Summary: Non-production of witness transmitting samples to the PFSA fatal to prosecution; importance of exhibition of recovered material; examination of accused under section 342 Cr.P.C. for fair trial; exercise of reversional jurisdiction; failure to establish identity; to present incriminating evidence as required by law; procedural lapses & non-compliance with legal requirements warrant acquittal 680Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 1035-23 FIDA HUSSAIN ETC VS STATE ETC Mr. Justice Muhammad Jawad Zafar 28- 02- 2025 2025 LHC 656

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 07.9.2022 passed by Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench in W.P. No. 6902 of 2013). Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Land in lieu of dower money---Scope---Concurrent findings of facts by three Courts below---Petitioner/defendant was aggrieved of judgments and decrees passed by all Courts below declaring respondent/plaintiff as owner of land in question given to her by her deceased husband in lieu of dower money during his life time---Validity---There was no dispute with regard to relationship between respondent/plaintiff and her deceased husband---Scriber affirmed that agreement of suit land was reduced into writing as per the directions of deceased husband of respondent / plaintiff, who at that time had also confirmed handing over possession of suit property in her favour, in presence of marginal witnesses who had endorsed signing of the agreement and had also verified the same to be genuine---High Court had rightly dealt with the question of jurisdiction, exercised by Family Court, in an elaborate and eloquent manner which suffered from no defect---Supreme Court declined to interfere with concurrent findings recorded by three Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Fozia Mazhar v. Additional District Judge, Jhang and others PLD 2024 SC 771 and Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and another v. Messrs Rashid Builders (Pvt.) Limited 2024 SCMR 1816 rel. Muhammad Ozair Chughtai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link, Lahore). Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 3rd March, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 15.05.2018, passed by Lahore High Court, Multan Bench Multan in Cr.A. No.454 of 2013). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 365-B, 376 & 380---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)---Abduction, rape and theft---Re-appraisal of evidence---Material witnesses, withholding of---Presumption---Medical evidence---Delay in sending vaginal swabs to Chemical Examiner---Accused was alleged to have abducted and raped a minor girl with the help of three co-accused persons; one stood acquitted and two absconded---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for life---Validity---Mother of abductee, her brothers, and other persons who allegedly accompanied the complainant in the process of recovery of abductee were not produced by prosecution---Old lady who allegedly informed father of the victim girl was a material witness and it amounted to withholding of best available evidence---Adverse inference within the meaning of Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was drawn against prosecution that had the persons been produced in witness box they would not have supported prosecution's case---Testimony of lady doctor, in absence of any other evidence of unimpeachable character, was not sufficient to prove that sexual intercourse was committed with victim girl by accused---Vaginal swabs taken from victim girl were sent to Chemical examiner after a delay of three weeks for which no explanation, much less, plausible, had been furnished by prosecution---Accused though was examined for potency, however, his semen had not been sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for matching with the semen stained swab obtained from victim girl--- Positive Chemical Examiner Report was of no help to prosecution---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and acquitted him of the charge, as prosecution failed to prove guilt through cogent and confidence inspiring evidence---Appeal was allowed. Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 and Muhammad Naeem Khan and another v. Muqadas Khan (decd) through L.Rs. and another PLD 2022 SC 99 rel. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---For giving benefit of doubt to accused it is not necessary that there should be so many circumstances creating doubt in prosecution's case---If only single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the mind of a prudent person is available, then such benefit is to be extended to accused not as a matter of concession but as of right. Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 and Najaf Ali Shah v. the State 2021 SCMR 736 rel. Ms. Shazia Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant. Irfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 19th February, 2025.

