Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 184(3)---Constitution petition challenging the proposed Twenty-Sixth (26th) Constitutional Amendment---Constitution petition and appeal dismissed as withdrawn---Counsel for the appellants/petitioners stated that he had been engaged on their behalf and had been instructed to withdrawl Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 89 of 2024 and the unnumbered Constitution Petition, filed on 16 September 2024 in respect of which certain objections were noted by the Registrar's office---Appellant No. 1 and the petitioner No. 1, who was earlier representing himself and was also the counsel of the other appellants/petitioners confirmed the statement made by the counsel---In such circumstances, Supreme Court declared that the said Appeal and the unnumbered Constitution Petition were dismissed as withdrawn. Hamid Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Abid Shahid Zuberi, Advocate Supreme Court and Appellant No. 1/ Petitioner No. 1 with appellants/petitioners, namely, Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Tahir Faraz Abbasi and Shafqat Mehmood Chauhan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th October, 2024. ORDER QAZI FAEZ ISA, CJ.--- Learned senior counsel Mr. Hamid Khan states that he has been engaged today on behalf of the appellants/petitioners and has been instructed to withdraw Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 89 of 2024 and the unnumbered Constitution Petition, filed on 16 September 2024 in respect of which the following objections were noted by the Registrar's office: 'a. The petition has been filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to challenge a document which has not yet attained the status of a law and it is stated to be a 'proposed law', not yet introduced in the parliament. b. That it is the members of the National Assembly and the Senate who may pass a bill, if and when presented. However, they are not arrayed as parties. The Federation, the Provinces, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and the President who are listed as respondents are not members of Parliament. c. That respondents Nos. 9 and 10 cannot be arrayed as parties in view of Article 248 of the Constitution. d. That under the Constitution the power to make laws vests in the Legislature and the same cannot be curtailed before a law is made. e. That hypothetical questions are posed in the petition. f. That the petitioners have mentioned that they are advocates and members of the Pakistan Bar Council whereas the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act stipulates that lawyers should not become parties. g. That if the petitioners have a grievance and want to be portrayed as members of the Pakistan Bar Council they should first approach their respective bodies, i.e., the Supreme Court Bar Association and the Pakistan Bar Council for authorizing them to represent these bodies. h. The interim order in the case of Raja Amer Khan v. The Federation of Pakistan passed in C.P. 6 of 2023 (at page 52 of the petition) cannot be considered by this office as a binding decision under Article 189 of the Constitution. 2. Mr. Abid Shahid Zuberi, the appellant No. 1 and the petitioner No. 1, who was earlier representing himself and was also the counsel of the other appellants/petitioners confirms the statement made by the learned senior counsel. 3. Therefore, the said Appeal and the unnumbered Constitution Petition are dismissed as withdrawn. MWA/A-49/SC Order accordingly.

Summary: Background: The petitioners, represented by senior counsel, filed a constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, challenging a “proposed law” that had not yet been introduced in Parliament. The petition named the Federation, Provinces, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, and the President as respondents, although the actual legislative bodies—the National Assembly and Senate—were not included as parties. The Registrar's office noted several procedural objections, including concerns about hypothetical questions posed in the petition, the lack of standing of certain respondents under Article 248, and procedural issues involving the petitioners' representation as members of the Pakistan Bar Council. -----Issues: 1- Can a constitutional petition be filed to challenge a proposed law that has not yet been enacted by Parliament? -----2- Do the petitioners have standing to file the petition without prior authorization from relevant legal bodies? -----3- Are the respondents, who are not legislative members, appropriate parties to the petition? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and the unnumbered constitutional petition as withdrawn. Key reasoning included: --Premature Challenge: The Court held that the petition, challenging a “proposed law,” was premature, as legislative processes had not yet been completed. The power to make laws lies solely with Parliament and cannot be curtailed before enactment. --Improper Parties and Hypothetical Questions: The petition improperly named respondents who were not part of the legislative process (as required by Article 248), and included hypothetical questions which are not justiciable. --Standing and Procedural Issues: The Court referenced the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, highlighting that the petitioners should first seek authorization from the Pakistan Bar Council or the Supreme Court Bar Association before filing such a petition as representatives. The petition was dismissed on procedural and substantive grounds, reaffirming that hypothetical challenges to unpassed legislation are not within the Court's purview and emphasizing adherence to legislative processes and proper party representation. -----Citations/Precedents: Raja Amer Khan v Federation of Pakistan (CP 6 of 2023): Referenced by the petitioners but not accepted as binding under Article 189 of the Constitution. Constitution of Pakistan: Article 184(3): Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for enforcing fundamental rights. Article 189: Binding nature of Supreme Court decisions on lower courts. Article 248: Immunity provisions for certain public offices.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan—Maintainability of writ petition—Statutory rules—Service under National Bank of Pakistan—Jurisdiction under Art. 199—Principle of vested rights ----Art. 199—Maintainability—National Bank of Pakistan Staff Service Rules, 1973—Subsequent enforcement of Rules, 2021—Effect—Petitioners were proceeded against under Rules, 1973, which were statutory in nature—Court held that rights and liabilities must be governed by the law in force at the time of initiation of disciplinary proceedings—Subsequent change in service rules could not retrospectively affect vested rights of petitioners—Objection to maintainability on basis of enforcement of non-statutory Rules, 2021, overruled—Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 199 held fully attracted. Muhammad Tariq Badar v. National Bank of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 314 Manzoor Ali v. United Bank Ltd. 2005 SCMR 1785 Haroon-ur-Rashid v. LDA 2016 SCMR 931 (b) Civil service—Departmental proceedings—Requirement to specify role in misconduct—Natural justice—Scam in foreign exchange department—No connection with petitioners established ----Where petitioners were not posted in the department in which the scam occurred, nor were they shown to be immediate or supervisory officers of the alleged mastermind, initiation of proceedings without specifying their direct or indirect involvement held unjustified—Mere general allegation of negligence without documentary evidence or clear attribution of failure of duty deemed insufficient—Court held that petitioners had been made scapegoats without legal justification. (c) Civil service—Performance record—Contrary to alleged negligence—Documentary proof of excellence ignored ----Petitioners had consistently received performance bonuses, letters of appreciation, and high annual appraisal remarks—Despite such evidence, competent and appellate authorities failed to consider these aspects—Court held that in absence of adverse supervisory comments, no inference of negligence could be drawn—Non-speaking orders of appellate authorities set aside for failing to apply judicial mind. (d) Departmental appeal—Supervisory officer's endorsement of innocence—Non-consideration by appellate authority—Effect ----Where appellate authority sought input from supervisory officer who explicitly recommended exoneration, failure to consider such recommendation held a serious lapse—Court termed dismissal of appeal without reasoned order as mechanical and in violation of principles of fairness and natural justice. (e) Civil service—Scam-based disciplinary action—Lack of nexus—Proceedings declared nullity ----Court reiterated that in absence of any material linking employee to commission of alleged misconduct, proceedings are void ab initio—Held, disciplinary measures must be based on actual culpability and not presumptive liability—Proceedings initiated merely on assumption or to fix responsibility in a generalised manner deprecated. (f) Disposition—Writ petitions allowed—Departmental orders set aside—Fresh proceedings permissible only if concrete material emerges —Held, impugned orders passed by competent and appellate authorities set aside—Petitioners exonerated—However, bank may initiate fresh proceedings if tangible evidence connecting petitioners to alleged scam becomes available—No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Service laws—Pay fixation—Point-to-point formula—Rounding off under international accounting standards—No illegality found ----Federal Government Civil Servants—Basic Pay Scales, 2007—President’s order sanctioning 15% pay increase—Employee challenged fixation on grounds that increase was less than 15%—Tribunal allowed service appeal based on its earlier decision in Appeal No.1815(R)CS/2017—Held, fixation based on point-to-point formula with rounding off to nearest 5th or 10th value was in line with accepted international accounting standards and IFRS/GAAP—No illegality found in such administrative practice—Tribunal erred in disregarding this Court’s earlier reversal of its precedent—Impugned judgment set aside. (b) Judicial precedent—Binding nature—Tribunal acting per incuriam—Effect ----Art. 189, Constitution of Pakistan—Tribunal passed judgment on basis of earlier precedent that had already been set aside by Supreme Court—Held, Tribunal’s failure to acknowledge binding judgment amounted to per incuriam decision—Once Supreme Court settles a question of law, it becomes binding on all subordinate courts and tribunals—Tribunal's continued reliance on a voided precedent was legally untenable. Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 483 Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1944 KB 718) Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling (1955) 2 QB 379 (c) Administrative law—Employee undertaking to refund disputed amount—Effect of estoppel ----Respondent acknowledged via written undertaking that he would return the excess amount if the Tribunal’s precedent was set aside—Held, respondent estopped from resisting recovery—He had expressly referred to the very judgment subsequently reversed by this Court, and cannot now claim distinct treatment. (d) Tribunal jurisdiction—Policy matters—Limitation on interference—Standard of review ----Held, unless a government policy is shown to be arbitrary, patently illegal, or unreasonable, the Tribunal or courts cannot interfere—Pay fixation methodologies involving rounding conventions and stage correspondence fall within domain of executive policy unless demonstrated to be discriminatory or ultra vires. (e) Service laws—Revised pay scales—Understanding of “point-to-point fixation”—Clarified ----Clarified that “point-to-point fixation” requires placing employee at corresponding stage above minimum in new scale, matching the stage held in previous scale—Small variances due to rounding to nearest increment do not vitiate the process—Such practice consistent with global accounting norms and not violative of law. (f) Disposition—Civil petition converted into appeal and allowed—Tribunal’s order set aside—Service appeal dismissed ----Held, impugned judgment passed by Tribunal on 27.07.2023 was without legal basis as it relied on a precedent already reversed—Civil petition converted into appeal and allowed—Service Appeal No.134(K)CS/2021 dismissed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Interlocutory orders---Stranger to proceedings---Leave to appeal---Maintainability---Principle of locus standi---Appellants, not being parties to Suit No.Nil of 2023, sought to challenge an interlocutory order dated 15.01.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge on the Original Side---Appellants contended that an observation made therein regarding the nature and terminability of contract appointments adversely affected their own pending Suit No.Nil(-155)/2024---High Court held that the observation in question, made in the context of another plaintiff’s interim arrangement as Chairman, BISE Sukkur, was not binding upon the Appellants nor determinative of their case---Appellants failed to obtain or seek leave as required under law to challenge the order as non-parties---Reliance on H.M. Saya & Co. v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. PLD 1969 SC 65 was found misplaced, as the Appellants did not satisfy the legal test for a non-party to appeal, i.e., whether they could properly have been a party in the original suit or proceeding---Appellants, holding distinct posts at other Boards of Intermediate Education, were unaffected by the observations and directive issued in the impugned order. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---Scope of constitutional appeal---Interlocutory orders affecting non-parties---High Court reiterated that mere apprehension of prejudice from general observations in another case’s interim order does not confer standing to appeal unless the appellant is directly aggrieved and properly impleaded or has sought leave to intervene---Observations not directly concerning appellants cannot form basis of an appeal under constitutional jurisdiction. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Cited Case: • H.M. Saya & Co. v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. PLD 1969 SC 65

