Summary: (a) The supremacy of the Constitution demands that any legislation must conform to constitutional requirements. If found in violation of the Constitution, the Court has the authority to declare such legislation unconstitutional and void. Furthermore, if the enabling or parent Act (i.e., the Act providing for delegation) is deemed void, any subordinate or delegated legislation made under that Act will also be declared unconstitutional and void. The limits imposed by the Constitution may be either express or implied. An express limit, as provided in the Constitution, stipulates that any law inconsistent with or contradicting Part II, Chapter 1 (Fundamental Rights) of the Constitution shall be void. (b) The principle of judicial deference mandates that courts should avoid encroaching upon the legislative domain unless the law in question is clearly ultra vires the Constitution. The courts have reiterated that mere allegations of bad faith, procedural irregularities, or policy disagreements do not provide sufficient grounds for judicial intervention. The Legislature, being a representative body, is presumed to act in the public interest. Therefore, courts may only intervene when a law either contravenes the Constitution or violates the fundamental rights enshrined therein. (c) A combined reading of Rule 52(1) of the Local Government (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2021 and Entry No. 2 of Part I of the Eleventh Schedule of the Act reveals that both use similar phraseology. Entry No. 2 of Part I of the Eleventh Schedule is not under challenge in the present writ petition. Moreover, the provision of Rule 52(1) is not in conflict with the parent statute; rather, it aligns with it. Additionally, Section 112(2) specifically confers power upon the Government to make rules with respect to the entries enumerated in Part I of the Seventh Schedule. In this context, Entry No. 1 specifically covers the subject matter of the present writ petition. Therefore, the Government, as defined in the Act, is well within its competence to frame rules on this subject. (d) The doctrine of unopposed or uncontested election is universally recognized and respected across jurisdictions. Accordingly, it cannot be considered a violation of principal policy or unconstitutional merely based on subjective perceptions or unfounded objections.

Summary: No hard and fast rule existed against considering plea of alibi at bail stage. While granting or refusing to grant bail to an accused person, the court was not required to see and consider the material/evidence collected in favour of the prosecution but also had to give proper attention to the defense plea taken by an accused person. Plea of alibi raised in a bail matter may not be out rightly rejected and can be gone into for the purpose of grant or refusal of bail. Circumstances of each and every case were to be looked into. Tests which were required for genuineness of plea of alibi should be that it had been taken at the earliest, that it appeared to be reasonable and there was no question of manipulation for the same. The basic philosophy of criminal jurisprudence is that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and this principle applies at all stages including pre-trial and even at the time of deciding whether accused is entitled to be released on bail or not which is not a static law but growing all the time, molding itself according to the exigencies of the time.

Summary: (a)The uncorroborated testimony of chance witnesses is inherently unsafe to rely upon. If there exists any reasonable doubt regarding the presence of such witnesses at the scene of the crime, their entire testimony may be discarded. (b)Unexplained delay in sending the case property to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) undermines its evidentiary value. Such delay raises the possibility of tampering or substitution of the crime weapon or spent cartridges, thereby rendering any positive FSL report unreliable. (c)Motive, by itself, is insufficient to sustain a conviction. While it may provide a possible reason for the commission of the offence, it can equally be used by the complainant to falsely implicate the accused. Thus, motive alone cannot substitute for direct or corroborative evidence. (d)In criminal law, the presence of even a single circumstance creating a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case is sufficient to warrant acquittal. The burden lies on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; not many doubts are needed, only one is enough.

