Summary: (Against the order dated 16.03.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in P.T.R. No.260 of 2012). (a) Sale of Goods Act (III of 1930)--- ----S. 4---Sale---Connotation---Sale occurs when ownership of goods is transferred to buyer and payment for such goods has been made---Payment must take the form of money, commonly referred to as price of goods---If ownership of goods is exchanged for anything other than money, such transaction cannot be classified as a sale; instead, it would be considered an exchange or barter. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 112(1), 153(7)(iii), 169 & 177---Amended assessment---Transfer of raw material---Pre-conditions of sale---Taxation officer interpreted transaction concerning transfer of raw materials as a sale and assessed the same under section 169 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Order of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, setting aside amended assessment was maintained by High Court---Validity---Sale of goods as elucidated by section 153 (7) (iii) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 encompasses any transaction in which goods are sold, irrespective of whether payment is made in cash or on credit, and is applicable regardless of the existence of a formal written contract---According to such definition, it is mandated that a sale must involve receipt of consideration, which can be either cash or credit---There was absence of such critical element of consideration with respect to transactions in question---Transactions documented in ledgers merely represented a straightforward transfer of raw materials from one entity to another and was devoid of any characteristics of a sale---Tax obligations outlined in section 153 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 did not pertain to transfer of raw materials to sister concern---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused. Ahmad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Branch Registry Lahore). Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 15th January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Sale of Goods Act (III of 1930)--- ----S. 4---Sale---Connotation---Sale occurs when ownership of goods is transferred to buyer and payment for such goods has been made---Payment must take the form of money, commonly referred to as price of goods---If ownership of goods is exchanged for anything other than money, such transaction cannot be classified as a sale; instead, it would be considered an exchange or barter. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 112(1), 153(7)(iii), 169 & 177---Amended assessment---Transfer of raw material---Pre-conditions of sale---Taxation officer interpreted transaction concerning transfer of raw materials as a sale and assessed the same under section 169 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Order of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, setting aside amended assessment was maintained by High Court---Validity---Sale of goods as elucidated by section 153 (7) (iii) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 encompasses any transaction in which goods are sold, irrespective of whether payment is made in cash or on credit, and is applicable regardless of the existence of a formal written contract---According to such definition, it is mandated that a sale must involve receipt of consideration, which can be either cash or credit---There was absence of such critical element of consideration with respect to transactions in question---Transactions documented in ledgers merely represented a straightforward transfer of raw materials from one entity to another and was devoid of any characteristics of a sale---Tax obligations outlined in section 153 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 did not pertain to transfer of raw materials to sister concern---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused. Ahmad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Branch Registry Lahore). Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 15th January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ----S. 540—Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 40, 46-A & 164—Re-summoning of witnesses—Production of video evidence—Exercise of court’s discretion. The trial court had partly allowed the accused’s application for re-summoning prosecution witnesses Nos. 30 and 31 (Investigation Officer and Superintendent of Police) but directed that they be treated as defence witnesses instead of court witnesses while permitting the accused to produce certain video clips. The High Court (Shariat Appellate Bench) held that S. 540 Cr.P.C. empowers the court to summon or recall any witness at any stage of the trial if his evidence appears essential to the just decision of the case. Such power must, however, be exercised to discover truth—not to fill lacunae. Since the impugned videos allegedly depicted the same prosecution officers, their proper examination was essential for ascertaining authenticity and evidentiary value; hence, they should have been summoned as court witnesses, not as defence witnesses, with both parties having full right of cross-examination. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984—Electronic and video evidence—Admissibility and proof. Evidence obtained through modern devices enjoys statutory recognition under Arts. 46-A and 164, QSO 1984, but may be relied upon only if proved genuine and untampered. Referring to Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2019 SC 675), the court reiterated that: the recording must be proved authentic and free from editing or mimicry; forensic report from PFSA or competent agency is admissible under S. 9(3) of the PFSA Act 2007; the person who recorded the event must be produced and the recording played in open court; safe custody, audibility, identification of voices/persons, and relevance must all be established. Mere playing of a clip without calling the recorder or proving chain of custody carries no evidentiary weight. (c) Nature of criminal justice and right of defence. The criminal justice system, though adversarial in form, is inquisitorial in spirit; the primary duty of the court is to reach a just conclusion. The accused—“a favourite child of law”—cannot be compelled to produce defence evidence nor can the burden of proof be shifted from prosecution. Nevertheless, his right to confront prosecution witnesses and present material discovered in his favour, including video evidence, cannot be curtailed on technical grounds. (d) Modern evidentiary standards—Requirement of corroboration. Video or electronic data may constitute documentary evidence under Art. 2(q) & 46-A QSO 1984 (PLJ 2010 AJK 54, 2000 YLR 448). Yet it must be corroborated by other evidence to ascertain veracity, and the person who recorded the footage is a material witness whose appearance is indispensable. Disposition: Both connected criminal revision petitions disposed of—Impugned order modified—Trial court directed to summon prosecution witnesses Nos. 30 and 31 along with the person who recorded the video as court witnesses—Both sides granted right of cross-examination—Trial court instructed to conclude proceedings expeditiously in accordance with law.

