Summary: (Against the judgment/order dated 25.09.2020 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P.No.42411 of 2017). Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 174(3), proviso---Maintaining of record---Statutory period---Authorities were aggrieved of restriction imposed by High Court for not seeking record from respondent / taxpayer because of statutory timeframe---Validity---Matter pertained to deemed assessment for tax year 2010 and show cause notice and reassessment orders dated 27-02-2015, which were within timeframe prescribed by law and fell within proviso to Section 174(3) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Cognizance was taken within five years when notice was issued and notwithstanding the interim order in case/litigation on the subject of challenging the notice, respondent / taxpayer was bound to retain documents under the law---Whether or not any stay was operative in the matter, if the cause was sub-judice it was enough for proviso to kick in and dilute the effect of six year timeframe till the matter was taken to its logical end under the law, provided that the initial notice was also within time prescribed by law---Requisite proviso had enabled the authorities to act accordingly---Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court to the extent of such direction---Appeal was allowed. Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. v. Federal Board of Revenue 2016 PTD 2074 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Panther Sports and Rubber Industries (Pvt). Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1133 rel. Muhammad Saeed Tahir, Advocate Supreme Court [Via Video-link from Lahore], Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General Law, FBR, Dr. Khalid Malik, Director (Law), FBR [At Islamabad] for Petitioners. Ex-parte for Respondent No. 1. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(1)---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXXI of 2019), S. 11(b)---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act (XXIII of 2013), S. 15-AA---Possession of amphetamine (ICE), charas and illegal possession of weapon---Post-arrest bail, grant of--- Woman accused---Recovery was made on prior information of informer---Search and seizure proceedings were not recorded by Police while using mobile phone or any other audio or video device--- Report of Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) was still awaited and it was yet to be determined by the FSL whether the recovered contraband was indeed “ICE” or some other substance, which cast doubt on prosecution’s case, and was to be determined after recording of evidence pro and contra, thus, for the time being accused was held entitled for grant of bail---In cases of women accused etc. as mentioned in S. 497(1), irrespective of the category of offence, bail is to be granted as a rule and refused only as an exception in the same manner as it is granted or refused in offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1)---Challan was complete, accused was not required for further investigation, thus, keeping her behind bars for an indefinite period would not serve any useful purpose---Post-arrest bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Mst. Ghazala v. The State and others 2023 SCMR 887 and Resham Khan and another v. The State and another 2021 SCMR 2011 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(1)---Post arrest bail---Female accused---Scope---Scope of bail in case of female accused is wider as compared to male accused. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(1)---Grant of bail---Availability of sufficient incriminating material---Relevant consideration---Scope---For grant of bail in exercise of the discretionary power of the court under S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., the availability of a sufficient incriminating material to connect the accused with the commission of the offence alleged against him is not a relevant consideration. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 154---First Information Report---Scope---FIR being the foundational document sets the criminal law in motion. Saeed Ahmad Awan for Petitioner. Malik Amjad Inayat, A.A.G, for the State. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025. Sadiq Ali, J .--- This order is directed to dispose of an application filed by petitioner namely Mst. Atiya Bibi wife of Rashid Ali for grant of post arrest bail in case FIR No. 207 dated 13.04.2025 registered under section 11 (b) of The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2019 read with section 15-AA, KPK, at Police Station Khaki, District, Mansehra.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.8 & 12---Suit for recovery of possession of immoveable property---Subsequent belated suit seeking specific performance of agreement to sell by vendee---Failure to prove full sale consideration---Absence of receipts or proof---Effect---The respondent filed civil suit seeking possession of the suit property along with arrears of rent---Trial Court decreed the suit in his favour which decision was upheld in appeal---The appellant / defendant challenged the concurrent findings in the present second appeal, contending possession was delivered to him under an agreement to sell dated 05.09.2006, consideration for which was partly paid, with subsequent payments accepted by the respondent, whereas, respondent denied full payment, asserted ownership, and argued that appellant痴 possession was unauthorized---Held: Appellant / defendant failed to point out any material irregularity, misreading or non-reading of the evidence---It was unconscionable for the appellant to maintain possession of the subject property in light of the fact that the respondent/plaintiff continued to be the registered owner of the same---Moreover, the courts below had correctly held that the appellant