Summary: (Against the Order dated 20.11.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi in Writ Petition No. 3346 of 2018). (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of dower decreed to the extent of entitlement to Rs.100,000/---Executing court ordering recovery of gold ornaments at current market value---Legality---Executing court could direct payment of the current market value of gold ornaments if their return was not possible---Respondent No.1 filed a suit before the family court for recovery of dower, dowry articles, and maintenance of minor, which was decreed while declaring her entitled to seven tolas of gold or, in the alternative, Rs.100,000/- as dower---In execution, the family court ordered recovery of either seven tolas of gold or its current market value---The petitioner/husband challenged this in revision, which was allowed by the district court holding that the entitlement was confined to Rs.100,000/---In respondent’s (wife’s) constitutional petition, High Court set aside the revisional order and restored the family court’s execution order, holding that she could recover the gold or its prevailing market value---The petitioner/husband then filed the present civil petition before the Supreme Court raising the question for determination as to “Whether the decree entitling the respondent/wife to seven tolas of gold or in the alternative Rs.100,000/-, limits recovery to the fixed sum or allows recovery of the current market value of gold when return in specie is not possible”?---Held: High Court correctly appreciated the scope of the judgment and decree, the conduct of the parties, and the settled principle that, where a decree expressly afforded alternate modes of satisfaction, the decree-holder retained the liberty to exercise her choice---The contention that the Respondent No. 1 voluntarily sought amendment during execution proceeding was misconceived---The executing court’s order maked it evident that the amendment was merely an addition of Rs. 100,000/- in consequence of the petitioner’s objection, without in any way deleting, relinquishing or substituting the original stipulation of seven (07) tolas of gold---An executing court could direct payment of the current market value of gold ornaments if their return was not possible---Impugned judgment neither suffered from legal error nor reflected any perversity or misapplication of settled law---On the contrary, it reinforced the principle that the court must give effect to the true intent underlying the decree and the contract from which it flew---Impugned judgment was well-reasoned, based on proper appreciation of facts and law---No illegality, perversity, or misreading and non-reading of evidence had been found in the impugned judgment---Accordingly, the instant petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---The constitutional courts exercise only limited supervisory jurisdiction and cannot re-appraise evidence or substitute their own opinion for that of the appellate court---Once a matter has been adjudicated upon facts by the trial and the appellate courts, constitutional courts should not exceed their powers by re-evaluating the facts or substituting the appellate court’s opinion with their own---The acceptance of finality of the appellate court’s finding is essential for achieving closure in legal proceedings conclusively resolving disputes, preventing unnecessary litigation, and upholding the legislature’s intent to provide a definitive resolution through existing appeal mechanism. M. Hamad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari and others 2023 SCMR 1434 rel. Ms. Farhana Qamar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. M. Asif Mukhtar Butt, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th August, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance of minor---Fixation of quantum and continuity of ‘nafaqah’ (maintenance) of a minor following dissolution of a marriage---Obligation of father to maintain child---Father disputing the quantum of maintenance allowance---Financial incapacity of father to maintain child, plea of---Plea of financial incapacity has to be substantiated with documentary evidence---Facts in brevity were that the former wife of the petitioner filed a suit seeking recovery of dower, maintenance for herself and her minor son (respondent No.2), and dowry articles---Trial Court decreed the suit granting her Rs.15,000 maintenance per month till completion of her iddat, Rs.5,000 in lieu of dower, a 6-marla house, nine tolas of gold or its value, and specified dowry articles, while awarding the minor Rs.25,000 maintenance per month with 10% annual increase until majority---Appellate court partly modified the decree reducing former wife's quantum of maintenance allowance and revised the assessed value of the dowry articles---Petitioner’s subsequent Constitutional petition before the High Court was dismissed leading to the present civil petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution, primarily challenging the quantum of maintenance awarded to the minor---Held: Petitioner disputed the quantum of maintenance fixed by the courts below by asserting that he had returned from abroad and was earning only Rs.100,000/- per month and remarried and was supporting another family---However, no documentary evidence was brought on record, such as a salary slip or income statement to substantiate this claim---It was established that the petitioner was a well-qualified individual who possessed the earning capacity to maintain the minor at the amount fixed by the courts below---Therefore, depriving the minor of the maintenance already awarded was deemed not to be in the best interest of justice----Amount of maintenance determined by the courts below was neither excessive nor beyond the petitioner’s financial capacity---No case was made out for interference with the concurrent findings of the all three courts below---Petition was dismissed and leave declined, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance of a child---Continuation of maintenance allowance despite child reaching age of majority---Precondition---Incapacitation of child due to mental or physical limitations---Scope---When a minor upon reaching majority is found to be incapacitated or otherwise unable to earn due to physical or mental limitations the father remains bound to maintain him. Humayun Hassan v. Arsalan Humayun PLD 2013 SC 557 rel. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance of a minor---Father to maintain his children, obligation of---Scope---A father bears a solemn and continuous obligation to provide maintenance for his offspring and this duty, grounded not merely in financial capacity but in the principle of nasab (lineage), persists until the son attains the age of puberty, and in the case of a daughter, until her marriage---In certain case fathers upon the dissolution of marriage or after losing custody, become hesitant to discharge their obligation of maintenance, viewing it as contingent upon matrimonial cohabitation or custodial rights---Such a perception is legally flawed and ethically untenable in light of Islamic principles, as the father’s obligation is not lessened by the child being in the hizanat (custody) of the mother. Humayun Hassan v. Arsalan Humayun PLD 2013 SC 557 rel. (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Providing maintenance allowances to minor and wife, obligation of---Distinction---Obligation to maintain a child is distinct and independent from the obligation to maintain a wife---The latter ceases upon the termination of the marital bond, whereas, the former survives the marriage itself and is directly tied to the immutable bond of paternity. (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance of minor---Obligation of father to maintain his children---Quantum of maintenance, determination of---Factors and considerations---Inability/incapacity of father to maintain child---Effect---Obligation of mother to maintain minor given her financial ease---Grandfather, responsibility of---Scope- --The determination of appropriate quantum of maintenance involves two principal considerations: (i) the nature and extent of the child’s reasonable requirements and (ii) the fathers financial means---Maintenance traditionally includes food, raiment , and lodging---However, this list is not exhaustive---Given evolving societal standards and the overarching principle of welfare of the minor, the term must be interpreted broadly to encompass all reasonable expenses necessary for the physical, mental, and emotional development of the child---This includes, inter alia, educational costs, healthcare, and other needs consistent with the natural growth and comfort of the minor---The amount awarded should reflect the family's social status, ensuring that the child is not deprived of opportunities for development and well-being solely due to the dissolution of the marriage---The second consideration pertains to the father’s financial capacity to maintain the child---Under Islamic principles, the