Summary: C.M.A. No. 3760 of 2022. (For setting aside ex-parte order). C. A. No. 613 of 2020 and C.M.A. No. 3760 of 2022, decided on 3rd March, 2025. Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Auction of land---Matching bid of highest bid---No concluded contact vesting interest in property---Appellants/plaintiffs were occupants of suit land who were given option to match the highest bid during auction of suit land---Suit filed by appellants/plaintiffs against respondent/Evacuee Trust Property Board was dismissed by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same against respondent/Board---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court---Validity---Bid at an auction was only an offer and without confirmation or approval it did not create any right in the property in favour of successful bidder---By matching bid of the highest bidder, appellants/plaintiffs merely stepped into their shoes---Status of appellants/plaintiffs upon exercising the option was no different from the highest bidder---Decision was made to re-auction suit land, and there was nothing preventing appellants/plaintiffs from participating in auction---Rejecting of highest bid and order of re-auction had afforded equal opportunity to persons whose bid had been rejected---Principles of natural justice were not deemed to have been violated---Acceptance of highest bid was subject to approval or confirmation by competent authority and unless and until such approval was granted or confirmation was made there was no concluded contract vesting the highest bidder with an interest in the property subjected to auction---Since approval contemplated by terms and conditions of auction was never issued in favour of appellants/plaintiffs, they were not entitled to a declaration to the effect that respondent/ETPB was legally bound to receive remaining amount of the highest bid and vested the appellants/plaintiffs with ownership rights in suit land---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court---Appeal was dismissed. Javed Iqbal Abbasi and Company v. Province of Punjab 1996 SCMR 1433; Captain-PQ Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. A.W. Brothers 2004 SCMR 1956 and Afzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.2, Lahore PLD 2005 SC 470 rel. Sardar Aman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court with Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. M. Siddique Aman, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3. Date of hearing: 3rd March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S.3AA, Chapters XII & XIII---Customs Rules, 2001, Rr. 328, 476, 598 & 638---Tracking and Monitoring of Cargo Rules, 2023, R. 1124---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Afghan Transit Trade---Tracking and monitoring---Discretion, exercise of---Clean hands---Petitioners were licensed custom-bonded carriers / transport operators, who were aggrieved of decision passed by Licensing Committee notifying respondent company for such transportation---Validity---Authorities were required to ensure that transit cargo should reach the destination without any pilferage and for that they were required / authorized to track monitoring of such cargo under Tracking and Monitoring of Cargo Rules, 2023---Petitioners did not challenge provisions of Tracking and Monitoring of Cargo Rules, 2023---Decision taken by the Committee pursuant to R. 1124 of Tracking and Monitoring of Cargo Rules, 2023 was justified and fell within their domain and jurisdiction---It was a matter of exercising discretion to ensure proper transit of cargo in question---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to upset exercise of such discretion, which otherwise appeared to be lawful and fully justified---Most of the petitioners had already participated in new procedure, therefore, it was not appropriate for them to approach High Court seeking exercise of discretion in their favor---One, who approaches High Court for exercise of any discretion under Art. 199 of the Constitution, must come with clean hands and be fair with the Court---High Court declined to interfere in the matter as the conduct of petitioners was not in consonance with principles of law and no case for indulgence was made out---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Federation of Pakistan v. E-Movers (Pvt.) Limited and another 2022 SCMR 1021; Collector of Customs and others v. Sheikh Spinning Mills 1999 SCMR 1402; Messrs Yousaf Enterprises v. Collector 2005 PTD 21; Messrs Mahmood and Company v. Assistant Collector, Sales Tax (Enforcement and Collection), Shalimar Division, Lahore and 2 others 2005 PTD 72; Universal Recycling through Authorized Representative v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division/Chairman FBR and 2 others 2024 PTD 754 and Sabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board Peshawar PLD 2019 SC 189 rel. (b) Discretion--- ----Statutory power, exercise of---Principle---Discretionary statutory power can only be exercised on a ground to achieve an object or purpose that is lawfully within the contemplation of that statute. Commissioner Inland Revenue v Pakistan Beverage Limited 2018 SCMR 1544 rel. Khalid Jawed Khan for Petitioners. Kashif Nazeer, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents Nos.1 and 2. Muhammad Anas Makhdoom for Respondents Nos.3 and 4. Dates of hearing: 25th, 26th February, and 3rd March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss.2(22A) & 