Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Accused were charged for committing murder of the father of complainant by firing---Ocular account had been furnished by complainant/son and brother of the deceased---Case of the complainant was that his father received the fire shot when he was present at the door of his cattle-shed/haveli while the stance of other witness was that there was cattle-shed/haveli of the deceased adjacent to the place of occurrence and deceased received the fire shot when he was present at a raised platform---Circumstances established that the prosecution could not prove its case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Presence of the complainant at the spot not proved---Accused were charged for committing murder of the father of complainant by firing---Complainant deposed that the deceased in injured condition was shifted to the police station on a motorcycle---Clothes of complainant were stained with the blood of deceased while shifting to the police station but admittedly no such blood-stained clothes of the complainant/eye-witness had been secured or produced by Investigating Officer---In these circumstances, it was concluded that complainant produced by the prosecution was not reliable and in all likelihood he had not witnessed the murder in issue---Appellant mounted assault as per prosecution's own case to settle score with complainant for allegedly having exchange of hot words with him---Site plan positions would show that complainant, the other witnesses and the deceased were at the mercy of the appellant but being the prime target even no threat was extended to complainant---As per prosecution's own case the appellant and complainant were face to face at the time of occurrence and said witness was well within the view and reach of appellant but astonishingly the appellant let the said witness go unhurt who was the prime target of assault---No other inference could be drawn from such circumstances other than that either said witness was not present at the scene or the occurrence took place in a backdrop other than the one narrated in the FIR---If any such altercation took place between the appellant and complainant then the prime target for the appellant should have been the said witness---Circumstances established that the prosecution could not prove its case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. Mst. Mir Zalai v. Ghazi Khan and others 2020 SCMR 319; Rafaqat Ali alias Foji and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1579; Mst. Rukhsana Begum and others v. Sajjad and others 2017 SCMR 596; Waris Ali and 5 others v. The State 2017 SCMR 1572 and Tariq Mehmood v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 1170 rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Night time occurrence---No source of light mentioned in FIR---Accused were charged for committing murder of the father of complainant by firing---Record showed that it was a night time occurrence and no source of light had been mentioned in the FIR, so there were chances of mistaken identity of the accused---Circumstances established that the prosecution could not prove its case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Motive not proved---Accused were charged for committing murder of the father of complainant by firing---Motive behind the occurrence was that on a few occasions before the occurrence, hot words were exchanged between the complainant and the appellant and due to that revenge, the appellant committed murder of his father---As per complainant, the place of motive incident was a very busy place but as conceded by him, he had not mentioned the name of any eye-witness regarding the motive incident---Even no detail of motive as to on what issue the hot words were exchanged between them was given by the complainant--- Investigating Officer also narrated during cross-examination that no witness joined the investigation before him in support of the motive, narrated by the complainant in the FIR---No independent witness qua motive was brought in the witness box at the time of trial---Therefore, the prosecution had not been able to substantiate alleged motive against the appellant---Circumstances established that the prosecution could not prove its case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.103---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery of weapon of offence---Accused were charged for committing murder of the father of complainant by firing---Record showed that .12-bore repeater gun was recovered at the instance of appellant which was taken into possession---Said recovery was inconsequential for the reason that the prosecution had failed to associate any independent witness of the locality as was evident from the recovery memo, which bore the signatures of the Police Officials as recovery witnesses---Thus, the mandatory provisions of S.103, Cr.P.C. had flagrantly been violated in that regard---Circumstances established that the prosecution could not prove its case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly. Muhammad Ismail and others v. The State 2017 SCMR 898 rel. (f) Criminal trial--- ----Medical evidence---Scope---Medical evidence is just a corroborative piece of evidence and can only give details about the locale, dimension, kind of weapon used, the duration between injury and medical examination or death and autopsy, etc. and never identifies the real assailant. Munawar Ali alias Munawar Hussain v. The State PLD 1993 SC 251; Machia and others v. State PLD 1976 SC 695 and Muhammad Jahangir and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1741 rel. (g) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Prosecution has to prove its case against the accused by standing on its own legs and it cannot take any benefit from the weaknesses of the case of the defence. (h) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If there is a single circumstance which creates doubt regarding the prosecution case, the same will be sufficient to give benefit of doubt to the accused. Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel. Muhammad Irfan Malik for the Appellant. Munir Ahmad Sial, Addl. Prosecutor General for the State. Muhammad Ihsan Gondal for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 17th February, 2025. Judgment Sardar Akbar Ali, J .--- Muhammad Amjad (appellant) along with his co-accused namely Muhammad Usman was tried by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhalwal in case FIR No.104 dated 29.02.2020, offence under Sections 302 and 34, P.P.C registered at Police Station Bhera District Sargodha for the murder of Muhammad Farooq (deceased) father of complainant. Vide judgment dated 18.11.2021 passed by the learned trial court, the appellant has been convicted under Section 302(b), P.P.C and sentenced to death, with a further direction to pay Rs. 10,00,000/- as compensation under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C. to the legal heirs of deceased. Through the same judgment, the above named co-accused of the appellant was acquitted of the charge by extending him benefit of doubt. Assailing the above conviction and sentence, the appellant has filed Crl. Appeal No.73258 of 2021 whereas the learned trial court has sent Murder Reference No.204 of 2021 for confirmation or otherwise of appellant's sentence of death, as required under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The complainant has also preferred Crl. Appeal No.77038 of 2021 against acquittal of co-accused of the appellant. Since all these matters have arisen out of the same judgment, therefore, are being decided together through this single judgment. 2. Prosecution story, as set out in the FIR (Ex.PB/1) registered on the written application (Ex.PD) of Muhammad Zahid, complainant (PW.8) is that on 29.02.2020 at about 08:30 p.m. he along with his father Muhammad Farooq was present in front of his house. Amjad Dogar (appellant) armed with repeater .12 bore and Usman Dogar armed with pistol .30 bore along with an unknown co-accused armed with firearm weapons came there. Amjad Dogar raised lalkara to teach a lesson to the complainant party and made a fire with his repeater .12 bore at the father of the complainant, with intention to kill him, which landed on his back, who fell down. Having heard report of firing and voice of quarrel, Muhammad Qadeer and Zulfiqar PWs attracted to the spot while witnessing the occurrence and on seeing them, all the three accused persons fled away toward north by waving their weapons and making aerial firing. The motive behind the occurrence as alleged in the FIR was that a few times earlier to the occurrence, hot words were exchanged between the complainant and Amjad (appellant) near Chak Wala Darwaza and due to that revenge, the accused persons committed the instant occurrence. The father of the complainant succumbed to the injury at DHQ Hospital, Sargodha on 02.03.2020 and Section 324, P.P.C was substituted with Section 302, P.P.C. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties as well as the learned Law Officer for the State at a considerable length and have also gone through the record very minutely. 4. The ocular account in this case has been furnished before the learned trial court by Zahid, complainant (PW.8) and Muhammad Zulfiqar (PW.9), who were closely related to the deceased being his son and brother respectively and were interested witnesses. It was case of the complainant before the learned trial court during his cross-examination that his father received the fire shot when he was present in the door of his cattle-shed/haveli while the stance of Muhammad Zulfiqar (PW.9) was that there was cattle-shed/haveli of the deceased adjacent to the place of occurrence and his brother (deceased) received the fire shot when he was present at raised plate farm (thara) whereas according to the rough site plan (Ex.PP), prepared by Muhammad Yousaf, S.I/I.O. (PW.7) on the pointing out of the PWs, the deceased received fire shot at point No.1, from where blood stained earth was also collected by the I.O. which is an abundant house of one Muhammad Akram. Zahid (PW-8) during cross-examination deposed that "the deceased in injured condition was shifted to the police station on a motorcycle. My clothes were stained with the blood of deceased while shifting in the police station" but admittedly no such blood-stained clothes of the said eye-witness had been secured or produced by Muhammad Yousaf, Sub Inspector (PW-7). In these circumstances, it is concluded that PW-8 produced by the prosecution was not reliable and in all likelihood he had not witnessed the murder in issue. Reliance is placed on case laws titled as "Mst. Mir Zalai v. Ghazi Khan and others" (2020 SCMR 319) and "Rafaqat Ali alias Foji and another v. The State and others" (2024 SCMR 1579). Moreover, it was a night time occurrence and no source of light has been mentioned in the FIR, so there are chances of mistaken identity of the accused. The motive behind the occurrence was that a few times earlier to the occurrence, hot words were exchanged between the complainant and the appellant at Chak Wala Darwaza and due to that revenge, the appellant committed murder of his father. The appellant mounted assault, as per prosecution's own case to settle score with Zahid, complainant (PW-8) for allegedly having exchange of hot words with him. The site plan positions would show that complainant (PW-8), the other PWs and the deceased were at the mercy of the appellant but being the prime target even no threat was extended to complainant (PW-8). As per prosecution's own case the appellant and Zahid (PW-8) were face to face at the time of occurrence and said witness was well within the view and reach of appellant but astonishingly the appellant let the said witness go unhurt who was the prime target of assault. No other inference could be drawn from such circumstances other than that either said witness was not present at the scene or the occurrence took place in a backdrop other than narrated in the FIR. If any such altercation took place between the appellant and Zahid (PW-8) then the prime target for the appellant should be to kill the said witness. Reliance is placed on case law titled as "Mst. Rukhsana Begum and others v. Sajjad and others" (2017 