obligation of maintenance is generally subject to certain conditions---Firstly, the child must be in need---If the child possesses independent means sufficient for his/her own support, the duty of the father to provide maintenance does not arise---Secondly, the child must be unable to earn due to minority or incapacity---Thirdly, the father must possess the means to provide such maintenance---While most Islamic schools of thought agree that the father's financial ability is a necessary precondition, the Hanafi school maintains a distinct view holding that, in the case of children, the obligation to maintain arises irrespective of actual wealth, provided the father has the capacity to earn---Therefore, the mere fact that the father is not working, in the absence of any serious mental or physical challenges, cannot be admitted as a valid justification for his failure to discharge the obligation of maintenance towards his children---In circumstances where the father lacks the means to provide maintenance and is incapable of earning due to genuine limitations, the duty to maintain the children may devolve upon the mother if she is in a position of financial ease---If neither parent possesses sufficient means, the obligation may extend to the paternal grandfather, subject to his financial ability to provide support to the children. Azeem ul Haq Pirzada, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 10th July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 9, 14, 25 & 27 – Right to Life, Dignity, Equality and Non-Discrimination Marital status as bar to family pension entitlement—Scope—Held, a daughter’s right to family pension of a deceased civil servant cannot be extinguished merely due to change in marital status after the pensioner’s death—Family pension is not a discretionary grant but a legal and constitutional entitlement grounded in Articles 9 and 14, encompassing both the right to life and to live with dignity—Denial of pension based solely on a woman’s change in marital status, without regard to actual financial need, constitutes systemic gender bias and violates Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution—Presumption that married women are financially secure and unmarried/divorced women are dependent, held, to be a flawed and patriarchal assumption—Eligibility for pension must be based on need, not formal status—Court observed that such restrictive interpretations fail to recognize women as autonomous right-holders and reinforce unconstitutional and discriminatory stereotypes. (b) West Pakistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963 – Rr. 4.7(1), 4.10(2)(B), 4.10(3) Interpretation of “unmarried” and “divorced” daughter—Scope—Held, Rules entitle both unmarried and divorced daughters to family pension without conditioning eligibility on the timing of marital status—Circular dated 05.12.2022 issued by Government of Sindh interpreted Rule 4.10(2)(B) restrictively by linking pension entitlement to status at time of death of the pensioner—Such restriction, held, had no support in the Act or the Rules and unlawfully curtailed an otherwise vested right—Rules confer pensionary entitlement based on category of beneficiary, not time-based marital conditions—Circular found to exceed its administrative scope and struck down as void. (c) Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 – S. 20 Right to pension—Nature and succession—Held, pension is not an ex gratia or charitable benefit but a legally accrued right of a government servant for past service—In case of death, this right devolves onto legal heirs under the Act and must be administered in accordance with law—Delay in disbursement or imposition of arbitrary restrictions amounts to negligence and breach of statutory and constitutional duty—Government departments bound to uphold fair, timely, and lawful distribution of pensionary benefits. (d) Executive Instructions and Circulars – Legal Status Administrative clarifications—Scope—Held, executive instructions or departmental circulars cannot override, amend, or narrow the operation of parent statutes or delegated legislation—Circular dated 05.12.2022 imposed an unauthorised condition that conflicted with the statutory pension framework—Court reaffirmed that executive authorities cannot issue clarifications that create new legal obligations or exclusions absent legislative backing. (e) Gender Equality – International Obligations – CEDAW, ICCPR, ICESCR, ILO Convention No. 111 Discriminatory pension frameworks based on marital status—Effect—Held, Pakistan’s international treaty obligations prohibit laws or practices that deny women access to economic benefits due to sex or marital status—Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ICCPR, ICESCR, and ILO Convention No.111 obligate the State to eliminate gender-based legal inequalities and stereotypes—Circular impugned was found to contravene Pakistan’s treaty commitments and reinforced unjust assumptions about women’s dependency and financial security—Court emphasized the need for a needs-based and dignity-affirming pension framework in line with global standards. (f) Comparative Jurisprudence – Pension Entitlement of Daughters Reference to Indian, Bangladeshi, and European legal frameworks—Held, India and Bangladesh have adopted progressive pension frameworks that assess entitlement based on financial need rather than marital status—Indian courts have interpreted “unmarried daughter” to include widowed and divorced daughters, and recognized pension as a constitutional right—European Court of Human Rights has held that denial of social security based on arbitrary classifications violates proportionality and equality principles—Pakistan’s rigid framework found to lag behind global standards and in need of reform. Disposition: Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused. Circular declared void ab initio for being unconstitutional and contrary to statutory law and international obligations.

Summary: (a) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----Ss.1(2), 3, 4 & 11---Workplace harassment complaint---Defective formation of inquiry committee, challenge to---Constituting an inquiry committee having gender disparity---Increasing the members of inquiry committee from three to five---Permissibility---Accused harassers not being subjected to cross-examination---Effect on inquiry proceedings---The petitioner (victim) was an ‘associate professor’ at a university who lodged a complaint before the Federal Ombudsman alleging various incidents occurring during her employment, after which the Ombudsman imposed penalties upon respondents Nos. 3 to 5 (accused harassers)---Both sides filed representations before the President of Pakistan, who dismissed the petitioner’s representation while accepting those of Respondents Nos.3 to 5---The petitioner then filed the present constitutional petition challenging the President’s order---Held: Perusal of the inquiry report showed that the harassment committee comprised of five members which was not in consonance with the mandate of S.3 of the Act, 2010---Section 3(2) of the Act, 2010 mandated in unequivocal terms that the inquiry committee had to consist of three members---The composition was further qualified by express criteria, i.e., one member must be a woman, one from senior management, and one a senior representative of the employees (or a senior employee where no CBA exists)---The statutory prescription of a three-member panel was deliberate and rooted in legislative intent, which was to ensure a fair, impartial, and gender-balanced inquiry process through a compact and manageable structure---Provisions of Ss. 3 and 11 of the Act were to be treated as mandatory in nature rather than directory---The organization, in the present case, had not constituted the inquiry committee in accordance with S. 3 of the Act, 2010 at the time of filing of the complaint by the petitioner, therefore, the organization constituting a five-member committee, having a gender disparity, expressly violated the mandatory provisions of the Act, 2010---Constitution of a five-member inquiry committee represented a flagrant departure from the mandatory structure---The inflation of membership from three to five was not a trivial or procedural irregularity; it constituted a patent illegality that struck at the root of the committee's jurisdiction---Record further revealed that the respondents Nos. 3 to 5, and their witnesses were not subjected to any meaningful cross-examination---An inquiry so conducted could not be sustained in the eyes of law and was liable to be declared void ab initio---Impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the respondent No. 1/President of Pakistan to decide the representation against the respondent No. 2/Federal Ombudsman’s order in the light of interpretation of the term sexual harassment rendered by Supreme Court---Instant writ petition filed by the victim was allowed, in circumstances. Nadia Naz and another v. The President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad and others