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Arts. 63A, 184(3), 186 & 188—Disqualification on grounds of defection—Judicial review—Scope of presidential reference—Validity of Supreme Court's earlier decision—Review petition challenging the Supreme Court’s majority decision in PLD 2022 SC 488 and PLD 2023 SC 42—Held, Art. 63A provides a detailed, self-executory procedure for disqualification on grounds of defection, granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Party Head, Election Commission, and Supreme Court (in appellate jurisdiction)—Supreme Court’s earlier ruling had incorrectly nullified valid votes cast in defiance of party directives, overstepped judicial authority by disregarding the Party Head's discretion, bypassing the Election Commission’s jurisdiction, and abolishing the right of appeal to the Supreme Court itself—Court held that interpretation should be based strictly on constitutional text, and no judicial legislation or personal morality-based rulings should substitute constitutional mandates. (b) Constitutional Interpretation: ----Scope of judicial review—Doctrine of "casus omissus"—Judicial restraint—Held, Art. 63A does not require interpretation as it is a clear, precise, and self-executory provision—Judges in the majority of the earlier decision had engaged in judicial overreach by inserting additional restrictions not provided in the constitutional text, effectively amending the Constitution through judicial ruling—Established principle reaffirmed that courts must not legislate from the bench or "read into" constitutional provisions what is not explicitly stated—Courts cannot override parliamentary intent or assume legislative powers—Doctrine of casus omissus applied, holding that courts must adhere to textual interpretation and avoid inserting unwritten consequences into constitutional provisions. (c) Article 186—Presidential Reference—Scope & Limitations: ----Advisory jurisdiction—Opinion vs. Binding Judgment—Held, under Art. 186, the President of Pakistan may seek an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court on questions of law of public importance—However, such an opinion does not have binding effect, unlike decisions made under Art. 184(3) (original jurisdiction)—Court observed that the Presidential Reference had been politically motivated, filed at a time when the then Prime Minister faced a vote of no-confidence, and lacked legal merit—Noted that the reference contained pre-determined conclusions rather than neutral legal questions, thereby compromising the neutrality required for constitutional references—Held, that the earlier Court had erred in treating the reference and constitutional petition together, as they arose under separate jurisdictions and required independent adjudication. (d) Separation of Powers & Judicial Overreach: ----Judiciary's role vis-à-vis Legislature & Executive—Encroachment on legislative and political matters—Court held that the earlier majority decision had encroached upon legislative powers by unilaterally expanding the consequences of defection beyond those stipulated in the Constitution—Judges had rewritten Art. 63A by effectively preventing votes from being counted and imposing an automatic disqualification, even though the Constitution clearly outlines a procedural mechanism involving the Party Head, Election Commission, and Supreme Court in appellate jurisdiction—Reaffirmed principles of separation of powers, cautioning against judicial intervention in legislative and political domains, especially where the Constitution explicitly assigns decision-making powers to other institutions. (e) Vote of No-Confidence & Political Consequences: ----Arts. 54(3), 58(1), 95—Unlawful dissolution of National Assembly—Court intervention—Judicial protection of parliamentary processes—Held, the vote of no-confidence against the then Prime Minister was a constitutional process under Art. 95, and interference by state institutions (Speaker of National Assembly and President) violated fundamental democratic principles—Court reiterated that once a vote of no-confidence is initiated, the Prime Minister cannot advise the dissolution of the National Assembly as per Art. 58(1)—Noted that the Supreme Court had earlier correctly intervened to prevent unconstitutional dissolution of the Assembly, ensuring that MNAs could exercise their right to vote in accordance with democratic norms. (f) Voting Rights of Parliamentarians: ----Nullification of votes—Violation of Art. 63A & Parliamentary Democracy—Earlier decision had ruled that votes cast in defiance of party directives should not be counted—Court held that this was unconstitutional, as the Constitution does not prevent a member from voting—The prescribed consequence of voting against party policy is post facto disciplinary action by the Party Head, subject to adjudication by the Election Commission and appeal to the Supreme Court—Votes cast in the National Assembly must always be counted to maintain