Summary: The petitioner argued that his exclusion from the SMC (senior management course) was illegal, unlawful, and in violation of natural justice principles. He requested the court to declare the nomination letters as void, allow him to attend the SMC, and fix responsibility for maladministration and misuse of authority on certain respondents.The petitioner's background includes his appointment as Mukhtiarkar in 1992, subsequent promotions, and his position as Additional Secretary as of November 2016. He contended that despite his seniority and eligibility, he was overlooked for the SMC in favor of junior officers and those with questionable appointments, alleging malafide intentions by the respondents.The respondents, represented by legal counsel, countered by emphasizing the adherence to set criteria for nominations to the SMC and denied any wrongful promotion or discrimination against the petitioner. They also highlighted that the petitioner was on approved leave during the relevant period, which could affect his eligibility for the course based on certain criteria outlined in official memorandums.After reviewing the submissions, evidence, and relevant legal and policy frameworks, the court found the petitioner's claims baseless, noting that the nominated officers were senior to the petitioner as per the provisional seniority list, and no junior officer was nominated in violation of the set criteria. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the petitioner's arguments.

Summary: Symmetry Digital (Pvt.) Limited petitioned for a reduction in share capital under Section 97 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The court, presided over by Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar, considered the petition on 24-04-2018. The petitioner, represented by Mr. Muhammad Ishaq Ali, sought approval for reducing its share capital from 100 million to 10 million, based on resolutions passed in an Extraordinary General Meeting on 23-06-2014. The resolutions included effecting the reduction as per the Ordinary and Special Resolution, dispensing with the use of "and reduced" in the company's name post-reduction, and confirming the minute detailing the reduction and directing its publication in English and Urdu newspapers in Sindh.The company, established with a paid-up capital of 100 million divided into 10 million shares, argued that its actual business never exceeded 10 million, justifying the reduction. The SECP, represented by M/s. Saad Abbasi and Syed Hafiz Ebad, initially filed comments with objections but later submitted a no-objection statement after the petitioner addressed their concerns, including satisfying a charge registered against the company by Bank Al Habib.Justice Mazhar, drawing on legal precedents and the principles outlined in cases like 2013 CLD 2156 [Sindh] and various foreign judgments, approved the petition. The court was satisfied that the company had complied with all formalities, including obtaining shareholder approval and addressing creditor concerns, and found no prejudice to creditors or third parties. Consequently, the court allowed the reduction of share capital as proposed and dispensed with the requirement to add "and reduced" to the company's name, considering the specific facts and circumstances. The order was dated 14-09-2018.

Summary: [LIMITATION (Conversion of revision into Appeal)]It is imperative for the proper working of any system of justice that in a context such as the one at hand a party aggrieved by an order passed by a judicial forum be required to assail that order in a timely manner through appropriate proceedings, as prescribed. As such, a party cannot be allowed to escape the consequence of its own indolence and failure to avail a prescribed remedy so as to adopt a course of action other than that envisaged under the law, and then retrace its steps while seeking to circumvent limitation through recourse to the plea that the order sought to be questioned is void.

Summary: S.37 STA summons/notice sans underlying inquiry---The Impugned Notice required the petitioner to appear in person and provide comprehensive records for the previous five years within seven days, with a warning that failure to comply would imply involvement in tax fraud. The petitioner's counsel argued that the notice was legally untenable, issued in a manner inconsistent with the law, and amounted to an unjustified audit. The department's counsel argued that the notice was valid, aimed at obtaining necessary documentation, and that compliance would resolve the matter without penalties. The judges considered the arguments and examined the relevant legal provisions. They emphasized that a departmental notice should only be challenged if it lacked jurisdiction, amounted to an abuse of process, or was malicious, unjust, or prejudicial. Thus, the central question was whether the Impugned Notice had any infirmities that warranted court intervention. Section 37 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 empowered officers of Inland Revenue to summon individuals for evidence and document production in ongoing inquiries under the Act. The judges noted that the Impugned Notice had not referenced any specific inquiry, making the absence of such an inquiry evident. The judges held that the notice had been issued without a basis in the form of an ongoing inquiry, which was a requirement specified in the law. As such, the notice was inconsistent with the provisions of section 37 of the Act and could not be justified. Therefore, they set aside the Impugned Notice, allowing the respondents to seek redress within the framework of the law if they had legitimate concerns. Overall, this judgment ruled in favor of the petitioner, concluding that the notice lacked a legal basis and was therefore invalid.

Summary: [Service matters (Son Quota (Dismissed))] In view of the above, it is crystal clear that the respondents cannot circumvent the law to make recruitment against son quota by issuing Standing Order for recruitment in Sindh Police against Shaheed Quota, Son Quota without approval of the Provincial Government

Summary: Promotion (respondents are hereby directed to consider the petitioners case for promotion in DPC. CP Allowed.)

