Summary: S. 135,141 Land Revenue Act:Partition be made after determination of title through Civil court

Summary: Art. 199 Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.Locus Standi, public interest litigation ... Scope.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-------Ss. 9(c) & 36---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.156(1)---Possessing narcotics---Appreciation of ' evidence---Personnel of Criminal Investigation Agency (CIA), no doubt,under S.156(1), Cr. P. C., had no power to iii vestigate a cognizable offence, but in the presentcase F.I.R. had been lodged at concerned police station and challan had also been submittedbefore the court by the S.H.O. of the said police station---Even if it was presumed that SubInspector C.I.A. was not competent to investigate the matter, it would amount only to anirregularity which would not affect the trial, particularly when neither any prejudice orinjustice had been caused to the accused, nor he had raised such objection during the trial---Trial Court had discussed the evidence in its true perspective and based its decision on validreasons---Section 103, Cr. P. C. was not applicable to narcotic cases by virtue of S.25 ofControl of . Narcotic Substances Act, 1997---Prosecution witnesses had givenstraightforward and confidence-inspiring evidence, who had no malice or animus against the accused---Planting of forty Kilograms heroin on the accused by the police was notbelievable---Section 36 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, did not requiredispatch of the whole recovered lot to Chemical Examiner for analysis, as a sample thereofwas always treated as a part of the total---Sending of 40 grams out of 40 Kilograms of heroinas sample to Chemical Examiner, therefore, was not questionable---Defence plea was absurd,improbable and unreasonable---House of recovery was owned by the wife of accused---Impugned judgment did not suffer from any illegality or material irregularity---Appeal wasdismissed accordingly.(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-------S. 36---Quantity of recovered substance to be sent to Chemical Examiner---Under S.36 ofthe Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, the whole recovered lot is not required to besent to Chemical Examiner for test and analysis, as a sample thereof is always treated as apart of the total.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-------Ss. 9(c), 20 & 21---Appreciation of evidence---Provisions of S.103, Cr.P.C. hadcategorically been excluded by S.25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997---PoliceOfficials having no ill-will or personal grudge against the accused were competent witnesses---Police witnesses had furnished straightforward and confidence inspiring evidence---Hugequantity of "charas" could not be planted on accused by Police Officials from their ownresources---Non-compliance of Ss.20 and 21 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act,1997, in the peculiar circumstances of the case would not make the conviction of accusedillegal---Narcotic was recovered not from a residential house but from a narcotic den---Spyinformation having been received after office hours, search warrants could not be obtained---Investigation of the case by CIA being an irregularity could not vitiate the whole trialentitling the accused to acquittal---Reader of Investigating Officer had recorded thestatements of witnesses under his directions and not independently---Tampering of theparcels of recovered narcotic having not been agitated, mere delay in sending the same forchemical analysis was not favourable to accused---Samples were drawn from 264 rods of"charas", each rod weighing ten grams, as such accused was found in possession of 2640grams of "charas" and he had been rightly convicted and sentenced---Appeal was dismissed,in circumstances.PLD 2004 SC 856; State through A.G. Sindh, Karachi v. Hemjoo 2003 SCMR 881; PLD2008 SC 376; 2008 SCMR 991; 2009 SCMR 431; Fida Jan v. The State 2001 SCMR 36;Muhammad Hanif v. The State 2003 SCMR 1237; Kausar Irshad v. The State 1998 SCMR1148 and Khawand Bakhsh and others v. The State and others PLD 2000 SC 1 ref.(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-------Ss. 20 & 21---Search and investigation---Authorized Officer under the law in exceptionalcases in which search warrant could not be possibly obtained before conducting the raid, canproceed for conducting of raid without warrant, but such power cannot be allowed to be usedin every case in normal circumstances.State through A.G. Sindh Karachi v. Hemjoo 2003 SCMR 881 ref.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 156(1)(2)---Investigation in cognizable case---Violation by Police (CIA)---Effect---Criminal Investigating Agency is part of the Police force; it is in fact a special branch carvedout from the Police force for special purpose---Violation of S.156(1), Cr.P.C. may not vitiatetrial if no serious prejudice has been caused to the accused resulting in miscarriage of justicein view of S.156(2), Cr.P.C.; it does not mean that the CIA personnel should knowinglyviolate the said provision of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898---Criminal Investigating Agencyis legally duty bound to ensure the supremacy of law.Kausar Irshad v. The State 1998 SCMR 1148 ref.