133---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S.3---Tax/Fiscal statues---Retrospective effect---Principle---Tax year pertaining to 2015---Amendment in statute brought in the year 2017---'Fast Moving Consumer Goods', definition of---Subsequent amendment in definition excluding 'durable goods'---The question that arose for determination before the High Court was as to "whether, under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, a taxpayer engaged in the wholesale distribution of table glassware was entitled to the reduced minimum tax rate of 0.2% applicable to 'Fast Moving Consumer Goods' for tax year 2015, and whether the subsequent exclusion of durable goods from the definition of 'Fast Moving Consumer Goods' through the Finance Act, 2017, could be applied retrospectively to deprive the taxpayer of such benefit"---Facts in brevity were that the applicant was engaged in the wholesale business of kitchen/table glassware a net filed its tax return for the year 2015 under S. 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the "Ordinance 2001")---The tax department issued a notice under S.122(5A), alleging that the return was erroneous and prejudicial to revenue interest due to incorrect application of the minimum tax rate under S. 113 of the "Ordinance, 2001"---The department contended that glassware, being durable goods, was excluded from the benefit of reduced tax rates for 'Fast Moving Consumer Goods'---The applicant argued that the reduced rate (0.2%) was applicable instead of the standard 1%, claiming that the definition of 'Fast Moving Consumer Goods' in 2015 did not exclude durable goods, and that subsequent amendments through the Finance Act, 2017 should not be applied retrospectively---Held: Each tax year was a separate unit of account and taxation, therefore, the definition of 'Fast Moving Consumer Goods' would apply as it stood in tax year 2015 prior to introduction of subsequent definitions which, of course, did not carry retrospective effect---Retrospective effect to legislation could only be given if it appeared beneficial for any person---An attempt on part of respondent department to bring the case of applicant within the 'exclusion ambit' of the amended definition clause of "Fast Moving Consumer Goods" was simply meant to deprive him of the benefit of the reduced tax rate---It was also meant to create a new liability and to disturb past and closed transaction---The plea of retrospective effect of the amendment, taken by the respondent department was therefore repelled---Regarding the question as to whether table glassware should be subject to the same sales tax criteria as held in the case reported as 2018 PTD 1582, particularly in cases where distributors of table glassware were required to pay a higher sales tax than those dealing in electronic appliances it was very clear that Art. 25 of the Constitution guaranteed equal protection of the law and prohibited arbitrary discrimination between similarly situated persons---Therefore, imposing a higher sales tax on distributors of table glassware than on electronic appliances created an unwarranted tax disparity, violating the principle of uniformity in taxation---No rational distinction existed between table glassware and electronic appliances that would have justified placing a higher tax burden on distributors of glassware while giving preferential treatment to electronics distributors---Distributors of table glassware were entitled to the same sales tax criteria as distributors of electronic appliances---The imposition of a higher sales tax on glassware distributors was unjustified and inconsistent with the principles of fiscal equity, constitutional rights, and fair market competition---The applicant / taxpayer was dealing in 'consumers goods' and thus he was liable to pay 0.2% minimum tax of the total turnover for tax year 2015---Reference application was accepted and decided against the respondent-Department. Fawad Ahmad Mukhtar and others v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-II), Regional Tax Office, Multan and another 2022 PTD 454; The Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Ltu, Karachi v. Messrs Pak Suzuki Co. Ltd., Karachi 2016 PTD 867 and Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582 rel. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Haier Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. 2018 PTD 1582; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Muhammad Aslam 2019 PTD 381; Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic (C-481/98) and Messrs D.G. Khan Cement Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2008 PTD 425 ref. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statutes---Fiscal neutrality principles---Scope---Fiscal laws must conform to the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and equal treatment and discriminatory tax policies must have a clear and rational basis---The principle of fiscal neutrality, recognized in both domestic and international taxation jurisprudence, dictates that goods or services serving similar economic functions should not be taxed differently without a justified legal or economic reason---Discriminatory tax policies that distort fair competition among similar goods violate fiscal neutrality principles. Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582 rel. Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic (C-481/98) ref. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Tax and fiscal statutes---Retrospective effect---Principle---Retrospective effect to legislation can only be given if it appeared beneficial for any person. Zahid Shafique for Applicant. Malik Itaat Hussain Awan for Respondents along with Yousaf Khan, Staff Officer, I.R. (Legal) (Hqrs), R.T.O., Rawalpindi. Hafiz Muhammad Idrees, amicus curiae.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) --- ----Ss.8 & 42 ---Suit for declaration and possession---Non-production of original title documents---Fatal to claim of grant---Allotment of land to a person while such land already existing in the name of another person---Legality---By no stretch of imagination an immoveable property could be allotted to any person while same still existed in name of some other person in the official record---Brief facts were that the petitioner/plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and possession of land along with mesne profits claiming that the land, originally owned by government, was granted to him by the barrage department in 1984 under the land grant policy, with relevant documents such as A-Form and Qabooliyat issued in his favour, whereas, the respondent/defendant denied petitioner's claim and asserted that the land had already been granted to his father in 1979-1980, supported by original title documents---The Trial Court dismissed the suit, and the appellate court upheld the Trial Court's decision, where after, the petitioner/plaintiff filed present civil revision under S.115 C.P.C.---Held: During the course of evidence the petitioner/plaintiff could not produce original order of grant in respect of the suit land issued by the barrage department in 1984---Perusal of official record revealed that the land in question was already granted to father of respondent/defendant No.1 which was not cancelled, therefore, it was clear that the said grant made in favor of father of the respondent/defendant No.1 was still intact when the suit land was allegedly granted to the petitioner/plaintiff---The original order of grant in favor of petitioner was never brought on record---On the other hand, respondent/defendant No.1 produced original title documents---In this view of the matter it was apparent that the grant made in favor of respondent/defendant's father was prior to the alleged grant in favor of petitioner/plaintiff---The claim of the applicant / plaintiff over subject property related to the year 1984 i.e. subsequent to the grant of land in favour of father of respondent/defendant No.1 in the year 1979-1980, thus, the same was apparently unlawful---By no stretch of imagination an immoveable property could be allotted and / or granted to any person while the same still existed in the name of some other person in the relevant record---Although original order of grant was not produced by the petitioner/plaintiff, even then if it was presumed that the land was granted by the concerned department in favour of the applicant / plaintiff in the year 1984, the same was not in consonance with the settled law and by such grant the respondent/defendant No.1 could not be deprived of his legitimate right as the grant made in favour of his father was still intact and effective when the alleged grant of land was made in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff---Civil revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Feroze and others v. Muhammad Jamaat Ali 2006 SCMR 1304 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----Ss.100 & 115---Remedy against the judgment of First Appellate Court---Second Appeal---Civil revision petition, maintainability of--- Where Second Appeal under S.100, C.P.C. lies to the High Court, civil revision petition shall not be maintainable against the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court. Sheikh Faqir Muhammad v. Mohammad Din 1993 SCMR 1055 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court---Concurrent findings---Scope---Normally the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction is not supposed to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, unless there are exceptional circumstances to do so. Haji Muhammad Yunis (Deceased) through legal heirs and another v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others 2022 SCMR 1282 and Muhammad Feroze and others v. Muhammad Jamaat Ali 2006 SCMR 1304 rel. Abdul Baqi Jan Kakar for Applicant. Hafiz Tanveer Ahmed for Respondent No. 1. Agha Athar Hussain Pathan, Addl. Advocate General Sindh for Respondents Nos. 2 to 6. Date of hearing: 27th January,2025. Judgment Muhammad Saleem Jessar, J .--- Through this Civil Revision Application filed under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, the applicant Abdar Khan has challenged the Judgment and Decree dated 02.05.2019 passed by IInd Additional District Judge, Naushehro Feroz, in Civil Appeal No.118/2019 (Re: Abdar Khan v. Shahid and others) whereby he maintained the judgment and decree dated 10.04.2018 passed by IInd Senior Civil Judge, Naushehro Feroz in old FC Suit No.228/2015 and New F.C. Suit No.198 of 2016. 