Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: ''Maintenance encompasses not only basic necessities but also expenses necessary for the mental and physical well-being of a minor including educational expenses'' ---- The SCP delved into the scope of the term "maintenance" and whether a Muslim father is under an obligation to pay the expenses incurred on education of his daughter/children or whether maintenance of child includes educational expenses? The court referred to various legal definitions and sources, including Black's Law Dictionary, Section 369 of the Principles of Muhammadan Law, and the dictionary meaning of "maintenance." It concluded that maintenance encompasses not only basic necessities but also expenses necessary for the mental and physical well-being of a minor.The judgment further explored the legal framework of maintenance under Islamic law, emphasizing that providing for a child's education is part of a father's obligation. It cited Quranic verses and Islamic principles to support this view.Additionally, the judgment referred to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 27 of the UNCRC recognizes a child's right to a standard of living adequate for their development, including education. Pakistan ratified the UNCRC, withdrawing its reservation, making the commitment to uphold these rights absolute.The judgment concluded that it is in the best interests of the child to include educational expenses within the concept of maintenance. Respondent No.4, an unmarried daughter, was pursuing higher education, and the court found that the petitioner had the means to provide for her educational expenses.In light of these considerations, the court upheld the judgment of the Appellate Court, ruling that the granted maintenance amount of Rs. 25,000 per month for Respondent No.4's education was neither excessive nor unjustified. The court dismissed the petition, finding it devoid of merit and refusing leave to appeal. rel. PLD 1970 SC 75

Summary: In a case of first instance, an international custody order under the Hague Convention was enforced in Pakistan and the mother was ordered to return the child to US as that was in the child's best interest ---- Issues:1) Whether the wrongful retention of the child by Respondent No.1 justifies the enforcement of the US custody order under the Hague Convention in Pakistan. ---- 2)Whether the child's welfare is best served by being returned to the petitioner father, aligning with both international conventions and Pakistani family law. ---- Holding:The court directed the respondent mother to transfer custody of the minor to the petitioner father, facilitating the child's repatriation to the United States. This decision is in line with the Hague Convention and previous court orders, marking a landmark enforcement of an international family judgment in Pakistan.ReasoningThe court's deliberation focused on:The paramountcy of the child's welfare, in line with the UNCRC principles, which advocate for a nurturing upbringing.Evaluations by the Council for Children?s Rights and US court, which favored the petitioner's ability to provide a superior environment for the child.Legal obligations under the Hague Convention and Pakistani statutes, particularly the incorporation of the Hague Convention into the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, to address international child abduction.Precedents from Pakistani and international jurisdictions, advocating for the child's return to their habitual residence to resolve custody disputes, with this case setting a novel precedent in Pakistan for the enforcement of international family judgments.Citations and Precedents Relied UponHague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 1980UNCRC, 1989Key Pakistani and international cases, such as PLD 2007 Lahore 293 (Ms. LOUISE ANNE FAIRLEY v. SAJJAD AHMED RANA) and 2019 CLC 1311, which underscore the significance of the child's habitual residence and well-being in custody conflicts. --- The incorporation of the Hague Convention into the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, to address international child abduction is a significant legal development that bridges international law and Pakistani family law, particularly in the context of cross-border child custody disputes. This section will delve into the legal obligations under the Hague Convention, its integration into Pakistani law, and the implications of such incorporation.The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child AbductionThe Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 1980, is an international treaty aimed at securing the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any contracting state. The Convention seeks to protect children from the harmful effects of abduction and retention across international boundaries by providing a procedure to bring about their prompt return.Key Provisions of the Hague Convention:Article 3: Defines the wrongful removal or retention of a child as a breach of custody rights under the law of the child's habitual residence.Article 12: Stipulates that a child should be promptly returned to their habitual residence unless a year has passed and the child has settled into their new environment.Article 13: Provides exceptions to the return, including if there is a grave risk that the return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm.Incorporation into Pakistani StatutesPakistan's accession to the Hague Convention and its subsequent incorporation into domestic law, specifically the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, represents a commitment to aligning with international legal standards regarding child abduction. This incorporation allows for the Hague Convention's provisions to be applied within Pakistani legal proceedings, enabling Pakistani courts to handle cases of international child abduction more effectively.Implications of Incorporation:Jurisdiction of Family Courts: By including the Hague Convention within the scope of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, Pakistan has granted its family courts the jurisdiction to hear cases related to international child abduction. This means that such matters can be adjudicated within the family court system, providing a clear legal pathway for the resolution of cross-border custody disputes.Enforcement of International Custody Orders: The incorporation enables Pakistani courts to recognize and enforce custody orders made by courts in other Hague Convention signatory countries, provided that such enforcement is in line with the Convention's principles and respects the child's welfare.Legal Recourse for Abducted Children: Parents or guardians seeking the return of a child abducted to Pakistan from another Hague Convention country now have a legal framework to pursue their case within the Pakistani legal system. This framework ensures that the child's return is handled expeditiously and in accordance with international standards.Balancing International Obligations with Domestic Law: The integration of the Hague Convention into Pakistani law represents a balance between respecting international legal obligations and the domestic legal framework, particularly in light of Pakistan's cultural, religious, and social norms. It allows Pakistan to fulfill its international commitments while providing flexibility to consider the local context in custody disputes.

