Summary: Ss. 194C, 194 & 196 of Customs Act (IV of 1969)---R. 4 of Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2006, ---Procedure of Appellate Tribunal---Interpretation of S. 194C of the Customs Act, 1969---Judicial and administrative powers of the Chairman---Constitution of Benches---Exercise of discretion by Chairman---Cases of urgency / exigency---Scope--Customs Act (IV of 1969)-------Ss. 194C, 194 & 196---Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,2006, R. 4---Procedure of Appellate Tribunal---Interpretation of S. 194C of the Customs Act,1969---Judicial and administrative powers of the Chairman---Constitution of Benches---Exerciseof discretion by Chairman---Cases of urgency / exigency---Scope---Question before the HighCourt was "whether Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal, without constituting a two-memberbench in terms of S. 194C of the Customs Act, 1969 had the jurisdiction to decide the matter as aSingle Member bench in cases of urgency"---Held, that while S. 194 of the Customs Act, 1969postulated and defined the powers of the Federal Government for constituting the AppellateTribunal, the appointment of judicial and technical Members and appointment of one of them asChairman, thereof ; thereafter constituting benches was the prerogative of the Chairman of theTribunal and procedure for distributing work among the benches had been provided under R.4 ofthe Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2006---FederalGovernment had no authority to constitute benches and distributing business among benches----While it was the sole discretion of the Chairman to distribute business among members of the Tribunal, but before doing so, he shall record reasons and after application of a judicial mind,entrust a case to any single member, subject to condition that only those matters shall beentrusted which have already been allotted to a bench of two members and said member /assignee was part of such a bench---Provision of S. 194C of the Customs Act, 1969 and Rulesframed thereunder were silent about the discretion of the Chairman, as he was only empoweredto the extent of administrative measures, but as far as judicial proceedings were concerned,powers of the Chairman and Member were equal, therefore, the Chairman could not himselfretain a case without constituting a bench of two or more Members and in case if any Memberdue to any reason was not available; only then, before adjudicating the lis, the Chairman withreference to exigency and urgency of the matter and after recording reasons thereof, may hear thecase, otherwise the order passed by him would be presumed to have been passed by a SingleMember, which was not permissible in law---Impugned order passed by the Chairman wastherefore coram non judice and not sustainable in law, and was set side---High Court directed theChairman to reconstitute the bench and fix the matter for de novo hearing---Reference wasanswered, accordingly.Director, Intelligence and Investigation (Customs and Excise), Faisalabad and another v.Bagh Ali 2010 PTD 1024 rel.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 ----Ss. 168, 32, 156(1)(9) & (14), 178---Import Policy Order, 2009---Vehicle confiscation---Petitioner, a charitable institution, imported a used Toyota Noah X (2003 model) from the UAE for use as an ambulance---Vehicle was seized upon examination as it lacked the requisite facilities to qualify as an ambulance, in violation of Customs Act provisions and Import Policy Order, 2009---Order-in-original directed confiscation of the vehicle, which was upheld by the Customs Appellate Tribunal---Court dismissed the reference, finding no substantial question of law arising from the Tribunal’s decision. (b) Customs Law---Seizure and Confiscation of Goods ----Non-compliance with import requirements---Vehicle imported under the guise of an ambulance lacked essential specifications as per the Import Policy Order and Customs General Order, rendering it liable to confiscation under relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1969. (c) Judicial Review---Scope and Limitations ----Reference under Customs Act---Substantial question of law---Court declined to interfere in the decision of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, holding that no substantial question of law was identified by the petitioner that warranted judicial review. -----Cited Laws and Regulations: Import Policy Order, 2009 Customs General Order 12 of 2002

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 --- Ss. 32, 168, 178 & 156(1)(9) & (14) Import of used vehicle as an ambulance—Non-compliance with specifications—Confiscation and dismissal of appeal—The petitioner, a charitable institution, imported a used Toyota Noah X, Model 2003, and sought its clearance as an ambulance. Upon physical examination, the vehicle was found non-compliant with the requirements specified under Serial No. 116 of CGO-12 of 2002. Consequently, the vehicle was seized under S. 168 of the Customs Act, 1969, for violations of Ss. 32 and 178 of the Customs Act, 1969, read with Import Policy Order 2009 and SRO 450(1)/2001. The Additional Collector ordered the vehicle's confiscation, which was upheld by the Customs Appellate Tribunal. -----Cited Legal Instruments: CGO-12 of 2002, dated 15-06-2002 Import Policy Order 2009 SRO 450(1)/2001, dated 18-06-2001 (b) Customs Appellate Jurisdiction --- Reference under Customs Act Dismissal of reference for lack of legal questions—The petitioner challenged the confiscation before the Islamabad High Court, contending errors in the Appellate Tribunal’s decision. The Court held that the petitioner failed to identify any substantial question of law arising from the impugned judgment. Consequently, the reference was dismissed in limi