SCMR 596), "Waris Ali and 5 others v. The State" (2017 SCMR 1572) and "Tariq Mehmood v. The State and others" (2019 SCMR 1170). As per complainant, the place of motive incident was a very busy place but as conceded by him, he has not mentioned the name of any eye-witness regarding the motive incident. Even no detail of motive as to on what issue the hot words were exchanged between them, was given by the complainant. The I.O. (PW.7) also narrated during cross-examination that no witness joined the investigation before him in support of the motive, narrated by the complainant in the FIR. We have also noted that no independent witness qua motive was brought in the witness box at the time of trial. Therefore, in our view, the prosecution has not been able to substantiate alleged motive against the appellant. So far as the alleged recovery of .12 bore repeater gun (P.5) at the instance of appellant which was taken into possession vide recovery memo. (Ex.PF) is concerned, the same is inconsequential for the reason that the prosecution has failed to associate any independent witness of the locality as is evident from the recovery memo. (Ex.PF), which bears the signatures of the police officials as recovery witnesses. Thus, the mandatory provisions of Section 103, Cr.P.C. had flagrantly been violated in that regard. Reliance may be placed on case law titled as "Muhammad Ismail and others v. The State" (2017 SCMR 898). Considering overall circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the eye-witnesses were not present on the spot at relevant time and had not witnessed the occurrence. 5. The medical evidence produced by the prosecution was not of much avail to the prosecution because the murder in issue had remained unwitnessed and, thus, the medical evidence could not point an accusing finger towards any of the culprit implicated in this case. Even otherwise, medical evidence is just a corroborative piece of evidence and could only give details about the locale, dimension, kind of weapon used, the duration between injury and medical examination or death and autopsy, etc, but never identify the real assailant. In the case "Munawar Ali alias Munawar Hussain v. The State (PLD 1993 SC 251) the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan held that:- "Medical evidence is corroboration to show that injuries were caused in a particular manner with particular weapon and even it can supply corroboration to the fact as to how many assailants there were and whether number of injuries is commensurate with number of assailants or not, but medical evidence can never be used as corroboration qua accused to show that particular accused has caused these injuries can never name the accused, that is, from the injuries alone it cannot be said who had inflicted those injuries." The cases "Machia and others v. State" (PLD 1976 SC 695) and "Muhammad Jahangir and another v. The State and others" (2024 SCMR 1741) are also to the same effect. 6. So far as the defence plea taken by the appellant in his statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, since the prosecution evidence is doubtful in nature, therefore, there is no need to discuss the same which is exculpatory in nature. 7. We have considered all the pros and cons of this case and have come to this irresistible conclusion that the prosecution could not prove its case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt. It is, by now well established principle of law that it is the prosecution, which has to prove its case against the accused by standing on its own legs and it cannot take any benefit from the weaknesses of the case of the defence. In the instant case, the prosecution remained failed to discharge its responsibility of proving the case against the appellant. It is also well established that if there is a single circumstance which creates doubt regarding the prosecution case, the same is sufficient to give benefit of doubt to the accused, whereas, the instant case is replete with number of circumstances which have created serious doubt about the prosecution story. In this regard, reliance may be place on the case law reported as "Muhammad Akram v. The State" (2009 SCMR 230). 8. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal in hand filed by Muhammad Amjad (appellant) is allowed, conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant vide judgment dated 18.11.2021 passed by the learned trial court are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge levelled against him while extending him benefit of doubt. The appellant is in jail. He shall be released forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case. 9. Murder Reference No.204 of 2021 is answered in the NEGATIVE and the sentence of death awarded to Muhammad Amjad (convict) is NOT CONFIRMED. 10. In view of above discussion, Crl. Appeal No.77038 of 2021 filed by the complainant against acquittal of Muhammad Usman, respondent No.1, having no merits is dismissed. JK/M-38/L Appeal allowed.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act ( IX of 1908)--- ----S. 5---Limitation--- Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause--- Scope ---Delay of each day in approaching the court for filing a lis or an appeal etc. against the order etc. has to be explained --- In the present case, the appellants' attorney has miserably failed to account for the delay of each day in filing the appeal--- Appellants' failure in contacting their advocate or pursuing the matter posits indolence and negligence on their part for which the opposing party cannot be penalized nor certain rights created in their favour thus taken away---Law of limitation has to be construed in strict sense because due to negligence and indolence of one party in pursuing the matter in the court, the valuable rights are accrued in favour of the other party which cannot be done away with on flimsy and unsubstantiated grounds---Delay in filing appeal etc. against the order etc. cannot be condoned without being satisfied about validity and sufficiency of the grounds raised for condonation of such delay--- In the present case, the vague and generalized statement has been given by the attorney in his affidavit regarding gaining knowledge of the dismissal of the suit---Appellants who have purportedly executed power of attorney in favour of their attorney have not come forward to file affidavits confirming the story narrated by their attorney---There is nothing on record to show as to why for a long time the appellants failed to pursue the case and did not produce evidence despite so many chances given by the Single Judge of this /High Court--- Thus, the appeal was hopelessly time barred---High Court dismissed application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 --- Appeal, being time barred, was dismissed accordingly. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ---- S. 5 --- Limitation --- Condonation of delay --- Sufficient cause---Instances --- A counsel's neglect to inform his client about fate of the case would not per se be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay when valuable rights accrue in favour of opposition party---Ground of living of the petitioner in a far off village and his lack of knowledge regarding dismissal of the appeal by High Court being a matter purely between him and his counsel, cannot be considered a sufficient ground for condonation of delay---Non supply of cause list to counsel for a party would not constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay in absence of affidavit of the person concerned---On account of dismissal of the suit, valuable rights accrued in favour of defendants which could not be taken away unless justifiable strong and convincing cause was shown to the court. Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others 1974 SCMR 223; Ahmed Din v. Ghulam Muhammad through legal heirs and others 2000 SCMR 647; Mst. Hajra Bibi and others v. Abdul Ghani 2002 SCMR 1405 and Irshad Ahmed v. Pervez Akhtar and others 2000 MLD 1 ref. Muhammad Taseer Khan and M. Amin Motiwala for Appellants. Fahad Hussain for Respondents. Syed Hussain Shah, A.A.G. Date of hearing: 17th February, 2025. Judgment Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro, J .--- Appellants filed a suit before this court on original side against respondents for declaration, cancellation and permanent injunction seeking following reliefs:- A. For a Declaration that the Suit property has always been and is still the property of the partnership firm/plaintiff No.3, and that the deceased defendant No.3 was never the sole or absolute owner of the Suit property: B. For a Declaration that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the lawful co-owners of the Suit property having 1/3rd share each therein, and that the remaining 1/3rd share in the Suit property belongs to the defendants 2(a) to 3(h) being the legal heirs of the deceased defendant No.3: C. For a Declaration that the defendants 3(a) to 3(h) had no right, power, authority or locus standi to enter into any Agreement in respect of the Suit property with the defendant No.2, and that such Agreement was mala fide, collusive and void ab initio; D. For a Declaration that the defendants 3(a) to 3(h) had no right, power, authority or locus standi to transfer or convey the rights, title or interest in the Suit property in favour of the defendant No.2, and that the defendant No.2 has not acquired any right title or interest whatsoever in the Suit property: E. For a Declaration that the alleged transfer of the Suit property in the name of the defendant No.2 by the defendant No.4 is illegal and void abinitio, and similarly, the alleged sale and/or transfer of the Suit property by the defendant No.2 in favour of the defendant No.1 and to defendants Nos. 6 to 11 is also illegal and void ab inios; F. For Cancellation of the alleged Sale Deed of the Suit property in favour of the defendant No.2, and/or all such Agreement/Deeds transferring the Suit property in favour of the defendants Nos. 1, 6 to 11 and/or in favour of any third party: G. For Permanent Injunction restraining the defendants 1,2 and 3(a) to 3(g), 6 to 11 from claiming any right, title or interest in the Suit property, and/or from raising construction thereon, and/or from creating any type of third party interest therein. The defendants 4 and 5 may also be restrained from transferring the Suit property in favour of the defendant No.1 and/or in favour of any third party; H. For any other / additional relief(s) that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case; and I. Costs of the Suit. 2. In response to a notice, respondents filed written statement contesting merits and challenging maintainability of the suit. However, issues were framed and appellants were called upon to lead evidence but they failed to respond. Finally, on 06.12.2019, noting consistent and regular absence of the appellants demonstrating lack of interest on their part to produce evidence, learned single judge of this court proceeded to dismiss the suit for want of evidence vide impugned order dated 06.12.2019 and decree drawn on 13.12.2019. This order and decree have been challenged by the appellants through the instant appeal filed on 13.07.2020 after the limitation of 20 days prescribed under Article 151 of Limitation Act for filing appeal from the decree or order of the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Seeking condonation of delay in filing appeal, the appellants have filed an application under section 5 of Limitation Act supported by affidavit filed by attorney of appellants namely Sadiq. 