PLD 2023 SC 588 and Raja Tanveer Safdar v. Mrs. Tehmina Yasmeen and others 2024 PLC (C.S.) 957 rel. (b) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----S.3---Workplace harassment---Statutory duty of the concerned organization to proceed in the matter without delay---Section 3 imposes a statutory duty upon every organization to constitute a three-member inquiry committee, which shall proceed without delay to inquire into complaints of workplace harassment---Law demands not only the presence of formal structures, but also the will to act promptly when complaints of harassment arise---Delays and administrative silence in such matters are not neutral acts; they are fertile grounds for injustice. (c) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----S.1(2)---Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act (X of 2010), Preamble---Harassment at workplace, complaint of---Absence of a Provincial forum at the time of filing of complaint---Jurisdiction to adjudicate complaint---Effect---Federal Ombudsman’s competence / jurisdiction to adjudicate complaint in vacuum of Provincial forum---Scope---It was not until the promulgation of the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 that the office of the Provincial Ombudsperson was formally instituted---Therefore, the Act, 2010, enacted by the Federal Legislature, remained operative for addressing the governing workplace harassment across Pakistan---The petitioner approached the Federal Ombudsman under the Act, 2010 who had assumed jurisdiction and rendered a decision---The Federal Ombudsman validly exercised jurisdiction in respect of the complaint dated 17-08-2016 as there was no Provincial Ombudsperson appointed in the Province before the Act, 2018---Furthermore, the principle of acquiescence and waiver is not without relevance---The Federal Ombudsman/Respondent No. 2 assumed jurisdiction and the proceedings were contested, however, at no stage the matter qua jurisdiction was raised by either party---Thereafter, the Respondent No. 1 also assumed jurisdiction whilst rendering the impugned order dated 17-07-2017 without divulging into the maintainability---To raise it now amounted to a procedural ambush and could not be permitted to vitiate otherwise valid proceedings, particularly when no alternate remedy was available at the time of filing the complaint in 2016, as the Provincial Ombudsperson was only formally appointed after the promulgation of the Amendment Act, 2018---Complaint was maintainable and Constitutional petition filed by the victim was allowed. Imran Maqbool, President MCB Bank Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law, Justice and Human Rights Division, Islamabad and others PLD 2019 Lah. 17 ref. (d) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----S.4---Harassment at workplace---Filing of complaint---Options for the complainant to file complaint before Ombudsman or the Inquiry Committee---Under Section 4(1) of the Act, 2010 it is clearly laid down that a complainant shall have the option to prefer a complaint either to the Ombudsperson or the Inquiry Committee---In this regard, the Federal Ombudsman can entertain a complaint where either no Inquiry Committee exists or where the complainant is dissatisfied with the process. Qazi Zaheer Ahmad v. Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection against Harassment at Workplace, Islamabad and 2 others 2021 PLC (C.S.) 839 ref. (e) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----S.2(h)---Harassment at workplace---Accused questioning locus standi of the victim by taking a plea that complaint concerned only office management issues and did not amount to sexual harassment---Relevance---Ambit and sphere of ‘sexual harassment’---Harassment, when manifested through sexually demeaning attitudes, is fundamentally aimed at degrading and dehumanizing an individual by subjecting them to exploitation, humiliation, and hostility grounded in their gender---Such conduct constitutes a form of gender-based discrimination---When these attitudes are exhibited within the workplace, they cross the threshold into actionable harassment, as they interfere with the victim's ability to perform professional duties and create an environment that is intimidating, hostile, or offensive---The resultant atmosphere not only undermines individual dignity, but also corrodes the institutional culture meant to uphold equality and respect---Definition of harassment has been expanded to include physical and discriminatory behaviour which also testifies to the purposive meaning of S. 2(h) of the Act, 2010---The purpose of harassment laws is to address gender-based discrimination at the workplace and not to limit it to sexual forms of harassment, which includes a broad range of conduct and behavior, resulting in workplace problems with serious consequences, one of the main being gender inequality. Nadia Naz and another v. The President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad and others PLD 2023 SC 588 and Raja Tanveer Safdar v. Mrs. Tehmina Yasmeen and others 2024 PLC (C.S.) 957 rel. Shahina Masood and 9 others v. Federal Ombudsman Secretariat for Protection Against harassment at workplace and 2 others 2020 PLC (C.S.) 186 ref. (f) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----S.2(h)---Harassment at workplace---Victim-centric assessment and approach---Applying the “reasonable woman” standard to determine whether conduct creates a hostile and harassing work environment---Scope---In matters of harassment, the victim’s viewpoint holds particular significance when evaluating whether the conduct in question deviates from acceptable standards of behavior---The appropriate standard is that of a reasonable woman, which must be applied to determine whether the behaviour constitutes harassment that creates a hostile work environment. Nadia Naz and another v. The President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad and others PLD 2023 SC 588 rel. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.9, 14, 18, 25 & 27---Right to salary and service privileges---Constitutional protection against arbitrary deprivation---Right to salary, perks, and privileges, lawfully accrued upon a person in service, is a fundamental right under Arts. 9, 14, 18, 25 and 27 of the Constitution, which cannot be curtailed through conjecture, institutional bias, or unsubstantiated accusations of indiscipline. (h) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Whether a provision is directory or mandatory---Determination---Test---Ascertaining the legislative intent behind the provision is essential---The general rule expounded is that the usage of the word 'shall' generally carries the connotation that a provision in mandatory in nature---However, other factors such as the object and purpose of the statute and inclusion of penal consequences in cases of non-compliance also serve as an instructive guide in deducing the nature of the provision. Province of Punjab through Secretary Excise and Taxation Department, Lahore and others v. Murree Brewery Company Limited (MBCL) and another 2021 SCMR 305 and Maulana Nur-ul-Haq v. Ibrahim Khalil 2000 SCMR 1305 rel. (i) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Whether a provision is directory or mandatory---Determination---General rule in which a statute is understood to be directory is when it contains matters merely of direction, but it is mandatory when those directions are followed by an express provision that in default of following them the facts shall be null and void. Niaz Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Raqeeb PLD 1974 SC 134 rel. (j) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Usage of the word “shall” is neither discretionary nor directory; it is indicative of compulsion and must be interpreted as binding in nature unless context dictates otherwise. (k) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning, unless such meaning leads to an absurdity or is manifestly contrary to the legislative intent. Ms. Imaan Zainab Hazir for Petitioner. Sabir Hussain for Respondents Nos.3, 4 and 5. Raja Zamir ud Din Ahmed, Assistant Attorney General. Assisted by Ms. Amna Danial Khawaja, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing: 12th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, future maintenance allowance and future marriage expenses---Prospective/ future marriage expenses, grant of---Scope and limitations in Family Law jurisprudence---Facts in brevity were that the petitioners (daughters) filed a suit against respondent No.1 (father) seeking recovery of maintenance allowance at Rs.10,000/- per month each and future maintenance at the same rate, along with Rs.2,000,000/- as marriage expenses, contending they were unmarried and their marriages would be arranged---The Family Court decreed Rs.5,000/- per month each for the past and Rs.10,000/- per month for the future with 10% annual increase, and Rs.1,000,000/- as marriage expenses payable at the time of marriage---Respondent No.1’s (father) appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court, but