Summary: The petitioner, challenged a notice issued by the Government of Punjab (respondent No. 2). The petitioner, which was a company registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, had set up an educational campus in Lahore leased out to the University of Lahore. It argued that the assessment of professional tax was ultra vires of item No. 48 of the Federal Legislative List in the Constitution of Pakistan (1973). The petitioner further contended that it did not fall under the second schedule of the Punjab Finance Act, 1977, and that the professional tax could only be levied by the Federation, as it had exclusive jurisdiction to levy tax on corporations. The court examined the relevant provisions, including Section 3 of the second schedule of the Punjab Finance Act, 1977, and Article 163 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which empowered the Provincial Assembly to impose taxes on persons engaged in professions, trades, callings, or employments. The court referred to the judgment in the case of Sargodha Textile Mills Ltd. and concluded that there was no bar against the Provincial Government of Punjab to recover professional tax from the petitioner. It held that companies were considered as persons under the law and could be subjected to professional tax by the provincial law. The court also mentioned that the petitioner had an alternate remedy available, which was to appeal the order of the District Excise and Taxation Officer to the Director, Excise and Taxation, under Rule 3 of the Punjab Professions and Trade Taxes Rules 1977.

Summary: S.35C,36C,Central Excise Act,1944:Only an aggrieved person can file an appeal

Summary: Background:M/s Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Sales Tax, and Central Excise (Adjudication) involves a dispute over the collection and retention of excess excise duty by the appellant insurance company on premiums from policyholders during the period from 01.07.1990 to 30.06.1995. The case revolves around the interpretation and application of Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 ("1944 Act"), which deals with the collection of excess duty passed on to consumers.---Issues:Whether Section 3-D of the 1944 Act applies retrospectively to the period from 01.07.1990 to 30.06.1995.What is the appropriate mechanism for the recovery of the excess duty collected under Section 3-D, considering the absence of specific provisions in the 1944 Act?---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court of Pakistan held:Retrospective Application of Section 3-D: The Court upheld the retrospective application of Section 3-D, determining that the words "has collected" in subsection (1) encompass all sums collected up to 30.06.1993, for which the person would be liable as of 01.07.1993.Recovery Mechanism for Excess Duty: The Court concluded that although the 1944 Act did not provide a specific mechanism for the recovery of duty under Section 3-D, the amount could be recovered as a debt owed to the Government. It suggested that the Government could file a suit for recovery, with a period of limitation of 60 years under Article 149 of the Limitation Act.Modification of Original Order: The Court modified the original order by imposing additional duty and penalty on the appellant for the period from 01.07.1993 to 30.06.1995. The appellant was directed to pay the specified amounts within 90 days, failing which the original order would stand revived and be operative in full.---Citations/Precedents:Nagappa Chettiar and another v. Union of India (1969) 72 ITR 255Inderchand v. Secretary of State for India (1941) 9 ITR 673Order---The fact that no provision existed under the Central Excises Act, 1944 for recovery of the deemed arrear of duty under s. 3-D did not mean that it could not be recovered at all. Any amount of duty or tax is, ultimately, a debt owed to the Government by the person who is liable to pay the same. It can therefore be recovered as any debt can by any person, i.e., by way of suit. Of course, Government hardly ever needs to take recourse to remedy by way of suit because the relevant fiscal legislation provides for specific and tailor made methods, which are far more effective as means of recovery. Remedy by way of suit is not barred for the Government. Thus, the proper remedy in respect of the facts and circumstances at hand would have been for the Government to file a suit for recovery of the deemed arrear of duty, for which the period of limitation would be as provided for under Article 149.