the integrity of parliamentary democracy—Court emphasized that automatic vote nullification or immediate disqualification without following due process would destroy democratic accountability and concentrate power in party leaders, violating fundamental principles of representative governance. (g) Global Perspective on Defection Laws: ----Comparative constitutional analysis—No automatic disqualification in global jurisdictions—Court examined global practices on defection and found that no country imposes automatic disqualification for voting against party directives—Noted that in India, defection proceedings are governed by the Tenth Schedule and involve a due process mechanism similar to Art. 63A—Reviewed case law from Papua New Guinea, where its Supreme Court struck down automatic disqualification as unconstitutional for violating parliamentary privileges and free speech—Court held that Pakistan's defection provisions should be applied in line with global constitutional norms, avoiding judicially imposed punishments that are not explicitly provided in the Constitution. (h) Review Jurisdiction & Reversal of Earlier Judgment: ----Art. 188—Scope of Supreme Court’s review power—Review petition filed under Art. 188 of the Constitution, arguing that the earlier majority decision had misconstrued Art. 63A, ignored established case law, and violated the separation of powers—Held, a review petition can be granted where there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record—Court found that the earlier decision had incorrectly bypassed constitutional procedures and infringed upon parliamentary rights—Earlier judgment was set aside, and the legal framework under Art. 63A was restored as per its original constitutional intent. ----Disposition: Review petition unanimously allowed—Majority judgment of 17 May 2022 (PLD 2022 SC 488) and detailed judgment (PLD 2023 SC 42) set aside—Original constitutional interpretation of Art. 63A reinstated—Votes cast by MNAs to be counted—Defection proceedings must follow due process as per Art. 63A—Separation of powers and parliamentary democracy reaffirmed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 78(2)(b)—Public funds—Supreme Court’s role in management of dam fund—Transfer of funds to the Public Account of the Federation—The Supreme Court and the Prime Minister of Pakistan had created a joint fund for the construction of Diamer-Bhasha and Mohmand Dams—Held, in terms of Art. 78(2)(b) of the Constitution, money received by or deposited with the Supreme Court must be credited to the Public Account of the Federation—Retention of the fund in a separate account was deemed inappropriate—Directed, that the total amount in account No. 03-593-299999-001-4 be transferred to the Public Account of the Federation and the said account be closed. (b) Judicial Oversight: ----Art. 184(3)—Scope of Supreme Court’s jurisdiction—Constitution of Implementation Bench—Judicial intervention in executive matters—Petition questioned whether the Supreme Court could constitutionally intervene in the construction of dams under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution—Court clarified that the matter was not under review, but noted that the Implementation Bench, constituted in 2019, had not undertaken any substantive work nor reviewed periodic progress reports submitted by WAPDA—Held, preparation of such reports was redundant in the absence of judicial oversight, and WAPDA was relieved from further submissions unless specifically directed. (c) Public Funds & Fiscal Management: ----Management of the Dams Fund—Accrued mark-up—Utilization of funds—State Bank of Pakistan reported that the collected amount was Rs. 11.47 billion, while the accrued mark-up, paid by the Federal Government, was Rs. 12.19 billion, making the total available amount Rs. 23.67 billion—Held, since the mark-up exceeded the principal collected, the Government had borne a significant financial burden—Considering that the total projected cost of both dams was Rs. 740 billion, the fund constituted only 3.2% of the required amount—Directed, that the transferred funds be placed in a sub-account within the Public Account of the Federation or invested in top-rated private scheduled banks to generate further mark-up before being utilized for dam construction. (d) Disposition of the Supreme Court Dams Fund: ----Final directions regarding fund utilization—Court directed that: Transfer of Funds: Entire amount in account No. 03-593-299999-001-4 be transferred to the Public Account of the Federation. Closure of Account: Once the transfer is complete, the account should be closed. Investment of Funds: A sub-account be created or another measure be taken to invest the amount in high-rated private banks to generate further mark-up. Utilization of Funds: When required, the amount and its accrued mark-up be utilized exclusively for the construction of Diamer-Bhasha and Mohmand Dams. ----Disposition: Applications and all connected petitions disposed of accordingly.