver, relied on e-mails submitted by the respondents-plaintiffs without requiring formal proof under the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, and Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984—Held, electronic records cannot be relied upon as evidence unless duly authenticated and verified in accordance with Articles 46-A and 78-A of Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984—Improper reliance on unverified electronic communication rendered the impugned order legally unsustainable. ----Cited Case: Ali Raza alias Peter v. The State 2019 SCMR 1982 (d) Administration of Justice: ---- Exercise of judicial discretion—Tentative observations not binding on trial proceedings—High Court directed the Trial Court to decide the main suit on merits within the stipulated period without being influenced by any tentative observations made in appellate proceedings—Held, courts must refrain from pre-judging factual issues at an interim stage and should ensure adjudication is based solely on the evidence presented during trial. ----Disposition: Appeal accepted—Order of Trial Court appointing receiver set aside—Application for appointment of receiver dismissed—Trial Court directed to proceed with adjudication of the suit without being influenced by the observations made in appellate proceedings.

Summary: (a) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) – Ss. 21 & 25: Trade mark infringement—Exclusive rights of registered proprietor—Prior use—Passing off—Trans-border reputation—Effect. Plaintiff, a UAE-based company, sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing its registered trade mark "MAAZA" (registered under No. 142298 in Class 32 for beverages, juices, and soft drinks) and from passing off identical trade mark products as its own. Defendant No.1 contested the claim, asserting prior use in Pakistan since 1997 and invoking S.25 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, to protect vested rights. Held, that the registration of a trade mark grants exclusive rights under S.21, and any unauthorized use of an identical or deceptively similar mark constitutes infringement. The plaintiff established a strong prima facie case based on international reputation and registration in multiple jurisdictions, including Pakistan. The defendant failed to prove prior use, as its trade mark application was filed on a "proposed to be used" basis, contradicting its claims of continuous use. Furthermore, the concept of trans-border reputation applied, as the plaintiff’s mark had global recognition due to extensive marketing, including in Pakistan, through advertising, international trade, and media exposure. (b) Trade Marks Act (V of 1940) – Ss. 10(2) & 25: Prior user rights—Bona fide adoption—Defendant’s claim of concurrent use—Failure to establish prior rights. The defendant argued that it had been using the "MAAZA" mark for fruit juices since February 1997 and had acquired goodwill and market share. However, documentary evidence, including tax records and invoices, failed to establish prior user rights before the plaintiff’s trade mark registration in 1997. Additionally, the defendant's trade mark application stated "proposed to be used," contradicting its prior use claim. Held, that mere use of a similar mark does not override the proprietary rights of a registered trade mark owner unless bona fide prior adoption is proved. The lack of documentary evidence before the trade mark registration date invalidated the defendant’s claim of concurrent rights. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2: Temporary injunction—Balance of convenience—Irreparable loss—Grant of relief to trade mark proprietor. For an injunction under O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2, C.P.C., the court considered: (i) prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience, and (iii) irreparable loss. Plaintiff demonstrated proprietary rights through international and local trade mark registrations and continuous use of the mark. The defendant’s adoption of an identical trade mark created likelihood of deception, which could mislead consumers. Held, that balance of convenience favored the plaintiff, as allowing continued unauthorized use would damage its brand reputation. Furthermore, irreparable loss was established, as unauthorized use of the mark would erode brand exclusivity and goodwill. The defendant could not claim honest concurrent use, as its adoption of the mark was not bona fide. (d) Words and Phrases—Acquiescence: Failure to act against infringer—Effect on proprietary rights. Defendant argued that the plaintiff had acquiesced to its use of "MAAZA" in Pakistan since 1997 and was estopped from claiming exclusive rights. Held, that mere delay in bringing an action does not bar a trade mark owner’s rights unless it is accompanied by encouragement or consent to the infringer. Plaintiff took legal action upon becoming aware of the defendant’s infringement, thus acquiescence did not apply. Fraudulent adoption of a well-known trade mark negates any claim of acquiescence. (e) Disposition: Plaintiff’s application for injunction granted. Defendant No.1’s application for recall of the interim injunction dismissed. ----Cited Cases: Messrs Tabaq Restaurant v. Messrs Tabaq Restaurant 1987 SCMR 1090 Mars Incorporated v. Pakistan Mineral Water Bottling Plant (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 MLD 39 Dabur India Ltd. v. Hilal Confectionary (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2000 Karachi 139 Cooper’s Incorporated v. Pakistan General Stores 1981 SCMR 1039 National Detergents Limited v. MOD and International (Pvt.) Ltd. 1993 MLD 590 J. N. Nichols (Vimto) PLC v. Mehran Bottlers (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2000 Karachi 192

Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872): ----S. 202---Termination of agency where agent has an interest in the subject matter---Scope---Exclusive bottling appointment agreement between PepsiCo and Bolan Beverages was terminated by PepsiCo, leading Bolan Beverages to file a suit claiming that an interest in the franchise had been created under S. 202 of the Contract Act, rendering the agreement irrevocable---Held, the relationship between the parties was not that of principal and agent but of buyer and seller, as Bolan Beverages operated its business independently without representing PepsiCo in dealings with third parties---No interest was created in the subject matter of the agreement as required under S. 202 of the Contract Act---Provisions of S. 202 were, therefore, not attracted. (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872): ----Ss. 182, 211, 213, 216, 217, & 218---Agency---Essential ingredients---Scope---Bolan Beverages failed to qualify as an agent under the Contract Act as it was not obligated to represent PepsiCo in dealings with third parties, render accounts, or share profits or losses with PepsiCo---All benefits and risks were borne solely by Bolan Beverages, indicating the absence of an agency relationship. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877): ----Ss. 21(a), 21(g) & 56(f)---Specific performance---Temporary injunction---Scope---Bolan Beverages sought a temporary injunction against the termination of its agreement with PepsiCo---Held, temporary injunctions are not granted where compensation in money constitutes an adequate remedy, as per S. 21(a) of the Specific Relief Act---The agreement involved a continuous duty extending beyond three years, which under S. 21(g) could not be specifically enforced---Issuance of a temporary injunction was not in the interest of justice, as it would effectively resurrect a terminated contract. (d) Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001): ----S. 46---Infringement of trademark---Allegations of marketing spurious products---Scope---PepsiCo alleged that Bolan Beverages had violated trademark rights by selling spurious products under the Pepsi trademark after ceasing to purchase Pepsi concentrate---Held, the sale of spurious products posed a serious risk to PepsiCo’s goodwill, further justifying the refusal of a temporary injunction. (e) Administration of justice---Ad interim injunction---Undue benefit from prolonged interim relief---Effect---Appellant continued to enjoy the benefits of the terminated agreement under the force of an ad interim injunction since 1999, causing significant prejudice to PepsiCo---Held, continuation of such an injunction was unjustified, and temporary relief was rightly refused. ---Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Temporary injunction refused. ---Cited Statutes: • Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 182, 202, 211, 213, 216, 217, & 218 • Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 21(a), 21(g), & 56(f) • Trade Marks Ordinance (XIX of 2001), S. 46 ---Judgment Reference: 2004 CLD 1530 (Supreme Court)

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – O. XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2: ---Grant of temporary injunction---Principles for consideration---Petitioner sought a declaration that he was entitled to exemption from development charges for Plot No. 45, D.I. Khan Cantt., and prayed for an injunction restraining the respondents from recovering the said amount---Held, the grant of a temporary injunction is governed by three essential factors: (i) prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience, and (iii) irreparable loss---Both the trial court and appellate court found that the petitioner had failed to establish a prima facie case as required under the law, and the refusal of an injunction was legally justified. (b) Development Charges – Exemption Policy: ---Old grant properties and exemption criteria---Petitioner and his brothers were co-sharers in 45 plots approved for conversion from old grants into regular leases---Under ML&C Department Letter No. 49/85/Lands/ML&C/96, dated 8-1-1999, exemption from development charges was allowed only for one subdivided portion where a building already existed---Exemption was already granted for Plot No. 12, which was later sold, and petitioner’s claim for additional exemption on Plot No. 45 was denied on the ground that no building existed on the plot---Held, the petitioner failed to demonstrate entitlement to