Summary: • When materials collected during the course of investigation do not sufficiently connect the accused with the commission of the alleged offence then the accused can be discharged, however, such discharge does not deprive the complainant of his remedy rather section 200 Cr.P.C. affords him a viable recourse through the filing of a private complaint. • In the absence of any compelling evidence of bias, mala fide, procedural irregularity, or miscarriage of justice, mere dissatisfaction of the petitioner does not justify the transfer of investigation from one jurisdiction to another. • The primary procedural safeguards available to an accused during investigation are set out in section 161 Cr.P.C. governing statements to the police, and section 342 Cr.P.C., empowering the Court to examine the accused during trial. This framework, consistently upheld by the superior judiciary, ensures fair process. The accused/ petitioner failed to record his statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C., indicating non-cooperation with the investigation, nevertheless, at trial, he retains the right u/s 340(2) Cr.P.C. to produce defence evidence, including witnesses and his own sworn statement; thus, he is not without remedy.

Summary: "It is a settled principle that once a court has conclusively affirmed a factual finding on a material issue, particularly relating to the validity of the main transaction, it cannot, without lawful justification or cogent reasons, render a subsequent finding that directly negates its own earlier conclusion. Such an approach is contrary to settled judicial norms and violates the doctrine of consistency in judicial reasoning. Such findings of fact cannot be contradicted by subsequent inconsistent observations within the same judgment unless supported by sound legal grounds and clear reasoning." ---- (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) — S. 115 — Revisional jurisdiction — Concurrent findings — Reversal by appellate court — Contradictory reasoning — Validity - Appellate court reversed the trial court’s decree that had declared Tamleek Mutation No.1874 dated 28.06.1987 as void—Appellate court in paragraph No.9 of its judgment affirmed the trial court’s finding that essential ingredients of a valid gift (offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession) were not proved, but in paragraph No.10 reversed the decree without assigning any cogent legal reason—Held, judicial reasoning must be consistent and cannot contradict earlier conclusive factual findings without lawful justification—Impugned judgment of appellate court suffered from non-reading and misreading of evidence and violated the doctrine of consistency—Trial court’s well-reasoned judgment was restored—Revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 CPC rightly invoked to correct miscarriage of justice. Cited Case: Chairman POF Board Wah Cantt v. Akhtar Tanveer and others 2025 SCMR 374. (b) Islamic Law — Gift (Tamleek) — Validity — Requirements — Declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession — Burden of proof — Failure to prove — Consequences Claim of donee Abdul Sattar that his father made oral Tamleek in 1987 found unsupported—Neither specific date, time, place nor names of witnesses were mentioned—No proof of offer, acceptance or delivery of possession produced—Held, where Tamleek results in exclusion of legal heirs, strict proof of all ingredients is mandatory—Donee failed to discharge burden—Mutation found to be a device to deprive female legal heirs of their rightful shares—Courts are to exercise heightened scrutiny in such cases. Cited Case: Raja Muhammad Yasin v. Zaitoon Begum and others 1993 CLC 2448. Cited Case: Mst. Aksar Jan v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar 2025 SCMR 88. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) — Art. 120 — Starting point — Fraud — Date of knowledge — Concurrent findings — Reversal without challenge — Legal effect Appellate court’s finding that suit was within limitation was not challenged—Held, when fraud is pleaded, limitation begins from date of knowledge—Petitioner came to know after father’s death—Trial court’s finding, upheld by appellate court, attained finality—Subsequent challenge misconceived—Attempt to reopen concurrent findings without specific revision challenge, held, impermissible. Cited Case: Baja through LRs v. Mst. Bakhan 2015 SCMR 1704. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) — O. VI, R. 4 — Pleading fraud — Sufficiency of particulars — Prima facie discharge — Burden shifts to donee Respondents’ objection that fraud was not specifically pleaded rejected—Petitioner alleged collusion with revenue staff, fake thumb impression, and donor’s incapacity—Appeared as PW-1 and affirmed such assertions on oath—Held, allegations specific enough to meet requirements under O. VI, R. 4 CPC—Initial burden discharged—Donee failed to rebut. (e) Constitutional and Islamic Principles — Inheritance rights of daughters — Gift depriving legal heirs — Judicial protection — Court observations Court held that depriving daughters from inheritance under Shariah on pretext of love and affection through dubious Tamleek transactions is not legally sustainable—Such practices condemned by Supreme Court—Courts must ensure female heirs are not disinherited through collusion, false statements, or fabricated mutations—Judiciary must safeguard Qur’anic rights against procedural manipulation. Cited Case: Mst. Aksar Jan v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2025 SCMR 88. (f) Evidence — Revenue record — Mutation entries — Rapat Roznamcha — Evidentiary value — Limitations Exh.D1 (Rapat Roznamcha) did not mention offer, acceptance, or delivery of possession—Mutation attested a month later without explanation—No independent witnesses of transaction produced—Held, mere mutation entry or patwari report cannot establish valid gift—Revenue record not conclusive of proprietary title where core legal requirements are missing. ---- Disposition: Civil revision allowed—Impugned judgment and decree dated 04.11.2010 set aside—Trial court’s judgment dated 28.02.2009 declaring Tamleek mutation void restored—No order as to costs.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 377-B---Sexual abuse---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the petitioner was that he sexually abused the daughter of the complainant---Except statement of victim, no other evidence was available at this stage of the proceedings---Sexual abuse could only be formalized after recording of evidence by the Trial Court---In the absence of forensic or medical evidence, petitioner had made a case for further inquiry---Burden of proof i.e. 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' on prosecution also applied at all stages including the pre-trial stage and even at the time of deciding whether the accused was entitled to bail or not---Prosecution so far had not discharged such burden successfully---Therefore, petitioner had succeeded to make out a case for further inquiry---For further inquiry, the Court can pick any of the situations which raises suspicion that accused is not involved in the commission of offence---Petitioner was behind the bars since 17.12.2024; investigation of the case was complete and his person was no more required for the purpose of further investigation, therefore, keeping the petitioner behind the bars would serve no useful purpose to the prosecution---Petition was allowed, in circumstances. Akhtar v. Khawas Khan and another 2024 SCMR 476; Mazhar Ali v. The State and another 2025 SCMR 318; Attaullah v. The State 2024 SCMR 1210; Muhammad Nawaz alias Karo v. The State 2023 SCMR 734 and Noor Kamal and another v. The State and another 2023 SCMR 999 rel. Shahid Rafiq Mayo for Petitioner. Ms. Noshe Malik, DPG with Hajra, Inspector for the State. Nemo for the Complainant. Order Muhammad Amjad Rafiq, J .--- Through this petition under Section 497 Cr.P.C., petitioner seeks post arrest bail in case FIR bearing No. 8984 dated 16.12.2024 registered under sections 377-B P.P.C at Police Station Nishter Colony, District Lahore. 2. Petitioner was under the allegation that he committed sexual abuse with Mafia, daughter of the complainant. 3. Except statement of victim, no other evidence is available at this stage of the proceedings. Sexual abuse could only be formalized after recording of evidence by the trial Court. In the absence of forensic or medical evidence, petitioner has made a case for further inquiry. In a case reported as "Akhtar v. Khawas Khan and others" (2024 SCMR 476), it has been held that the burden of proof i.e. 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' on prosecution also applies at all stages including the pre-trial stage, and even at the time of deciding whether the accused is entitled to bail or not. Prosecution so far has not discharged such burden successfully. Therefore, petitioner has succeeded to make out a case for further inquiry. For further inquiry, the Court can pick any of the situations which raises suspicion that accused is not involved in the commission of offence. Some of the situations have been highlighted in the judgment of Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as "Mazhar Ali v. The State and another" (2025 SCMR 318), "Attaullah v. The State" 2024 SCMR 1210), "Muhammad Nawaz alias Karo v. The State (2023 SCMR 734) and Noor Kamal and another v. The State and another (2023 SCMR 999). Petitioner is behind the bars since 17.12.2024, investigation of the case is complete and his person is no more required for the purpose of further investigation, therefore, keeping the petitioner behind the bars will serve no useful purpose to the prosecution. 4. In view of what has been discussed above, the petition in hand is allowed and the petitioner is admitted to bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 500,000/- (five lacs) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court. JK/A-54/L Petitiion allowed.