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 22-A & 22-B—Application for direction to register FIR—Scope and discretion of Justice of Peace Applicant sought registration of FIR under Ss. 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C., alleging theft of dowry articles by his brother and nephews—Learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace dismissed the application, holding the dispute to be civil in nature arising out of inheritance—High Court upheld the finding, observing that the Justice of Peace correctly exercised discretion in declining to issue direction for registration of FIR where the underlying dispute was patently civil and the police had already declined to record the applicant’s version. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 22-A & 22-B—Alternate remedy—Filing of direct complaint When the police refuse to register FIR and the version of the complainant is not accepted, the appropriate course is to file a direct complaint before the competent court, enabling the complainant to lead his own evidence—Justice of Peace not bound to direct registration of FIR in such circumstances—Adequate remedy through private complaint considered sufficient. Habibullah v. Political Assistant, Dera Ghazi Khan (2005 SCMR 951) relied upon. (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Art. 199—Writ jurisdiction—Judicial restraint High Court observed that even under Art.199, issuance of writ for registration of FIR is not obligatory in every case—Court may exercise judicial restraint where adequate alternative remedies exist and the matter is essentially civil in character. (d) Criminal jurisprudence—Civil disputes given criminal colour—Principle Courts must guard against conversion of family or property disputes into criminal proceedings—Where facts disclose civil liability or inheritance contest rather than a cognizable offence, criminal process should not be invoked to settle private grievances. Cited case: • Habibullah v. Political Assistant, Dera Ghazi Khan 2005 SCMR 951 (g) Disposition — Application dismissed—Applicant advised to avail remedy of direct complaint before competent court—Observations made not to prejudice any future proceedings.

Summary: (a) Supreme Court—Leave to appeal vs. review—Scope and limits ----AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974—Arts. 42(11), 42(12) & 42-D; AJ&K Supreme Court (Power of Review) Act, 1980—S. 2; AJ&K Supreme Court Rules, 1978—O. XLVI r.1; Civil Procedure Code, 1908—O. XLVII r.1. Grant of leave under Art. 42(12) is a discretionary filter, not a matter of right. In leave proceedings the Court is not obliged to undertake full appraisal of facts/law as in an appeal under Art. 42(11). A review under Art. 42-D against an order refusing leave is available only on the narrow grounds akin to O. XLVII r.1 C.P.C. (e.g., error apparent, overlooking an obvious/important aspect, discovery of new and important matter). Mere re-agitation of the same submissions or claiming that an alternative view is possible is insufficient. Where refusal of leave was by a Division Bench after conscious consideration, the threshold for review is even higher; absent demonstration that the Court overlooked a material point, review does not lie. (b) Service/Recruitment—Waiting list; transfer; accrued entitlement ----Primary Teacher (Female)—Union Council Hattian Bala—Merit/waiting list validity. Petitioner stood at serial No. 7 on the waiting list which, by notification, expired on 15-11-2019. Her writ filed on 16-11-2019 thus could not found any right to appointment. The impugned transfer order was dated 07-09-2018, prior to compilation of the waiting list (15-11-2018); petitioner had no locus to challenge that transfer via waiting-list rights. Assertions that departmental authorities later “scrutinized” the transfer or contemplated cancellation did not supply a review ground, nor did they revive an expired waiting list. (c) Review—Foundational principles restated ----Standards for interference. Review will not be used to rehear a concluded matter, to create false hope of an appeal, or to disturb conscious findings unless an obvious error floating on the record or an overlooked decisive point is shown. Petitioner failed to point to any such omission; the earlier refusal of leave explicitly addressed (i) expiry of the waiting list and (ii) anterior date of the transfer order. Disposition: Review petition dismissed. Order refusing leave to appeal maintained. Cited Provisions: AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974—Arts. 42(11), 42(12), 42-D; AJ&K Supreme Court (Power of Review) Act, 1980—S. 2; AJ&K Supreme Court Rules, 1978—O. XLVI r.1; C.P.C.