2. Brief facts giving rise to filing of instant Civil Revision Application are; that applicant Abdar Khan filed abovesaid civil suit in the Court of IInd Senior Civil Judge, Naushehro Feroz for Declaration, Possession, Mesne Profits and Permanent Injunction, alleging therein that the disputed agricultural land admeasuring 2-00 acres, situated in Mohag of Survey No.340 of Deh Tharushah, originally belonged to Government, thereafter, the same was granted to the applicant / plaintiff by the Barrage Department being Muhagedar on fully paid basis according to land grant policy and such A-From, Qabooliyat and other documents were issued in his favour by the Barrage Department on 29.4.1984. After grant of the suit land, the applicant / plaintiff approached the then Executive District Officer, Naushahro Feroze for confirmation of said grant, which was accordingly confirmed vide order dated 27.11.2006 and the plaintiff become lawful owner of suit land and since then he was in possession of the land and beside was cultivating and enjoying its produce. It was further stated that in the second week of October, 2014 defendant No.1 forcibly occupied the suit land illegally with mala fide intention. However, some other persons namely, Azizullah and others filed F.C. Suit No.153/2014 against him and they in collusion with each other with mala fide intention made attempt to usurp the property of the plaintiff. However, when the plaintiffs in aforesaid suit came to know that the suit property had already been granted in favour of applicant / plaintiff by Barrage Department, they withdrew their suit on 16.10.2014. Thereafter, the applicant / plaintiff approached several times to the Revenue Authorities for mutation of record of rights in his name, but they always kept him on false hopes and lastly refused to do so, as such he filed the abovesaid suit. 3. After admission of the suit, the defendants were served and defendants Nos.1 and 2 filed their respective written statements, while official defendants Nos.3 to 6 adopted the same written statement as filed by official defendant No.2. 4. Defendant No.1 in his written statement stated that claim of the plaintiff is false and that, in fact, he is the lawful owner of the suit property on the basis of title documents issued by the competent authority in favour of his father Mohammad Usman. He further asserted that the documents relied upon by the plaintiff had been arranged by him, thus the same have no binding effect upon the defendant. He further stated that the plaintiff has never remained in possession of suit property and he (defendant No.1) is in lawful possession thereof since long and the claim of possession of the plaintiff is false. He lastly stated that the suit of the plaintiff is without cause of action and the same is not maintainable under the law and is liable to be dismissed. 5. Official defendant No.2 in his written statement stated that in the report submitted by concerned Supervising Tapedar/Tapedar of the beat, has stated that as per entry No.55 of VF-VII-A an area of 1-00 acre out of S.No.340 of Deh Tharushah was entered in the name of Abdar son of Abdul Jabbar (share 28 paisa) on the basis of registered sale deed and the Muhaga of S.No.340 has not been entered in the record of rights on the basis of A-Form in the name of any person by Barrage Mukhtiarkar. He further stated that the dispute over the said plot is in between two private parties in which the government interest is not involved. 6. After recoding evidence of the parties and hearing their advocates, the suit was decreed by the trial court vide judgment and decree dated 05.4.2017 which were assailed by defendant No.1 Shahid by preferring Civil Appeal No.57/2017 in the Court of District Judge, Naushahro Feroze. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, Judgment and Decree passed by trial court were set-aside and the case was remanded to the trial court with direction to frame the following additional issue, lead evidence on that issue and decide the matter afresh. "Whether defendant No.1 Shahid is lawful owner of the suit land on the basis of documents of his father Muhammad Usman?" 7. The trial court, in compliance with above direction framed above said additional issue. Plaintiff Abdar Khan adduced his evidence on the additional issue and thereafter counsel for the plaintiff closed plaintiff's side. However, defendant No.1 did not adduce any evidence on the additional issue but his counsel filed statement Ex.78 thereby adopting the same evidence already recorded by trial court and closed defendant's side. 8. After hearing arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, as detailed above, the trial Court dismissed the suit and such dismissal was challenged by the applicant / plaintiff by filing Civil Appeal which was also dismissed vide judgment dated 02.05.2019. Hence the applicant has filed instant Civil Revision Application impugning the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material made available before me on the record. 10. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the land in question was granted to the applicant initially in the year 1984; however, due to violence on account of assassination of Muhtarma Benazir Bhutto on 27.12.2007, entire record was set on fire; therefore the defendant / respondent No.1 by taking advantage of said incident had occupied subject land by dispossessing the plaintiff/applicant. According to him, the courts below have not taken into consideration this aspect of the case. He further submitted that the respondents have not produced any record/material to substantiate their claim over the suit land. He further submitted that judgments of the Courts below suffer from misreading of the evidence. He, therefore, prayed for allowing instant civil revision application and setting aside the judgments passed by the courts below. 11. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 opposed the revision application and submitted that initially the suit filed by the applicant was decreed; however, in appeal the judgment was set aside and case was remanded to the trial court for framing additional issue mentioned in said judgment and deciding the matter afresh. The trial court after recording evidence on additional issue and hearing learned advocates for the parties, dismissed the suit. Such dismissal was assailed by the applicant/plaintiff by preferring civil appeal which was also dismissed vide judgment dated 10.04.2018. The applicant/plaintiff has impugned said judgment of the appellate Court by way of Civil Revision Application. According to him, during evidence it has been established that claim of the applicant pertained to the year 1984, whereas, prior to that the father of respondent No.1 namely, Muhammad Usman, was granted suit land in the year 1979-1980 and, according to him, while said grant was intact having neither been cancelled nor such order having been recalled by the concerned department, the applicant could not be granted subject property and such grant, if any, was unlawful and illegal. 12. Learned Assistant Advocate General Sindh appearing for official respondents adopted the arguments advanced by learned counsel for respondent No.1 and submitted that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgments which may warrant interference by this court. He also raised question about maintaining second appeal before the first appellate court. 13. At the very outset, it may be observed that instant Civil Revision Application seems to be non-maintainable in view of the fact that where second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. lies to the High Court, civil revision application shall not be maintainable against the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court. For this proposition I am fortified by a judgment of Honourable Supreme Court passed in the case of Sheikh Faqir Muhammad v. Mohammad Din, reported in 1993 SCMR 1055, wherein it was held as under: "Position thus crystallizes that the respondent had the right to file a second appeal and no revision lay under section 115, C.P.C. As held in PLD 1970 SC 506 a revision does not lie where the order is appealable with the District Court. Even in cases where second appeal lies to the High Court revision will not be maintainable against that judgment and decree. It is contended that the revision application could have been treated as a second appeal. In that event as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant the period of limitation provided for filing a second appeal having expired the respondent would be required to make an application for condonation of delay. This exercise would require enquiry for determination of facts whether sufficient cause for condoning the delay has been made out. Such determination can hardly be made here." 14. Besides above, it is also noteworthy to point out at this juncture that normally this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction is not supposed to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below, unless there are exceptional circumstances to do so. In this context, reference may be made to the case of Haji Muhammad Yunis (Deceased) through legal heirs and another v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others, reported in 2022 SCMR 1282, wherein it was held by Honourable Supreme Court as under: "The High Court did not have, in its revisional jurisdiction, the legal mandate to reverse the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts, without first addressing the said reasoning of the trial and appellate courts. Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court warrants correction." In another case reported as Muhammad Feroze and others v. Muhammad Jamaat Ali (2006 SCMR 1304), the Apex Court held as under: "12. It is well-settled that concurrent findings of fact by two Courts below cannot be disturbed by High Court in second civil appeal, muchless in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under section 1l5, C.P.C. unless the two Courts below, while recording the findings of fact have exercised jurisdiction not vested in them or failed to exercise jurisdiction so conferred. Scope of interference with concurrent findings of fact by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is very limited. While examining legality of judgment and decree in exercise of its powers under section 115, C.P.C., High Court cannot upset finding of fact, however, erroneous such finding is, on reappraisal of evidence, and take a different view of evidence." 