Summary: ICA in WP 4606/18 (WP: Misc Matter: Seeking direction to setaside the operation of impugned order dated: 25 -10 -2018 regarding extradition.) judgment dated 15.5.19.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Intra Court Appeal in WP 1544-20 (Sugar Scam/ Against the impugned notification dated 16.03.2020 issued by M/o Interior and also seeks direction to set aside the impugned report of commission of inquiry consuited by M/o Interior to probe into the increase in sugar prices dated 21.05.2020)

Summary: ICA in WP 1159/17 (Extradition Matter, Seeking direction to cancel extradition order of accused petitioner son.)

Summary: Background:Civil Review Petitions (C.R.P.) were filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 01-08-2019, passed in Civil Petitions (C.P.) Nos. 257-L and 258-L of 2019.The petitioners challenged the impugned order on various grounds, including that it lacked reasoning.---Issues:Whether the impugned order warranted a review.Whether the practice of adopting the reasoning of the court below without further elaboration is permissible.Whether the applications for condonation of delay in filing the review petitions should be allowed.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Court found no ground for reviewing the impugned order and dismissed the review petitions.Emphasized that if the Court is satisfied with the reasoning and conclusions of the judgment challenged before it, it can simply endorse the impugned judgment and adopt the reasoning of the court below, without the need for further elaboration.This approach is not offensive to fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution and does not undermine due process.Courts worldwide have moved towards efficient time and case management techniques, and adopting a well-reasoned judgment through a short order serves the purpose adequately.The applications for condonation of delay in filing the review petitions were allowed for the reasons given in the applications.The applications for condonation of delay were allowed.---Quote:No need for a detailed judgment by this Court in every case. Adopting the reasoning of the courts below is sufficient.

Summary: Background:The appellant, Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan, challenged the judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal, which set aside a notification and letter regarding the retirement date of the respondent, Asmatullah Kakar.The respondent claimed that his correct date of birth was 25.12.1961, contrary to the date recorded in his service records as 08.01.1959.----Issues:Whether the Balochistan Service Tribunal erred in setting aside the notification and letter regarding the respondent's retirement date?Whether the respondent's request for correction of his date of birth was legally justified?----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court found in favor of the appellant.The Court observed that the respondent's date of birth was recorded as 08.01.1959 in his service records and remained unchallenged for many years.Despite obtaining a court decree in 1989 for correction of his date of birth, the respondent did not pursue the matter further until his retirement was imminent.The Court held that the Balochistan Service Tribunal overlooked relevant service rules and legal precedents in allowing the respondent's appeal.It emphasized that the date of birth recorded at the time of joining government service cannot be changed except in specific circumstances, which were not applicable in this case.The Court set aside the judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal, declaring it unsustainable.----Citations/Precedents:Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009Balochistan Government Initial Appointment to the Civil Service post (age and relaxation of upper age limit) Rules, 2012Civil Servants (Appointments, Promotions and Transfers) Rules, 1973Qamaruddin v. Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and another (2007 SCMR 66)Dr. Muhammad Aslam Baloch v. Government of Balochistan through Secretary, Health Department and others (2014 SCMR 1723)Ali Azhar Khan Baloch and others v. Province of Sindh and others (2015 SCMR 456)Dr. Zulfiqat Ahmed Malik v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division, Chairman FBR, Islamabad and others (2019 SCMR 1973).

Summary: FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and others-Respondents (Against judgment dated 10.10.2019 of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed to Writ Petition No. 1311-P of 2018 and Writ Petition No. 3577-P of 2017) Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (VIII of 1975)- Contempt Proceedings against Chief Secretary, Sindh and others 2013 SCMR 1752 ref.