3. A perusal of his affidavit shows that the reason for filing the appeal with delay is absence of the appellants from the country and their living in Dubai since long. In the said backdrop, attorney of the appellants has alleged that when on 19.06.2020 he was passing by the area, he found the building and houses standing on the property No.86 situated in Depot Lines/N.I. Lines Cantonment Area, Karachi (Suit property) were demolished by the respondents, hence he immediately informed appellant No.2 who instructed him to contact his advocate Mr. Raja Qureshi. On inquiry, he was found long dead and no one left to attend his cases, hence he rushed to the relevant staff of the court, who informed him about dismissal of the suit by the impugned order for want of evidence. Then, after getting special power of attorney from the appellants, on their instructions, he filed the appeal after obtaining certified true copies of the order and decree. It is further stated in the supporting affidavit that before dismissal of the suit, no notice was issued to the appellants to appear and produce evidence and since the appellants were residing in Dubai, they were not aware of either death of their advocate or process of the court requiring their appearance for evidence. It is further stated that the subject property is owned by M/s Charan Enterprises, appellant No.3 which is a partnership firm formed by appellants Nos.1 and 2 and the deceased Muhammad Ismail, the predecessor of respondents. The suit property was not the sole and absolute property of deceased Muhammad Ismail as alleged by respondents, therefore, limitation would not be a hurdle in the case to defeat merits of the case. This application under section 5 of Limitation Act has been vehemently opposed by the respondents by filing written objections to it. 4. Learned counsel for appellants in his arguments has reiterated the grounds already encapsulated in supporting affidavit of the attorney of the appellants. While, his arguments have been opposed by learned counsel for respondents. 5. We have considered submissions of the parties and perused material available on record. Admittedly under Article 151 of Limitation Act, period for filing the appeal against an order or a judgment of High Court exercising original jurisdiction is 20 days. The impugned order was passed on 06.12.2019 and then on 13.12.2019 the decree was drawn. An application for obtaining certified true copies thereof was filed on 11.07.2020 which is almost after seven months of the order and decree. The grounds to justify such delay postulated by attorney in his affidavit is that the appellants are residing in Dubai and were not in contact with their counsel Mr. Raja Qureshi, who had assured them of looking after their interest in the suit in their absence and intimate them if their presence was ever required for evidence. These facts however, have been stated by the attorney in his own affidavit and not by the appellants themselves through affidavits. Although, the attorney has filed special power of Attorney but to support his aforesaid statement, has not filed the affidavits of appellants to the effect that they were not aware of either death of their advocate or the dismissal of the suit for want of their evidence. If the attorney can file the power of attorney executed by the appellants living in Dubai, he could have easily filed their affidavits to support the facts narrated by him. Failure to do so has cast a dark spell on the story revealed by the attorney in his affidavit. 6. Not the least, when nothing has been brought on record to establish that appellants Nos. 1 and 2's permanent residence in Dubai. Prima facie no documentary evidence in this regard has been filed to support such fact. Besides, the story narrated by the attorney that on 19.06.2020 when he passed by the suit property, he found the same to have been demolished by the respondents is not without a suspicion in that he has not provided substantial details in this regard relating to the time when he was passing by the property and the reason of his visiting the same area on that particular day and whether he was alone or in company of some body, and he was travelling in a vehicle or walking through it. It is also strange to note that he got alarmed on seeing the suit property, when admittedly he was neither party nor was even acting as attorney in the suit on behalf of the appellants. Even his own affidavit does not suggest that he had any knowledge about pendency of the suit between the parties. 7. Without having any nexus or interest in the suit property, attorney of the appellants getting alarmed on seeing the suit property that too by chance does not seem credible enough to believe him. Particularly in the context when he has neither described the reason of his visit nor other details as to why on that particular day he happened to be in the area leading him to spot its demolition and causing him alarm. That said, his statement: he saw the property having been demolished by the respondents on 29.06.2020 is generalized in tenor and at the best vague for want of necessary details. 8. It is a settled proposition of law that delay of each day in approaching the court for filing a lis or an appeal etc. against the order etc. has to be explained. In this case, the appellants' attorney has miserably failed to account for the delay of each day in filing the appeal. Appellants' failure in contacting their advocate or pursuing the matter posits indolence and negligence on their part for which the opposing party cannot be penalized nor certain rights created in their favour thus taken away. 9. The Supreme Court in case of Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others (1974 SCMR 223) has laid down that even a counsel's neglect to inform his client about fate of the case would not per se be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay when valuable rights accrue in favour of opposition party. In the case of Ahmed Din v. Ghulam Muhammad through legal heirs and others (2000 SCMR 647), the Supreme Court has held that petitioner's ground of living in a far off village and his lack of knowledge regarding dismissal of the appeal by High Court was a matter purely between him and his counsel, cannot be considered a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. In the case of Mst. Hajra Bibi and others v. Abdul Ghani (2002 SCMR 1405), it has been held that non supply of cause list to counsel for a party would not constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay in absence of affidavit of the person concerned. Finally, in the case of Irshad Ahmed v. Pervez Akhter and others (2000 MLD 1), a Division Bench of this court has held that on account of dismissal of the suit, valuable rights accrue in favour of defendants which could not be taken away unless justifiable strong and convincing cause was shown to the court. 