Summary: BCA Held: (i) As per the Schedule II to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the offences under Sections 352, 337-A(i), and 337-L(ii) PPC (Shajjah-i-Khafifah) are bailable, while the respondent / accused Kamran allegedly fired shots in the air seemingly intended to intimidate rather than causing death or grievous hurt to the complainant, therefore, the offence of criminal intimidation falls under First Paragraph of Section 506 PPC, which is bailable. It is a settled principle of law that in the case of bailable offences, the grant of bail is the absolute right of the accused as per the clear provisions of Section 496 Cr.P.C. (ii) The complainant was examined by Dr. Muhammad Rehman at RHC, Domel, Bannu on January 27, 2025. The medical evaluation revealed lacerations and bruises on the nasal bridge, left elbow and knee as well as swollen eye with a laceration. The Brain CT Scan showed normal result, indicating no severe head trauma. The police added Section 337-F(iii) PPC to FIR, making the case cognizable and non-bailable despite the injuries not meeting the criteria for Ghayr Jaifah (mutalahimah). This insertion of wrong section of law in the FIR suggests potential mala fide intentions on the part of the police and complainant. (iii) Accused / respondent Waleed, born on March 21, 2009, is considered a Juvenile based on his educational testimonials. As a result, he is entitled to the protection and benefits afforded by the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, particularly its Section 6(3). (iv) The Disability Certificate dated 17.03.2023 issued by the Chairman, Medical Assessment Board / Hospital Director (MTI), Bannu, confirms that the accused Kamran’s right arm was amputated above the elbow, which was also observed in Court. This physical limitation raises doubts about the aerial firing charge, suggesting it may be unfounded. (v) The complainant has made generalized allegations against the accused, and it is yet to be determined which accused caused which specific injury to the complainant. Moreover, the question of sharing common intention by the respondents / accused cannot be determined at this stage in the attending circumstances, and this aspect is yet to be thrashed out at the trial. (vi) The courts have always been slow to cancel bail already granted, as the liberty of a person cannot be curtailed on flimsy grounds. No interference with a bail granting order is required to be made unless the order is lacking in reasons or is perfunctory in nature. Once bail is granted, then, the prosecution would be required to make out a strong case for its cancellation by giving substantive proof of the allegations leveled. The cancellation of bail is a harsh order, because it interferes with the liberty of an individual. Hence, it shall not be resorted to lightly and power to take back an accused in custody is to be exercised with due care and circumspection. (BCA dismissed)

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 --- S. 9(c) --- Recovery of narcotics --- Chain of custody --- Safe custody and transmission of case property --- Evidentiary value of chemical examiner’s report --- Prosecution’s burden --- Standard of proof --- Legal requirement for conviction under S. 9(c). For conviction under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the recovered material was in fact a narcotic substance. This burden includes proof of safe custody and unbroken transmission of the recovered substance from the moment of recovery until its analysis by the chemical examiner. Failure to establish the integrity of this chain renders the chemical report unreliable and inadmissible for conviction. In the present case, there was no unimpeachable evidence regarding the custody of the eight sealed bags between 13.03.2017 and 22.03.2017, nor regarding the identity and role of the person who transmitted them. Thus, the report of the chemical examiner lost its evidentiary value. Cited Cases: Ameer Zeb v. The State (PLD 2012 SC 380) Kashif Amir v. The State (PLD 2010 SC 1052) Muhammad Noor v. The State (2010 SCMR 927) The State v. Imam Bakhsh (2018 SCMR 2039) Amjad Ali v. The State (2012 SCMR 577) Ikramullah v. The State (2015 SCMR 1002) Zahir Shah v. The State (2019 SCMR 2004) (b) Criminal trial --- Duty of trial court --- Powers under S. 540, Cr.P.C. --- Summoning of material witnesses --- Obligation to ensure just decision --- Discretionary and mandatory powers distinguished. Under section 540 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a trial court has wide discretionary powers to summon any person as a witness at any stage of trial, and in certain situations, is under a mandatory duty to do so when evidence is essential for a just decision. The trial court in the present case failed to summon material witnesses connected with safe custody and transmission of narcotics, despite the prosecution’s omission. The court’s failure to exercise its powers under section 540, Cr.P.C., amounted to a miscarriage of justice and deprived itself of the means to reach a just conclusion. Cited Cases: Nawabzada Shah Zain Bugti v. The State (PLD 2013 SC 160) Shahbaz Masih v. The State (2007 SCMR 1631) Sajid Mehmood v. The State (2022 SCMR 1882) Ishaq v. The State (2022 SCMR 1422) Mst. Razia Sultana v. The State (2019 SCMR 1300) Abdul Salam v. The State (2000 SCMR 102) Muhammad Murad Abro v. The State (2004 SCMR 966) Syed Saeed Muhammad Shah v. The State (1993 SCMR 550) Painda Gul v. The State (1987 SCMR 886) (c) Criminal prosecution --- Prosecutorial misconduct --- Failure to produce material witnesses --- Recklessness or complicity --- Role of prosecutors and investigation officers --- Directions issued. The failure to produce witnesses involved in the custody and transmission of narcotics was not a mere inadvertent lapse but indicative of