Summary: Background: The petitioner, appointed as a Medical Officer (BPS-17) in the Health Department, Government of Sindh on 02.06.1996 and regularized on 20.12.2003, sought proforma promotion through a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC). Despite his seniority, the petitioner was overlooked in the 2016 DPC meeting, and his juniors were promoted. He was subsequently denied consideration for promotion despite meeting the service length requirements and having notified the department prior to his retirement on 14.11.2022. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner’s promotion could be deferred due to the absence of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). 2- Whether the petitioner fulfilled the requisite length of service to claim promotion to BPS-18. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court examined whether the lack of ACRs could justify the deferral of the petitioner’s promotion. It was noted that the department is responsible for maintaining ACRs, and any failure in this regard should not prejudice the petitioner’s rights. The petitioner served for 16 years, including a substantial period on study leave approved by the competent authority. Despite this, he had over 10 years of effective service, meeting the minimum requirement of 5 years for promotion to BPS-18. The court highlighted the principle that promotions should not be deferred for administrative oversights or procedural delays attributable to the department. It was also emphasized that the petitioner’s deferred promotion, despite his qualifications and lack of fault, constituted a breach of his rights under Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution, guaranteeing equality before the law. The court concluded that the petitioner was wrongfully denied promotion due to the department’s failure to maintain ACRs and other procedural missteps. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 3 of the Sindh Regularization of Doctor’s Appointed on Contract Basis Act, 2003: Provided the legal basis for the petitioner's regularization. Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation, and Seniority) Rules, 1975: Outlined conditions under which promotions could be deferred. Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973: Ensure the right of equality and fair treatment under the law.

Summary: Issue:Whether the increase in fair market value of shares held as a long-term investment by the respondent is taxable under "income from business" in terms of section 18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.---Holding:The Supreme Court held that the increase in fair market value of the respondent's long-term investment in shares is not taxable under "income from business" as per section 18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.----Rationale:The Court analyzed section 18(1)(d) and found that for income to be classified as "business income," it must meet a two-pronged test: it must have a fair market value and be derived from a business relationship.The Court determined that the respondent's gain from the investment did not meet this test, particularly because the investment was not made in furtherance of or connected with its business activities.The Court further noted that the Taxation Officer did not acquire any new information beyond the original assessment that would justify amending the assessment under section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.----Precedents Relied On:Californian Copper Syndicate (Limited and Reduced) v. Harris (Surveyor of Taxes) [5 TC 159], regarding the treatment of gains from investments as business income.United Liner Agencies of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi v. Miss Mahenaee Agha [2003 SCMR 132], on the nature of business relationships.Nusserwanjee Pestonjee and others v. Meer Mrioodeen Khan Wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan Bahadoor [1885) UK PC 15], on jurisdictional requirements.Dewan Khalid Textile Mills Ltd. V. Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal Division), Large Taxpayers Unit, Karachi [2019 PTD 291], concerning the assessment and reassessment of tax liabilities.---Decision:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the notional gain from the increase in value of the shares held by the respondent was not taxable under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.

Summary: Sentence reduced---Background:The petitioners challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction of the accused, Mudassar, under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (P.P.C.), but altered his sentence to imprisonment for life. The case arose from an incident in 2011 where Mudassar was indicted for the murder of Muhammad Arif.---Issues:Whether there were contradictions between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence.Whether the motive for the crime was sufficiently proven by the prosecution.Whether the High Court's decision to reduce the sentence from death penalty to life imprisonment was justified.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court found no contradictions between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence. The delay in reporting the crime was sufficiently explained, and the witnesses' accounts remained consistent and credible. The medical evidence corroborated the eyewitness testimony, supporting the conviction.The prosecution failed to prove the motive for the crime, which was considered a mitigating factor. As per legal precedent and international standards, the absence of motive can lead to a reduction in sentence.The Court referenced international conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Pakistan is a signatory to. It emphasized the importance of limiting the use of the death penalty to the "most serious crimes" and observed that the motive was not proven by the prosecution, justifying the reduction of sentence.