Summary: (a) Legal practitioner- -Law society-Admission as an advocate-"Certificate of character"as a pre-requisite for admission as an advocate-Previous convictions of applicant-"Fit and proper person"standard (in section 55 of Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, 2006)-Scope and purpose-Purpose of the"fit and proper standard"was to ensure that those admitted (to practice) could be entrusted to meet the duties and fundamental obligations imposed on lawyers-Such obligations included upholding the rule of law-Reflecting such purpose, the assessment of fitness and propriety focused on the need to protect the public and to maintain public confidence in the legal profession-Such exercise had a protective, not punitive, purpose, and it also involved consideration of whether the applicant was honest, trustworthy and a person of integrity-Where the applicant had prior convictions, the Court must consider whether the convictions remained relevant; this was a fact-specific inquiry and the Court must look at all the evidence to make a judgment as to the applicant's present ability to meet the duties and obligations of a lawyer-Applicant had the onus to show the standard was met-Although the standard was a high one, the Court should not lightly deprive qualified persons from the opportunity to practise law. The respondent, completed the necessary academic and professional qualifications for admission as a Barrister and solicitor of the High Court as a mature student. The New Zealand Law Society (the Law Society), the appellant, refused to give him a certificate of character essentially because of concerns about his character. Those concerns related to his history of criminal offending, which included four convictions for driving with excess breath/blood alcohol, and his attitude towards that offending. Without a certificate of character from the Law Society, the respondent could not be admitted in the usual way. Instead, the matter proceeded to a contested hearing in the High Court. Subsequently, the High Court concluded that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to be admitted in terms of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, 2006 (the Act) and refused his application. The respondent appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal, which concluded that, subject to the respondent taking the statutory oath, he was entitled to an order admitting him as a Barrister and solicitor of the High Court. The Law Society unsuccessfully sought a stay of the Court of Appeal judgment. As a result, the respondent was admitted as a barrister and solicitor and had been issued with a practising certificate. The Law Society appealed to the Supreme Court. [Per Ellen France, J (Majority view): The issue in the present appeal was as to what was the approach to be taken to section 55(1) of the Act. Said section provided that the Court could take into account a number of factors to determine if a person was fit and proper. The relevant factors included any prior convictions. The fit and proper person standard had to be interpreted in light of the purposes of the Act. Those purposes broadly reflected two aspects. The first aspect was the need to protect the public, in particular by ensuring that those whose admission was approved could be entrusted with their clients' business and fulfil the fundamental obligations in section 4 of the Act. The second aspect was a reputational aspect reflecting the need to maintain the public confidence in the profession at the present time and in the future. This second aspect also encompassed relationships between practising lawyers and between lawyers and the court. Re Lundon [1926] NZLR 656 (CA) at 658; Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 298 and New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins [2001] NSWCA 284, (2001) 52 NSWLR 279 at [20] ref. The fit and proper person evaluation was a forward-looking exercise. That is because the Court or the Law Society, as the decision maker, was required to make a judgment at the time of undertaking the evaluation as to the risks either to the public or of damage to the reputation of the profession if the applicant was admitted. Those risks have to be construed in light of the fundamental obligations on lawyers. Of particular relevance were the obligations to uphold the rule of law and to protect the interests of the client subject to duties as an officer of the Court or under any other enactment. Lincoln v New Zealand Law Society [2019] NZCA 442 at [34(d)] ref. The fit and proper person evaluation was a protective exercise focused on either the need for public protection or the maintenance of public confidence in the profession. The approach was not punitive. Punishment for past conduct had no place. Further, what comprised fitness to practise must be referable to the good character appropriate to the particular profession. For an applicant for admission to the legal profession, the appropriate aspects of the fit and proper person standard were whether the applicant was honest, trustworthy and a person of integrity. Re Davis (1947) 75 CLR 409 at 426; Law Society of Upper Canada v Schuchert [2001] LSDD No 63 at [20]; Cohen v Legal Practitioners Admissions Board (No 2) [2012] QCA 106 at [12]; DeMaria v Law Society of Saskatchewan [2013] SKQB 178, (2013) 420 Sask R 230 at [46] and New Zealand Law Society v Mitchell [2010] NZCA 498, [2011] NZAR 81 at [24]-[25] ref. Where the applicant had prior convictions, the Act indicated three aspects of previous convictions may be relevant. Those aspects were the nature of the offence, the time that had elapsed since the offending, and the applicant's age when the offence was committed. Lawyers and Conveyancers Act, section 55(1)(c) ref. The nature of the offence was an important consideration. Some convictions would inevitably be problematic by their very nature. Dishonesty offences were in that category because of the direct connection with legal practice. Offending involving a failure to comply with disclosure obligations was treated in a similar way. Very serious prior convictions, such as murder, posed their own issues. GE Dal Pont Lawyers' Professional Responsibility (6th ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2017) at [2.60]; Hart v Auckland Standards Committee 1 of The New Zealand Law Society [2013] NZHC 83, [2013] 3 NZLR 103 at [186]; Re Owen [2005] 2 NZLR 536 (HC) at [34]; Thomas v Legal Practitioners Admission Board [2004] QCA 407, [2005] 1 Qd R 331 at 335 and Preyra v Law Society of Upper Canada [2003] LSDD No 25 at [69] ref. The inquiry into the effect of prior convictions was an inquiry into whether the"frailties"or"defects of character"reflected by the