Summary: i. Mere stamp of injuries would hardly qualify for the conviction of an accused as by doing so the Courts of law would deviate from the set pattern which in turn would lead to unfavorable results not for the appellant but for the prosecution as well. The stamp of injuries may indicate the presence of the injured on the spot but that would hardly qualify a witness as a truthful witness and would hardly convince that what the witness spoke was the whole truth. ii. The introduction of this witness was to fill up the lacuna but he failed to fetch the desired results. iii. Right from the beginning till the end the prosecution witnesses fell in dishonest improvements trying to make its case a success but instead they damaged the case beyond repair. Neither the complainant could tell that who prepared the site plan on whose pointation nor the Investigating officer. It was the inconsistency between these witnesses which showered mist over the place of occurrence and even the witnesses could not confirm the venue where the unfortunate incident occurred. iv. Once it is disputed that on whose pointation the site plan was prepared and once the witness was left unexamined then the site plan as a piece of evidence can hardly be taken into consideration. v. If such statement is taken into consideration then this Court is to see that why the human hair found in possession of the deceased collected by the doctor handed over to the Investigating officer was not sent for DNA knowing the fact that it was the best evidence in possession of the prosecution for establishing the identity of the accused. The reluctance on the part of the Investigating officer to transmit the same to the laboratory for DNA is a factor which this Court cannot ignore and in our understanding the Investigating officer did not send the same apprehending that the same would exclude the involvement of the appellant and that his miseries to investigate further would increase. vi. Forensic science assists the law enforcement by providing accurate objective analysis of criminal evidence. It helps to identify the culprit investigate the duration and understanding the nature of the crime forensic research scientists can aid investigators in learning how a crime was committed including what tools were used when the crime occurred and where it occurred. DNA evidence has revolutionized the field of forensic science playing a crucial role in solving homicide cases. By analyzing genetic material found and crime scenes investigators can identify suspects with a high degree of certainty but it requires the strongest will and the desire to bring the actual culprits to books. vii. Here it lies with the prosecution to charge and to prove. We noticed that the prosecution charge hastily but it was lacking the courage to investigate diligently. We do not blame the prosecution as no efforts were made to streamline the way the investigation is made and to encourage the collection of credible evidence which in turn would decide the fate of all concerned. Here much is expected from the Courts and less from the law enforcement agencies instead it is the law enforcement agency which is to collect more and the courts would then appreciate the collected evidence.

Summary: (a) Constitutional Law: ---- Art. 48 – Executive appointment – Role of the President – Whether the President acts as persona designata while making appointments under Section 9 of the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council Ordinance, 1981 – Appointment of Chairman PARC – Held, that the President, while appointing the Chairman of PARC, is bound by the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48 of the Constitution – No legislative intent in the PARC Ordinance suggests that the President exercises this power independently – Court reaffirmed that the pleasure doctrine cannot override constitutional principles of fairness and transparency in executive appointments. ----Cited Cases: • Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhera v. The President (PLD 2020 Islamabad 1) • Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada (1999 SCMR 2189) • Senator Taj Haider v. Government of Pakistan (2018 CLC 1910) • University of the Punjab v. Ch. Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093) (b) Administrative Law: ---- Public Sector Appointments – Tenure of office – Whether tenure can be altered post-appointment – Chairman PARC was appointed based on an Advertisement dated 18.01.2022, which clearly specified a two-year tenure – Subsequent executive action extended tenure to three years by relying on Para 5(3) of the MP Scales Policy, 2020 – Held, that post-appointment changes to tenure violate principles of fairness, transparency, and due process – State must ensure a level playing field for all applicants – Advertisement terms cannot be modified retroactively. ----Cited Cases: • Muhammad Shafeeq v. Federation of Pakistan (2023 PLC(C.S.) 205) • Usmat Batool v. Bahauddin Zakariya University (2013 PLC(C.S.) 484) • Muhammad Yasin v. Federation (PLD 2012 SC 132) • Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana v. Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1159) (c) Public Employment – Transparency in Appointments: ---- Public sector recruitment – Appointment procedure – Compliance with advertised terms – Selection of Chairman PARC did not follow the MP Scales Policy, 2020, as required for MP-1 scale posts – Instead, the selection process followed the 2019 O.M. for Chief Executives of Key Public Sector Enterprises – Held, that the Selection Committee was not properly constituted, making the appointment procedurally flawed – Executive discretion in appointments must be exercised in a structured, non-arbitrary, and transparent manner. ----Cited Cases: • Dr. Naveeda Tufail v. Government of Punjab (2003 SCMR 291) • Barrister Sardar Muhammad v. Federation (PLD 2013 Lahore 343) • Dossani Travels v. Travel Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2014 SC 1) (d) Judicial Review of Executive Discretion ---- Judicial review – Scope – Public interest litigation – Writ of quo warranto – Challenge to Chairman PARC’s appointment – Objections to maintainability based on mala fide intent and laches rejected – Held, that quo warranto petitions can be filed by any person in the public interest and do not require personal grievance – However, courts must assess bona fides of the petitioner – Relief under quo warranto is discretionary and not issued as a matter of course. Cited Cases: • Qazi Hussain Ahmed v. General Parvez Musharraf (PLD 2002 SC 853) • Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Jahangir Khan Tareen (PLD 2018 SC 114) • Jawad Ahmad Mir v. Prof. Dr. Imtaiz Ali Khan (2023 SCMR 162) • Malik Munsif Awan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2021 SC 379) (e) Disposition ---- Appointment of Chairman PARC declared unlawful – O.M. dated 15.03.2024, extending tenure to three years, set aside – Respondent No.6 directed to vacate office immediately – Government ordered to fill the vacancy through a fresh recruitment process following the PARC Ordinance and principles of fairness, transparency, and due process – No recovery ordered for benefits already received by Respondent No.6 during his tenure.

Summary: (a) Income Tax—Classification of Transactions as "Sales" for Taxation Purposes: ----Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, Ss. 122(1), 133(1), 153(6), 177 ----Sale of Goods Act, 1930, S. 4 Definition of "sale"—Essential element of monetary consideration—Transactions between associated companies—Taxpayer transferred raw materials to its sister concern without monetary consideration—Tax authorities treated the transaction as a sale and imposed tax under the presumptive tax regime—Held, a sale occurs when ownership of goods is transferred in exchange for money—If ownership is exchanged for something other than money, the transaction constitutes barter or exchange, not a sale—Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and section 153(7)(iii) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, require the presence of consideration (cash or credit) for a valid sale—Since no monetary consideration was involved, the transaction could not be classified as a sale, and presumptive tax was not applicable. (b) Burden of Proof in Tax Assessments: ----Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, Ss. 122(1), 153(7)(iii) Tax authorities must provide concrete evidence before classifying a transaction as a sale—Mere assumptions or ledger entries without proof of monetary consideration are insufficient—High Court rightly rejected Revenue’s claim, finding no justification for treating inter-company transfers as taxable sales. (c) Taxability of Internal Transfers Within Associated Companies: ----Inter-company transfers without monetary consideration do not fall under section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Tribunal and High Court correctly concluded that these transactions did not trigger withholding tax obligations—Presumptive taxation regime cannot be applied without fulfilling the fundamental legal requirement of consideration in a sale. ----Disposition: Petition dismissed—Leave to appeal refused—Inter-company transfer of raw materials without monetary consideration held to be outside the scope of "sale" under tax laws.

Summary: (a) Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 — S. 27 — Nominee vis-à-vis legal heir — Scope Nomination of a person under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, does not confer proprietary rights upon the nominee after the death of a society member. Legal heirs of the deceased member have superior rights under the law of succession. In the present case, the suit land was originally allotted to Hameed Khan under the Co-operative Farming Scheme. Upon his death, his nominee, Anwar, was entered in the society records, and after Anwar’s death, the petitioner Matloob claimed proprietary rights as his nominee. The High Court held that nomination merely conferred the right to receive money or benefits from the society but did not substitute inheritance rights under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1948. Held, a nominee could not supplant the legal heirs of the original allottee under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, and the proprietary rights should devolve upon the legal heirs of Hameed Khan. Cited Cases: Mst. Amtul Habib and others v. Mst. Musarrat Parveen and others (1974 SCMR 185) Fazal Shah v. Muhammad Din and others (1990 SCMR 868) Manzoor Ahmad v. Mst. Salman Bibi and others (1998 SCMR 388) Muhammad Bakhsh v. Mst. Ghulam Fatima (2007 SCMR 1227) (b) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1948 — Inheritance — Legal heirs' entitlement Nomination under a co-operative society’s byelaws does not affect inheritance rights under Shariah. Petitioner Matloob, being a nominee, could not inherit the suit land as the proprietary rights vested in the legal heirs of Hameed Khan by operation of law. The High Court correctly applied the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1948, which mandated that upon the death of a member, his estate devolves upon his heirs in accordance with Islamic inheritance principles. (c) Administration of Justice — Fraud — Effect of fraud on property rights Petitioner Matloob was not born at the time of the original allotment in 1948, yet he claimed membership rights in the society. The Court found that incorrect entries in the society records were manipulated to deprive the legal heirs of Hameed Khan. Fraud vitiates all proceedings. Held, no proprietary rights could be conferred upon the petitioner based on fraudulent claims, and the petition was dismissed accordingly. Disposition: Petition dismissed — Leave to appeal refused. This version keeps the legal tone intact while correcting formatting issues. Let me know if you need further refinements!