recklessness, or possibly complicity. Despite clear legal standards, the prosecution did not act diligently. The judgment emphasizes that this systemic failure contributes to frequent acquittals in narcotics cases and undermines the purpose of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act. The Court called upon the Government of Sindh and Prosecutor General to take corrective action, including issuing guidelines under S. 9-A(1) of the Sindh Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2009. (d) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 --- Art. 175(2) --- Judicial responsibility --- Duty of trial courts to actively manage trials --- Passive conduct deprecated. The trial court’s passive conduct in failing to summon necessary witnesses or reject the prosecution’s request to give up material witnesses demonstrated a neglect of its duty to reach a just and informed verdict. The court was reminded that it is not to act as a “timorous soul” and must utilize all legal powers to unearth the truth and ensure justice, particularly in serious offences involving narcotics. (e) Public accountability --- Role of State and law enforcement agencies --- Failure to control narcotics menace --- Need for reform. The judgment highlighted systemic failure by law enforcement agencies, which often limit their actions to arresting carriers from underprivileged backgrounds and fail to dismantle wider criminal networks. The Federal and Provincial Governments, as well as the judiciary, were urged to take responsibility and improve the quality of prosecution and trial processes to ensure meaningful deterrence and accountability in narcotics-related offences. Disposition: Appeal allowed; convictions and sentences set aside; appellants acquitted. They were ordered to be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 read with S.R.O. 565(I)/2006 dated 05.06.2006 as amended by S.R.O. 474(I)/2016 dated 24.06.2016 ----Exemption from customs duty---HS Codes 3402.1300 & 3402.1190---Manufacturers and formulators of agricultural pesticides---Approval by Ministry of National Food Security & Research---Scope---**Petitioner, importer and manufacturer of agricultural surfactants/surface-active agents such as stabilizers, emulsifiers, and solvents, sought customs duty exemption under SRO 565 as amended by SRO 474---Claim denied on ground that petitioner was not approved or recognized by Ministry of National Food Security & Research as a manufacturer/formulator of agricultural pesticides---Held, exemption under Column (3) of Table at Serial (3) of the SRO was subject to conditions mentioned in Column (2), including mandatory approval by Ministry---Mere classification under HS Code was insufficient to claim benefit of zero percent duty---Obligations under SRO were binding and petitioner’s failure to meet prerequisites disentitled it from exemption---No vested right was curtailed and petitioner may still challenge vires of SRO before appropriate forum if so advised---Petitions dismissed and leave to appeal refused. (b) Interpretation of SROs and Tax Exemptions ----Conditional exemptions---Legislative intent---SRO-based tax exemptions not absolute and must be interpreted strictly---Held, exemption clauses in SROs are construed narrowly, and compliance with specified conditions is mandatory---Failure to fulfill qualifying requirements renders claim untenable irrespective of nature of imported goods or similarity to exempted items---Distinction drawn between provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 and subject SRO held valid as former lacked comparable restrictive language.

Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 – S. 19(7) – Trial timelines – Expedited proceedings directed Trial before Anti-Terrorism Court – Delay in conclusion – Petition by State for cancellation of bail of accused-respondents – Supreme Court declined to address merits of bail order to avoid prejudicing trial – However, considering multiple FIRs, numerous co-accused, and voluminous prosecution witnesses, Court directed Anti-Terrorism Court to conclude trial within four months from receipt of order – Reminder issued of duty under Section 19(7) of the Act requiring trial within seven days, and communication with Chief Justice of the High Court in case of delay. Held: Fair trial rights under Article 10-A of Constitution must be protected even during expedited proceedings. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Art. 10-A – Fair trial – Access to record, exemption from appearance Fundamental rights – Accused nominated in multiple FIRs before various Anti-Terrorism Courts – Supreme Court held that accused’s right to fair trial includes access to copies of charges and witness testimonies – Trial courts directed to entertain exemption applications where personal appearance is not feasible – Observed that denial of necessary documentation may undermine ability to prepare effective defence. Directions: Trial courts and Chief Justices to ensure procedural fairness and logistical accommodation for accused across multiple proceedings. (c) Judicial oversight – Monitoring mechanism for trial compliance Oversight mechanism – To ensure expeditious and lawful trial, Supreme Court permitted concerned Chief Justices to call fortnightly reports from Anti-Terrorism Courts or Administrative Judges – Objective is to monitor progress and ensure no infringement on right to fair trial while maintaining the mandate of speedy trial under anti-terror laws. Note: Prosecution reserved right to seek cancellation of bail in case of abuse or non-cooperation by accused. Disposition: Petition disposed of – No finding on merits – Trial to be completed within four months – Directions issued to Anti-Terrorism Courts and High Court Chief Justices to safeguard both expeditious proceedings and fair trial rights.