Summary: Import of vehicle under personal baggage and payment of duty and taxes under Para 6 of Appendix E of the Import Policy order 2020

Summary: Outcome of a criminal proceeding would not adversely affect determination of a Civil liability in a fatal accident suit, inter alia, because standard of proof in both proceedings is different. Family of the deceased is also entitled for damages for "loss of consortium", that is, deprivation of the benefits of a family relationship due to the death caused by a tortfeasor. Suit decreed.

Summary: The petitioners argue that Show Cause Notices should not be issued without conducting a prior audit under Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act. They contend that the self-assessment nature of the Act requires an audit before a Show Cause Notice can be issued. However, the court finds that there is no mandatory requirement for an audit before issuing a Show Cause Notice under Section 11(2) of the Act. The court emphasizes that both provisions are available to the revenue department, and it can choose to issue notices based on a review of sales tax returns or conduct audits. The court also noted a rising trend of directly challenging Show Cause Notices through constitutional jurisdiction without exhausting the remedies provided by the Special Law. It cited precedents to emphasize that this practice should be discouraged as it undermines the statutory norms and the specialized forums created for such matters. The court dismissed the petitions and affirms that the constitutional jurisdiction of the court should not be invoked without justifiable cause. --- The main argument put forth by the petitioners, represented by several lawyers, is that the Show Cause Notices are not legally valid because they were issued without conducting a prior audit. According to the petitioners, Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 mandates an audit before issuing Show Cause Notices under Section 11(2) of the Act. They contend that the Act operates on a self-assessment basis, and issuing Show Cause Notices without first conducting an audit renders Section 25 redundant. Additionally, the petitioners argue that an audit is necessary for a thorough investigation and allows them to voluntarily deposit the tax amount without incurring penalties, as per Section 25(5) of the Act.On the other hand, the Department's legal representatives argue that an audit is not mandatory before issuing Show Cause Notices. They claim that the information provided in the tax return is sufficient, and if discrepancies are identified, a Show Cause Notice can be issued. The Department maintains that the petitioners were given ample opportunity to address any issues.The Court's ruling states that there is no statutory requirement for an audit before issuing Show Cause Notices under the Sales Tax Act. It emphasizes that both audit and direct issuance of Show Cause Notices are options available to tax authorities. The Court also notes that challenging Show Cause Notices directly in constitutional jurisdiction is on the rise, and such actions are discouraged. Instead, the Court advises taxpayers to respond to the notices and follow the established procedures provided under the Special Law, which includes appealing to specialized forums. It concludes that the petitions lack merit and dismisses them accordingly.

Summary: However, the court noted a procedural anomaly: the petition was filed as a "Divorce Petition" instead of a "Suit," contrary to the provisions of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936. To address this, the court examined the Sindh Chief Court Rules related to matrimonial jurisdiction. Part I of Chapter XXIII governed proceedings under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, while Part II dealt with the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936. Rules 434 to 447 specifically outlined the procedure for Parsi marriage and divorce cases. The key difference was that while the Indian Divorce Act referred to "petition," the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act used the term "plaint."The court directed the office to convert the "Divorce Petition" into a "Suit" and correct references accordingly. It also instructed the office to assign a suit number to the case.The plaintiff's petition cited reasons for divorce, including the defendant's abandonment for seven years and their mutual desire to end the marriage under Section 32 of the Act. The plaintiff emphasized their intention to share joint custody of their daughter.The court discussed the appointment of delegates to aid in the adjudication of Parsi divorce cases, acting similarly to a jury. It highlighted that majority delegate decisions governed divorce cases, with the presiding judge stepping in if delegates were evenly divided. The court also noted that the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, was applicable to these proceedings.The judge clarified that the High Court in Karachi was acting as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction for the Karachi district, exercising authority over divorce cases.The court reviewed the grounds for divorce under Section 32 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, and noted that the plaintiff had sought divorce on the grounds of desertion.Ultimately, the plaintiff and defendant agreed to dissolve their marriage based on desertion, and the delegates concurred with this decision. The court decreed the dissolution of the marriage and directed the office to send a copy of the decree for registration to the Registrar of Marriages as required by the Act. No additional claims or counterclaims were made in the case.---- The case involves a divorce petition under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936. The presiding judge, delves into the procedural aspects of the case and clarifies the rules under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act compared to the Indian Divorce Act, emphasizing the need for the proceedings to be treated as a suit rather than a petition. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant has neglected marital obligations and wishes to dissolve the marriage under Section 32 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936. Both parties agree to joint custody of their daughter. The judge discussed the grounds for divorce under Section 32 of the Act, which include factors such as desertion, adultery, and other reasons that can lead to dissolution. The judge also explains the role of delegates, who function like a jury in Parsi matrimonial cases, and how they consider societal and communal standards. The judge ultimately grants the divorce based on the ground of desertion. The joint custody agreement is acknowledged, and no other financial or property-related issues are raised in the case.