Summary: -Since statute does not provide remedy of appeal, this petition has been filed to invoke jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. By dismissal of an application under order VII rule 11 CPC, none o

Summary: policy decision---Prima facie, the launching of Gulshan-e-Hadeed Housing Scheme Phase-IV was/is a policy decision which has already been taken care of by the Secretary Ministry of Industries and Production, Government of Pakistan, whereby the request of PSMC was declined for delinking of the launching of Gulshan-e-Hadeed Housing Scheme from the privatization process vide letter dated 13.04.2015. Besides the subject matter in these proceedings is a policy matter and Privatization Commission has already taken back the decision vide letter dated 16.02.2015 for the launching of aforesaid Society till the privatization of PSMC which is the policy decision of respondents; and, in the given circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere in the policy decision under its Constitutional jurisdiction, for the reasons already given hereinabove.

Summary: The court discusses various petitions filed by the pharmaceutical companies against the Impugned Notice and Impugned SRO (Statutory Regulatory Order) issued by DRAP. The pharmaceutical companies challenge the validity of the notice and order, claiming that they are in violation of the orders of the honorable Supreme Court. The companies argue that the pricing of drugs should be based on the 2018 Drug Pricing Policy rather than the 2015 Policy, which the Impugned SRO relies on. The court's judgment emphasized the role of the statutory appellate board in resolving disputes related to drug pricing and the importance of adhering to the directions provided by the honorable Supreme Court. It stated that the parties should pursue their grievances through the established statutory appeals process rather than approaching the High Court directly. The court directed the pharmaceutical companies to file appeals before the appellate board and to seek interim relief within that process. The judgment also highlights the power of the appellate forum to grant interim relief during the pendency of appeals, even if the governing statutes do not explicitly provide for such relief. The court urged the appellate board to expeditiously hear and determine the appeals and applications for interim relief in accordance with the law. Overall, the judgment underscored the importance of following the established legal procedures for dispute resolution and appeals, as well as the significance of adhering to the directives of the higher courts.

Summary: The petitioner, alleged that they were allocated 45 acres of land in Karachi through a ballot conducted by the Board of Revenue, Government of Sindh. The petitioner was initially granted approval for a layout plan for three blocks of land but later faced restrictions on Block-II and Block-III due to a dispute involving Pakistan Air Force (PAF) claiming portions of the land. After rounds of litigation and the involvement of various parties including the Cantonment Board Malir, Karachi, the case reached the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court set aside a previous order and directed the High Court to reevaluate the case with due opportunity for all parties to be heard. In the fresh hearing, the High Court considered the claims of the petitioner and PAF. PAF clarified that its claim was limited to 2.6 acres of land in Block-III and had no objections to the layout plan for Block-II. The Court concluded that the cancellation of the layout plan approval by the Cantonment Board should only apply to the 2.6 acres in Block-III that were under PAF's claim, and not to Block-II. In light of this, the High Court allowed the petition, holding that the cancellation of the layout plan should only pertain to Block-III. The Court ordered that the cancellation of the layout plan approval for Block-II was not legally justified.

Summary: Against withholding of income tax by the Accountant General Sindh on the amounts paid towards Judicial Allowance and Special Judicial Allowance by treating the same as part of their salary income chargeable to tax under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Hon'ble bench of Sindh High Court has been pleased to allow both these petitions in the following terms:-"In view of hereinabove facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that amount of judicial allowance and special judicial allowance paid to the Members of establishment of Sindh High Court as well as to the Members of the establishment of sub-ordinate judiciary of Province of Sindh falls within the exclusion in terms of clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, therefore, not part of their taxable salary income, hence, not chargeable to Tax or deduction under Section 149 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Accordingly, withholding of income tax on the aforesaid amounts is hereby declared to be illegal and without lawful authority. Consequently, both the constitutional petitions are allowed along with listed applications. Respondents are directed not to withhold any amount of income tax from judicial allowance and special judicial allowance of the Members of establishment of Sindh High Court as well as the Members of establishment of sub-ordinate judiciary in Province of Sindh. The amounts already deducted from the salary of the Members of establishment of Sindh High Court as well as to the sub-ordinate judiciary, shall be refunded by the FBR, on their filing refund applications in accordance with law, preferably, within a period of three months from the date of such claims."

Summary: NAB (Bail granted, as accused made Pardon granted to him , main co accused already on bail.)

Summary: The case involved the appellants and the respondent, Meezan Bank Limited, where the appellants had previously agreed to settle their liabilities with the bank under certain terms, which were confirmed by the court in an Order and Decree dated 23.07.2015. According to this decree, the appellants were to pay Rs.10,000,000 as a full and final settlement of their admitted liability of Rs.18,049,673 and additional legal charges, in a structured installment plan.However, the appellants failed to adhere to the payment schedule, leading to the initiation of execution proceedings by the bank. The appellants then filed an application during these proceedings, claiming they had paid an additional amount and requested the court to declare the decree satisfied. The Banking Court dismissed this application, stating the appellants had violated the terms of the compromise decree.The appeal in the High Court was argued by advocates on behalf of both parties. The appellants' advocate contended that the decretal amount had been paid and that any delay in payment did not constitute a default under the compromise decree. Conversely, the respondent's advocate maintained that the appellants had agreed to the consequences of default, and the appeal against the impugned order did not merit consideration.The High Court, after reviewing the arguments and the relevant legal precedents, concluded that the Banking Court's order was in accordance with the law. It was highlighted that the compromise decree was a result of a joint application by the parties and was never challenged by the appellants. The court emphasized that the executing court did not exceed its mandate and that the appeal was barred by Section 22(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001, which precludes appeals against interlocutory orders not disposing of the entire case.In conclusion, the High Court upheld the impugned order, dismissing the appeal and any pending applications associated with it, with no order as to costs.

Summary: Service matters (Appointment)---The petitioner argued that the waiting list mechanism could save resources and time, but the FPSC's refusal was based on invalid grounds. The FPSC claimed they couldn't recommend candidates beyond the original 50 qualified ones due to SOPE conditions. The Deputy Attorney General representing the respondents contended that the case should be taken to the Service Tribunal as it involves civil service terms and conditions. The court deliberated on whether the petition was maintainable under Article 199 and whether the petitioner's claim had merit. It was determined that the grievance wasn't about terms and conditions but about appointment. The court noted that 50 vacancies were advertised, and only 46 candidates were appointed, leaving vacancies. The court, however, rejected the petitioner's claim based on the precedent of a similar case (Ghulam Ahmed and others) where the Supreme Court ruled that no vested right for appointment had been established. In conclusion, the court dismissed Akmal Hussain's petition seeking an Offer Letter for the Section Officer position, citing precedent and the absence of a vested right for his appointment.

Summary: [Tax matters (Conduct of raid u section 175 of I Tax Ord and u/s 38 of Sales Tax Act 1990)]Sales Tax Act & Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 - Power to search premises of a taxpayer under S. 38 of Sales Tax Act and Section 175 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 can only by permitted when "some proceedings" are already pending before the officer.

Summary: [Tort Law, Civil Procedure Code CPC (Damages)] A remedy available to a person under the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, cannot operate as an absolute bar for seeking a remedy under an ordinary civil jurisdiction by filing a suit.The Defendants, who are Employer [Client], Contractor and sub-contractors, respectively, were jointly and severally held liable to pay damages for the negligent acts, which caused the Plaintiff serious injury and partial disability of permanent nature. Damages have been awarded by invoking the principle of composite negligence.