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – O. XXIII, Rr. 1 & 2 – Withdrawal of suit – Conditions – Requirement to specify formal defect Withdrawal of suit – Conditions for leave to file fresh suit – Petitioner sought withdrawal of suit with permission to file afresh under O. XXIII, Rr. 1 & 2 of the Code – Held, to obtain such permission, plaintiff must explicitly plead a “formal defect” such as procedural or technical error that does not go to the root of the case – Failure to specify such defect disentitles the plaintiff to relief – Mere desire to re-agitate matter is insufficient in law – Petitioners failed to meet threshold for judicial satisfaction under Rule 2. Cited cases: Muhammad Yar v. Muhammad Amin (2013 SCMR 464); Bashir Ahmed v. Martrade Shipping (PLD 2021 SC 373); Haji Muhammad Boota v. Member (Revenue), BOR (PLD 2003 SC 979) (b) Civil trial – Adverse judgment on merits – Bar to withdrawal for refiling Adverse judgment – Effect – Trial court had already dismissed the suit on merits after recording evidence – Held, once a decision on merits exists, plaintiff cannot withdraw suit and seek to re-litigate same cause of action without setting aside the judgment through proper appellate process – Allowing withdrawal in such manner would frustrate principles of finality and judicial discipline. Cited cases: PLD 2003 SC 979; PLD 2021 SC 373 (c) Discretionary power – Prerequisites – Speaking order mandatory Judicial discretion – Exercise under O. XXIII, R.2 CPC – Held, grant of permission to withdraw suit with liberty to file afresh is discretionary and must be backed by a speaking order reflecting judicial satisfaction – Petitioner must justify with valid legal ground or formal defect; failure to do so renders grant of such permission unlawful. Reiterated: Relief under O. XXIII, R. 2 is exception to bar under R. 3; cannot be exercised mechanically. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused – Petition dismissed – Impugned judgment of Lahore High Court upheld.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 45-B, 46 & 74---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Order passed under S. 74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Perusal of Ss. 45-B and 46 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act 1990’), which are the provisions conferring right of appeal, clearly spell out that an appeal under S.45-B read with S.46 of the Act, 1990 is only available against orders passed under S. 10, 11, 25, 36 or 66 of the Act, 1990---Section 74 under which the impugned order has been passed, is not an appealable order, therefore, the only remedy available with the petitioner, particularly in the wake of the fact that impugned order has allegedly been issued without notice or an opportunity f hearing, is by way of filing a Constitutional petition as the petitioner cannot be left remediless. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Order passed under S.74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990, assailing of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Submission was that the appeal(s), if required to be filed, would become available once proceedings on the basis of Show-Cause Notices commenced---Held: Such submission tantamounts to avoid inevitable consequences of an inchoate, arbitrary and fanciful order---The edifice of the Show-Cause Notices solely hinges upon the vires of the impugned order---Where a superstructure is built on illegal and void order(s), the same is meant to collapse if such an order is declared illegal and unlawful---Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice---High Court set-aside the Impugned Order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the impugned order were declared bad in law and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition, filed by Company/Registered Person, was allowed accordingly. Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and 2 others PLD 1958 SC 104; Mir Wali Khan and another v. Manager, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Muzaffargarh and another PLD 2003 SC 500; Moulana Atta-ur-Rehman v. Al-Hajj Sardar Umar Farooq and others PLD 2008 SC 663; Vice Chancellor Agriculture University, Peshawar and others 2024 SCMR 527; Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Lahore and others v. Ijaz Aslam and others 2024 SCMR 1831 and Ghulam Mustafa Lund v. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman, Islamabad and others PLD 2024 SC 54 ref. (c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Condonation of time-limit---Order passed under S.74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---Officer of the Inland Revenue, powers of---Scope---Limitation, importance of---Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act, 1990’), makes it abundantly clear that the condonation of delay for exposing a taxpayer to the rigors of process after the lapse of statutory period is not a routine and usual exercise; an order for condonation can only be issued in exceptional circumstances, which exceptional circumstances can only be supplemented by supplying reasons and the reasons must ooze out from such orders---It cannot be the true import, intent and purpose of the law that the matter of condonation may be left at the whims of an officer of the Inland Revenue as the limitation is not merely a technicality; it has to be more robustly applied in the financial matters particularly in the taxation matters, enabling the taxpayer as well as the revenue hierarchy to have estimations of their respective financial outlook so that the available revenue, the expenditure required and the planning to be rolled out may be assessed with some degree of certainty---Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the impugned order are declared bad in law and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition, filed