—O. XLVII r.1. Cited Cases: • Abdul Ghaffar-Abdul Rehman v. Asghar Ali, PLD 1998 SC 363 (review principles). • Kamran Ali v. Abdul Qudoos, 2021 SCR 501 (AJK) (review scope under Art. 42-D; O. XLVI/O. XLVII). • Walayat v. Feroze, PLD 1977 SC AJK 11; Muhammad Kabir Khan v. Mst. Anees Begum, 2005 SCR 23; Mirpur Development Authority v. Ch. Aarif Najeeb, 2007 SCR 545; M. Mehrban v. M. Siddique, 2005 SCR 418; Muhammad Din v. Abdul Hameed, 2008 SCR 292; Azmat Bi v. Muhammad Laal, 2008 SCR 300; Ch. Muhammad Sadiq v. Mujahid Hussain Naqvi, 2008 SCR 313; Sardar Muhammad Hussain v. Dr. Najeeb Naqi, 2014 SCR 140; WAPDA v. Taj Begum, 2014 SCR 588; Rafaqat Hussain v. AJK Govt., 2016 SCR 1302; Fazal Elahi v. Abdul Latif, PLD 1981 SC AJK 75; Registrar Cooperative Societies v. Muhammad Ishaque, PLD 1985 SC AJK 56; Raja Abdul Qayyum v. Ch. Latif Akbar, 1994 CLC 2041.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 188---Review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Condonation of delay in filing a review petition---Scope---Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan (SCBAP) filed a Civil Review Petition (CRP) with a three-day delay, seeking condonation---Validity---Held, that under Art. 188, the Supreme Court has the constitutional power to review any judgment or order, subject to the Supreme Court Rules, 1980---Since the detailed reasons for the original judgment were issued after the filing of the CRP, the review petition was premature but justified---The inability of SCBAP to file a review within thirty days as per Order XXVI, Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, was excusable due to the late issuance of reasons, and condonation was allowed. Cited Cases: Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Ltd. PLD 2023 SC 241 (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980 ----Order XXVI, Rules 1, 3 & 4---Grounds for review---Requirement of certified copy of judgment---Scope---Under Order XXVI, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, a review petition may only be filed on grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, including errors apparent on the face of the record or other sufficient reasons---Held, that a review petition must be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment, as per Rule 3, and must include a reasoned opinion from the Advocate certifying that a review is justified, as per Rule 4---Since the detailed reasons of the original judgment were issued after the review petition was filed, the review grounds were justified and the delay was condoned. Cited Cases: PLD 2023 Supreme Court 241 (c) Supreme Court Practice and Procedure ----Composition of Bench---Objections to Bench constitution---Judicial discretion---Scope---Petitioner objected to the composition of the Bench hearing the review petition, citing the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, and Ordinance No. VIII of 2024, which mandated that every case be assigned by a committee comprising the Chief Justice, the next most senior judge, and a nominated judge---Validity---Held, that while the ideal practice is for the review petition to be heard by the same Bench that delivered the original judgment (Order XXVI, Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules), it was not practicable in the present case as the original Bench member, Munib Akhtar, J., had recused himself---The Bench was thus reconstituted lawfully, and objections were overruled. Cited Cases: Raja Amer Khan v. Federation of Pakistan PLJ 2024 SC 114 (d) Right to Counsel ----Right of legal counsel to meet client in custody---Scope---Counsel for PTI and Imran Khan sought permission to meet his client, who was confined in Adiala Jail, alleging procedural hurdles in doing so---Validity---Held, that the right of legal counsel to meet an incarcerated client is a fundamental component of due process---Additional Attorney General was directed to ensure that the counsel was granted access to meet his client immediately, with an additional meeting permitted the next day if required. Cited Cases: PLJ 2024 Supreme Court 114 (e) Procedural Fairness ----Issuance of notices in constitutional review petitions---Scope---Petitioner argued that formal notices should have been issued to all parties before the review petition was heard---Validity---Held, that the review petition was not an ordinary case affecting a private party’s property or rights but rather a matter of constitutional significance widely reported in the media---The Court had already allowed any interested party to submit applications for intervention, ensuring procedural fairness---Objections were overruled. Cited Cases: Presidential Reference No. 1 of 2022 Disposition: Delay in filing the review petition condoned; objections regarding Bench constitution, issuance of notices, and procedural fairness overruled; review petition to proceed for hearing.