Summary: Issues PresentedWhether the election in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province should be conducted under the supervision of Judicial Officers to ensure fairness and transparency.The legality and constitutionality of government officers appointed as DROs, ROs, and AROs by the Election Commission of Pakistan.---- HoldingThe Court dismissed the petition in limine (at the outset) without commenting on the merits, noting that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had already taken cognizance of the matter with a final judgment pending.ReasoningThe Court relied on the Supreme Court's intervention in a similar matter (CP No. 4385 of 2023) where the Supreme Court suspended the Lahore High Court's order that conflicted with its judgment and stayed further proceedings. The Supreme Court emphasized the constitutional duty of the Election Commission of Pakistan to conduct elections and questioned the maintainability of the petition filed before the Lahore High Court. Given this precedent, the Peshawar High Court decided not to proceed with the matter, acknowledging the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and pending judgment on the issue.--- Final OrderThe writ petition was dismissed in limine due to the Supreme Court's prior involvement in a similar case, indicating deference to the higher court's pending judgment on the matter.Citations and Precedents Relied UponConstitutional Petition No. 1783-P of 2023Constitutional Petition No. 2224-P of 2023Constitutional Petition No.80828/2023 before the Lahore High CourtCP No. 4385 of 2023 before the Supreme Court of PakistanArticle 198 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973Election Act, 2017Article 218(3) of the Constitution of PakistanArticle 199 of the Constitution regarding the jurisdiction and powers of High CourtsThe Lahore High Court and Supreme Court's directives on the appointment of DROs, ROs, and AROs

Summary: Background: The petitioner, an overseas Pakistani woman, was married to the respondent in 2011. The marriage was registered in both Pakistan and Norway. The respondent later moved to Norway with a spouse visa, and the couple had a child together. In July 2022, the respondent contracted a second marriage in Pakistan without seeking formal permission from the petitioner. This prompted the petitioner to file a complaint under Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO), through her special attorney, seeking action against the respondent for marrying without permission. The Family Court dismissed the complaint for being filed through an attorney, and the Additional District Judge upheld this decision on appeal. The petitioner then filed a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. -----Issues: Whether a complaint under Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, can be filed and prosecuted through an attorney. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Filing of Complaint through Attorney: The court held that under criminal law, including Section 6 of the MFLO, complaints and criminal proceedings cannot be initiated or pursued through an attorney. Criminal law requires the personal involvement of the complainant, as the complainant must be someone who has personal knowledge of the facts and can testify to the offense. The court emphasized that criminal matters cannot be delegated to an attorney, as the attorney's testimony would be based on hearsay rather than personal knowledge. Relevance of Family Courts Act, 1964: The court referred to the Family Courts Act, 1964, which governs family matters, including those arising under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. While the act allows for representation through an agent in certain matters, it does not extend to criminal complaints like the one filed under Section 6 of the MFLO. The court cited relevant precedents that clarified that criminal complaints cannot be filed through attorneys. Dismissal of Petition: The court found that the lower courts were correct in dismissing the complaint for being filed through an attorney. The petitioner failed to show any legal error or irregularity in the lower courts' decisions. As a result, the constitutional petition was dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: Muzaffar Nawaz v. Ishrat Rasool (2022 YLR 1920) Liaqat Ali Mir v. Additional Sessions Judge (2017 P Cr. L J 1026) Muhammad Qasim v. SHO Police Station Khudabad, District Dadu (2016 MLD 1238) Khalid Mehmood and others v. Safdar Iqbal (2017 P Cr. L J 1104) Usman Saleem v. Additional District and Sessions Judge III, Karachi East (2021 P Cr. L J Note 66) Ghazanfar Ali v. M. Zahid Hussain and others (PLD 2011 Lahore 179)