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 337-H---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.417(2)---Hurt by rash or negligent act---Leave to appeal against acquittal, refusal of---Complainant had instituted private complaint afteran unexplained delay of nine months---Lady Doctor who had actually conducted the operation ofthe complainant had not been arrayed as an accused in the complaint---Present accused had beenworking under the said Lady Doctor during operation, which had been performed with theconsent of the husband of the complainant successfully---Presence of sponges in the abdomen ofcomplainant and their recovery therefrom was never brought into the picture either duringinquiry proceedings or before the Trial Court---Said sponges admittedly had been kept in theabdomen of the complainant for a specific period for stopping bleeding, but complainant had leftthe hospital against medical advice without permission of the concerned Surgeon---Accused respondents, therefore, could not be held responsible for leaving the sponges in the abdomen ofthe complainant---Trial Court had acquitted the accused on cogent reasons, which were neitherperverse nor fanciful---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed in circum-stances.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 417---Appeal against acquittal---Principles---Double presumption of innocence gained byaccused after acquittal cannot be lightly interfered, unless and until the judgment of acquittal isshown to be perverse, ridiculous, arbitrary and shocking---Acquittal of accused cannot bereversed only for the reason that Appellate Court on reappraisal of evidence forms anotheropinion than that of Trial Court, provided both the opinions were plausible in the circum-stancesof the case.

Summary: S.30 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act (XIII of 1975), no one to take benefit of technicalities---(a) Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act (XIII of 1975)------S. 30---Scheme of Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee Trust Properties, 1977,Chapter III(B) & S.19---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.l99---Constitutional petition---Plotin question was allotted to father-in-law of the petitioner by order of Deputy Custodian,Evacuee Trust Property, who constructed a shop on the said plot and rented out the sameto predecessor-in-interest of respondents---Authorities, without carrying out the survey,allotted said shop to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents/tenant; which transferwas challenged and finally the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of predecessorin-interest of the petitioner---After death of husband of the petitioner, she submittedapplication for restoration of tenancy in her name and her request was acceded to andDistrict Magistrate directed to get the vacant possession of shop in question to thepetitioner---Predecessor-in-interest of respondents, after lapse of about ten years, raisedan objection that under the Scheme of Management and Disposal of Urban Evacuee TrustProperties, 1977, property in question could not be transferred in the name of thepetitioner, objection was allowed, which resulted in setting aside the tenancy anddirection for auction of the same---Validity---Matter having ultimately been finalized bythe Supreme Court while dismissing the petition filed by predecessorin-interest ofrespondents, there was no ground available with the Authority to set aside the order whereby, after death of husband of the petitioner, tenancy was restored to her---Impugnedorders were in violation of judgment of the High Court and the Supreme Court---Suchorder was set aside and Administrator was directed to get shop vacated from privaterespondents and put the petitioner into possession.(b) Administration of justice-------Entire dispute between the parties should be decided on merits; and no one should beallowed to take benefits of technicalities.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-------Art. 140---Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing---Procedure detailed.(b) Administration of justice-------If any act is required to be done in a particular manner, then it should be done in thatmanner, otherwise it should not be done at all.(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.140---Qatl-e-amd----Accused not allowedto confront Investigating Officer with previous statements of witnesses and improvementsmade by them in court---Trial Court had not allowed the accused to confront the InvestigatingOfficer with the previous statements of the witnesses and improvements made by them in theirstatements made in the court in terms of Art.140 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Not allowingthe accused to confront the Investigating Officer during cross-examination with the saidprevious statements and not bringing on record the contradictions made by the witnessesamounted to procedural defect and unfairness in trial resulting in miscarriage of justice andserious prejudice to the accused---Impugned judgment was consequently set aside and the casewas remanded to Trial Court with the direction to re-examine the Investigating Officer andprovide an opportunity of cross-examination to accused in view of the observations of the HighCourt strictly in accordancewith law.