Summary: (a) Qatl-i-amd—Afw (forgiveness) by heir—Effect on Tazir death—Fasād fil-arḍ threshold—Where an adult sane wali validly waives Qisās (Section 309 APC), the court’s residual power to award death under Tazir (Section 311 APC) survives only in exceptional cases meeting the doctrinal standard of fasād fil-arḍ (systemic/public disorder)—Absent such aggravation, overriding a lawful afw by imposing Tazir death is impermissible. Qur’anic scheme (Al-Baqarah 2:178; Al-Mā’idah 5:33) recognized; forgiveness is a divinely sanctioned concession and must be given legal effect. (b) Penal discretion under Section 311 APC—Contours—“Fasād fil-arḍ” requires conduct transcending private grievance and threatening public order (e.g., terror, serial violence, armed insurrection). Mere gravity of a single domestic homicide, without demonstrable societal destabilization, is insufficient to justify Tazir death once Qisās stands waived. (c) Statutory framework—Sections 302(a)–(c), 309, 311 APC—Mapped—(i) Qisās if not forgiven; (ii) Tazir (death or life) where Qisās not applicable; (iii) life imprisonment as Tazir where circumstances so warrant—Valid, unconditional afw by a wali extinguishes retributive death; exceptional Tazir death requires a reasoned finding of fasād fil-arḍ. (d) Proportionality and welfare considerations—Islamic criminal law emphasizes reconciliation and social welfare—Executing Tazir death in the present familial context would orphan minor children and offend proportionality; life impri

Summary: (a) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1985—Section 10(3)—Rape—Conviction based on solitary testimony—Standard of proof—In offences of sexual violence, corroboration by ocular evidence is seldom possible; conviction can rest solely on the testimony of the victim if it inspires confidence and is free from material contradictions—Victim’s consistent and unwavering deposition, corroborated by medical evidence and contemporaneous discovery in undressed condition, held sufficient to sustain conviction—Principles restated from Istikhar Hussain v. Shahbaz (PLJ 2013 SC (AJ&K) 106), Saleem Khan v. State (PLJ 2001 FSC 46) and Mudassir Hussain v. The State (NLR 2005 SD 827). (b) False implication—Presumption and probability—Courts recognize inherent improbability of false accusation in cases of sexual assault, particularly where complainant is a minor—No credible motive of malice shown—Defence version found implausible—Doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has limited application to offences of this nature—Nasrullah Khan v. The State (1985 P.Cr.L.J. 683) followed. (c) Forensic evidence—Absence of seminal stains—Effect—Where ocular and circumstantial evidence remains consistent, absence of semen traces or delayed chemical examination not fatal—Forensic omission treated as procedural irregularity; no adverse presumption under Article 129(a), Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, arises. (d) Juvenile Justice System Act, 2021—Section 2(b) & 4—Plea of juvenility raised for first time before Supreme Court—Burden lies upon accused to substantiate with credible proof such as birth record, NADRA certificate, school register or medical opinion—Mere verbal assertion insufficient—In absence of proof, plea rejected. (e) Appellate review—Concurrent findings—Scope—Where findings of trial and appellate courts are based on proper appreciation of evidence and settled principles, and no jurisdictional error, misreading, or perversity shown, interference is unwarranted. Disposition: Appeal dismissed—Conviction and sentence of 25 years’ simple imprisonment under Section 10(3) of the Hudood Ordinance maintained—Plea of juvenility declined.

Summary: Court has directed the District Police Officer, Swat, to issue a Police Clearance Certificate to Sheraz Sikandar, the petitioner, without mentioning any adverse remarks related to FIR No. 1078 dated 26.10.2022. This decision was made after the petitioner was acquitted of the charges in the case, based on a compromise between the parties.

Summary: Aqal Zeb`s appeal against his conviction and sentence for murdering Noor Muhammad has been dismissed by this Court. The court upheld the trial court`s decision, citing overwhelming evidence against Aqal Zeb, including a dying declaration, eyewitness account, and circumstantial evidence. The prosecution`s case relied on Noor Muhammad`s dying declaration, which implicated Aqal Zeb as the perpetrator. This was corroborated by Farman Ali, Noor Muhammad`s cousin, who testified against Aqal Zeb. Additionally, Aqal Zeb was arrested with a .30- bore pistol, and the FSL report matched the crime empty recovered from the spot. The court rejected Aqal Zeb`s arguments, including the claim that the single shot fired was a mitigating circumstance. It emphasized that targeting a vital area like the chest demonstrates lethal intent. As a result, Aqal Zeb`s death sentence, along with a compensation of Rs. 1,000,000 to the deceased`s legal heirs, has been upheld. He was also convicted under Section 15 AA and sentenced to three years RI with a fine of Rs. 20,000.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 07.09.2017, passed by the High Court of Balochistan Quetta in C.P. No. 267 of 2012). (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 185(3) & 199---Contractual dispute---Security deposit, forfeiture of---Executing court not to travel beyond the scope of decree---Principle---High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction making factual inquiry in the matter and granting relief releasing security amount which relief was neither granted nor even prayed for before the Trial Court---Legality---Facts in brevity were that the father of the petitioners was awarded a contract in 1986 for construction of the Balochistan High Court building but due to alleged unsatisfactory performance he was blacklisted by the C&W Department and his security deposit was forfeited---Being aggrieved, father of petitioners filed a suit which was decreed to the extent of declaring him an "A" class contractor and setting aside the blacklisting---His subsequent execution application for recovery of the forfeited security was dismissed by the executing court on the premise that suit to the extent of release of security amount was not decreed---During appeal before the High Court, the contractor died, and his legal heirs (petitioners) were impleaded---The High Court converted the matter into a Constitutional petition, and after summoning the record and probing into the matter, partly allowed the petitioner by ordering the C&W Department to pay Rs. 20,12,668/- to the legal heirs from the security deposit, leading the petitioner to seek recovery of the full Rs. 68,67,668/- on account of security deposit from the C&W Department by challenging the partial payment order---Pivotal question before the Supreme Court was as to "Whether the petitioners were entitled to recover the full security amount withheld by the C&W Department despite the Trial Court's decree not expressly granting such relief, and whether the High Court while exercising its Constitutional jurisdiction was justified in ordering partial payment of Rs. 20,12,668/- on account of security release after conducting factual inquiry in the matter?"