Summary: Acquittal granted -- Issues:--Whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.--The credibility and reliability of the prosecution witnesses.--The relevance and impact of the delay in FIR registration and postmortem examination.--The significance of the recovery of the firearm from the appellant's possession.--The effect of the acquittal of co-accused on the appellant's conviction.-----Judgment:The court allowed the criminal appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence against Amir Shahzad, and acquitted him of the charge. The criminal revision filed by the complainant for the enhancement of the sentence was dismissed.----Rationale:Witness Credibility: The court found inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly regarding their presence at the crime scene and the location of their residences in relation to the crime scene.Delay in FIR and Postmortem: The delay in lodging the FIR and conducting the postmortem examination was not satisfactorily explained, casting doubt on the prosecution's case.---Recovery of Firearm: The recovery of the firearm from the appellant's possession was deemed inconsequential due to the lack of evidence connecting the firearm to the crime, such as the absence of spent cartridges at the crime scene.---Acquittal of Co-Accused: The acquittal of the co-accused, based on the same set of evidence, raised doubts about the appellant's involvement in the crime, invoking the principle of "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything).---Benefit of Doubt: Given the aforementioned doubts and inconsistencies, the court held that the appellant deserved the benefit of the doubt, leading to his acquittal.-----Precedents Relied Upon:"Nirmal Singh And Anr vs State Of Bihar" (AIR 2005 SUPREME COURT 1265)"MUHAMMAD AHMAD and another versus THE STATE and others" (1997 SCMR 89)"Muhammad Shafi alias Kuddoo vs. The State and others" (2019 SCMR 1045)"PATHAN versus The STATE" (2015 SCMR 315)"NAVEED alias NEEDU and others versus The STATE and others" (2014 SCMR 1464)"Notice to Police Constable Khizar Hayat son of Hadait Ullah" (PLD 2019 SC 527)"PERVAIZ KHAN and another versus The STATE" (2022 SCMR 393)"NAJAF ALI SHAH versus The STATE" (2021 SCMR 736)---

Summary: Facts:The petitioner, Muhammad Riaz, was the vendee in a suit for pre-emption filed by the respondents.The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court decreed it in favor of the respondents. The petitioner's subsequent revision was dismissed by the Lahore High Court, leading to this appeal in the Supreme Court.----Issues:Whether the respondents fulfilled the essential conditions for the exercise of the right of pre-emption, particularly the performance of Talb-i-Mutuathibat, as required under Section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991.Whether a delay of one or two minutes in making Talb-i-Mutuathibat by one of the respondents is sufficient to dismiss their claim.----Judgment:The Supreme Court held that the respondents failed to prove the validity of Talb-i-Mutuathibat due to an incomplete chain of information regarding the sale of the suit land and the delay in making the demand.The Court noted that the right of pre-emption is a personal right that must be proven by the pre-emptor through their own statement. Respondent No. 2's failure to appear as a witness or produce an attorney adversely affected his claim.The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed. The judgments of the appellate court and the High Court were set aside, and the trial court's decision to dismiss the suit was restored.----Principle:This judgment reaffirms the principle that the right of pre-emption is contingent upon the strict fulfillment of the conditions laid out in the relevant law, including the immediate performance of Talb-i-Mutuathibat upon gaining knowledge of the sale. Any delay or failure in adhering to these conditions, as well as the absence of personal testimony by the pre-emptor, can lead to the dismissal of the pre-emption claim.