Summary: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)- -S. 13(3)-Suit for possession through pre-emption-Talb-i-ishhad, notice of-Format-Notice of Talb-i-ishhad tendered on a printed specimen/form, with blank columns filled by the petition writer-Invalid-Tendering of the notice of Talb-i-ishhad through a printed format/pro forma does not fulfill the conditions laid down under section 13 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -Ss. 11 & 48-Execution of decree-Res judicata, principle of-Maxim "excaptio res judicata"-Scope-Petitioners were aggrieved of order passed by Lower Appellate Court allowing second application for execution of decree-Plea raised by petitioners was that in view of principle of res judicata, second execution proceedings were not maintainable-Validity-Respondent filed execution application and sought execution of order and decree, whereas first execution application had already been disposed of and no one from contesting parties had challenged the same before higher forum and that order took finality-Respondent's execution application had come under the purview of res judicata-Doctrine of res judicata is a well-settled rule in nearly all judicial systems, which empowers the Court to put at rest the litigation at some terminating point-Provision of S.11, C.P.C., embodies such rule of conclusiveness of judgment-Principle of res judicata enacts that once a matter is finally decided by competent Court, no party can be permitted to reopen it in subsequent litigation-To bring an end to litigation and to save parties from constant troubles, harassment and expenses, the rule of res judicata was made in Civil Procedure Code, 1908-To bring finality of judgment, such rule is applied, which is a rule of universal application and almost in every civilized legal system, this rule is being followed-Concept of res judicata evolved from common law system and it rests on the overriding concept of judicial economy, consistency and finality of a civil action-It has roots in Roman law also where a defendant could successfully contest a suit under the plea of excaptio res judicata, meaning that"one suit and one decision is enough for any single dispute"-Doctrine of res judicata is conceived in general interest of public policy, which requires that all litigation must come to an end at a point of time-Principle of res judicata is also founded on justice, equity and good conscience, which requires that a party who has once succeeded on an issue should not be harassed by multiplicity of proceedings involving same issue-High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction dismissed execution proceedings filed by respondent and order passed by Lower Appellate Court was set aside-Revision was allowed accordingly. Mazhar Saeed Qureshi v. Government of Punjab through Secretary, Irrigation and Power Department, Lahore and 49 others 1986 SCMR 12 and Ejaz Hussain v. Bashir Ahmad and others 2000 SCMR 1190 rel.

Summary: (a) Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011)--- ----Ss. 23 & 75---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 27---Assessment of tax---Ex-parte proceedings---Notice to taxpayer, issuance of---Expression "served by post"---Scope---Presumption of effective service, rebutability of---Scope---Principle of audi alteram partem---Inapplicability---Section 23 of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 (‘the Act 2011’) prescribes the procedure for assessment of tax and its subsection (2), while prescribing the procedure to be adopted by the Assessing officer prior to determining the tax liability, categorically shows that, prior to passing "the Original Order", the Assessing Officer must give to the taxpayer a show-cause notice ; its purpose is to put the person on notice about the allegations for which the authorities intend to proceed against him and to give an opportunity to explain his position---Main object of issuance of a show-cause notice is to intimate the concerned party about nature of allegations, contravention and penal action intended to be taken against him, therefore, it is mandatorily required to be served upon the taxpayer under S. 75 of the Act, 2011---Section 75 of the Act 2011 provides procedure for service of notice, order or requisition on a person named therein either in person, through agent, by registered post, by courier service or in the manner provided for service of a summons under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908---However, S. 75 of the Act, 2011 is required to be read in juxtaposition with S. 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (‘the Act 1897’) which provides that wherever in a Provincial or a Central Statute the expression "served by post" or any other similar expression is used, then "the service shall be deemed to be affected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post a letter containing the document"---Section 27 of the Act, 1897 provides for the raising of a presumption that unless contrary is proved, the service of addressee shall be deemed to have been affected---Though, undoubtedly, under S.27 of the Act, 1897 there is a presumption that the addressee has received the letter sent by registered post but such presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to raise objection before the Court to deny the presumption by stating that he never received any notice---In the present case, the Appellant denied the presumption of effective service and the respondent / Department had produced proof of delivery of show-cause notice as well as "the Original Order", which were duly acknowledged by two persons including appellant---In such circumstances, the burden to prove such contention laid upon the appellant---Although the appellant denied proper service of show-cause notice and "the Original Order" but he did not bring on record anything supporting his contention, and he did not even mention the source of information through which he came to know about "the Original Order"---Therefore, it stood proved that appellant was duly served with the show-cause notice prior to passing "the Original Order"---Perusal of "the Original Order" showed that the same had been passed on the strength of the record available on appellant's portal and not merely because of his absence---As the appellant was duly served but he deliberately remained away from the proceedings, therefore, principle of audi alteram partem' was not applicable in the present case---In absence of any defense, despite valid service, the Assessing Officer had no other option but to proceed against the appellant ex-parte---Appeal stood dismissed. Mst. Samina Begum v. Muhammad Haq Nawaz Khan and 2 others 2023 MLD 103 ref. (b) Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011)--- ----S. 43---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)--Non-filing of returns by the taxpayer---Penalty, imposition of---Mens rea, presence / absence of---Effect---Burden of proof---Scope---Court to presume existence of certain facts---Scope---There is no cavil to the proposition that mens rea is the basic ingredient to impose any of the penalties prescribed under the law, while burden to prove existence of mens rea lies upon the department and to discharge such burden, the department has to bring on record that all possible measures were taken to get the law complied with by the taxpayer but he deliberately and willfully abstained himself from complying with the subject provisions of law---Record revealed that in compliance of S. 23 of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 (‘the Act, 2011’), department issued show-cause notice which was duly served upon appellant but neither he responded to show-cause notice nor did he appear before the Assistant Commissioner---In such circumstances, following the rule of presumption provided under Art. 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (‘the Order, 1984’), the department was justified to draw an inference that appellant's appearance before the Assistant Commissioner would have caused an unfavorable result, therefore, he abstained himself from responding to show-cause notice---Therefore, appellant's absence before the Assessing Officer, despite valid service of show-cause notice, showed his deliberate and willful default to comply with the provision of law, which was sufficient enough to establish existence of mens rea in non-filing of subject returns by the appellant---In the present case, admittedly, the appellant did not carry out any taxable service, therefore; he filed "NULL" returns since the date of his registration with the department---Non-filing of return did not cause any loss to government exchequer, therefore, gravity of non-compliance of legal provision was on the lower side---Nevertheless, on account of non-compliance of S.30 of the Act 2011 by the appellant, the machinery of law came into motion, which could not be overlooked---In such circumstances, the idea of token penalty cames into operation, which in fact was a step toward reformation of the appellant in particular and society in general---Appellate Tribunal Sindh Revenue Board imposed "token penalty" upon the appellant of Rs.5,000/----Appeal stood disposed of accordingly. (c) Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011)--- ----Ss. 30 & 43---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 5 & 18---Non-filing of returns by taxpayer---Penalty, imposition / quantum of---Right to freedom of trade etc.