10. The reason to cite aforementioned case law on the point is to emphasize that the law of Limitation has to be construed in strict sense because due to negligence and indolence of one party in pursuing the matter in the court, the valuable rights are accrued in favour of the other party which cannot be done away with on flimsy and unsubstantiated grounds. The superior courts have been very strict in condoning the delay in filing appeal etc. against the order etc. without being satisfied about validity and sufficiency of the grounds raised for condonation of such delay. 11. In this matter as observed above, the vague and generalized statement has been given by the attorney in his affidavit regarding gaining knowledge of the dismissal of the suit. The appellants who have purportedly executed power of attorney in favour of their attorney have not come forward to file affidavits confirming the story narrated by their attorney. Then, there is nothing on record to show as to why for a long time the appellants failed to pursue the case and did not produce evidence despite given so many chances by the learned Single Judge of this court. This and in the light of reasons given supra, We, find this appeal hopelessly time barred. Consequently, we dismiss application under section 5 of Limitation Act and as a result dismiss the appeal being time barred along with pending applications. The appeal is accordingly disposed of along with pending applications. MQ/S-25/Sindh Appeal dismissed.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 19.07.2024 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in C.R.No.365-P of 2024) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss. 14 & 17---West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance (II of 1962), S.18---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 14---Condonation of delay-- -Wrong appellate forum---Petitioner/authorities were aggrieved of award being made rule of the Court, and preferred appeal before High Court but the same was dismissed for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction---Lower Appellate Court and High Court declined to condone the delay caused due to filing of appeal before High Court---Validity---Delay of time in filing of appeal, application or suit may be condoned but subject to plausible and reasonable explanation---One who seeks condonation of delay has to explain each and every day's delay---Petitioner/authorities could not put-forward reasonable and plausible justification/explanation for filing appeal after about two years of passing of judgment and decree by Trial Court---Earlier appeal filed before High Court was not a reasonable justification---Petitioner/ authorities could not claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant---Time consumed in pursuing appeal in wrong forum could not be condoned under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Time spent in pursuing proceedings before wrong appellate forum could not be excluded for the purposes of filing of an appeal---If appeal was barred by time, provisions of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908, could only be invoked, that too, by showing sufficient cause---Forum of appeal was regulated by jurisdictional value in plaint---In presence of section 18 of West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 there could be no doubt or complication to determine forum of appeal-- -Provisions of sections 5 and 14 of Limitation Act, 1908 would come into play only if delay appeared to be condonable because of the petitioners/authorities prosecuting their case with due diligence---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High asCourt---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Messrs SKB-SNK Joint Venture Contractors through Regional Director v. Water and Power Development Authority and others 2022 SCMR 1615; East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darfi and others 1970 SCMR 558; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rais Pir Ahmad Khan 1981 SCMR 37; Federation of Pakistan v. Niaz Ahmad 1997 SCMR 959; Mst. Khadija Begum and 2 others v. Mst. Yasmeen and 4 others PLD 2001 SC 355; Dr. Syed Sibtain Raza Naqvi v. Hydrocarbon Development and others 2012 SCMR 377; Ghulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor and another PLD 1991 SC 957; Abdul Ghani v. Mst. Mussarat Rehana 1985 CLC 2529; Government of Pakistan v. Rafi Associates Limited 1985 CLC 2234; Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar PLD 1977 SC 102; Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another v. Syed Sirajuddin 1998 SCMR 2296; Raja Karamatullah and 3 others v. Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sukhera 1999 SCMR 1892; Akhtar Nasir Ahmed v. Province of Punjab through District Collector Gujrat and others PLD 2024 SC 1268; Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872; Chief Executive Officer NPGCL, Genco-III, TPS, Muzaffargarrah v. Khalid Umar Tariq Imran and others 2024 SCMR 518; Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region and others v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari 2024 SCMR 1021; Kiramat Khan v. IG, Frontier Corp and others 2023 SCMR 866 and Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad and another PLD 2008 SC 462 rel. Shah Faisal Ilyas, A.A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th February, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 06.03.2024 passed by Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench in R.F.A.No. 53-D of 2020 with C.M. No. 31-D of 2020). Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)--- ----S. 4---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 17(2)(a)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for recovery of money---Promissory note, non-attestation of---Evasive denial---Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Suit filed by respondent/plaintiff was decreed by both the Courts below in his favour and against the petitioner/defendant---Validity---Promissory note, under section 4 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is required to contain four essential ingredients: (i) an unconditional undertaking to pay; (ii) the sum should be the sum of money and certain; (iii) the payment should be to or to the order of a person who is certain, or to the bearer of the instrument; and (iv) the maker should sign it---If an instrument fulfills such four conditions, it is called a promissory note---Requirement of attestation of a document provided under Article 17(2)(a) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 does not apply to promissory note---Petitioner/defendant took a vague stance and evasively denied allegations so made by the respondent/plaintiff as to his claim against petitioner/defendant---Such denial without any substantive proof could not be considered and approved---Trial Court and High Court minutely appreciated and evaluated pleadings of parties and had assessed evidence on the principle of preponderance---Both the Court below reached to a just conclusion that petitioner/defendant failed to successfully overturn the stand taken by respondent/plaintiff against him---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by two Courts below in favor of respondent/plaintiff---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused. Sheikh Muhammad Shakeel v. Sheikh Hafiz Muhammad Aslam 2014 SCMR 1562 and Muhammad Ashraf v. Abdul Ghafoor and 4 others 1999 SCMR 2633 rel. Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Sheikh Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Burhan Latif Khaisori, Advocate Supreme Court for legal heirs of Respondent. Date of hearing: 17th February, 2025.

Summary: Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 74 & 76---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 151 & O.XIII, R. 2---Suit for recovery of money---Secondary evidence---Loss of original documents---Due diligence---Proof---Plaintiff/applicant sought permission to produce secondary evidence with regard to documents in question which were claimed to be lost---Validity---Plaintiff/applicant could not claim benefit of Art. 76(c) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Loss of original documents was not due to uncontrollable or unforeseeable event but rather resulted from plaintiff's/applicant's own internal mismanagement---Allowing secondary evidence under such conditions would undermine the principle that parties must exercise proper care in preserving documentary evidence, particularly when such documents form basis of a legal claim---Request of plaintiff/applicant to rely on secondary evidence under Art. 76(c) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was legally unsustainable and could not be entertained---Protection of Art. 76(c) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 is not granted mechanically or routinely; it is contingent upon the party demonstrating that loss of documents occurred despite exercising reasonable care and was not due to its own negligence---Plaintiff's casual assertion of loss, without any accompanying evidence of efforts to prevent or mitigate such loss, indicated lack of due diligence---Such plea was only raised when Evidence Commissioner refused to exhibit photocopies of documents concerned---High Court declined producing of secondary evidence of documents in question as plaintiff/applicant was treating invocation of Art. 76(c) of Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984, as an afterthought rather than a legitimate legal entitlement---Application was dismissed, in circumstances. Akhtar Sultana v. Muzaffar Khan Malik PLD 2021 SC 715; Khurshid Begum v. Chiragh Muhammad 1995 SCMR 1237; Gujranwala Development Authority v. Muhammad Hussain 2001 YLR 1884; Amirzada Khan v. Ahmad Noor PLD 2003 SC 410 and Noor Jehan v. Saleem Shahadat 2022 SCMR 918 ref. Iftikhar Ahmad v. Muhammad Younus Khan 1982 CLC 2114; Ghulam Ali v. Muhammad Hussain Kathawala PLD 1985 Kar. 152; Javed Rafat Khan v. Shabbir Tiles PLD 2005 Kar. 1 and Uzma Aziz v. Maryam PLD 2006 Kar. 58 rel. Faiz Durrani for Plaintiff. Abdallah Azzaam Naqvi for Defendant. Dates of hearing: 11th, 22nd December, 2023, 18th March, 2024 and 10th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ----S. 497(5)---Cancellation of bail---Scope---Principles for interference with bail orders---Petitioner sought cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to respondents in a case under Ss. 324, 109 & 34 PPC---Held, once bail is granted by a competent court, it can only be recalled on strong and exceptional grounds---Petitioner failed to press or prove any recognized grounds such as misuse of bail, tampering with evidence, threat to prosecution witnesses, likelihood of absconsion, or emergence of fresh incriminating evidence---Impugned order granting bail held to be neither perverse nor legally infirm---Petition dismissed. Cited Case Law: • Sami Ullah and another v. Laiq Zada and others (2022 SCMR 1115) • Shahid Arshad v. Muhammad Naqi Butt and others (1976 SCMR 360) (b) Penal Code, 1860 ----Ss. 324, 109, 34---Attempted murder---Bail---Grant of pre-arrest bail---Previous litigation and family enmity---FIR registered by complainant alleged that respondents forcibly abducted and injured his daughter by firearm---Held, investigation revealed prior enmity and cross-cases between parties---Respondents produced CDR data showing most of them were not present at the crime scene---Accused had already joined investigation and no further custody was required---Allegations in FIR, though grave, required deeper probe---Pre-arrest bail rightly granted by trial court. (c) Bail---Bail once granted---Cancellation---Effect of liberty ----Principle---Held, bail once granted gives rise to presumption of liberty in favour of accused, which cannot be withdrawn lightly---Courts are reluctant to interfere with such orders in absence of compelling or new circumstances---Discretion must be exercised to protect liberty guaranteed under the Constitution unless clear abuse or miscarriage of justice is demonstrated. Disposition: Bail cancellation petition dismissed---No ground for interference with the pre-arrest bail order of respondents.

