Summary: "Right of appeal available at the time of promulgation of Amendment Act extinguishes if amendment is made effective retrospectively or from a particular date" ----- (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Tax reference—Jurisdiction—Larger Bench—Interpretation of amended tax laws—Held, in light of Explanation inserted via Finance Act, 2024, reference applications against orders of Commissioner (Appeals) communicated after 3rd May 2024 (date of commencement of Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024) shall lie before the High Court, even if proceedings were initiated prior to said date—Amendment Act held applicable to all such post-communication orders—Explanation declared to have retrospective applicability for pending proceedings regarding forum of remedy. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ----S. 47(2)—Reference to High Court—Applicability of Income Tax provisions—Held, sub-section (2) of S. 47 incorporates provisions of S. 133 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 mutatis mutandis—Thus, the clarification inserted through Explanation to S. 133, Income Tax Ordinance 2001 by Finance Act 2024 applies equally to Sales Tax references—Reference lies before High Court if order of Commissioner (Appeals) is communicated after 03.05.2024. (c) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ----S. 133 & Explanation [Finance Act 2024]—Reference—Right of appeal/reference—Scope—Right of appeal is a vested substantive right and continues unless specifically taken away by legislation—However, Explanation to S. 133 clearly and explicitly provides that orders of Commissioner (Appeals) communicated after 03.05.2024 (commencement of Amendment Act) shall be challenged via reference to High Court—Held, this legislative intent must be respected—Pending adjudication before Commissioner (Appeals) does not bar jurisdiction of High Court under amended law. (d) Interpretation of statutes—Prospective vs. retrospective operation ----Held, declaratory laws or explanations inserted to remove doubt are treated as clarificatory and operate retrospectively unless expressly stated otherwise—Legislative intent in Explanation to S. 133 is explicit, resolving forum-related controversy without need for interpretative exercise—Relied on Muhammad Ishaq v. The State (PLD 1956 SC 256), Idrees Ahmad v. Hafiz Fida Ahmad (PLD 1985 SC 376). ----- Disposition: Legal question settled. Amendment Act deemed to commence from 03.05.2024. Reference applications challenging orders of Commissioner (Appeals) communicated after this date shall lie before the High Court. Reference matters in Annex-A directed to be placed before concerned Division Benches. Determination without prejudice to individual merits.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) [as amended by Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act (XX of 2022)], S. 9(1), Sr. No. 3(c)---Possession of chars---Bail, grant/dismissal of---Allegation against the accused-applicant was that 2000-grams chars was recovered from beneath the driver seat of the jeep being driven by the applicant---Perusal of record revealed that the accused was driving the vehicle, while the co-accused was found sitting on the front seat---Inchargeof the vehicle was always considered to be the driver of the vehicle and he was held responsible for recovery of any sort of article from the said vehicle---Driver of the vehicle could not be absolved from the liability, if substances were transported in the vehicle being driven by him---On tentative assessment of the record, prima facie it appeared that the accused applicant was found seated on the driving seat of the vehicle and recovery of 2000-grams chars was also effected from beneath the driving seat---Offence fell within the ambit of prohibitory clause of S.497(1),Cr.P.C., which was not only heinous, but also non-bailable---Therefore, Court was not inclined to grant bail to accused applicant and to his extent the bail application was dismissed---Record transpired that the co-accused was seated on the front seat of vehicle and nothing had been recovered from his exclusive possession rather the contraband was recovered from beneath the driving seat---Under such circumstances, the case of the said co-accused fell within the ambit of further inquiry, thus the innocence or guilt of said co-accused was yet to be determined, which could only be determined after recording evidence---Bail application to the extent of said co-accused was allowed, in circumstances. Kashif Amir v. The State PLD 2010 SC 1052 and Abdul Ghafoor and another v. The State 2020 PCr.LJ 1512 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in the bail order are tentative in nature, and same shall not influence the merits of the case at the trial. Attaullah Langove, Jam Saka Dashti, Naik Muhammad and Sarmad Ahmed Khan for Applicants. Muhammad Younas Mengal, Additional P.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025. Muhammad Najam-ud-Din Mengal, J .