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-e-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Ocular account of occurrence wasstraightforward and confidence-inspiring---Presence of eye-witnesses at the scene ofoccurrence was not doubtful---Parties being known to each other, misidentification ofaccused was out of question---Prosecution witnesses having no direct animosity with.theaccused, could not be termed as interested witnesses due to their relationship with thedeceased---Ocular evidence did not suffer from any material contradiction, discrepancy orinherent infirmity and was consistent with the probabilities fitting materially with otherevidence---Promptly lodged F.I.R. containing the specific role of accused had elimingted thechance of deliberation or consultation on the part of complainant---Accused had not deniedthe incident in his examination and statement on oath recorded under Ss. 342 and 340(2),Cr.P.C., but had disputed the manner of incident---Prosecution version was more probablethan defence version---Negative report of firearm expert being purely a corroborative pieceof evidence, was not sufficient to discard the ocular testimony corroborated by medicalevidence and motive, and was not fatal to prosecution version---Conviction and sentence ofaccused were upheld - in circumstances.Muhammad Amin v. The State 2000 SCMR 1784; Amir Khan v. The State 2000 SCMR 1885and Sarfraz alias Sappi v. The' State 2000 SCMR 1758 ref.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)--- Qatl-e-amd--- Appreciation of evidence--- Interested witness, description andcredibility of---Interested witness is one who has a motive for false implication of accused, is apartisan and is involved in the matter against the accused---Friendship or relationship with thedeceased is not sufficient to discredit a witness, particularly when there is no motive for falseinvolvement of accused.Muhammad Amin v. The State 2000 SCMR 1784 ref.(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-e-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Ocular and medical evidence inconflict---Contradictory medical .evidence cannot outweigh the confidence-inspiring oralevidence of a truthful witness.Amir Khan v. The State 2000 SCMR 1885 and Sarfraz alias Sappi v. The State 2000 SCMR1758 ref.(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)--- Qatl-e-amd--- Appreciation of evidence--- Medical opinion---Opinion of adoctor is not binding upon the courts ipso facto, but court has to see the opinion expressed by adoctor if to be acceptable in the light of well recognized principles of medical jurisprudence.Tahir Hussain and Abdul Sattar Kakar for Appellant.

Summary: Ss.14 & 32 Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 & S.12(1), 6 Third Schedule ATA 1997, jurisdiction----(a) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908)-------Ss. 4 & 5---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.7 & 19(8B)---Juvenile offender---Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court---Scope---Appreciation of evidence---Sentence,reduction in---Police prosecution witnesses through their straightforward and confidenceinspiring evidence had connected the accused with the crime---Police Officials having noill-will against the accused were competent witnesses and their evidence could not bediscarded only due to their being connected with the Police department-Non-productionof independent witnesses from the locality was immaterial on account of the present trendof the society of avoiding poking their nose in such like affairs---Accused had beenarrested red handed while preparing a bomb and a large quantity of explosive substancewas recovered from their possession, which was to be used in bomb blasts for which theywere making preparations---Case of accused fell within the jurisdiction of Anti-TerrorismCourt---Age of an accused had no relevance to the question of such jurisdiction---UnderAnti-Terrorism Act, 1997, court would acquire jurisdiction if the offence was triable byit, whereas under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, court would acquirejurisdiction if offenders were juvenile, irrespective of the nature of the offence committedby them---Acquittal of four co-accused in the case was of no help to accused, as the natureof evidence in respect of acquitted co-accused was quite different than the nature ofevidence against the present accused---Required sanction for prosecution, if not receivedwithin 30 days of submission of challan in the court, the same would be deemed to havebeen accorded within the meaning of S.19(8B) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---TrialCourt, thus, could proceed with the trial of the case---Accused did not deserve anyleniency---Conviction of accused was consequently maintained---Sentence of two accusedwas also maintained, but the sentence of third accused who was minor at the time ofoccurrence was reduced from 14 years' R.I. to 8 years' R.I., as he might have been involved under the influence of his elder brother---Appeals were disposed of accordingly.Yaqoob Shah V. The State PLD 1976 SC 53 ref.Constitutional Petition No.156 of 2004 distinguished.