Summary: (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Ss.2(s), 156, 187, 187A & 211---Vehicle with tampered chassis number---Whether FSL report conclusive proof of smuggling---Held, that a Forensic Science Laboratory report showing that the chassis number/chassis plate of a vehicle is tampered, cut and welded, re-stamped or filled with welding material is not, by itself, conclusive proof that the vehicle is smuggled within the meaning of S.2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969---Such report may create a presumption and justify inquiry/adjudication, but the ultimate legal burden to establish smuggling remains upon the State, subject to shifting evidentiary burden during proceedings. (b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----S.187A---Presumption of legal character of vehicle---Finance Act, 2025---Deeming provision---Scope---Held, that S.187A does not redefine or enlarge the definition of “smuggling” under S.2(s) of the Customs Act---It is a deeming provision creating a rebuttable presumption that a vehicle with tampered chassis number may be smuggled---Such presumption must be strictly construed because it exists in a fiscal statute carrying penal consequences, including confiscation and possible prosecution. (c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----S.187A---Tampered chassis number---Locally manufactured or lawfully imported vehicle---Effect---Held, that a vehicle lawfully imported into Pakistan after payment of duties/taxes, or a locally manufactured vehicle, cannot be treated as smuggled merely because its chassis number was later defaced or tampered for reasons unrelated to concealment of smuggling---To treat every tampered vehicle as smuggled, regardless of lawful explanation or absence of owner’s fault, would produce an unjust and absurd result not intended by the Legislature. (d) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Ss.156(1), clauses (9), (89), (90), 187 & 211---Penalty/confiscation---Finding of wrongdoing against owner---Requirement---Held, that penalty under clauses (9), (89) and (90) of S.156(1) cannot be imposed without a finding of culpability, negligence or fault on the part of the owner/person in possession---Confiscation of property of a wholly innocent person, without knowledge or consent regarding wrongdoing, is grossly unjust---State must establish a fault element before penal consequences can lawfully follow. (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.9, 10A, 23 & 24---Customs confiscation---Civil forfeiture---Property rights and due process---Held, that although civil forfeiture is procedurally in rem against property, it operates as a penalty affecting the owner’s constitutionally protected property rights---Therefore, confiscation must be preceded by a lawful finding of liability/fault against the owner and must satisfy due process and fair trial guarantees. (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.23 & 24---Customs Act, 1969, Ss.156 & 187A---Confiscation of vehicle---Doctrine of proportionality---Least restrictive means---Held, that confiscation must satisfy legality, necessity and proportionality---Blanket confiscation of a vehicle with tampered chassis number is not always the least restrictive means of achieving the State objective of preventing smuggling---Where identity concerns can be addressed through less restrictive regulatory measures such as assigning a new State-issued VIN or special registration series, outright confiscation may fail the proportionality test. (g) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Ss.187, 211 & 156---Burden of proof---Shifting evidentiary burden---Held, that once the Customs Department shows prima facie material such as tampered chassis number, burden may shift to the owner to provide lawful excuse or documents of lawful import, auction, amnesty clearance, registration, theft recovery, accident history or purchase---Upon such material being produced, burden shifts back to Customs to establish that the vehicle was smuggled through an unauthorized route or that the owner was culpable. (h) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Ss.156, 187 & 211---Bona fide purchaser---Lawful excuse---Held, that the defence of a bona fide purchaser/lawful possessor is relevant in confiscation proceedings where property rights and due process are implicated---State cannot deprive an innocent purchaser of property merely by labeling the vehicle as tampered without proving smuggling and owner’s culpability or negligence. (i) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Ss.168, 169, 182, 187A & 201---Seized vehicle---Safe custody and chain of custody---Held, that where a tampered chassis plate/report is relied upon as the primary basis for alleging smuggling, safe custody and safe transmission of the vehicle/case property are essential---If the vehicle is used by public officials, moved without proper record, or examined without associating the owner, evidentiary value of the FSL report may be undermined. (j) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Ss.168 & 187A---Seizure of vehicle---Suspicion alone---Held, that seizure and confiscation cannot rest on suspicion alone---Customs authorities must collect and preserve best evidence, verify import/amnesty/auction/MRA records, associate the owner where appropriate, and establish through admissible material that the vehicle falls within S.2(s) of the Customs Act. (k) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Show-cause notice---Due process---Grounds beyond notice---Held, that confiscation cannot be sustained on a ground not put to the owner in the show-cause notice---Where notice alleges failure to produce documents but confiscation is ultimately based on tampered chassis/VIN or another distinct allegation, such adjudication offends due process. (l) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----S.179(3)---Order-in-original beyond prescribed time---Penal consequences---Held, that where an order-in-original is passed beyond the statutory period prescribed under S.179(3), no penal consequence can flow from such time-barred order. Cited Case: • Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons 2017 SCMR 1427 (m) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Ss.169(4), 182, 201 & 223---Seized/confiscated vehicle---Sale or use by Government departments during pendency of proceedings---Held, that case property subject to adjudication must ordinarily be preserved until rights are finally determined---Customs General Orders cannot enlarge statutory power or authorize sale/use of property contrary to Ss.169, 182 and 201---State cannot dispose of or use