--- This order disposes of Criminal Bail Application No.13 of 2025, whereby the applicants (accused) Hair Biyar Khan son of Hassan Ali and Meraj Ahmed son of Munir Ahmed, are seeking bail after arrest in case FIR No.01 of 2025 dated 17th January 2025, Police Station Excise Bella, District Lasbela under Section 9(1) 3-C of CNS Act, 2022 lodged on the complaint of one Faisal Iqbal, Inspector, Excise and Taxation Narcotics, Bela with the history of recovery of 2000 grams of Charas from beneath the driver seat of the Jeep bearing Registration No.QAS-3134 being driven by the applicant (accused) Hair Biyar Khan.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.8, 12 & 39---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.53-A---Suit for recovery of possession by vendor---Maintainability---Contingent contract---Contingency in agreement to sell not fulfilled---Legal consequences---Vendor seeking possession of suit property---Vendee having paid almost entire sale consideration---Effect---Failure of vendor to seek cancellation of agreement to sell---Legal implication---Possession of property cannot be granted without prior cancellation of agreement---Scope---In the present case the core challenge stemmed from the vendor’s/petitioner’s attempt to reclaim possession of the property without first seeking cancellation of the subsisting agreement to sell---The agreement to sell was contingent upon issuance of NOC from GHQ, which was never granted, but despite this the vendee had already paid almost the entire sale consideration and continued in possession---The vendor, instead of pursuing cancellation of the agreement to sell, directly filed a suit for possession, which was legally questionable as to how possession could be reclaimed unless the underlying sale agreement was first lawfully set aside---Held: Possession being sought by the appellant/plaintiff was without any ground or justification as the said possession could not be granted in the absence of a prayer for cancellation of the agreement to sell---Valuable rights in favour of the respondent/vendee had already accrued for the reasons that significant percentage (95%) of the sale consideration had already been paid to the appellant/vendor---Suit of the appellant/vendor was rightly dismissed by the courts below---Moreover, under equitable principles the respondent/vendee was entitled to retain her possession---In the given circumstances her possession was a complete defense to the suit filed by the appellant which was rightly dismissed by courts below---No substantial error in the impugned judgment was pointed out, as such, no case for interference was made out---Second appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S.53-A---Possession of a property in part performance of a contract---Scope---Possession of a property in part performance of a contract can only be used as a shield and not as a weapon of offence. Syed Athar Hussain Shah v. Haji Muhammad Riaz 2022 SCMR 778 and Hikmat Khan v. Shamsur Rehman 1993 SCMR 428 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.100---Second appeal---Scope---A second appeal to the High Court lies only on any of the following grounds; (i) the decision being contrary to law or usage having the force of law; (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (iii) a substantial error of defect in the procedure provided by C.P.C. or by any other law for the time being in force which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon merits---Notwithstanding such clear provisions on the scope of second appeal, sometimes the High Courts deal with and decide second appeals as if those were first appeals; they thus assume and exercise a jurisdiction which the High Courts do not possess and thereby also contribute to unjustified prolongation of litigation process which is already chocked with high pendency of cases---High Court in such cases cannot enter into the exercise of re-reading and re-appraisal of evidence, in second appeal, and reverse the findings of facts of the first appellate court, much less the concurrent findings of facts reached by the Trial court as well as the first appellate court. Zafar Iqbal and others v. Naseer Ahmed and others 2022 SCMR 2006 rel. Khawaja Naveed Ahmed for Appellant. Salman Javed Mirza for Respondent. Dates of hearings: 24th March and 18th April, 2025.

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Summary: The appellate court has got ample jurisdiction to mould the relief if a party is entitled to the same and the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction does not ordinarily interfere in exercise of such jurisdiction by the appellate court but for that purpose the matter should be directly in issue before the appellate court for decision and decision should not ordinarily be passed in collateral proceedings as has been done in the instant case.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending