Summary: The petitioner had filed a civil suit for the recovery of rent, water charges, electricity charges, and maintenance charges. The suit was decreed in part in favor of the petitioner, and subsequent review applications were dismissed. The petitioner then filed an appeal before the District Judge, which was dismissed. Hence, the petitioner filed the instant revision petition. The petitioner's counsel argued that the appellate court had committed irregularities and failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly. However, upon examination of the record, it was found that the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed as time-barred. The petitioner's counsel did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the appeal or any application for condonation of delay. It is established legal principle that a revision petition against a time-barred appeal is not maintainable. Additionally, the High Court can only interfere with the lower court's findings of fact if they are found to be fanciful, perverse, or arrived at through a defective process. Since no illegality, irregularity, or jurisdictional defect was identified in the orders of the lower courts, the revision petition was dismissed without any further merits.

Summary: Sec:144 C.P.C. Pre-condition for restitution in respect of Court decree, discussed---(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 144---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Declaration of title---Restitution of benefit---Variation of order---Illegal possession---Defendant, right of---Principles---Plaintiff claimed ownership of truck in question and after passing decree inhis favour he took over the possession of the truck---High Court remanded the matter toTrial Court making good the deficiencies in court-fees-Trial Court in post remandproceedings, directed the defendant to hand over the possession of truck to defendant---Validity---Defendant could only restitute a benefit in the light of S.144, C. P. C., whereany such benefit had been taken from his possession in result of a decree, for which hewas entitled---If any benefit, for which defendant was not legally entitled to keep it inpossession, being trespasser or illegal occupier, he could not agitate to get any benefit inview of S.144, C.P.C.---Defendant was prima facie a trespasser or grabber, who took thelaw in his hands, therefore, he was not entitled to restitution against person, who took theproperty in possession through a lawful direction--Judgments passed by Lower AppellateCourt as well as of Trial Court were set aside being illegal.AIR 1941 PC 128 rel.(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------S. 144---Restitution---Pre-conditions---From any act of any court no suitor should beinjured, therefore, any benefit, which is refundable and returnable to a party entitled tosuch benefit through restitution upon variation or reversal of a decree take the benefit ofprinciple of restitution reflected in S.144, C.P.C.---Main conditions, which are to befulfilled for invoking provisions of S.144, C.P.C. being that (i) restitution must be inrespect of a decree, which has been varied or reversed; (ii) party applying for restitutionshould be entitled to a benefit under a reversing or variation decree; and (iii) reliefclaimed must be properly consequential on reversal of variation of decree.

Summary: S.22 (b) of the Emigration Ordinance 1979, S.403 Cr.P.C, Section 26 General Clauses Act & Art. 13 of the Constitution 1973, double jeopardy---(a) Emigration Ordinance (XVIII of 1979)-------S. 22(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.13---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898),Ss.403 & 561-A---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.26---Receiving moneyfraudulently for providing foreign employment---Punishing the accused twice for thesame offence---Petition for quashing of proceedings---Earlier, as a result of proceedingsinitiated by complainant, petitioners were convicted and sentenced under Ss.406 and420, P.P.C.-Petitioners could have also been charged under S.22(b) of EmigrationOrdinance, 1979 which had not been done; it would be too late to initiate freshproceedings against the petitioners under the garb of S.22(b) of Emigration Ordinance,1979--Under the Principles envisaged in Art.13 of the Constitution, S.403 of CriminalProcedure Code, 1898 and S.26 of General Clauses Act, 1897, a person could not bepunished or put in peril twice for the same offence and no person could be punishedtwice for one and the same cause---Simultaneous action could be initiated, subject tocertain legal exceptions, but in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case,simultaneous action could not be initiated against the petitioners, for the reasons thataction against them had already been finalized and . their acquittal on account ofcompromise arrived at between the petitioners and complainant had attained finality---Person, once convicted or acquitted could not be tried for the same offence---Criminalcharge, once having been adjudicated upon by a competent court, that adjudication was final, whether it ended in acquittal or conviction---Offence under S.22(b) of EmigrationOrdinance, 1979 was a lesser one and while trying a case earlier under Ss.420, 406, 417,419, 467, 468 & 471, P.P.C., court was competent to convict the accused under S.22(b)of Emigration Ordinance, 1979, even without framing a separate charge---Petitioners/accused in the present case, were not only subjected to criminal proceedings,but were also arrayed in civil litigation---Acquittal of the petitioners in circumstances,had become final---Proceedings were ordered to be quashed.(b) Emigration Ordinance (XVIII of 1979)-------S. 22(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 561-A & 417-A---Receivingmoney fraudulently for providing foreign employment---Quashing of proceedings,petition for---Appeal against acquittal---Acquittal carried double presumptions ofinnocence in favour of accused---Courts were always reluctant to interfere in anacquittal order, unless and until it was shown that the same was perverse, ridiculous andshocking; or the court had not taken into consideration any material evidence, havingdirect bearing on the case---In the present case beside the agony of criminal trial, thepetitioners were also arrayed in civil litigation; and said longstanding litigation finallyended, when the petitioners were acquitted of the charge by High Court on the basis ofcompromise arrived at between the parties---Petitioners had already suffered a lot, asconceded by the Standing Counsel---Re-opening of a past and closed transaction wouldserve no fruitful purpose---On account of compromise effected between the parties, therewas no possibility of the petitioners being convicted of any offence---Further proceedingsof the case would amount to abuse of the process of law---Proceedings pending against thepetitioners, were quashed, in circumstances.

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Summary: Summary pending

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Summary: Summary pending.