previous convictions could now be regarded as"entirely spent"or"safely ignored". The decision maker was essentially trying to assess whether the convictions remained relevant to whether the applicant met the fit and proper person standard and, if so, to what extent the conduct remained relevant at the time of the current inquiry. The inquiry into relevance would commonly require consideration of the circumstances of the offending and of whether the applicant could be seen to have moved on in the sense of being either reformed or having undertaken steps towards rehabilitation. Alternatively, there may be other features of character which meant that the convictions should assume less relevance. That it was not always easy to draw the line emphasised the fact-specific nature of the inquiry. Re Lundon [1926] NZLR 656 (CA) at 658; Brown v New Zealand Law Society [2018] NZHC 1263, [2018] NZAR 1192 at [39(e)]; Lincoln v New Zealand Law Society [2019] NZCA 442 at [34(f)]; Layne v Attorney General of Grenada [2019] UKPC 11, [2019] 3 LRC 459 at [58]; Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 283; Re Owen [2005] 2 NZLR 536 (HC) at [35] and [37]; Pou v Waikato/Bay of Plenty District Law Society HC Rotorua CIV-2004-463-0511, 10 May 2005 at [43]; Venton v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2010] EWHC 1377 (Admin) at [17]; Re an application for admission as a legal practitioner by MCF [2015] QCA 154 at [10] and [18] and Law Society of British Columbia v De Jong 2017 LSBC 44, [2017] LSDD No 293 at [117]-[118] ref. Due to the focus on the potential risk to the public and to the public confidence in the profession, the fit and proper person standard was necessarily a high one. But the Court should not lightly deprive someone who had otherwise met the qualifications of the opportunity of practising as a lawyer. Perfection was not required. Finally, the onus was on the applicant to show that he or she was a fit and proper person. Applications were unlikely to turn on fine questions of onus. Jideofo v The Law Society [2007] EW Misc 3 (EWLS) at [16(i)]-[17]; Lincoln v New Zealand Law Society [2019] NZCA 442 at [34(a)]; Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 298; Preyra v Law Society of Upper Canada [2003] LSDD No 25 at [71] and Re M [2005] 2 NZLR 544 (HC) at [16] ref. In the present case the Court of Appeal was correct to conclude that the respondent was a fit and proper person, and thus met the standard for admission. When the evidence was viewed, the concerns arising from the respondent's convictions were not a controlling factor given his otherwise good character, including the fact that he had led a productive life and contributed to the community. Although the respondent's offending was of obvious concern, it was not of a character that had a direct connection with legal practice. There was also no suggestion of a lack of candour or dishonesty given the respondent's full disclosure and cooperation with the Law Society's requests for further information. Further, there was a gap of some seven years since the respondent's last offence and the offending was not at the serious end of the range of drink driving. It was also relevant that both of the Courts below accepted the sincerity of respondent's commitment to reform]. Hawke's Bay Lawyers Standards Committee v Beacham [2012] NZLCDT 29; Canterbury-Westland Standards Committee v Taffs [2013] NZLCDT 13; Waikato/BOP Lawyers' Standards Committee No 1 v Pou [2014] NZLCDT 86; Auckland Standards Committee No 5 v Rohde [2016] NZLCDT 9; Auckland Standards Committee No 1 v Chen [2017] NZLCDT 7 and Otago Standards Committee v Copland [2019] NZLCDT 29 ref. [Per Glazebrook, J (Minority view): The High Court was correct to hold that the respondent was not a fit and proper person. Drink driving was very serious offending as it was inherently dangerous and could cause serious injury or death. Further, multiple drink driving convictions would often signal a drinking problem, a contempt for the law or both. Both would directly affect a person's ability to operate as a lawyer. There must be a risk that a drinking problem could adversely affect a lawyer's judgment and thus their ability to serve their clients competently. Contempt for the law raised serious questions as to a lawyer's ability to fulfil their fundamental obligation to uphold and promote the rule of law. Since driving while impaired was inherently dangerous, multiple drink driving convictions should always be treated as very serious offending for the purpose of admission and professional disciplinary decisions, even where they were not at the serious end of the range of drink driving. In the present case, the respondent had multiple drink driving convictions over a long period, including one following the completion of his law degree. Although the respondent did express regret for his offending but he continued, even before the High Court, to minimise the seriousness of his offending. He admitted he may have had an alcohol problem but asserted that he had largely stopped drinking. He did not, however, provide any evidence of an independent alcohol assessment or of having undertaken any treatment. Lack of an expert report was fatal to the respondent's case. Respondent's own assertions as to reform were an insufficient basis for the Court of Appeal's conclusion that his risk of reoffending was not high. The High Court was right to consider that the effect of respondent's latest conviction (in 2014) could not be considered"spent"and thus that it could not safely be ignored. That conviction had to be seen in the context of respondent's long history of drink driving, the possibility of an untreated drinking problem and the minimisation of his offending. It was also a relevant factor that the respondent committed the offending as amature man and that he could be seen as acting as though different rules applied to him. The effect of respondent's past convictions remained relevant and the fact that he was of otherwise good character was therefore irrelevant. Although the respondent was not a fit and proper person to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor at the time of the High Court hearing, this did not mean he could never be admitted. He would need to supply an expert report, complete any treatment recommended and provide independent and cogent evidence that he had given up drinking]. [Per Ellen France, J (Majority view): (b) Legal practitioner- -Law society-Admission as advocate-"Fit and proper person"standard or"good character" requirements for entry to the legal profession as applicable in England and Wales, Australia and Canada.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Seeks release of consignment