Summary: Background: The appeal originates from a High Court judgment dated February 22, 2023, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission's (PSC) advertisement of posts without adhering to the 2% quota for disabled persons as mandated by law. The appellant claimed the PSC failed to include this quota in advertisements for Senior Science Teachers and other posts, thereby excluding eligible disabled candidates from the selection process. ----Issues: 1- Did the PSC violate the legal requirement to reserve a 2% quota for disabled persons in its job advertisements? 2- Should the High Court have intervened to enforce the disabled persons' quota and ensure the appellant's inclusion in the selection process? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court held that the High Court's decision to dismiss the writ petition was lawful. It noted that although the PSC did not initially include the disabled quota in the advertised posts, it later advertised a position specifically for disabled persons under Advertisement No. 01/2020. The appellant had the opportunity to participate in this selection process. The Court emphasized the broader need for adherence to the disabled quota in all future job advertisements and proposed several directives to enhance the employment prospects and working conditions for disabled persons. The appeal was disposed of with specific recommendations for ensuring compliance with the quota and improving the treatment and inclusion of disabled persons in the workforce. ----Citations/Precedents: Malik Ubaidullah vs. Government of Punjab etc., PLD 2020 SC 599 Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 2006

Summary: (a) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)--- ----S. 118---Qanun-e-Shahdat (10 of 1984), Art. 129---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII---Execution of negotiable instrument---Presumption attached to negotiable instrument---Scope---Shifting of burden of proof back on the plaintiff on rebuttal---Scope---Lending of money as a natural human conduct /relation in a society---Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff---Validity---In a suit for recovery on the basis of a negotiable instrument, there are certain presumptions attached to the same in terms of S. 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘the Act 1881’), as to the passing of consideration, date, time, etc---Such presumptions have been created by law, however, the same are rebuttable and it is for the defendant to raise a defence to rebut the statutory presumptions---The defendant in the suit, by setting up a probable defence, can refute the said legal presumption as regards the date and time of execution as also the consideration; the same can be established by evidence or circumstances of the case, which can be culled out from the mouth of the plaintiff and his witnesses or even from such other attending circumstances through which the Court can be shown that the passing of consideration is improbable, doubtful or illegal, or that the circumstances are such that a reasonable prudent man would disbelieve lawful issuance/execution of the instrument---Pertinently, the lending of money is part of human relation and of natural human conduct in a society, therefore, the same needs to be seen and viewed through the prism of natural human conduct---Statutory presumptions like the one attached to the negotiable instrument are based upon the natural and/or established human conduct---Given the diversification and inherent variability of human conduct, such presumptions have been made rebuttable---High / Appellate Court has to keep in sight the fact that there is an inextricable interplay of presumptions and burden of proof as existence of presumption shifts the burden of proof on the other side---The presumptions under S. 118 of the Act, 1881 merely shift the burden on the defendant to prove that the issuance of negotiable instrument was consequence of any fraud---In addition to the documentary or oral evidence, the defendant in a suit under O. XXXVII, C.P.C., can always rely on existence of certain fact(s) based upon the existence of some other fact to set up probable defence that concomitantly shift the burden of proof---Under Art. 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahdat Order, 1984 (‘the Order 1984’), the Courts are empowered to entertain the presumption of certain facts to have happened in the common course of natural events and human conduct---Said provisions unambiguously read that the Court while deciding a case can look into the facts relating to the human conduct---Thus, the statutory presumption under S. 118 of the Act, 1881 can be dislodged by the Court itself to shift the burden back on the plaintiff to prove consideration and/or genuineness of negotiable instrument by presuming the existence of certain facts in consonance with the common course of natural events and human conduct---In the present case, admittedly, it was not a case involving business relation inter se the appellant and respondent, rather was one of money lent to the appellant (defendant) by the respondent (plaintiff)---Unlike the cases involving established business relationship between the parties, the cases involving negotiable instruments based upon lending money call for greater circumspection on the part of the Courts---For instance, where the relations inter se the parties are cordial and long-lasting and/or are those of involving trust in the normal and natural course of human conduct, such presumption as carried by negotiable instruments, under S. 118 of the Act 1881, would call upon the defendant to rebut such presumption with plausible evidence to shift the burden back on the plaintiff---However, cases where the parties are alien to each other and/or have strained relation to such an extent that they were involved in criminal litigation involving commission of heinous offence under S.302, P.P.C., a such presumption would subside by denial of the defendant because this was contrary