---Obedience of law and Constitution---Word “inviolable”, meaning of---Doctrine of sovereignty---Scope---Article 18 of the Constitution provides right to freedom of trade, business or profession but such right is not absolute as the same is subject to law which governs such trade, business or profession, therefore, Art. 18 has to be read in juxtaposition with Art. 5 of the Constitution---In order to secure fundamental rights, every citizen has to adhere to the relative law and policies issued by the Government having binding effect under the doctrine of sovereignty---Rights and duties are two sides of the same coin and both go side by side---Article 5 of Constitution categorically envisages the obedience of law and the constitution---Word “inviolable” used therein means that it is never to be broken and infringed; meaning thereby it is the sole responsibility of every citizen to obey law, rather than taking it (the law) for granted---To be loyal to the State is basic duty of all citizens and they have to be obedient to the Constitution and the law, wherever they may be---Degree of penalty must be proportionate to the wrong committed---Where the wrong was trivial or committed under some unavoidable circumstances or for the first time, mercy and leniency was a rule---In the present case, admittedly, the appellant did not carry out any taxable service, therefore; he filed "NULL" returns since the date of his registration with the department---Non-filing of return did not cause any loss to government exchequer, therefore, gravity of non-compliance of legal provision was on the lower side---Nevertheless, on account of non-compliance of S.30 of the Act 2011 by the appellant, the machinery of law came into motion, which could not be overlooked---In such circumstances, the idea of token penalty come into operation, which in fact was a step towards reformation of the appellant in particular, and society in general---Appellate Tribunal Sindh Revenue Board imposed "token penalty" upon the appellant of Rs.5,000/----Appeal stood disposed of accordingly. Mst. Fatima Faryad and others v. Government of Punjab and others 2020 CLC 836; President Balochistan High Court Bar Association and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 1784 and Muhammad Aslam v. The State and another PLD 2006 SC 465 ref. Appellant in person. Nabi Bukhsh Shar, AC (Mirpurkhas) for Respondent. Dates of hearing: 7th September and 21st September, 2023.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 417(2A):Appeal against acquittal---Principles for interference---Scope---Appeal filed by complainant against acquittal of three accused in a murder case was dismissed as trial court had given valid and cogent reasons for granting benefit of doubt—It is well-settled law that presumption of innocence is doubly applicable once an acquittal is recorded and that interference by appellate court is justified only where judgment is perverse, artificial, or legally flawed—Appellate court found no misreading or non-reading of evidence, nor any manifest error that could amount to a miscarriage of justice—Findings of the trial court were upheld.State v. Abdul Khaliq PLD 2011 SC 554, Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230, and Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 relied upon.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 452, 302, 149:Murder---Acquittal---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Trial court acquitted accused due to inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case, including:(i) The motive alleged was inconsistent with the identity of the victim;(ii) Only related witnesses were produced despite the incident occurring in broad daylight in a residential locality;(iii) Contradictions between prosecution witnesses regarding presence of blood on clothes and rickshaw used for transport;(iv) Delay in sending evidence to chemical laboratory and failure to send recovered empty cartridge to FSL;(v) Weapons not recovered, and no CDR evidence provided;(vi) Presence of blackening on wound not corroborated by any witness testimony—Held, prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984----Art. 129(g):Presumption arising from withheld evidence---Adverse inference---Non-production of central witness (Sanas Ali)—a son of the complainant and an alleged eyewitness—invited adverse inference under Art. 129(g), QSO, 1984, that had he been examined, his testimony would not have supported the prosecution—This omission further weakened the case.(d) Criminal Law---Standard of proof---Presumption of innocence---Judicial restraint in appeals against acquittal---It is a settled principle that even a single reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal, which is a constitutional right, not a concession—Acquittal judgments should only be disturbed if they are perverse, arbitrary, or suffer from serious legal infirmities—Appellate court cannot substitute its own view merely on reappraisal unless trial court’s findings are wholly untenable.----Disposition: Appeal Dismissed—Acquittal Upheld.