by Company/ Registered Person, was allowed accordingly. Messrs Mehr Dastgir Leather and Footwear Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance and others 2025 PTD 16 and Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit Range, Zone-I and others v. Messrs Eden Builders Limited and others 2018 SCMR 991 ref. (d) Limitation--- ----Significance---True import of statute of limitation, its significance and essence stated:-(i) The law of limitation is a statute of repose, designed to quieten title and to bar stale and water-logged disputes and is to be strictly complied with---There is no scope in law of limitation for any equitable or ethical construction to get over them; justice, equity and good conscience do not override the law of limitation;(ii) The hurdles of limitation cannot be crossed under the guise of any hardships or imagined inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the Court---Ignorance, negligence, mistake or hardship does not save limitation, nor does poverty of the parties;(iii) There is absolutely no room for the exercise of any imagined judicial discretion vis-a-vis interpretation of a provision, whatever hardship may result from following strictly the statutory provision---There is no scope for any equity---The Court cannot claim any special inherent equity jurisdiction;(iv) The law of limitation is an artificial mode conceived to terminate justiciable disputes---Therefore, it is to be construed strictly with a leaning to benefit the suitor. Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 ref. (e) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24A---Condonation of time-limit---Order passed under S.74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---Reasons to be given---Pre-requisite---Though there should be no room to escape tax liability through official and institutional manipulation, however, in such cases, the Federal Board of Revenue / Respondent has to lay the reasons at the outset, which are conspicuously missing in the present case---It is axiomatic that no statute can muffle fundamental rights and must at all times advance the public interest and remain constitutionaly compliant---If the competent authority is of the view and opinion that the case of the petitioner /taxpayer falls within the mischiefs, which require condonation of delay for opening a past and closed transaction, there should have been reasons to do so---Forming an opinion by a competent authority requires that such opinion be supplemented with reasons---The Respondents / Department were bound to supply the reasons and petitioner / taxpayer was entitled to a reasoned order---Supplying reasons in an order or decision is not a choice, instead, it is incumbent upon the authority and an essential attribute of a sustainable order---The chain between the conclusion and fact in a decision is broken if there are no reasons---Term ‘reasons’ has not been defined in statutory law, but in common parlance or in terms of reasonable prudence, the presence of reasons is what confirms whether an order or decision is lawful, reasonable and complies with the provisions of law and element of reasonableness---The reason is very life of law, for when the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases, because reason is the foundation of all our laws(Wharton’s Law Lexicon)---Order passed by an authority must contain reasons, enabling an affectee to challenge the same before appropriate forum but if such an order does not contain reasons, the availing of remedy was of no avail as there will be no grounds to test the vires of such an order, which is meant to collapse for its own liability---Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the impugned order were declared bad in law and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition, filed by Company / Registered Person, was allowed accordingly. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Officer (RTO), Mayo Road, Rawalpindi and another v. Messra Sarwaq Traders, 216/1-A, Adamjee Road, Rawalpindi and another 2022 SCMR 1333 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III RTO, Rawalpindi and others v. Messra Sarwaq Traders, Rawalpindi and others 2025 SCMR 341 ref. (f) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24A---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 10A & 199---Condonation of delay---Opportunity of hearing, non-affording of---Due process, absence of---Judicial review of public ations---Fairness, due process of law and natural justice are important constitutional elements as grounds for judicial review of public actions ; they fall to be dealt with under two provisions, one constitutional and the other statutory---The constitutional provisions are Art. 4 and Art. 10A of the Constitution which guarantee fair trial and due process of law---In the presence of a statutory provision like S.24A of General Clauses Act, 1897, it is hard to see how our Courts can shy away from enforcing the duty to give reasons where authorities are acting in an administrative or quasi-judicial capacity---The mandatory requirements to give reasons must be applied with complete vigor, particularly in financial matters---High Court is mindful of the fact and does not expect the revenue officers to demonstrate as if they are trained legal minds and must know the jurisprudence to entirety, however, the least which is expected from them is that their orders must be well founded and rooted in reasons on the basis of plain meanings and contours of a statutory provisions, which they tend to invoke---Even though the right of reasoned order is not formally recognized as one of the principles of natural justice, it is one in spirit and practice, continually gaining prominence as a tenet of natural justice---Thus, it can be said: “Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion and without the same, it becomes lifeless”---In the matters pertaining to the rights of the citizens/persons, particularly, where it is complained that rights guaranteed under Arts. 4 and 10A of the Constitution have been breached, the effective supervision by the Courts comes in and such supervision for guarding the alleged infringed rights requires the rationale for the duty to give reasons---Wouldn’t a duty arise in any case where the underlying decision is subject to judicial review?