---Held: A perusal of the prayer clause set out in the plaint reflected that the petitioners had not made any prayer for release of security amount---The order for release of the security amount by the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction was objected to by the C&W Department stating that it had already been released to the contractor---Factual controversy raised by the parties could only be resolved after recording pro and contra evidence through a civil suit---The High Court mainly keeping in view exigency in the matter involved, decided to get such matter examined by summoning official record, carrying out full-fledged inquiry in presence of the parties, which exercise could not have been done in writ jurisdiction---The scope and ambit of the proceedings before the High Court, in the present case, was limited to the extent of judgment and decree of the Trial Court and the order passed by the executing court dismissing the execution application on the ground that the claim for recovery of the security amount mentioned in execution application was not decreed in favour of the contractor (father of petitioners)---The High Court had not attended to any of the prayers and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and order of the executing court, and proceeded to decide the case after making a detailed inquiry---Thus, High Court exceeded its authority by passing the impugned judgment, which called for interference---High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction could not entertain matters requiring factual inquiry which was the prerogative and domain of the Trial Court---Findings, conclusions and directions issued to the C&W Department for payment of security amount to the petitioners was beyond the Constitutional mandate and authority of the High Court---Impugned judgment was set aside and the petition filed by the legal heirs of the contractor seeking release of remaining security was dismissed and leave was refused, whereas, petition filed by the Department was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, exercise of---Matters requiring factual inquiry---Scope---High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot entertain matters requiring factual inquiry which is the prerogative and privilege of the Trial Court to examine such controversies so as to be disposed of on merit after taking into consideration the evidence led by the parties. Waqar Ahmed and others v. The Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others 2024 SCMR 1877 rel. (c) Jurisdiction--- ----Principle---It is constitutionally impressible for the Courts to expand and enlarge their jurisdictional domain which is neither allowed by the Constitution nor by the law. Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through Director General, Islamabad v. Ednan Syed and others PLD 2025 SC 11 rel. Khalil Ahmed Panezai, Advocate Supreme Court and Abdus Saleem Ansari, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 182-Q of 2017). Zahoor Ahmad Baloch, Additional Advocate General, Balochistan for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 191-Q of 2017). Zahoor Ahmad Baloch, Additional Advocate General, Balochistan for Respondents (in C.P. No. 182-Q of 2017). Khalil Ahmed Panezai, Advocate Supreme Court and Abdus Saleem Ansari, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.P. No. 191-Q of 2017). Date of hearing: 14th July, 2025.

Summary: The controversy arising in the present appeal hinges upon two material questions: firstly, whether the appellant/defendant had extended an offer to the respondent/plaintiff to take oath in support of his claim, and secondly, whether the appellant/defendant, after having made such an offer and upon the matter being decided in consequence thereof, could subsequently resile from the same. * It appears from the record that a wakalatnama was filed on behalf of the appellant in favour of Mr. Sher Muhammad, Advocate, before the learned trial Court on 19.06.2023. The record further reveals that the application for leave to defend had earlier been submitted by the appellant himself on 08.06.2023. Today, the appellant has appeared in person before this Court, and upon being questioned regarding his offer, the recording of his statement, and the affixation of his thumb impression thereon, he candidly admitted all these facts. The suit, therefore, was decided in accordance with the mode voluntarily adopted by the appellant, which squarely attracts the doctrine of election. * Moreover, it is not the case of the appellant that no such offer was made to the plaintiff for decision of the suit on oath, or that he himself was absent from the Court on the relevant date. On the contrary, the facts pertaining to the offer extended by the appellant, its acceptance by the plaintiff, the recording of their statements, and the consequential decision of the trial Court, are admitted and undisputed. These proceedings, to which a presumption of truth is attached, cannot now be questioned or disowned either by the plaintiff or by the appellant. * In addition, proceedings undertaken under the provisions of the Oath Act, 1877, are to be conducted strictly in accordance with the terms mutually agreed upon by the parties. Once it stands established on the record that the parties consented to certain terms and conditions for the adjudication of the lis, neither party can thereafter be permitted to approbate and reprobate, having already taken a decisive step because of their mutual agreement.