Summary: (a) Electricity Act, 1910----S. 24NEPRA Act, 1997----S. 45 & Consumer Service ManualElectricity disconnection---Recovery of arrears from subsequent allottee---Scope---Petitioner, an employee allotted official accommodation, challenged the disconnection of electricity by SEPCO and demand for arrears (Rs. 800,000/-) attributed to the previous allottee—It was an admitted position that the petitioner was regularly paying electricity bills since the date of her occupation, and a separate new meter had been installed—Held, SEPCO could not demand previous dues from the petitioner without lawful basis, nor disconnect electricity for arrears attributable to a prior occupant—Section 24 of the Electricity Act, 1910 and Section 45 of the NEPRA Act, 1997, read with the Consumer Service Manual, mandate that disconnection is only permissible upon non-payment of dues by the consumer named on the current meter—In absence of any restraining order and as petitioner continued to pay her dues, disconnection was declared illegal—SEPCO may initiate recovery against the previous allottee or refer the matter to a competent forum such as the Electric Inspector.(b) Service Law & Official Accommodation----Allotment letter---Liability of utilities---Scope---Petitioner's allotment letter explicitly required payment of utility bills from the date of occupation—Responsibility to clear dues of previous occupants was not placed on petitioner—Any arrears owed by prior allottees must be recovered separately under relevant recovery procedures, and petitioner cannot be held liable for the same in law—Respondent-SEPCO’s action of disconnecting supply on that ground was found to be contrary to the terms of allotment and public service fairness.(c) Administrative Law----Public utility obligations---Fair procedure---SEPCO, as a public utility provider, must follow principles of due process before taking coercive steps such as disconnection—Disputes regarding arrears or liability for past consumption must be resolved via Electric Inspector or proper legal forum—Electricity supply cannot be denied to a consumer who is regularly paying their own consumption charges—Public utility bodies are required to act fairly, transparently, and in accordance with law.----Disposition: Petition Allowed in Terms—Electricity Connection to be Restored—Arrears Attributable to Previous Allottee Not Recoverable from Petitioner.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 367Judgment---Mandatory contents---Failure to address specific charges---Effect---Trial court’s judgment convicting appellant under Ss. 324, 337-A(i), 337-F(ii), and 337-D, P.P.C., and acquitting co-accused under same FIR was set aside and case remanded due to non-compliance with mandatory requirements of S. 367, Cr.P.C.—Trial court failed to clarify whether accused was acquitted or convicted under S. 302, P.P.C., despite its inclusion in the charge, and omitted any reference to S. 34, P.P.C. (common intention) while convicting and acquitting different accused persons—Judgment lacking specification of charges, points for determination, findings, and reasons held to be legally unsustainable.Irfan v. Muhammad Yousaf 2016 SCMR 1190 and Bashir Ahmed v. The State 2022 SCMR 1187 relied upon.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302, 324, 337-A(i), 337-F(ii), 337-D & 34Criminal trial---Common intention---Failure to determine liability under S. 34, P.P.C.---Remand---Despite framing of charges including S. 302/34, P.P.C., trial court did not assign any finding regarding the applicability of S. 34, P.P.C. while convicting one accused and acquitting others—Held, it was the bounden duty of the trial court to clearly address common intention where multiple accused were charged—Lack of findings under S. 34, P.P.C., especially where conviction or acquittal hinges on collective criminal liability, rendered the judgment deficient—Case remanded for rewriting judgment in accordance with law, requiring the court to decide on each head of charge including individual and collective liability.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss. 342, 340(2), 367 & Remand JurisdictionAppeal---Remand for proper adjudication---Incomplete judgment---Scope---Conviction challenged due to deficient judgment—Trial court omitted findings under key charges and failed to provide reasons for conviction and acquittal—High Court remanded case to trial court with direction to rewrite judgment after giving opportunity of hearing to all parties—Remand ordered to ensure compliance with fair trial principles under procedural law and constitutional safeguards—Directions issued for expeditious completion of process within three weeks.(d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 10-ARight to fair trial---Incomplete and ambiguous trial court judgment---Violation---Failure to address all charges, assign proper reasoning, and determine individual vs. joint liability of accused was found to violate the accused’s constitutional right to fair trial and due process as guaranteed under Art. 10-A of the Constitution—Remand necessary to uphold rule of law and ensure lawful and reasoned adjudication of criminal liability.-----Disposition: Judgment of Trial Court Set Aside---Case Remanded for Rewriting of Judgment---Connected Criminal Appeal and Revision Declared Infructuous and Dismissed.