(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-------Ss. 12(1), 6, Third Sched., Cl.(iii)---Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court---Attempt tocommit or aid, or abetment of or any conspiracy to commit any of the offences stated inS.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, to be a Scheduled offence, exclusively triable by AntiTerrorism Court under S.12(1) of the said Act.(c) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-------S. 12 & Preamble---Jurisdiction, determination of---Essentials---While determiningjurisdiction it would be necessary to examine that the ingredients of the allegedoccurrence have nexus with the object of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for determiningwhether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design orpurpose behind the same has to be seen---In case of any doubt with regard to the meaningof any particular provision, the Preamble of the Act may be considered to arrive at theproper conclusion---Preamble of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, clearly manifests that thesame has been promulgated to control the acts of terrorism, sectarian violence and otherheinous offences as defined in S.6 of the said Act.(d) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)-------Preamble & S.32---Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (XXII of 2000), Preamble &S.14---Distinguishing features of the two enactments---Under. Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997,courts acquire jurisdiction if the offence is triable by them, whereas under JuvenileJustice System Ordinance, 2000, courts acquire jurisdiction if offenders are juvenile,irrespective of the nature of offence committed by them--Provisions of Anti-TerrorismAct, 1997, under its S.32 have the overriding effect over all other laws including theJuvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, whereas under S.14 of said Ordinance its provisions shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time beingin force.(e) Interpretation of statutes------Removal of doubt---In case of any doubt with regard to the meaning of any particularprovision, the Preamble may be considered to arrive at the proper conclusion.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-------S. 29---Presumption from possession of illicit articles---Scope---Burden to prove---Primaryduty is of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and its burden is not shiftedto the accused under the presumption contained in S.29 of the Control of Narcotic SubstancesAct, 1997---Section 29 only says that once the prosecution establishes recovery beyond doubt,it is then that the burden is shifted---Said section does not absolve the prosecution of its primaryduty to prove its case beyond doubt---Defence plea, if any, has to be adjudged by the court for itsprobability and legal value depending on the circumstances of the case.(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-------S. 9(c)---Possession and trafficking the narcotics---Appreciation of evidence---Accused hadbeen arrested from the spot while sitting on the driving seat of car, from the rear seat of which 40Kilograms of "Hashish" was recovered---Section 103, Cr.P.C. being not applicable to narcoticcases, non-association of private witnesses in recovery proceedings did not vitiate the trial---Police witnesses were as good witnesses as any other citizen unless any mala fide wasestablished against them---Police Officials had furnished a straightforward and confidenceinspiring account, which did not suffer from any contradiction, discrepancy or inherent infirmity---Record did not show that prosecution witnesses had deposed against the accused out of malice---Accused had admitted his presence in the car---Samples of narcotic recovered from the carwere found to be "Hashish" on chemical analysis--- Car being in possession and control ofthe accused, he would be deemed to be in actual and conscious possession of the narcoticrecovered therefrom---Defence plea was nothing but a cock and bull story---Prosecution versionwas more plausible and nearer to truth than defence version---Impugned judgment was based onvalid reasons and was neither perverse nor arbitrary---Conviction and sentence of accused wereupheld in circumstances. The State v. Shawal Khan 1998 SCMR 1107 ref.(c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)-------S. 9(c)---Possession and trafficking narcotics---Appreciation of evidence---Police witnesses,credibility of--- Police witnesses are as good witnesses as other citizens, unless any malafide is established against them---Deposition of a Police Official cannot be brushed asidesimply on the bald allegation that he belongs to Police department.