was unable to prove that he had paid anything over Rs.200,000 to the respondent and categorically admitted that he had no receipt or proof of the same---Further, the appellant admittedly never approached the respondent seeking performance of the above-mentioned agreement---It was also noticeable that the civil suit was filed by the respondent in the year 2007 and suit for specific performance of the said sale agreement was only filed by the appellant in the year 2019, after the judgment and decree was pronounced by the Trial Court---This conduct itself did not warrant any equitable relief in favour of the appellant/defendant---Had the appellant/defendant been vigilant the said suit for specific performance ought to have been filed earlier---Moreover, it was evident from perusal of the evidence led by the respective parties that the appellant/defendant had not taken any steps in furtherance of the said agreement---Further, it appeared that he was not willing to perform his part of the contract---The same could be deciphered from the fact that the appellant filed a suit for specific performance after the Trial Court had passed a judgement and decree in favour of the respondent / plaintiff---No substantial error or defect was identified by the appellant which required interference of the High Court---Second appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S.53A---Doctrine of part performance---Protection to buyer / vendee under an agreement to sell of immoveable property, availability of---Applicability, scope and limitations---Applicability of S. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act depends upon the following factors;(i) There is a contract in writing signed by the transferor in respect of an immovable property; (ii) From the writing, transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty; (iii) In part performance of the contract, the transferee has taken possession of the property or any part thereof or if he was in possession, he continues to be in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and (iv) The transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract---If all these conditions are satisfied, then even if the contract is not registered, the transferor or any person claiming under him cannot enforce any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken possession except such right, which a transferor is entitled to enforce by virtue of the contract. ������ Naib Subedar Taj Muhammad v. Yar Muhammad Khan 1992 SCMR 1265 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.100---Second appeal---Scope, restrictions and limitations---Under S. 100 of C.P.C. a second appeal to the High Court lies only on any of the following grounds: (i) the decision being contrary to law or usage having the force of law; (ii) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; and (iii) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by C.P.C. or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon merits---The scope of second appeal is thus restricted and limited to these grounds, as S. 101, C.P.C. expressly mandates that no second appeal shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in S. 100, C.P.C.---Notwithstanding such clear provisions on the scope of second appeal, sometimes the High Courts deal with and decide second appeals as if those were first appeals; High Courts thus assume and exercise a jurisdiction which they do not possess, and thereby also contribute to unjustified prolongation of litigation process which is already chocked with high pendency of cases---A High Court cannot, in such case, enter into the exercise of re-reading and re-appraisal of evidence, in second appeal, and reverse the findings of facts of the first appellate court, much less the concurrent findings of facts reached by the trial court as well as the first appellate court---It has, in second appeal, no jurisdiction to go into the question relating to weightage to be attached to the statements of witnesses, or believing or disbelieving their testimony, or reversing the findings of the courts below just because the other view can also be formed on the basis of evidence available on record of the case. ������ Zafar Iqbal and others v. Naseer Ahmed and others 2022 SCMR 2006 rel. ������ Nausheen Tajammul and Tajammul Hussain Lodhi for Appellant. ������ Ms. Sarwar Jahan for Respondent. ������ Date of hearing: 16th April, 2025. ������ MUHAMMAD JAFFER RAZA, J.--- The instant IInd Appeal has been filed against judgment and Decree dated 05.09.2019 and 07.09.2019 respectively, (的mpunged Judgment and Decree�) passed by the Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 159 of 2018.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The first and foremost issue that arises for determination is whether respondent, having secured less than the qualifying marks, could claim any legal entitlement to appointment. It is settled law that no candidate can claim appointment as a matter of right without meeting the eligibility criteria prescribed by the recruiting authority. Recommendations made without evaluating the respondent's failure to qualify in the written examination do not confer any vested right. The act of making such recommendation, without the backing of merit, cannot override statutory rules or established recruitment procedures. It is a settled law that the High Court, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, is not expected to act as a selection or appointing authority so as to substitute its own assessment for that of the competent body.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The first and foremost issue that arises for determination is whether respondent, having secured less than the qualifying marks, could claim any legal entitlement to appointment. It is settled law that no candidate can claim appointment as a matter of right without meeting the eligibility criteria prescribed by the recruiting authority. Recommendations made without evaluating the respondent's failure to qualify in the written examination do not confer any vested right. The act of making such recommendation, without the backing of merit, cannot override statutory rules or established recruitment procedures. It is a settled law that the High Court, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, is not expected to act as a selection or appointing authority so as to substitute its own assessment for that of the competent body. 483Local Government 41936/19 Abdul Haq Vs Province of Punjab etc Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 08- 05- 2025 2025 LHC 3200 2025 YLR 1768 (Lahore)