his writ petition was partially accepted by the High Court, setting aside the decree to the extent of marriage expenses, thereafter being dissatisfied, the petitioners filed the present petition---Significant question for determination before the Supreme Court was as to “Whether a father could be compelled under the Family Courts Act, 1964 to pay prospective or future marriage expenses for his daughters when the claim of daughters was merely speculative and was founded solely on apprehensions”---Held: The Family Courts Act, 1964 recognized in section 5 read with its Schedule-I certain categories of claims including maintenance, dower, recovery of dowry articles, restitution of conjugal rights, jactitation of marriage etc. but not prospective marriage expenses, unless a concrete cause arose---Thus, entertaining such speculative claims could open a floodgate of hypothetical litigation, undermining the procedural discipline and judicial economy---A suit for marriage expenses could be preferred if such expenses were immediate, certain, and unjustly denied, especially if customary contributions, jahez or rukhsati costs, were refused at the time of an actual engagement or marriage---However, law did not create a statutory obligation on a father to bear advance or indefinite marriage expenses, especially when no marriage date was fixed, no engagement or preparation was underway, therefore, the claim was speculative and indeterminate in nature---In the present case, the petitioners had neither shown any arrangement for their marriages nor any evidence of finalized preparations---Their apprehension of financial need, though genuine and understandable, did not translate into a legal debt enforceable through court in the said circumstances---Despite the emotional and financial vulnerability daughters often face in such situations the law did not empower the Courts to direct payments for future and indeterminate events---The claim of the petitioners (daughters) as to marriage expenses, although based on understandable concerns, was premature and not maintainable, however, they (petitioners) were at liberty to seek appropriate legal recourse at a proper time when their marriages were to be fixed in future and in case of refusal of respondent No.1 (father) to take responsibility of expenses of the same---No case for grant of leave was made out which was refused and petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Faiz Bakhsh and others v. Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer, Bahawalpur and others 2006 SCMR 219 rel. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Courts are forums of law and not speculation as well as supposition- --Relief may only granted on the basis of existing rights and actual infringement thereof, not of imaginary and hypothetical causes---Courts must be cautious in entertaining claims which are premature, uncertain or not ripe for adjudication---No suit can be instituted for future cause of action that may or may not arise. Mian Muhammad Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 7th July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939), Ss.2(viii)(a) & 2(viii)(d)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Husband selling immoveable property/plot belonging to wife to a third party---Recovery claim by wife to the extent of total sale consideration, granting of---Respondent/father failing to pay maintenance to minor children---Obligation of father to pay maintenance---Financial capacity of father, consideration of--- Dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---Cruelty as a ground---Scope and effect---Family court ordering wife to return dower--- Legality---Cruelty was established and wife was allowed to retain the dower---Factual background was that petitioner No.1/wife married respondent No.1/husband in 2011 against a prompt dower of Rs. 50,000/- and 20 tolas of gold, and had two daughters from the marriage---She alleged persistent cruelty, abuse, and violence by the respondent/husband, culminating in incidents in 2021 where she was assaulted, and her parents were abused---A suit for maintenance and recovery of personal belongings was filed, including claims for dowry, gold ornaments, a plot worth Rs. 5,075,000/- (belonging to the petitioner No.1/wife)---The family court partially decreed the suit, granting limited maintenance, recognizing alternate value of dowry articles, and ordering return of dower gold---On appeal, maintenance was enhanced, but other reliefs were partly upheld---The pivotal issues for determination before the High Court were as to “whether the family court and appellate court erred in (i) ignoring the sale of petitioner No.1’s plot by the respondent/husband, (ii) awarding insufficient maintenance for minors given the respondent’s financial capacity; and, (iii) directing wife to return dower despite dissolution being sought on cruelty?”---Determination---Held: The document (agreement to sell the plot which belonged to the petitioner No.1) was duly acknowledged by the respondent in his admission made during cross-examination---In addition, a provisional allotment letter clearly established that plot sold by the respondent was owned by petitioner No. 1 / wife---This unimpeachable evidence reflected that the plot belonged to the petitioner No.1, ex-wife of the respondent, and was sold by the respondent, who received the entire sale consideration --- There was no denial on respondent’s part, particularly given his admission that he sold the plot to one “MN” despite not being the lawful owner of the said property---The respondent / husband was under a legal obligation to discharge the burden of proof by demonstrating that after receiving total sale consideration the property was transferred and the amount was paid to petitioner No.1/wife---First appellate court’s findings that petitioner/wife failed to produce sale deed by which plot was sold were beyond pleadings as such assumption was outside the scope of pleadings and was not even claimed or argued by the respondent at any forum---Moreover, it erroneously placed burden upon petitioner No.1 to prove that witness of the said agreement were not summoned---Trial Court and appellate court were under the obligation and had proper jurisdiction to resolve the issue of plot rather than just saying that the plot amount was not prayed for as both the courts could mold the relief in order to grant substantial justice---Both findings of courts below, though concurrent, were not based upon proper appreciation of evidence---Plot in question admittedly belonged to petitioner No.1/wife which was evident from documentary record and admission made by respondent that he sold the same to a third party and received sale consideration---Resultantly, claim of petitioner No.1 to the extent of total sale consideration of Rs.50,75,000/- was decreed by High Court in her favor---With respect to the maintenance of minors, respondent/father possessed sufficient means to maintain his children which was otherwise a heavy obligation of the father in all respects, however, in the present case, respondent’s (father's) conduct indicated his lack of serious efforts to pay maintenance---Financial status shown by respondent (father) pertained to the period 2019-2021, thus, as of the present year 2025, the respondent/father, who had failed to pay regular maintenance for the minors, did not merit any leniency---Accordingly, as he had not paid the arrears of maintenance, the maintenance was fixed at Rs.25,000/- by the High Court---With respect to the third question for determination in the present case i.e. cruelty as highlighted in the suit for dissolution of marriage filed by petitioner No.1, on plain reading of the record and S.2 (viii)(a) & (d) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (the “Act 1939”), the elements of cruelty and mental torture were established which petitioner No.1/wife endured during the subsistence of her marriage and those were sufficient to be considered against the respondent who had failed to refuse such allegations---Moreover, selling of plot in question which belonged to the petitioner No.1/wife and not transferring the consideration/sale proceeds to her was cruelty under S.2(viii)(a) of the Act 1939---Respondent failed to pay a single penny in maintenance which amounted to cruelty, as non-maintenance of one’s wife and minor children was not justifiable under any social or legal framework---Therefore, petitioner No.1/wife was entitled to a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of cruelty, a ground which stood fully established---Respondent’s claim for adjustment of dower amount of 20 tolas of gold was not sustainable---The simple khula decree granted by family court was modified, and the marriage stood dissolved on the ground of cruelty---Condition imposed upon petitioner No.1/wife for return of 20 tolas of gold was waived of---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Abid Hussain v. Additional District Judge, Alipur, District Muzaffargarh 2006 SCMR 100 rel. (b) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)--- ----Ss.2(viii)(a) & 2(viii)(d)---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5, Sched.---Dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---Return of dower by wife upon dissolution of marriage---Exception---Cruelty as a ground, proving of---Factors to be considered by Court---Cruelty whether mental or physical, premeditated or unpremeditated is not diminished by lack of intent---Obviously, if it is a physical act, it would be a question of fact; however, in the event of mental cruelty, an inquiry is required to be conducted regarding the nature of the treatment to determine its impact or repercussions on the mind of the spouse---Mental cruelty may broadly be delineated as a course of conduct that inflicts mental pain with such severity and harshness as to render it impossible for the aggrieved party to continue the matrimonial bond or to cohabit---The matrimonial relationship is inherently based on mutual trust between the husband and wife, encompassing emotions, and it obliges reciprocal respect, love, and affection, aimed at ensuring a fair and balanced adjustment between spouses without generating a sense of anguish and disappointment---While deciding any lis for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, the Court must assess the intensity and severity of the acts alleged, and determine whether such conduct amounts to something more than mere trivial disputes, which are common in day-to-day married life---The conduct must be of such a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it---The unbecoming attitude of the husband amounts to cruelty, as not only physical torture but also mental, moral, and psychological abuse by a partner constitutes cruelty---The grant of a decree of khula simpliciter is not justiciable when the incidents and the overall conduct of the husband reflect a cruel and oppressive demeanor, otherwise, wife would not approach the Court for dissolution of marriage---While dealing with such disputes the courts are not expected to act in an arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical manner---The most pertinent question for determination, therefore, would be, to what extent the right to dissolve marriage on the basis of khula is exercisable by the wife?---Where the claim for dissolution is based on cruelty, the court is duty bound to make a thorough inquiry into the matter, examine the complete body of evidence, and may even interview the spouses---If the conduct of the husband reaches a level demonstrated through the record that amounts to a cruel relationship, the court is obligated to grant a decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula. Mst. Taiba Amreen v. Shafaqat Ali Kiani 2023 SCMR 246; Faheem-ud-Din v. Mst. Hameeda PLD 1967 SC 97 and Sadia Begum v. Maqbool Ahmad PLD 1984 SC 329 rel. Rifatullah v. Hadiya Mustafa and 2 others 2023 MLD 1237; Mst. Saima Irum v. Tariq Javed 2006 MLD 83; Ana Liaqat v. Additional District Judge, Gujranwala PLD 2021 Lah. 757; Mst. Balqis Fatima v. Najm-ul-Ikram Qureshi PLD 1952 Lah. 113 and Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Baboo Muhammad Amin PLD 1959 Lahore 566 ref. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Relief not expressly prayed for, granting of---Molding of relief by court---Powers of court---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---When the court is seized of the matter under Art.199 of the Constitution then it does not matter whether the relief has not been claimed or it falls under a specific provision of the Constitution or not---Given the circumstances of the case if relief is found and justice demands that relief is to be given then courts have ample power under Art.199 of the Constitution to grant relief and not refuse the relief on technical or hyper technical grounds as it is against the spirit of the Constitution and the larger interest of the public. Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills PLD 1975 SC 244 rel. (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Maintenance of minors, awarding of---Financial capacity of father---Scope---Maintenance is to be awarded considering the financial capacity and living status of the father. Dr. Aqueel Waris v. Ibrahim Aqueel Waris 2020 CLC 131 ref. (e) Administration of justice--- ----Relief not expressly prayed for, granting of---Powers of court---Molding of relief---Scope---Courts can mold relief with the changing circumstances even if such relief is not prayed for expressly---Courts are empowered by the law to adopt this course and dispense an effective decree which settles the rights of the parties forming the part of the same issue in order to avoid multiple legal actions---Courts cannot deny relief just because there is a defect in the prayer and such relief has not been asked for---Courts are not powerless to overlook such defects. Amina Begum and others v. Mehr Ghulam Dastagir PLD 1978 SC 220 and Syed Abdul-ala Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 673 rel. Abdul Majid Qureshi v. National Bank of Pakistan 1997 PLC (C.S.) 671 ref. Waqas Ahmed Abbasi and Barrister Abdullah Haroon for Petitioners. Abid Hussain Kayani for Respondent No. 1.

Summary: (a) Civil Servants Act, 1973 – S. 2(1)(b); Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 4, 25, 27, 34 & 35 – Status of Civil Servant – Female Government Officer’s Right to Change Domicile Respondent, a female civil servant originally appointed under KPK domicile, changed her domicile to Balochistan post-marriage and applied for direct recruitment to a post under Balochistan quota—Held, respondent remained a “civil servant” within the meaning of S. 2(1)(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and was rightly subject to recruitment regulations applicable to civil servants—Mere success in competitive exam does not confer a vested right of appointment—FPSC acted within administrative capacity; locus standi to file appeal was upheld—Change of domicile after marriage is not automatic but a matter of legal choice, and constitutionally protected where permitted under policy. (b) Civil Service Regulations, Vol I – R. 310-A; Office Memoranda (O.M.) 1971 & 1975 – Change of Domicile During Service – Female Officer’s One-Time Right Held, under O.M. 1971, domicile declared at entry into service is frozen and immutable during service tenure to preserve provincial quotas and inter-federal equity—However, O.M. 1975 read with R. 310-A, CSR Vol. I, carves a gender-sensitive exception: married female civil servants may exercise a one-time option to adopt husband’s domicile for direct recruitment—Such change does not disrupt seniority or service structure if the recruitment involves a distinct post and fresh scale—Court affirmed the validity of respondent’s change of domicile under O.M. 1975 as a permissible and final legal exercise. (c) Interpretation of Service Law – “Direct Recruitment” vs. “Initial Recruitment” – Scope and Application Held, terms “direct recruitment” and “initial recruitment” are interchangeable in service jurisprudence—Both apply to appointments made otherwise than by promotion or transfer—Thus, in-service civil servants are eligible for “direct recruitment” to new posts if they meet criteria and obtain departmental NOC—O.M. 1975 applies equally to in-service female officers seeking fresh appointment on new posts, enabling one-time domicile adoption in line with spousal domicile. (d) Gender Equality – Article 25(3) of the Constitution – Women-Centric Constitutional Interpretation Court adopted purposive, gender-sensitive interpretation of O.M. 1975 in harmony with Art. 25(3), 34 and 35 of the Constitution—Held, law must be applied to recognize historical disadvantages faced by women—Affirmative action through lawful accommodation (e.g., permitting change of domicile for direct recruitment) is a constitutionally sanctioned tool to promote substantive gender equality—Respondent’s legal right to adopt her husband’s domicile for one-time use upheld as valid and non-discriminatory. (e) PMDC Regulations, 2018 – S. V(5), (6) & (9) – Validity of Experience Certificate – Jurisdiction of Certifying Authority Held, PMDC is the competent statutory authority to assess teaching experience in medical faculty appointments—PMDC’s unchallenged certification confirming respondent’s qualifying experience in BS-18 and BS-19 roles carries legal finality—Internal arrangements or terminology used by PIMS do not override PMDC’s certification—FPSC cannot disregard or override PMDC’s jurisdiction—Objections to experience certificate rejected as baseless. Disposition: Petition dismissed—Orders of FPSC dated 10.07.2024 and 02.10.2024 rejecting respondent’s candidature were set aside—FPSC directed to consider respondent for appointment to post of Associate Professor on Balochistan quota within 15 days—Court upheld respondent’s domicile change and experience as lawful. Cited Constitutional Provisions and Statutes: • Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Articles 4, 25(3), 27, 34, 35 • Civil Servants Act, 1973 – S. 2(1)(b) • Civil Service Regulations, Volume I – R. 310-A • Establishment Division O.M. Nos. F.8/5/75-WC (1975) & 1/14/71-TRV (1971) • Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Regulations, 2018 • Citizenship Rules, 1952 Notable Cases and Authorities Cited: • Muhammad Mubeen us Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 • Dr. Rashid Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan 1996 PLC (C.S.) 1073 • District Education Officer v. Sonia Begum 2023 SCMR 217 • Waqar Zafar v. Mazhar Hussain Shah PLD 2018 SC 81 • Hadayat Ullah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1691 • Mohsin Ali Hasani v. Government of Pakistan 1990 SCMR 1685 • Yaqub Ali Khan v. FPSC 2019 SCMR 413 • Lord Denning’s dissent, and international references including CEDAW Articles 2, 5, 15 & 16

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S.42---Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962), Ss.3 & 5---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Inheritance dispute---Succession to estate of deceased by legal heirs of his brother, claim of---Core issue---Property devolved upon widow of deceased under prevailing custom---Reversion of estate to full owner upon death of widow---Effect---Brother of deceased claiming his share in inheritance of deceased---Entitlement and legality---Upon termination of limited estate of widow, property would revertto last full owner (deceased) and brother of deceased being alive at time ofdeath of deceasedwould entitle the legal heirs of deceased's brother to inherit his share---Whether brother of deceased survived/outlived the deceased---Factual controversy---Determination---Effect on succession rights, significance of---Challenge in the present case was regarding the determination of succession rights over agricultural land originally belonging to one "UB"---The case arose out of a dispute concerning inheritance of agricultural land originally owned by "UB", leaving behind his widow as a limited owner under prevailing custom---Upon widow's death, a mutation was sanctioned which excluded the legal heirs of "GM" who was "UB's" brother---The plaintiffs, being heirs of "GM", instituted a suit claiming entitlement to 95/576 share (5/24 of 19/24) in the suit property, asserting that "GM" survived "UB" and was therefore entitled to inherit his share---The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the basis of mutation entries suggesting "GM" predeceased "UB", but the appellate court reversed this decision, relying on prior admissions in earlier litigation---Therefore, the core issue before the High Court in the present civil revision was "whether the plaintiffs, being legal heirs of "GM", were legally entitled to a share in "UB's" estate upon the termination of the limited estate of widow of "UB"?"---Held: Main issue for determination was as to whether "UB" died in lifetime of "GM" and the trial court decided this issue against the respondent/plaintiffs by holding that in the inheritance mutation of "GM" (Exh.P-2)---In inheritance mutation (Exh.P-2) date of death of said "GM" was recorded as 02.01.1940---Mutation (Exh.P-3) was with regard to inheritance of "UB" which was sanctioned in favour of his widow, in column No.13 of said mutation, date of death of "UB" was written as 12.02.1941---Exh.P-2 was incorporated on 21.02.1941, whereas Exh.P-3 was incorporated on 22.02.1941---It meant that both the mutations were entered with a difference of one day---Both mutations were attested on the same day i.e. 19.03.1941---From perusal of both the mutations it appeared that the concerned Patwari entered the said mutations on the information provided by one of the relatives namely "H" andhe was not produced in the witness box---No other evidence was brought on record with regard to the date of death of "GM" and "UB"---Moreover, date of death mentioned in the mutations did not find corroboration through any other evidence---The entries in the mutation register by themselves were not conclusive evidence of the facts which they purported to record---Therefore, date of death mentioned in the said mutations entries had no evidentiary value---It was noted that with regards to inheritance of "GM" a suit for declaration was instituted on 22.03.1976---Witnesses in the said suit corroborated that "UB" had died prior to the death of "GM" and said suit was partially decreed and plaintiffs (defendants in the present suit) succeeded to get their share from legacy of "GM" on the ground that "GM" died after the death of "UB"---Plaintiffs of the said suit being defendants in the present suit were bound their plaint and were bound by the statement of PW-2 who represented all the plaintiffs of the said suit---After the death of widow of "UB" the property inherited to her was reverted to original full owner namely "UB"---It was evident that at the time of death of "UB" his brother "GM" was alive---So he was entitled to get his legal share from the legacy of his brother "UB"---But as at the time of opening of said succession he had died, hence his legal heirs were entitled to get same share as their predecessor "GM" was entitled---The lower appellate Court keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case reached to a just conclusion that the respondents/ plaintiffs were entitled to get their legal share as per their entitlement---No illegality, material irregularity, misreading or non-reading of evidence and jurisdictional defect were found in the findings of the lower appellate court, hence, same did not call for interreference by the High Court under S.115 of C.P.C while exercising revisional jurisdiction---Present civil revision having no substance, was dismissed, in circumstances. Khizrat Muhammad and others v. Ghulam Muhammad and others PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lah. 492 ref. (b) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S.42---Mutation---Entering a mutation or reporting factum of acquisition of any right in an estate to patwari is a mere ministerial act which would not confer or extinguish any right in the property---Principle stated---Under S.42 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 no witnesses or respectable are required either to accompany the person reporting acquisition of such an interest to patwari not to witness the entering of a mutation in said connection---Entering a mutation or reporting the factum of acquisition of any right in an estate to the Patwari is a mere ministerial act, which does not confer or extinguish any right in any property and thus nothing really hinges on the same. Khalil Ahmad v. Abdul Jabbar Khan and others 2005 SCMR 911 rel. (c) Estoppel--- ----Admission of facts---Evidentiary value and binding effect---Admission becomes conclusive and binding when acted upon by other party and operates as estoppel, precluding retraction by maker---Scope and limitations---Although admission of facts are only relevant and are not conclusive proof of the matters made through said admission, however, such admissions become conclusive and are binding on a party making them only if it amounts to a representation on a matter of fact made to the other party, who in consequence of such representation has altered its position---When admission is thus acted upon by the party to whom it is made, it operates as estoppel and becomes in a way conclusive, inasmuch as the party making it is not then permitted to show that the admission. Ahmad Khan v. Rasul Shah and others PLD 1975 SC 311 rel. (d) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962)--- ----Ss.3 & 5---Female/widow as limited owner under prevailing custom---Limited ownership of female holder, termination of---Effect and consequence---Property to revert to last full owner---Scope---As per S.3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, limited interest of female holders terminates and in terms of S.5 of the Act (ibid) on the termination of the limited estates, the property is to be considered as the ownership of the last full owner and should be devolved upon his legal sharai heirs alive at the time of his death and if anyone of such heir had died prior to the termination of the limited estate his heirs would get the share to which their predecessor would have been entitled if alive---Accordingly, the limited owners are also entitled to their sharai share whether alive or dead. Muhammad Shahzad Farid Langrial for Petitioners. Muhammad Khalid Khan Sikhani for Respondents. Date of hearing: 15th May, 2025. Judgment Ahmad Nadeem Arshad, J .