Summary: 1. Presumption of truth is attached to the long-standing entries made in the record of a Revenue Estate and to dislodge/rebut such entries very strong convincing and trustworthy evidence is required. 2. Documentary evidence has to prevail over the oral/verbal assertions. 3. The purpose of the laws of limitation is to establish certainty in the affairs of men to bring repose and to bring an end to litigation after a certain time period has expired from accrual of an actionable right.

Summary: 1. Strong presumption of truth is attached to a registered document and it is an established law that the registered sale deed(s) stands on higher pedestal as against any other deeds/documents. 2. When a basic document is not proved then the whole structure built upon it would automatically collapse. 3. In revisional jurisdiction the High Court cannot disturb or set aside the concurrent findings on the facts when the same do not suffer from any misreading or non-reading of evidence.

Summary: The purchase of land and the improvements made by the respondents in the disputed house have been established by them but there is no evidence on the record to suggest that the petitioner/plaintiff had ever raised any objection regarding the mentioned developments in the disputed area. The doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right while the act is in progress and after the violation is completed he cannot afterwards complain. In literal sense the term ‘acquiescence’ means silent assent tacit consent concurrence or acceptance which denotes a conduct that indicates an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also denotes the conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. Acquiescence may be either direct with full knowledge and express probation or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and inspite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. However acquiescence will not apply if laps oaf time is of no importance or consequence.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 199---Writ of certiorari---Scope and limitations---High Court’s power of judicial review---The High Court, while exercising judicial review under Art. 199, must not substitute its own findings for those of the lower courts or tribunals but may intervene where there is a jurisdictional error, non-consideration of material evidence, or an error of law on the face of the record---In the present case, the High Court modified the appellate court’s decision by awarding enhanced maintenance and granting recovery of gold ornaments without remanding the matter for reconsideration---Held, that while the High Court had the authority to issue a writ of certiorari where the lower court’s findings were flawed, it should have remanded the case for fresh adjudication instead of substituting its own findings.Cited Cases:Nawaza v. Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1970 SC 391Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141(b) Family Law---Maintenance and Dowry Articles----Recovery of maintenance---Quantum---Scope---In family disputes, courts must determine maintenance based on credible evidence regarding financial circumstances and necessity---In the present case, High Court enhanced the maintenance allowance to Rs. 10,000 per month but did not remand the matter for further factual determination---Held, that while the enhancement of maintenance was justified based on evidence, the matter should have been remanded to the appellate court for a thorough re-evaluation.(c) Family Law---Recovery of Gold Ornaments----Evidentiary burden on spouse claiming recovery of dowry articles and gold ornaments---Scope---Where a spouse claims entitlement to gold ornaments, the burden is on them to establish ownership and wrongful retention by the other party---High Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and granted recovery of 04 tolas of gold without directing further inquiry into the matter---Held, that the issue required factual determination, and the High Court should have remanded the case for proper adjudication instead of making a direct substitution of findings.(d) Civil Procedure---Appellate Jurisdiction----Scope of appellate court’s review in family matters---High Court’s interference with appellate court’s findings---Where an appellate court has made a determination based on available evidence, the High Court should not interfere unless there is a clear case of misreading or non-consideration of material evidence---Held, that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by substituting its own findings without remanding the matter for reconsideration.Cited Case:Nawaza v. Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1970 SC 391----- Disposition: Petition converted into an appeal and allowed. The matter remanded to the appellate court to decide the issue of maintenance and recovery of gold ornaments afresh, in light of the High Court’s observations, within three months.