15. In view of above legal position, instant Civil Revision Applicant is apparently not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on this score alone. However, even on merits the applicant / plaintiff does not have a good case. 16. From perusal of record it reveals that claim of the plaintiff is in respect of 2-00 acres of land situated at Muhag of Survey No. 340 of Deh Tharushah allegedly having been granted to him by the Barrage Department in the year 1984. However, during course of evidence the plaintiff could not produce original order of grant in respect of suit land issued by the Barrage Department in his favour in the year 1984. The official witness in his evidence deposed that he tried to verify from the relevant record about the suit property but the same was not available as the original record was burnt on 27th December 2007 at the time of assassination of Muhtrama Benazir Bhutto. From perusal of record it appears that the plaintiff produced only a copy of order passed by Executive District Officer Naushahro Feroze having been issued on the application moved by him, wherein it was stated that the suit land was granted to the applicant. However, from perusal of record it also appears that prior to alleged grant of suit land in favour of the plaintiff, an area of 2-35 acres out of same Survey No.340 in Muhag of Deh Tharushah was granted in the name of one Muhammad Usman viz. father of defendant No.1. It is also significant to point out here that before granting suit land to the plaintiff, the aforesaid grant in favour of Muhammad Usman was neither cancelled nor order in respect of said grant was recalled by the Barrage Department. In the circumstances, it is clear that said grant made in favour of father of defendant No.1 was still intact when the suit land was allegedly granted in favour of the plaintiff without cancelling earlier grant in favour of Muhammad Usman. The original order of alleged grant in favour of the plaintiff has also not been brought on record by him and the original record is also not available in the office of Barrage Mukhtiarkar. 17. On the other hand, defendant / respondent No.1 has produced original title documents relating to the subject property in the name of his father Muhammad Usman. In support of his claim defendant No.1 produced original complete PC of grant papers in favour of his father Muhammad Usman pertaining to the year 1979/1980. As stated above, from perusal of record it appears that an area of 2-35 acres out of same Survey No.340 in Muhag of Deh Tharushah was granted in favour of father of defendant No.1 namely Muhammad Usman and such grant was neither cancelled nor recalled by the Barrage Department. The Mukhtiarkar Estate Nawabshah by receiving Rs.900/- from father of defendant No.1 issued Form-A, in favour of father of defendant No.1 in the year 1979-1980. In this view of the matter, it is apparent that the grant made in favour of defendant's father was prior to alleged grant of land in favour of the applicant / plaintiff. During course of evidence before the trial Court the applicant / plaintiff could not succeed in establishing that the title of defendant No.1 in respect of subject property was either cancelled or such order was recalled by the concerned Department. The claim of the applicant / plaintiff over subject property relates to the year 1984 i.e. subsequent to the grant of land in favour of father of defendant No.1 in the year 1979-1980 thus, the same is apparently unlawful. By no stretch of imagination an immoveable property could be allotted and / or granted to any person while the same still exists in the name of some other person in the relevant record. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Hafeez Ahmad v. Muhammad Hussain and another, reported in 1983 CLC 130 [Lahore], wherein it was held as under: "6. There are short points involved in this case. Firstly whether the method, mode and manner adopted by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner in re-transferring an already transferred property was permissible under the law. The second question is whether the resumption order of 1968 which was based on a notice of resumption dated 15-8-1965 has any factual basis. In so far as first question is concerned, Mr. Shahzad Jehangir, learned counsel for the Settlement Department has very frankly conceded that no transfer of an evacuee property could be made on the mere statement of an interested person that it was not previously transferred person and was available. The jurisdiction of the functionaries was dependent upon the finding that the property in question was an evacuee property and was also available property' it did not stand transferred to anybody previously. There is no scope in law for passing a conditional order of the kind which was passed in this case. I am inclined to agree with this aspect of the submission. The functionary was required to act in the matter with open eyes and satisfy himself that the requirements of existence of jurisdictional facts were fulfilled in this case. He did not even care to consult his own record to find out that the property stood transferred long ago. It is settled law that a property already transferred cannot be re-transferred to any other person without first previous transfer. This was not done nor the previous transferee heard in the matter. The impugned order was passed on a misstatement and wrong assumption which lacked factual basis. The result is that the order of transfer dated 20-3-1971 on this score alone is liable to be struck down and declared as being without lawful authority and of no legal effect." 