--- This Civil Revision is directed against the judgment and decree dated 25.01.2006 whereby the learned lower appellate Court while accepting the appeal of the respondents/ plaintiffs set aside the judgment and decree dated 07.02.2005 of learned trial Court and consequently decreed their suit. 2. Relevant facts forming background of this revision petition are that the respondents/plaintiffs instituted a suit for declaration on 01.12.1993 to the effect that they are owners in possession of the property described in schedule Alif annexed to the extent of 95/576 share (5/24 of 19/24) and the petitioners/defendants have no concern whatsoever with the suit property and the entries in the revenue record to that extent are void having no effect upon their rights. The main assertion of the respondents/plaintiffs in their suit was that the suit property originally belonged to one Usman alias Bagga son of Mahmood who died (before pre-partition) prior to the death of his brother namely Ghulam Muhammad; that after the death of Usman the suit property was inherited to his widow namely Mst. Subhai as limited owner according to the custom prevailing at that time; that after the death of said Mst. Subhai, the property under her control being limited owner was reverted to original full owner namely Usman and being his brother Ghulam Muhammad was entitled to get 5/24 share from his inheritance; that through inheritance mutation No.6358 sanctioned after the demise of Mst. Subhai they being legal heirs of Ghulam Muhammad were illegally deprived from the legal share entitled by their predecessor. The suit was hotly contested by the petitioners/defendants with the assertion that Ghulam Muhammad had been died prior to the death of Usman, therefore, impugned mutation was rightly sanctioned and the respondents are not entitled for any share. Learned trial Court after full-fledged trial dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 07.02.2005. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents/plaintiffs preferred an appeal which was allowed vide impugned judgment and decree dated 25.01.2006 and consequently the respondents' suit was decreed. Being dis-satisfied, the petitioners/ defendants assailed the said judgment and decree through the instant civil revision. 3. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties at full length and also perused the record with their able assistance. 4. From the perusal of record it appears that the only point for determination is whether Usman alias Bagga son of Mahmood died prior to the death of his brother namely Ghulam Muhammad or not. The learned trial Court in this regard framed issue No.4 in the following words:- "4. Whether Usman died in the life time of Ghulam Muhammad? OPP" 5. The learned trial Court decided this issue against the respondents/plaintiffs by holding that in the inheritance mutation of Ghulam Muhammad (Exh.P-2) the date of his death was written as 02.01.1941, whereas in the inheritance mutation of Usman (Exh.P-3) his date of death was shown as 12.02.1941, therefore, it is established that Ghulam Muhammad died prior to the death of Usman. The learned appellate Court reversed the said findings in the light of admission made by the petitioners/defendants in earlier round of litigation. 6. There is no dispute to the effect that one Mahmood died leaving behind his two sons namely Ghulam Muhammad and Usman with the landed properties. It is also admitted fact that Usman contracted two marriages, one with Hoor and second with Mst. Subhai. Whereas, Ghulam Muhammad contracted marriage with Mst. Bharo. Mutation No.2650 (Exh.P-2) is with regard to inheritance of Ghulam Muhammad son of Mahmood, which was sanctioned in favour of his widow namely Mst. Baharo. In column No.13 of said mutation, date of death of said Ghulam Muhammad was recorded as 02.01.1940. Mutation No.2651 (Exh.P-3) is with regard to inheritance of Usman son of Mahmood which was sanctioned in favour of Mst. Subhai. In column No.13 of said mutation, date of death of Usman is written as 12.02.1941. Exh.P-2 was incorporated on 21.02.1941, whereas Exh.P-3 was incorporated on 22.02.1941. It means that both the mutations were entered with a difference of one day. Both mutations were attested on the same day i.e. 19.03.1941. It is also evident that both the mutations were sanctioned in favour of the widows as limited owner. 7. Perusal of both the mutations it appears that the concerned Patwari entered the said mutations on the information provided by one of the relatives namely Haider. Said Haider was not produced in the witness box. No other evidence was brought on record with regard to the date of death of Ghulam Muhammad and Usman. Presumption of truth and correctness is not attached to the entries made in the mutation. In order to prove these entries strong and unimpeachable evidence is required. Entering a mutation or reporting factum of acquisition of any right in an estate to Patwari is mere ministerial act, which would not confer or extinguish any right in property. Under section 42 of Land Revenue Act, 1967, no witnesses or respectables are required either to accompany the person reporting acquisition of such an interest to Patwari nor to witness the entering of a mutation in said connection. For reference "Khalil Ahmad v. Abdul Jabbar Khan and others" (2005 SCMR 911), wherein it has been held as under:- "We say with respect that entering a mutation or reporting the factum of acquisition of any right in an estate to the Patwari was a mere ministerial act, which did not confer or extinguish any right in any property and thus nothing really hinged on the same. As would be evident from section 42 of Land Revenue Act no witnesses or respectables were required either to accompany the person reporting acquisition of such an interest to the Patwari nor to witness the entering of a mutation in the said connection." 8. The date of death mentioned in the mutations do not find corroboration through any other evidence. The entries in the mutation register by themselves are not conclusive evidence of the facts which they purport to record. Therefore, date of death mentioned in the said mutations entries have no any evidentiary value. Reliance is placed upon "Khizrat Muhammad and others v. Ghulam Muhammad and others" (PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lahore 492), whereby the learned Division Bench of this Court observed as under:- "A copy of the inheritance mutation Exh.P-6 of Muhammad Khan's estate was also produced on the record. This again has not been referred to by the Courts below and the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants pressed it on our attention as it contains, in Column No.3, the date of the death of Muhammad Khan as the 3rd of June 1950, mutabiq-kitab-e-chowkidar. We do not think this has any evidentiary value by itself, being a piece of second-hand evidence based on the chowkidar's book which was not produced." 9. With regard to inheritance of Ghulam Muhammad son of Mahmood a suit for declaration titled as "Muhammad Yar etc. v. Mahmood etc." was instituted on 22.03.1976 (Exh.P-9). Perusal of Para 11 of the said plaint it appears that the plaintiffs of said suit maintained that Umar, Ahmad sons of Bakhsh, Usman son of Mahmod, Ali Muhammad son of Mehmeed were died prior to the death of Ghulam Muhammad. The exact narration is as under:- In the said suit Haq Nawaz appeared as PW-1 (Exh.P-12) and deposed in his examination-in-chief as under:- Noor Muhammad, one of the plaintiffs of said suit, appeared as PW-2 (Exh.P-12). He also maintained that Usman had been died prior to the death of Ghulam Muhammad. His exact deposition is as under:- The said suit was partially decreed vide judgment (Exh.P-10) and decree (Exh.P-11) dated 18.01.1978. Through said judgment and decree the plaintiffs of said suit succeeded to get their share from the legacy of Ghulam Muhammad on the ground that Ghulam Muhammad died after the death of Usman. The plaintiffs of said suit are now defendants in the present suit. Noor Muhammad son of Mahmood is arrayed as defendant No.11 in the present suit who is plaintiff No.7 in the said suit. Therefore, they are bound by their plaint and the statement of Noor Muhammad who represented all the plaintiffs of said suit and entered in the witness box on their behalf as PW-2. 10. Although admission of facts are only relevant and are not conclusive proof of the matters made through said admission. However, such admissions become conclusive and are binding on a party making them only if it amounts to a representation on a matter of fact made to the other party, who in consequence of such representation has altered its position. When admission is thus acted upon by the party to whom it is made, it operates as estoppel and becomes in a way conclusive, inasmuch as the party making it is not then permitted to show that the admission was wrong. For reference "Ahmad Khan v. Rasul Shah and others" (PLD 1975 SC 311), wherein it is held as under:- "Therefore, an admission which is wrong in point of fact or is made in ignorance of legal right, has no binding effect on the person making it. This is however, subject to two well recognized exceptions. First: such admissions become conclusive and are binding on a party making them only if it amounts to a representation on a matter of fact made to the other party, who in consequence of such representation has altered its position. When admission is thus acted upon by the party to whom it is made, it operates as estoppel and becomes in a way conclusive, inasmuch as the party making it is not then permitted to show that the admission was wrong. Such admission is really hit by rule of estoppel in section 115 of the Evidence Act, 1872." 