---Courts may run into some difficulties when there is an attempt to justify a reason-giving requirement on this basis---Some limitations must be devised---Supply of reasons and openness as a rationale for the present case is coherent with effective supervision as a general rationale for a duty to give reasons---Separation of powers, rule of law and good administration concerns can provide justification for a reason-giving requirement even in situations where the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions make no such imposition on administrative decision-makers---Article 4 of the Constitution is the bedrock of the Rule of Law and an antithesis to the rule of men in our country; it is a restraint on the executive and judicial organs of the State to abide by the rule of law---Article 4 of the Constitution ordains that it is an inalienable right of every citizen, wherever he may be and any person whenever he is in Pakistan, to have and enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law---Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the Impugned Order were declared bad in law and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition, filed by Company/ Registered Person, was allowed accordingly. Doody v. Secretary of State for Home Department (1993) 3 All ER 92, 106; Government of Pakistan and another v. Dada Amir Haider Khan PLD 1987 SC 504; Khalid Iqbal and others v. Shahid Iqbal and others 2021 CLC 1880; Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, JT (2003) Supp 2 SC 354 and AIR 2004 SC 1794 ref. (g) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S. 24A---Passing of order---Reasons to be given---Object and purpose---General Clauses Act, 1897, has been called the legislative dictionary; the object is to promote brevity and uniformity in the language of the statutes---A number of expressions have been defined in the Acts, making them of general application, except where an intention to the contrary appears in the particular Act in which they may be used---The General Clauses Act, the Provincial Acts and their definitions and rules of construction automatically apply to all statutes, unless contrary be expressed or the context otherwise requires and must, therefore, be always borne in mind in the construction of statutes---In other words, the rules enacted in these Acts have a binding effect---Section 24A accords legislative recognition to the well-known rule that all persons exercising State power have to act fairly, justly and honestly---Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, gives legislative recognition to the view that the duty to give reasons is part of the duty to uphold the rule of law in the sense indicated above, by providing that the statutory decision-maker shall "so far as necessary or appropriate, give reasons for making the order or, as the case may be, for issuing directions..."; it also gives effect to the principles of fairness---Decision-making power is subject to an implied duty to give reasons. Bahadur and another v. The State and another PLD 1985 SC 62; Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268; Zain Yar Khan v. Chief Engineer C.R.B. C. WAPDA, D.I. Khan and another 1998 PLC (C.S.) 1484; Ch. Zahur Illahi v. Secretary to Government of Pakistan Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Rawalpindi PLD 1975 Lah. 499 and S.S. Miranda Ltd. v. The Chief Commissioner, Karachi and another PLD 1959 SC 134 ref. (h) Judicial review--- ----Administrative decisions---Reasons for a decision, non-providing of---Indian perspective---The requirement to give reasons for a decision has been expanded by increasing the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions---What started as a mere exception (that of providing reasons for a decision) has now replaced the established proposition which stated that reasons need notbe afforded for administrative decisions---Said development has been brought about through various judicial pronouncements in India and other foreign jurisdictions---A right to reasoned decision has become, over time, to be an indispensable part of a system based on judicial review and is considered to be an integral part of fairness and justice now---Notably, the requirement to give reasons has advantages and the necessary disadvantages associated with it---However, the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages of such a requirement, and as such the requirement is deemed to be an essential part of any system of law---In India, there is no specific statute governing such administrative decisions, the general rule is that a purely administrative authority has no requirement to state reasons for its actions or the determination it has reached---However, to establish the balance between claims of individual justice and administrative flexibility, the courts in India have grafted exceptions to this rule, observing that an administrative authority shall record and furnish reasons for its decisions; one, where the body is quasi-judicial; two, where the decision would affect the civil rights of the individual; three, by bringing such decisions within the purview of judicial review and lastly, four, by incorporating the requirement of reasons to be an integral part of principles of natural justice---Thus, in India, an administrative body is required