multiple exemptions under the policy. (c) Judicial Discretion – Scope of Interference in Revision: ---Refusal of injunction not to be interfered with unless perverse or arbitrary---Petitioner argued that lower courts exercised jurisdiction arbitrarily in refusing temporary injunction---Held, mere refusal of injunction does not warrant interference in revision under S.115, C.P.C., unless it is shown that the decision was perverse, arbitrary, or in violation of settled principles---Observations made while deciding an injunction application do not amount to a final determination of the case. (d) Temporary Injunction and Substantive Suit: ---Distinction between interim relief and final relief---Held, if issues raised in the injunction application are inextricably linked to the merits of the suit, courts must carefully balance the observations made to avoid prejudicing the final decision---However, this does not mean that temporary injunctions must be granted in every suit for permanent injunction. ----Disposition: Civil revision dismissed; refusal to grant temporary injunction upheld.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) – S. 42: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – O. XXXIX, RR. 1 & 2, S. 115 Grant of temporary injunction—Essential ingredients—Balance of convenience, irreparable loss, and prima facie case—Plaintiffs (Zamindaran Patti Kulalote) filed a declaratory suit along with an application for an injunction against defendants (Zamindaran Mouza Rattu)—Trial Court granted an ad interim injunction on the day of filing the suit and later confirmed it—Defendants’ appeal before the District Judge was dismissed—Held, that in cases of temporary injunction, courts must ascertain whether essential conditions are met—Evidence, including revenue records and grazing rights, demonstrated that defendants (petitioners) would suffer irreparable loss rather than the plaintiffs—Trial Court misread the documentary evidence, failing to acknowledge that plaintiffs were tenants while defendants were owners of the disputed property—Defendants had longstanding grazing and firewood collection rights—Both lower courts committed illegality and irregularity by failing to appreciate the evidence properly—High Court intervened to rectify the misreading of evidence—Revision petition accepted, and impugned orders of lower forums set aside. ----Disposition: Revision accepted.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Grant of temporary injunction---Conditions---Petitioner sought a temporary injunction restraining the Capital Development Authority (CDA) from demolishing unauthorized constructions on his property and requested enforcement of an earlier CDA Board decision for the provision of a lane between plots---Courts below denied the relief, holding that the petitioner lacked a prima facie case, the balance of convenience was not in his favor, and the loss incurred would not be irreparable---Petitioner’s affidavit undertaking to remove unauthorized constructions when directed by the CDA negated his claims for equitable relief. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877): ----S. 56(j)---Injunction---Discretionary relief---Scope---Relief of injunction is discretionary and cannot be granted to a party acting inequitably or concealing material facts---Petitioner suppressed details of prior litigation and attempted to mislead the court by omitting the fact that earlier suits and appeals had been dismissed---Such concealment rendered the petitioner disentitled to equitable relief. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings---Scope---High Court refused to interfere in the concurrent findings of the lower courts, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any illegality, material irregularity, or jurisdictional error---Findings of fact and the discretionary relief granted by lower courts were upheld. (d) Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960): ----S. 49-C---Unauthorized constructions---CDA's authority to remove violations---Petitioner’s unauthorized constructions, including additional floors, projections, and windows contrary to zoning regulations, were subject to removal per his own undertaking to the CDA---CDA's actions in issuing demolition notices were within its statutory powers. ----Cited Cases: Mid East Medical Centre Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 1986 CLC 1607 Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar 2003 MLD 1543 Dilawar Hussain v. District Coordination Officer, Okara 2004 CLC 324 ATCO Lab. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. PFIZER Ltd. 2002 CLD 120 ----Disposition: Revision petition dismissed. Petitioner was found to have acted inequitably by suppressing material facts, violating undertakings, and seeking relief against public interest and established legal principles.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) – Ss. 42 & 54 – Declaratory Suit – Agreement to Sell – Ownership Rights: Dispute over ownership of a plot in Mirpur—Appellants filed a declaratory suit and perpetual injunction, claiming their father initially owned the plot but a conditional sale agreement executed in 1971 was later revoked—Respondent No.1 obtained transfer of the plot from the Municipal Corporation in 2004 based on the allegedly revoked agreement—Appellants contended that the transfer was fraudulent and void—Held, an agreement to sell does not confer ownership rights, and a declaratory decree cannot be granted solely on its basis—However, the right of allotment can be transferred through an agreement to sell or affidavit—Since proprietary rights were never granted to the allottee or transferees, the relevant authority had the power to transfer only the allotment rights—Reliance placed on Ch. Shaukat Ali v. Muhammad Javaid (Civil Appeal No. 61 of 2002, Supreme Court, decided 21-5-2003). (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – S. 96, O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 – Temporary Injunction – Possession of Disputed Property: Appellants sought an injunction, alleging fraud in the transfer of their father’s allotted plot—Trial Court granted interim relief but later vacated the status quo order—Respondents contended that the plot was lawfully purchased and had undergone multiple transfers—Last transferee, Respondent No.7, constructed a three-story building on the plot after obtaining approval from the relevant authority—Held, a temporary injunction cannot be granted where the disputed property is in the possession of another party with a prima facie valid claim—Court upheld the District Judge’s ruling, allowing construction to continue subject to the condition that Respondent No.7 would not claim compensation if the appellants' suit succeeded—Reliance placed on Kh. Taufique Qadir v. Qazi Khalil-ur-Rehman (2001 YLR 3263). ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed—Temporary injunction vacated, subject to Respondent No.7 furnishing an undertaking that no compensation would be claimed in case the appellants' suit succeeded—Appellants to pursue ownership claims through proper legal proceedings.

Summary: Background: The case involves a suit for specific performance initiated by the father of the petitioners against the respondents. The petitioners also filed an application for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which was dismissed by the trial court on 17.12.2015. An appeal was filed, and the appellate court granted the temporary injunction on 14.12.2016. Subsequently, the respondents filed an application for the restoration of possession of certain shops and a hall, which the appellate court accepted, leading to the issuance of a Robkar for the delivery of possession. ----Issues: Whether the appellate court had the jurisdiction to entertain the application for restoration of possession after granting a temporary injunction. Whether the appropriate remedy for the alleged violation of the court's order was under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-C read with Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction of Appellate Court: The court held that after deciding the appeal on 14.12.2016, the appellate court became functus officio and had no pending matters before it. Thus, any violation of the order should have been addressed by the trial court where the suit was pending. Appropriate Remedy: The court noted that the proper remedy for any violation of the injunctive order was to file an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-C read with Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, before the court of first instance. The application under Sections 36, 94(c), 151 read with Order XXXIX, Rule 2, and Order XXI, Rule 101, was not maintainable before the appellate court. Provisions of Law: The court referred to the relevant provisions of law, including Order XXXIX, Rule 2-C, and Section 144, which provide for restitution and consequences of disobedience or breach of injunction. The court emphasized that the proper venue for such applications was the trial court where the suit was sub-judice. Improper Exercise of Jurisdiction: The court concluded that the appellate court wrongly exercised its jurisdiction by passing the impugned order dated 26.06.2021. The provisions of Order XXI, Rules 100 and 101, were discussed, highlighting that they relate to the rights of third parties dispossessed by decree holders and are not applicable to parties within the same suit. ----Conclusion: The revision petition was accepted, and the impugned order dated 26.06.2021, passed by the appellate court, was set aside. The application filed by the respondents under Sections 36, 94(c), 151 read with Order XXXIX, Rule 2, and Order XXI, Rule 101, was dismissed. The court directed that the proper remedy should be sought before the trial court under the relevant provisions. ----Key Points: The appellate court became functus officio after deciding the appeal and had no jurisdiction to entertain further applications. The appropriate remedy for alleged violations of injunctive orders is under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-C read with Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Provisions of Order XXI, Rules 100 and 101, apply to third-party claims and not to parties within the same suit.