11. The controversy was arisen when Mst. Subhai passed away and her inheritance mutation No.6358 (Exh.P-6) was attested on 13.05.1987. In the said mutation legal heirs of Ghulam Muhammad were deprived. 12. Admittedly, Mst. Subhai was a limited owner. As per Section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, limited interest of female holders terminates and in terms of Section 5 of the Act (ibid) on the termination of the limited estates, the property was to be considered as the ownership of the last full owner and should have devolved upon his legal sharai heirs alive at the time of his death and if anyone of such heir had died prior to the termination of the limited estate his heirs would get the share to which their predecessor would have been entitled if alive. Accordingly, the limited owners were also entitled to their sharai share whether alive or dead. 13. Therefore, after the death of Mst. Subhai the property inherited to her was reverted to original full owner namely Usman. In the light of above discussion it is evident that at the time of death of Usman his brother Ghulam Muhammad was alive. So he was entitled to get his legal share from the legacy of his brother Usman. But as at the time of opening of said succession he had been died, hence his legal heirs are entitled to get same share as their predecessor Ghulam Muhammad was entitled. 14. The learned lower appellate Court keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case reached to a just conclusion that the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled to get their legal share as per their entitlement and the inheritance mutation No.6358 dated 13.05.1987 (Exh.P-6) is required to be corrected/rectified. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants has not been able to point out any illegality, material irregularity, misreading or non-reading of evidence and jurisdictional defect in the findings of learned lower appellate Court, which do not call for any interference by this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C. 16. Epitome of above discussion is that the instant civil revision having no substance/merit is dismissed. No order as to costs. UN/M-117/L Revision dismissed.

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 12---Suit for specific performance---Payment of remaining sale amount---Conduct of vendee /plaintiff---Delaying tactics---Effect---Trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff directing him to pay the remaining sale consideration within thirty days, which judgment was maintained by the Appellate Court---Contention of the petitioner/plaintiff was that he paid amount of Rs. 500,000/- to female respondent / defendant subsequently, which (payment) was required to be adjudicated on merits by production of evidence and that the Appellate Court made erroneous observations that possession of the suit-property was with him, and that appeal filed by him should not have been dismissed due to non-payment of court-fee---Validity---Notably, non-payment of court-fee was not the basis for dismissal of appeal of the petitioner/plaintiff; it was merely an observation of the Appellate Court that the petitioner was bound to pay the same who had not paid despite repeated opportunities which did not otherwise affect the outcome of the appeal on merits---Further, observation of the Appellate Court that possession of the suit property was with the petitioner was merely an additional observation which also did not affect the outcome of the suit inasmuch as it was explicitly stated in the plaint that an amount (of Rs. 2,895,625/-)was remaining sale consideration and the said claim was conceded by the female respondents, whereafter, the Trial Court rightly decreed the suit of the petitioner/plaintiff directing him to pay the said remaining sale consideration within thirty days but he did not pay the same on the pretext that he had paid Rs. 500,000/- to the respondents on account of marriage of daughter which had nothing to do with the transaction alleged by him in the plaint---Said plea/pretext was merely an afterthought and it had been established on record that the petitioner was never ready and willing to pay the remaining sale consideration within the stipulated period mentioned in the agreement and even failed to do so pursuant to the decree / judgment and the earnest money paid by the petitioner to the respondents surely stood forfeited under the forfeiture clause of the agreement executed between the parties---No illegality or infirmity had been noticed in impugned decrees and judgments passed by both the Courts below---Revision, filed by plaintiff, was dismissed, in circumstances. Raja Muhammad Riaz Satti for Petitioner. Barrister Syed Ali Numan, Ali Sher, Hassan Safdar Khan and Abu Bakar Attique for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Rizwan ul Hassan for Respondent No. 3. Date of hearing: 2nd June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Child Marriage Restraint Act ( XIX of 1929)--- ----Ss. 2(a), 2(e), 8 & 9---Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR), Art. 16(2)---United Nation convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Art. 24(3)---Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Art. 16(2)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 22-A & 22-B---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Child marriage---Registration of FIR---Ex-officio Justice of Peace, jurisdiction of---Petitioner / husband of minor was aggrieved of order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace on application of respondent / mother of minor to register a case against him for marrying her daughter who was a minor---Validity---Child marriage is a global human rights concern because it violates multiple fundamental rights, including the rights to equality, education, health, protection from violence, and right to free and full consent in marriage---Ex-officio Justice of Peace could issue directions to police authorities and the term “police authorities” has not been defined in Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 at some places, it uses expression “Officer in-charge of a Police Station”---Union Council was not a police authority, so it was beyond the jurisdiction of Ex officio Justice of Peace---Application of respondent / mother of minor under S.22-A(6), Cr.P.C. before Ex-officio Justice of Peace was not maintainable and his order was without jurisdiction---Proper course for Ex-officio Justice of Peace was to dismiss that application---Respondent / mother of minor was to approach the Union Council, which was under a legal obligation to act on the information and lodge a complaint before competent Court in accordance with S.9 of Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929---On failure of Union Council, respondent / mother of minor could invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court by seeking a writ of mandamus under Art.199 of the Constitution---High Court set aside the order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances. Farooq Omar Bhoja v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 FSC 1; Edukanti Kistamna (Dead) through L.Rs and others v. S. Venkatareddy (Dead) through L.Rs. and others AIR 2010 SC 313; R (Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687 and Food Corporation of India v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries AIR 1993 SC 1601 rel. (b) Public Functionaries--- ----Statutory duty---Performance---Where a statute confers a power upon a public authority for promotion of a public good, exercise of that power becomes a duty when the circumstances for its exercise arise. Julius v. Bishop of Oxford [1880] 5 App Cas 214 (HL); R(GC) v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21 and Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Superintendent of Stamps v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd. AIR 1950 SC 218 rel. (c) Child Marriage Restraint Act (XIX of 1929)--- ----S.9---Child marriage---Union Council, duty of---Union Council, under S.9 of Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 is not expressly obliged to file a complaint before competent Court---Such obligation arises by necessary implication in light of interpretive principles of Superior Courts---When credible information regarding commission of an offence comes to its notice, the Union Council is legally bound to act---Provisions requiring a prior complaint or sanction before initiating criminal proceedings are not uncommon---Similar mechanisms exist under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and other special laws to protect against misuse and to preserve procedural integrity. Shahid Farooq Gondal, assisted by Rana Attique-ur-Rehman for Petitioner. Sittar Sahil, Assistant Advocate General for the State. Malik Muhammad Sajjad Nawaz for Respondent No. 3. Date of hearing: 30th April, 2025.