18. In view of above legal position, although original order of grant has not been produced by the applicant / plaintiff, even then if it is presumed that the land was granted by the concerned department in favour of the applicant / plaintiff in the year 1984, the same was not in consonance with the settled law, as discussed above, and by such grant the defendant No.1 cannot be deprived of his legitimate right as the grant made in favour of his father Mohammad Usman was still intact and effective when the alleged grant of land was made in favour of the applicant / plaintiff. 19. The upshot of above discussion is that instant Civil Revision Application being not maintainable under the law, at the same time the applicant has also not made out a case on merits for interference in the judgments passed by two courts below in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, instant Civil Revision Application is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. UN/A-35/Sindh Revision dismissed.

Summary: (a) Service Tribunal—Status as “Court” vs. “Tribunal”—Entitlement of staff to judicial allowances ––AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, Arts. 44 & 47(1)(a); AJ&K Service Tribunals Act, 1975, Ss. 1 & 5(2). AJ&K Service Tribunal is a special/quasi-judicial forum created under Art. 47(1)(a) to adjudicate service matters of civil servants; it is not, stricto sensu, a “Court” akin to the Supreme Court or the High Court (which are constitutionally singular institutions under Arts. 42–43). The deeming provision in S.5(2) of the 1975 Act (treating the Tribunal as a civil court for limited procedural purposes) cannot expand or override the constitutional scheme. Consequently, staff of the Service Tribunal cannot, merely by analogy to judicial functions, claim parity with High Court/Supreme Court establishment for “three-time judicial allowance,” utility allowance, or transport allowance. Petition dismissed. (b) Equal treatment & similarity of functions—No automatic parity with courts or other fora ––Constitutional structure; administrative law principles. Similarity in the nature of work (quasi-judicial/appeal-type functions) is not a sufficient yardstick to equate Service Tribunal employees with the High Court/District Judiciary establishment. If functional resemblance alone were accepted, employees of other quasi-judicial/revenue fora could press identical claims, which is impermissible. No discriminatory treatment was shown: Tribunal staff already receive emoluments/secretariat allowances as provided by statute/rules; Chairman/Members’ distinct terms (fixed tenure; separate emoluments) do not govern permanent staff. (c) Financial parity with Pakistan’s Federation/Provinces—Inapplicability in AJ&K ––Fiscal/administrative autonomy; precedent. AJ&K Government has no automatic parity with the Federal or Provincial Governments of Pakistan for allowances. “Parity with Punjab” has been declined as a binding rule; at most, external frameworks may offer guidance where AJ&K law is silent. Claims that other Service Tribunals (Federal/Sindh/Balochistan/GB) staff receive the allowances do not oblige AJ&K to replicate them. (Azad Govt. & others v. Sardar Muhammad Mukhtar Khan & others, 2016 SCR 206, rel.) (d) Writ of mandamus for allowances—When not issuable ––AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, Art. 44; administrative discretion. Courts do not direct the executive to create or extend financial benefits absent a clear legal right. As the governing statutes/rules delineate Tribunal staff emoluments and no enforceable right to “three-time judicial allowance,” utility, or transport allowance was shown, mandamus does not lie. (e) Reliance on “Service Tribunal is a Court” jurisprudence—Scope distinguished ––PLD 2013 SC 501; 2016 SCR 228. Authorities recognizing Service Tribunals as judicial/quasi-judicial fora for specified purposes (e.g., independence in appointments/proceedings) do not convert them into superior courts for all incidents of service/finance nor confer automatic parity in allowances. Constitutional text (Art. 47) controls. Cited Cases: • Azad Govt. & others v. Sardar Muhammad Mukhtar Khan & others, 2016 SCR 206 (parity with Punjab—guidance only) • Sheikh Riaz-ul-Haq v. Federation of Pakistan & others, PLD 2013 SC 501 (nature of Service Tribunal—distinguished for present fiscal claim) • AJ&K Govt. v. Syed Khalid Hussain Gillani, 2016 SCR 228 (Service Tribunal as judicial forum—applied in limited sense, distinguished) Disposition: Writ petition dismissed; no entitlement made out to three-time judicial allowance, utility allowance, or transport allowance for AJ&K Service Tribunal staff.