Summary: (a) Administrative Law – Appointment to Public Office – Tenure Determination ----Public office appointments must be made strictly in accordance with the advertised terms and conditions----Where an advertisement explicitly states the tenure of office, the executive cannot subsequently alter the duration post-appointment----The extension of tenure beyond the advertised period violates the principles of fairness, transparency, and due process. Cited Cases: Muhammad Shafeeq vs. Federation of Pakistan (2023 PLC(C.S.) 205) Usmat Batool vs. Bahauddin Zakariya University (2013 PLC(C.S.) 484) (b) Constitutional Law – Role of the President in Executive Appointments – Article 48 of the Constitution ----The President, while appointing public officeholders under a statute, is bound to act on the advice of the Prime Minister and does not have independent discretion unless expressly provided----The appointment of the Chairman PARC under Section 9 of the PARC Ordinance must conform to constitutional requirements and cannot be treated as an exclusive presidential prerogative. Cited Cases: Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhera vs. The President (PLD 2020 Islamabad 1) University of the Punjab vs. Ch. Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093) (c) Executive Discretion – Judicial Review of Policy Decisions ----Courts have the authority to review executive decisions where they violate principles of due process, transparency, and fairness----Judicial restraint does not apply where the question pertains to the legality of a public appointment rather than a mere policy decision. Cited Cases: Muhammad Yasin vs. Federation (PLD 2012 SC 132) Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana vs. Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1159) (d) Quo Warranto – Challenge to Public Office Holders – Locus Standi ----A writ of quo warranto may be filed by any member of the public to question the legality of a public officeholder's appointment----Courts can deny relief if the petition is filed with mala fide intent, but mere delay in filing does not bar maintainability unless bad faith is demonstrated. Cited Cases: Qazi Hussain Ahmed vs. General Parvez Musharraf (PLD 2002 SC 853) Jawad Ahmad Mir vs. Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan (2023 SCMR 162) (e) Fair Competition in Public Sector Appointments – Non-Alteration of Advertisement Terms ----The government must adhere to the advertised tenure and selection criteria for public sector appointments----Modifying the tenure post-appointment undermines transparency and may deprive other candidates of an equal opportunity to compete. Cited Cases: Muhammad Yasin vs. Federation (PLD 2012 SC 132) Dr. Naveeda Tufail vs. Government of Punjab (2003 SCMR 291) Disposition: Petition allowed. The extension of tenure for respondent No.6 beyond the advertised two-year period was declared unlawful. The appointment was deemed expired, and the office of Chairman PARC was declared vacant. The government was directed to fill the position afresh in accordance with legal requirements.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---Sections 195, 476, 480, 485, 487; Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 174--- Procedure for trial of offenses under Sections 172 to 188, PPC---Scope and limitations---The appellant, a Station House Officer (SHO), was convicted under Section 174, PPC, by the Additional Sessions Judge for failing to produce an accused in compliance with a court order. Held, offenses under Sections 172 to 188, PPC, fall within the purview of Section 195, Cr.P.C., which prescribes that such offenses cannot be tried without a written complaint from the public servant concerned or a competent court. The Additional Sessions Judge was not legally authorized to directly convict and sentence the appellant. Instead, the complaint should have been forwarded to a Magistrate with jurisdiction for trial under the prescribed procedure. (b) Judicial authority and contempt of court ---Scope of powers under Sections 480 and 485, Cr.P.C.---Offenses such as refusal to produce a document or answer questions (Sections 175 and 179, PPC) can attract the summary procedure under Sections 480 and 485, Cr.P.C., allowing the court to impose up to seven days’ imprisonment. However, Section 174, PPC, does not fall within this framework, and its trial requires adherence to the procedure under Chapter XX of Cr.P.C. (c) Restriction on judicial powers ---Section 487, Cr.P.C.---Judges and Magistrates (except High Court Judges) are barred from directly trying offenses under Section 195, Cr.P.C., committed before themselves or in contempt of their authority. In such cases, the Judge or Magistrate must refer the matter to a competent Magistrate for trial. ----- Disposition: Conviction and sentence under Section 174, PPC, set aside as unlawful. The Additional Sessions Judge may initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with the prescribed legal procedure.

Summary: Summary pending