to common course of natural events and human conduct that a person would lend money to someone whose close relative had allegedly murdered son of the lender---Respondent could not deny the factum of registration of the criminal case by him (respondent) against son-in-law of the appellant for alleged murder, however, took the plea that a compromise between the parties had taken place and the relations became cordial between the parties, therefore, the respondent agreed to lend money to further strengthen relations between the parties---Said contention of the respondent belied logic that when the respondent alleged that son-in-law of the appellant had murdered his (respondent’s) son that he would lend such a huge money to the appellant even if matter had been compromised---Thus, the appellant had been able to successfully rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the pronote as a result of which the burden of proof shifted back to the respondent to prove that the pronote was executed lawfully and this crucial aspect of the case had been ignored by the Trial Court---High Court set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and the suit of the respondent was dismissed---Appeal was allowed accordingly. (b) Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)--- ----S. 118---Qanun-e-Shahdat (10 of 1984), Art. 129---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII---Execution of negotiable instrument---Presumption attached to negotiable instrument---Scope---Lending of money---Financial position of the plaintiff---Suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff---Held: In a suit for recovery on the basis of a negotiable instrument, there are certain presumptions attached to the same in terms of S. 118 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (‘the Act, 1881’), as to the passing of consideration, date, time, etc---Such presumptions have been created by law, however, the same are rebuttable and it is for the defendant to raise a defence to rebut the statutory presumptions---In the present case, admittedly, the respondent/plaintiff was driver by profession from where he could earn hardly to live comfortably let alone that he had savings to lend to others---Thus, it was difficult to believe that he had an amount of Rs.1,000,000/- to lend to the appellant---Financial position of the plaintiff was a relevant factor in such like matters---Therefore, lending of such an amount by the respondent to the appellant having the kind of job as held by the respondent seemed improbable that he would have lent such an amount---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and the suit of the respondent was dismissed---Appeal was allowed accordingl y. Salar Abdur Rauf v. Mst. Barkat Bibi 1973 SCMR 332 ref. (c) Qanun-e-Shahdat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 79---Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), S. 118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII---Execution of negotiable instrument---Marginal witnesses of negotiable instrument, non-production of---Scope and effect---Question as to whether the two marginal witnesses are mandated to appear and prove the execution of the negotiable instrument (pronote) and what is the effect of non-production of the marginal witnesses?---Held: Provision of the Art. 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahdat, 1984, comes into play only if a particular document is required by law to be attested---In the present case, the document-in-question was pronote which was not required by any law to be attested by two witnesses---Therefore, when a document was not required by any law to be attested, the failure to produce marginal witness was not fatal and detrimental to the case in such a situation where the defendant of a case under O. XXXVII, C.P.C., fails to put up a probable defence---However, said rule was not applicable in the present case, since appellant /defendant showed probable defence and the burden to prove had shifted back to the respondent on account of denial by him to have executed any pronote and/or the receipt, therefore, the respondent was obligated to prove the issuance and execution of the pronote by producing both attesting witnesses of the pronote---The respondent could have moved the Court to summon the said witness through process of Court and could have cross-examined him so as to prove his stance, however, no such effort was made---In such circumstances, an inference could be drawn that had said witness appeared before the Court, he would have deposed against the respondent and non-production of second attesting witness of the pronote was certainly fatal---Scanning of the evidentiary resume of the case revealed that animosity between the parties was admitted---Similarly, a plaintiff’s witness also admitted that signatures of the appellant on the backside of pronote and the receipt were different---Another plaintiff’s witness, who was a deed writer, deposed that the pronote was not recorded in his record and he was unable to produce any such record, and also admitted that amount mentioned in the pronote was not given to the appellant by the respondent in his presence---Such shortcomings were fatal for the respondent and had also escaped notice of the Trial Court---Absence of the second attesting witness of the pronote cum receipt and also the shortcomings in the oral and documentary evidence of the respondent propelled High Court to conclude that the presumption of correctness attached to the pronote was successfully rebutted by the appellant by putting forth probable defence and it was obligatory on the part of the respondent to prove the issuance and lawful execution of the pronote which the appellant failed to do---High Court set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and the suit of the respondent was dismissed---Appeal was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Imran Shahzad Bhatti for Appellant. Ch. Iftikhar Ahmed Warraich for Respondent. Date of hearing: 24th January, 2024.