Summary: (Against the judgment/decree dated 10.03.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Civil Revision No. 583 of 2023). (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 2(g), 13 & 14---Contract procured under duress and undue influence---Execution of agreement while vendor being in police custody---Legality---Coercion, duress and undue influence, presumption of---Free consent of the vendor being an essential element of a valid contract ---Requirement---Burden of proof---Onus on beneficiary of the transaction to prove that transaction was made without any duress and with free consent of the owner---Scope---Contract procured under duress would be void---The present case was about a house that originally belonged to the respondents' family and was inherited by them through an inheritance mutation in 2001---Years later, some financial dealings between the petitioners and respondents went sour after a failed investment project---During this dispute, the respondents' predecessor was arrested and kept in police custody---While in custody, he was made to sign an agreement that transferred the family/inherited house to the petitioners, and a fresh mutation was recorded in their (petitioners') names---The respondents argued that the agreement was forced and had no legal value since it was signed under duress---The legal question before the Supreme Court was as to "whether the agreement for transfer of property, executed by the respondents' predecessor while in police custody, could be treated as a valid transaction reflecting free consent, or whether it stood vitiated by duress and coercion, rendering the subsequent mutation in favor of the petitioners void"?---Held: Since the respondents' predecessor (vendor) was arrested and was in custody, the complainant of the FIR was obviously in a position to dominate the will of accused, and therefore, the burden was upon the petitioner (vendee) to prove that he had not exerted any influence to strike a bargain/deal---The transaction so made was made on the basis of the agreement which was void---The suit of the respondents was filed within time and the petitioner was under heavy burden to prove that transaction made was without any duress and was made with free consent---No evidence was on record which could support the case of the petitioner and that was the reason the High Court dealt with the question extensively and had held rightly that the transaction made consequent to the agreement in police custody was void---No ground was present warranting interference of the Supreme Court in findings given by the High Court---Civil appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 2(g), 13 & 14---Contract procured under duress---Agreement executed while vendor being under police custody or detention---Legality and validity---Coercion, duress or undue influence, presumption of---Essentials of a valid contract stated---Offer, acceptance, consideration, legal capacity, and free consent---Contract procured under duress void---Effect---Benefits derived from void contract to be restored---Under the law a transaction or an agreement executed under custody or detention could potentially be considered as having been made under coercion, duress or undue influence, if the free consent is not given or the expressed will was the outcome of such circumstances---A person in custody or detention may be particularly vulnerable to coercion or duress as his freedom or liability to resist is severely limited---A person under the custody of the law enforcement agencies having control over the situation if enters into an agreement against best interest has an option to avoid it hence can be challenged in the court as voidable---A legally binding contract requires several elements i.e. an offer, acceptance of that offer, consideration, the parties having legal capacity to contract but not for an unlawful purpose, surely with a free consent (meeting of the minds or consensus ad idem)---If the consent is procured by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, the consent is not free---An undue influence is a demonstration of controlling the will of the other party because of the prevailing situation of the main party---While coercion is an act of enforcing a will but the undue influence or duress are the consequence of coercion---A contract procured under duress by one party over the other is void and any benefit received there from must be restored and the loss be made good to such party---Duress in its more extended sense means that the degree of constraint or danger either actually inflicted or threatened which creates sufficient insecurity or an apprehension to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary fairness---It does not necessarily imply that the means used should be in themselves unlawful, but includes the use of lawful means in an unlawful manner or for an improper purpose---A duress by imprisonment, both lawful or unlawful, to force the party into executing a contract is illegal---In such circumstances, the contract would be deemed to be void under section 2(g) of the Contract Act, 1872 since it lacked consent as defined under section 13 of the said Act and free consent under section 14 of the Act. Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum and others PLD 1975 SC 624; Lahore Stock Exchange Limited v. Pedrick J. Whyte Group (Pakistan) Ltd. and others PLD 1990 SC 48; Dilber Hussain Hashmi and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank, Shahra-e-Iqbal Branch, Quetta 2001 SCMR 265 and Pokcom Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 44 rel. Kamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 20.12.2016 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Crl. A. No. 13 of 2011, Crl. A. No. 19 of 2021 and M.R. No. 10 of 2011). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 396 & 460---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, dacoity with murder, person jointly concerned in lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night---Reappraisal of evidence---Confession, recording of---Appellants were charged that they entered into the house of complainant, tied his and his wife's hands and one of them murdered his son---In the present case, the judicial confession of one of the appellants was available on record in the form of Section 164 Cr.P.C statement, in which the said appellant narrated the occurrence and gave an inculpatory confessional statement which involved the role of all co-accused persons, who were the present appellants in the instant case---Judicial confession is attributed with a high degree of confidence ipso facto, as it is recorded by a judicial officer in a Court in consonance with Sections 164 and 364 of the Cr.P.C. and it is commonly relied upon for maintaining conviction---Judicial confessional statement of an accused is recognized by law as circumstantial evidence against the other co-accused---In the present case, the inculpatory confession made by the appellant not only detailed his own involvement but also implicated the other appellants in the incident---Even though the confession was subsequently retracted, a conviction could still be sustained if there existed other corroborative and incriminating evidence against the appellants---Once a confessional statement was found to be true and voluntary, it could form the basis for conviction---Inculpatory judicial confession of appellant constituted a significant cornerstone of the prosecution's case---Said confession was duly corroborated by the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the identification parade, medical evidence, the recovery of the weapon and the forensic report issued by the Forensic Science Laboratory, collectively forming a consistent and credible chain of evidence supporting the prosecution's narrative---Appeal was dismissed with modification in sentence. Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edition; John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law ? 821, at 308 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 4th rev. ed. 1970); Imran v. the State 2015 SCMR 155; Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLD 2022 SC 353; Mazhar Hussain v. The State 1990 MLD 195; Haji Jatoi v. The State 2003 PCr.LJ 1492; Farooq Mengal v. The State 2007 SCMR 404; Manjeet Singh v. The State PLD 2006 SC 30; Tariq Hussain v. The State 2003 SCMR 938; Maj (R) Tariq Mehmood v. The State 2002 SCMR 1493; Mst. Rubina Bibi v. The State 2001 SCMR 1914; Emperor v. Daii Norsu and Govinda Nath ILR (1883) 6 Bom 223; Khurrum Malik and others v. The State and others PLD 2006 SC 354; Mohd. Sabir v. Rex AIR 1952 All 796; Rema Naik v. State AIR 1965 Ori 31; Balbir Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 and Muhammad Amin v. The State PLD 2006 SC 219 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 396 & 460---Qatl-i-amd, dacoity with murder, person jointly concerned in lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night---Reappraisal of evidence---Motive not proved---Mitigating circumstance---Quantum of sentence---Accused were charged that they entered into the home of complainant, tied his and his wife's hands and one of them murdered his son---Record showed that the prosecution's case revealed two conflicting narratives regarding the motive---One asserted that the murder occurred during a robbery/dacoity, while the other proposed the possibility of targeted killing---Consequently, the true motive remained shrouded in mystery---Both versions had surfaced in the evidence, yet neither diminished the culpability of the appellants, nor any of the versions was supported by cogent evidence---Where the motive for the offence is shrouded in mystery then the extreme penalty of death is not warranted---Additionally, given that four individuals were implicated in the crime, the investigation and identification parade did not attribute a specific role to each appellant with respect to inflicting that injury---Said factual matrix, while not exonerating the appellants, constituted a relevant mitigating circumstance in the assessment of their respective culpabilities and the quantum of sentence---Thus, death sentence of the appellants was modified to the sentence of life imprisonment--- Appeal was dismissed with said modification in sentence. Muhammad Yaqoob v. State 1999 SCMR 1138; Ali Asghar alias Aksar v. The State 2023 SCMR 596; Nadeem Ramzan v. The State 2018 SCMR 149; Amjad Shah v. State PLD 2017 SC 152; Zafar Iqbal v. State 2014 SCMR 1227 and Shameem Khan v. The State 2024 SCMR 1802 rel. Raja Shafat Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants. Ms. Chaand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Mustafa Ramday, Advocate Supreme Court along with Zoe K. Khan, Advocate High Court, Ahmed Junaid, Advocate High Court, Akbar Khan, Advocate High Court and Barrister Salman Khan, Advocate High Court for the Complainant. Assisted by: Muhammad Subhan Malik (Judicial Law Clerk). Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025.