private property as if title has finally vested in it before lawful final confiscation. (n) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----S.196---Reference jurisdiction of High Court---Questions of law---Constitutional and statutory interpretation---Held, that reference jurisdiction under S.196 is not merely advisory; it is appellate in character to the extent of questions of law---High Court may interpret provisions of the Customs Act, apply constitutional principles, and answer any legal question arising from the Tribunal’s order/proceedings necessary to determine rights and obligations of parties. Cited Cases: • Messrs Squibb Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2017 SCMR 1006 • Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2017 SCMR 1136 • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Rafeh Ltd. 2020 PTD 1657 • Pakistan Match Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Assistant Collector Sales Tax 2019 SCMR 906 • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Sargodha Spinning Mills 2022 SCMR 1082 • Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise v. Qadbros Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. 2023 SCMR 939 (o) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Amnesty/auction/regularization by Customs---Subsequent confiscation due to chassis tampering---State representation and nonfeasance---Held, that where Customs itself regularizes, auctions or releases a vehicle upon payment of duty, taxes and redemption fine, and issues NOC for registration, such official act carries a representation that the vehicle has marketable title---State cannot later burden an innocent purchaser merely because Customs failed to verify chassis authenticity at the relevant time. (p) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Tampered vehicle---Theft or accident history---Effect---Held, that where vehicle owner produces material showing theft, recovery, accident, repair or other plausible explanation for chassis/VIN tampering, such material must be considered by adjudicating authorities---FSL report alone cannot override such explanation unless Customs discharges its burden to prove smuggling and culpability. (q) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.2A & 227---Customs Act, 1969, S.187A---Civil forfeiture without fault---Islamic injunctions---Held, per additional note, that applying S.187A without the qualifications and safeguards recorded in the main judgment would suffer from operational invalidity by contravening Arts.2A and 227, because deprivation of innocent citizens’ vehicles through faultless civil forfeiture would offend principles of justice, due process and protection of private property. (r) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---- ----Ss.2(s), 156 & 187A---Vehicle with tampered chassis number---Confiscation---Summary of principle---Held, that tampering with chassis number is relevant evidence and may justify detention, forensic examination and adjudication, but it is not an automatic substitute for proof of smuggling---Confiscation is lawful only where the Customs Department establishes, after due process, that the vehicle is smuggled and that the owner/person proceeded against lacks lawful excuse or bears fault, negligence or culpability. Disposition: Consolidated customs references were decided in light of the above principles; Custom Reference No.12/2022 had already been allowed by short order and release of vehicle was directed; in other connected references, Tribunal orders were either maintained or interfered with depending on whether the owner had discharged the burden of lawful possession/import and whether Customs had proved smuggling, owner culpability, due process compliance, safe custody and lawful basis for confiscation.

Summary: (a) Constitutional law ----Legislative competence---Post–18th Amendment distribution of powers---Art. 142(a), (c)---Federal Legislative List---Residual provincial domain---Overlap of fields---Held, after abolition of Concurrent List (18th Amendment), subjects not in Federal Legislative List fall within exclusive provincial competence; however, constitutional overlaps can arise and must be resolved through interpretive doctrines rather than mechanical invalidation. (b) Taxation and labour welfare ----Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967---Preamble/objects---Duty of excise as “cess” for labour welfare in mining industry---Balochistan Finance Act, 2020---Amendment of S.3 (charging provision)---Enhancement of rates---Challenge on ground of exclusive federal domain (Entry 44, Federal Legislative List)---Held, while “duties of excise” are placed in the Federal Legislative List (Entry 44), the dominant statutory objective of the 1967 Act is labour welfare in the mining sector, a provincial subject; the excise mechanism is employed instrumentally to finance welfare measures, and the scheme is linked to collection, allocation and utilization for the welfare object. (c) Interpretation and constitutional doctrines ----Doctrine of pith and substance---Incidental encroachment---Doctrine of double aspect legislation---Sustaining legislation in overlap situations---Held, where a law in its true nature falls within one sphere but incidentally touches the other, it is not invalid for incidental encroachment; additionally, where a single subject legitimately bears two “aspects” (fiscal aspect and welfare/public-interest aspect), both federal and provincial competence may co-exist, and courts should prefer an approach that sustains enactments rather than striking them down, consistent with constitutional restraint and democratic legitimacy. (d) Cooperative federalism ----Constitutional design post–18th Amendment---Inter-governmental harmony---Avoidance of rigid “silo” approach---Held, constitutional structure endorses cooperative federalism; interacting legislative spheres are contemplated; therefore, mere overlap between the federal power to levy excise and the provincial responsibility to advance labour welfare does not per se render the provincial amendment ultra vires. (e) Application to facts ----Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 (S.7) amending S.3 of 1967 Act---Rate enhancement---Legality---Held, the provincial amendment operates within a constitutionally permissible overlap to advance a legitimate provincial objective (labour welfare), using a fiscal instrument tied to the statute’s welfare scheme; it does not amount to an impermissible displacement of federal authority warranting invalidation. Disposition: Civil Petition dismissed; leave refused; no order as to costs. (Civil Petition No. 315 of 2024; heard 11.12.2025).

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 ----S. 194C (as amended by the Finance Act, 2024)---Appellate Tribunal—Jurisdiction of Single Member Bench—Effect of omission of sub-section (3A) and substitution of sub-section (2)—Scope and legislative intent—After the Finance Act, 2024, the omission of sub-section (3A) and restructuring of sub-section (2) of S.194C do not extinguish the concept of Single Member Benches—Sub-section (1) continues to empower the Chairman to constitute Benches, and the amended sub-section (2) merely regulates the procedure, case management, and ancillary matters—The mandatory requirement under amended sub-section (3) applies only where the amount of duty, tax, penalty, or fine exceeds five million rupees—Therefore, appeals below that pecuniary threshold may lawfully be heard by a Single Member Bench. (b) Customs Act, 1969 ----S. 194C(4)---Statutory interpretation—Meaning of “authorized” and “constituted”—Scope and independence of sub-section (4)—Sub-section (4) operates as an independent enabling provision empowering the Chairman or an authorized Member of the Appellate Tribunal to sit singly and dispose of any case within the prescribed pecuniary limit—Its operation is not contingent upon the prior constitution of a two-Member Bench, nor is it dependent upon the framing of rules under sub-section (2)—The retention of S.194C(4) post-amendment manifests legislative intent to preserve the jurisdiction of Single Benches. (c) Interpretation of statutes ----Withdrawal or curtailment of jurisdiction—When presumed—Omission of a provision does not by itself imply extinguishment of an existing jurisdiction—Legislative intent to withdraw a conferred jurisdiction must be expressed in clear words or arise by necessary implication—The principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius is inapplicable where the legislative scheme expressly preserves a concurrent provision (such as S.194C(4))—Hence, Single Bench jurisdiction stands retained. (d) Customs Act, 1969 ----S. 194C---Special Benches—Scope of mandatory composition—Only matters exceeding the pecuniary limit of Rs. 5 million must be heard by a Bench of not less than two Members, including one Judicial and one Technical Member—Matters below the said threshold may be lawfully heard and decided by a Single Member Bench under S.194C(4). (g) Disposition— Preliminary question of law answered in the affirmative—Orders passed by Single Member of the Customs Appellate Tribunal held valid and within jurisdiction—Single Benches remain competent to adjudicate cases falling within the pecuniary limits prescribed by S.194C of the Customs Act, 1969—Matters fixed for hearing on merits on 14.10.2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 435, 439 & 561-A---Criminal Revision---Scope of revisional jurisdiction--- Petitioner assailed order of Special Judge (Customs, Taxation and Anti-Smuggling) whereby only CNIC was ordered to be returned while other seized articles, including vehicle and personal belongings, were withheld---Held, that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court may be exercised where the subordinate court has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or has acted arbitrarily or contrary to law---Impugned order, to the extent of refusal to release personal belongings, was passed without sufficient legal justification and amounted to improper exercise of discretion---Interference warranted. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 516-A & 523---Custody and disposal of property---Personal belongings not forming part of case property---Return thereof--- Items seized during personal search of accused, including vehicle, mobile phones, SIM cards, ATM and Army cards, wallet, cash, driving license, and vehicle registration book, were not alleged to be proceeds of crime or instrumentalities of the offence---No material was produced by prosecution to connect said items with the offence under Customs Act, 1969---Held, that mere seizure at the time of arrest, without establishing a nexus with the alleged offence, cannot justify continued retention---Personal property of accused not required for investigation or trial must be returned. (c) Customs Act, 1969 ----Ss. 2(s), 16, 157, 178(i), 156(1)---Articles seized during investigation---Relevance to offence--- No evidence on record to show that the vehicle or other seized articles were part of smuggling activity or constituted case property---Retention of such articles under the guise of investigation held unwarranted. (d) Administration of justice--- ----Right to property---Exercise of judicial discretion--- Court observed that continued withholding of property belonging to an accused, which bears no evidentiary value, constitutes arbitrary deprivation of property and misuse of judicial discretion---Articles not required for purposes of trial must be released to their lawful owner. (g) Disposition --- Criminal Revision allowed---Impugned order dated 05.03.2025 set aside to the extent of denial of release of seized items---Respondents directed to return petitioner’s vehicle and personal belongings upon furnishing surety bonds of Rs.100,000/- within seven days.