to give reasons for its decision based on the broad heads of grounds namely, statutory and constitutional perspective and vision of reasoned decision as a facet of natural justice. (i) Judicial review--- ----Reasons for a decision, non-providing of---English perspective---In English law, even if provisions of relevant law provides that the decision maker “shall not be required to assign any reason” yet such provisions does not prevent the Court to exercise its power of judicial review on the usual traditional grounds; the fact that the decision is not subject to appeal or review does not affect the obligation of the decision maker to be fair---Thus, under English Law, though there is no general duty to give reasons, however, it can be seen that the position has been evolving to cast a more expansive duty on decision makers to accord reasons for their decisions---Yet it cannot be said that there is a duty in all cases to do so---Of course, the position under English law is distinguishable from our law because in Pakistan as by virtue of S.24A of General Clauses Act, 1897 , this duty has been accorded statutory recognition and thus would necessarily make it of a wider import than under English law. R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fayed (1997) 1All ER 228, 230;. Ex Parte Fayed and Attorney-General v. Ryan (1980) AC 718 PC; [Doody (1993) 3 All ER 92, 110; R v Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Cunningham [1991] 4 All ER 310 (CA) and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fayed [1997] 1 All ER 228 (CA), 248) ref. (j) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Order passed under S.74 of the Sales Tax Act , 1990---Opportunity of hearing, non-affording of---Judicial review---Grievance of the petitioners was that they had not even been heard before passing the impugned order---Validity---Such course of action was fatal to the vires of the impugned Order---The days when it used to be said that a person seeking even a privilege was not entitled to be heard were long gone---It is hard to see how the High Courts can fulfill their judicial review responsibility under Art. 199 of the Constitution, which is a responsibility to see that public authorities keep within the limits of their authority and act lawfully, unless the decisions impugned before the High Court(s) contain the reasons for them---Thus, the impugned order being devoid of any reasons, having been issued without an opportunity of hearing, which could not withstand any test of due process and administration of justice---High Court set-aside the impugned order with the result that the Show-Cause Notices issued on the basis of the impugned order were declared bad in law and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition, filed by Company / Registered Person, was allowed accordingly. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery (318 US 80) ref. Muhammad Shoaib Rashid and Minahil Khan for Petitioner. Shahjahan Khan for Respondents. Date of hearing: 17th April, 2025.

Summary: ----Preamble---National Electric Power Regulator Authority---Object, purpose and scope---National Electric Power Regulator Authority provides a comprehensive framework for regulating power sector in Pakistan, promoting efficiency, transparency and fairness---Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 has a broad scope that encompasses various aspects of power sector in Pakistan inter alia, including regulation of power sector; issues of licenses to power generation, transmission and distribution companies; tariff determination for power generation, transmission and distribution; ensuring fair and transparent prices; market operation; consumer protection, etc. (b) Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act (XL of 1997)--- ----Ss. 31 & 51---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 77, 142 & 199---Constitutional petition---Surcharge, levy of---Jurisdiction of Federal Government--- Scope--- Petitioners/companies assailed different surcharges imposed under S. 31(5) of Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997---Plea raised by petitioners/companies was that this was the authority of Legislature and not the Executive---Validity---National Electric Power Regulator Authority does not determine surcharge---This is a statutory function of Federal Government to impose the levy which later becomes part of tariff and it cannot be treated as tax---Vires of validating provision was not under challenge, therefore a strong presumption of Constitutionality was attached to such enactment---Surcharge was Constitutionally not invalid due to its initial mode of introduction---In its current form, S. 31(8)(a) of Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 had granted excessive discretion to the Executive and was inconsistent with the object and purpose of Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997---High Court declared to 途ead down� provision of S. 31(8)(a) of Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997, to restrict its application solely to public sector projects that directly pertained to generation, transmission and distribution of electricity---High Court directed Federal Government that in exercise of its powers under S. 31(8)(a) of Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997, it should ensure that any surcharge levied was strictly confined to projects within the electricity sector---High Court further declared that any imposition of surcharges beyond such scope would be deemed ultra vires Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997---High Court advised the relevant authorities to review and amend the provision to explicitly reflect such limitation, ensuring compliance with statutory framework governing power sector---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. ������ Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills and 814 others v. WAPDA and others 1997 SCMR 641; Jurists Foundation through Chairman v. Federal Government through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others PLD 2020 SC 01; Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. and others v. Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary Law and others PLD 2002 SC 460; Shahtaj Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others 2024 SCMR 1656 and Province of Punjab through Secretary Agriculture Department, Lahore v. Saleem Ijaz and others 2023 SCMR 774 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal statute---Validating a levy retrospectively---Principle---Legislative competence of the Parliament to validate a levy retrospectively, where procedural or Constitutional infirmities have been identified by a Court, has consistently been upheld, provided that the defect in the original enactment is effectively addressed through substantive legislative measures---Mechanism of re-enactment or retrospective validation has been judicially recognized as a legitimate tool of legislative correction, enabling the State to preserve fiscal measures and statutory levies that may otherwise fall due to procedural lapses. ������ Baz Muhammad Kakar and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and Justice and others PLD 2012 SC 923; Engineer Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1337; Messrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Sheikh Muhammad Ilyas and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others PLD 2020 SC 641 and Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and another v. Durrani Ceramics and others 2014 SCMR 1630 rel. (d) Interpretation of Constitution--- ----Trichotomy of powers---Scope---Constitution is based on the principle of trichotomy of powers---Legislature makes laws, the Executive executes it, while the Judicature is entrusted with duty to interpret it---Constitution identifies and explains authority of the Parliament to exclusively make laws with respect to any matter in the Federal legislative list---All such matters pertaining to such areas in the Federation are not included in any Province. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 77 & 142---Levy of tax---Delegation of powers---Scope---Levy of tax for the purposes of Federation is not permissible except by or under the authority of an Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Such legislative powers cannot be delegated to executive authorities---Parliament alone and not the Government/Executive is empowered to levy tax---Delegation of such powers to Government Executive is for the purpose of implementation of such laws, which is to be done by framing rules or issuing notifications etc. ������ Cyanamid Pakistan Ltd. and another v. Collector of Customs (Appraisement), through Assistant Collector Customs House, Karachi and others PLD 2005 SC 495 rel. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Reading in and reading down a provision---Object, purpose and scope---When open ended or closed ended legislative provisions come for scrutiny before Courts, the same may be examined while applying principles of 途eading in� and 途eading down�---Court must exercise restraint to save the statute instead of destroying it---Appropriate course is to interpret the statute in such a manner to align it with its object and purpose---Principles of 途eading down� and 途eading in� serve as essential tools in statutory interpretation, allowing Courts to uphold legislative intent while ensuring conformity with Constitutional mandates---迭eading down� is employed to preserve validity of a statute by construing its provisions in a manner that aligns with the Constitutional principles, thus preventing the need for striking down the legislation---This approach is particularly useful when a provision appears overly broad or ambiguous but can be interpreted in a restricted manner to maintain its legality and effectiveness---Courts apply such principle to avoid declaring statues unconstitutional unless absolutely necessary, favoring an interpretation that keeps the law functional within the permissible framework---Conversely, 途eading in� is used when a legislative omission results in ambiguity or unintended consequences---In such cases, Courts may infer and incorporate language that aligns with the legislative intent while ensuring that the statue remains coherent and effective---Such principle is applied cautiously, ensuring that judicial intervention does not amount to unauthorized legislation but rather serves to give effect to the true purpose of law. ������ Schacter v. Canada [1992] 2 SCR 679; AAM Log Itehad and another v. The Election Commission of Pakistan and others PLD 2022 SC 39; Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others v. M.Q.M. through Deputy Convener and others PLD 2014 SC 531; Arshad Mehmood v. Commissioner/Delimitation Authority, Gujranwala and others PLD 2014 Lah. 221; Syed Mukhtar Hussain Shah v. Mst. Saba Imtiaz PLD 2011 SC 260; Sundew Properties Limited v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission and others AIR 2024 SC 3155 and Introduction to the Interpretation of Statutes by Dr. Avtar Singh and Dr. Harpreet Kaur (Third Edition, 2009, pp. 238, 239) rel. ������ Shumail Ahmad Butt, Isaac Ali Qazi, Iqbal Akhtar Khan, Abdur Rahim Khan Jadoon and Muhammad Yasir Khattak for Petitioners. ������ Sanaullah, Additional Attorney General, Asad Jan, Malik Sajjad Manzoor, Saeed Khan Akhoonzada, Farhad Ali, Ms. Zainab Iftikhar, Junior of Abdur Rauf Rohaila, along with Muhammad Tofeeq, Liaison Officer, Amir Nawaz, Chief Law Officer, PESCO/TESCO, Zafar Khan, Senior Law Officer, MOE and Muhammad Farooq Afridi for NEPRA for Respondents. ������ Dates of hearing: 22nd, 23rd and 24th January, 2025.