Summary: The appellant contended that the rejection of the application was erroneous and not legally sustainable. He argued that he had the right to request the entire recovered substance be sent for chemical analysis to ascertain its purity. The State's representative contended that the appellant's application was not maintainable and that the trial court had correctly rejected it. He argued that the Chemical Examiner's report on the record confirmed that the recovered substance was a narcotic drug as defined in The Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The judgment examined relevant provisions of the law and determined that Section 36 of The Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, was applicable to chemical analysis. It emphasized that only a small sample from the recovered substance was required to determine whether it was a narcotic drug, and there was no specific quantity mandated for sending the entire substance for analysis. The court noted that the appellant had not specified any provision of law to support his application and pointed out that Section 3 of the Act, cited by the appellant, related to calculating percentages in liquid preparations, which was not relevant in this case. In conclusion, the judgment emphasized that the law did not require sending the entire recovered substance for chemical analysis unless there were extraordinary reasons to do so. It highlighted the potential for misuse if such requests were allowed, enabling drug traffickers to manipulate the process. Therefore, the court upheld the trial court's decision to reject the appellant's application, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.

Summary: The petitioner had served as a Stenographer in the defunct Bureau of Education, Government of Punjab, from 1975 until its abolition in 1991. Afterward, he was absorbed into the Primary Education Cell of Curriculum Research and Development Center (CRDC) and later into the Punjab Text Book Board. The issue in question was the calculation of the petitioner's pension and medical allowance. The petitioner claimed that he was entitled to a 50% medical allowance on his full pension based on his entire 34 years of service under the Government of Punjab. However, the government had withdrawn the medical allowance for the period he served with the Punjab Text Book Board, stating that it had been introduced only from July 1, 2010, and he was absorbed into the board in 2002. In response, the government argued that the petitioner was only entitled to the medical allowance for the period he served with the board and not for the entire service, as he had absorbed into the board after the introduction of the medical allowance. The court reviewed the relevant notifications, circular letters, and rules governing pension and medical allowances. It found that the petitioner was entitled to the medical allowance for his entire service, as the circular letters did not exclude government servants who retired before the introduction of the allowance. Additionally, the court noted that the notification of the merger of CRDC into the Punjab Text Book Board explicitly stated that pensionary benefits would remain unaffected, and the burden of pension payment would be transferred to the board. In conclusion, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner, directing the respondents to release the 50% medical allowance based on his entire service for pension calculation in accordance with the law.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed Shariat Petitions challenging the provisions of Sections 7 and 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. They claimed that these sections are anti-people, inhuman, and un-Islamic. The petitioners argued that the father's right as the natural guardian should be absolute, without interference from the courts, and that the welfare of the minor should be determined based solely on Islamic principles. ----Issues: 1- Whether Sections 7 and 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, are repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. 2- Whether the court should provide a judicial interpretation of these sections consistent with Islamic principles. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, including Sections 7 and 25, had previously been examined by the Council of Islamic Ideology, which found it to be in accordance with the injunctions of Islam, except for Sections 19(a) and 39(j). The court emphasized that its mandate is to determine whether a law or provision is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, not to answer broad or hypothetical questions. The court underscored that the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration under Section 25 of the Act, consistent with Islamic jurisprudence. The court also noted that the petitioners failed to identify any specific Islamic injunctions that were violated by these sections. The petitions were dismissed in limine, reaffirming that the challenged sections are not repugnant to Islamic injunctions and that the welfare of the minor remains the primary concern. ----Citations/Precedents: 1974 SCMR 305 (Rahimullah Choudhury vs. Mrs. Syeda Helali Begum & others) PLJ 2014 FSC 99 (Ambreen Tariq Awan, Advocate vs. Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary M/O Law & Justice, Islamabad)

Summary: Appreciation of evidence, delay in FSL, no direct recovery (Acquitted)

Summary: S.13,15,19 Pre-emption Act:Requirements of Talabs--Principle of implied waiver--partially pre-emption property

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42---Suit for declaration---Application for temporary injunction---Defendants had specifically denied the execution of any agreement or Iqrarnama which could be decided after recording of evidence---Burden to establish by positive evidence that such agreement had been entered into by and between the parties was on the plaintiff---Plaintiff had chosen a civil forum for redressal of his grievance through suit against the defendants---Defendants could not be restrained from taking a lawful course for redressal of their grievance---Civil and criminal proceedings were independent from each other---Criminal court could not defeat the plaintiff's right to pursue a civil remedy against the complainant---Plaintiff by filing a suit could not restrain the defendants from lodging the FIR if case was made out---Nobody was supposed to file/lodge a false case against anybody and if he had made the same then victim would be entitled to avail a remedy in criminal court for prosecuting the complainant---Plaintiff had no case to restrain the defendants from taking a legal course for redressal of their grievance---Application for grant of temporary injunction was dismissed in circumstances.

Summary: In this case, Wahab Ahmad challenges the validity of an order from the Family Court, Lahore, which allowed the respondent's application to include the names of witnesses in the list and record their evidence. The petitioner argues that the respondent did not initially include these witnesses in the list appended with the plaint, hence claiming that such an application is not maintainable under the Family Courts Act, 1964.The judgment delves into the interpretation of Section 7 of The Family Courts Act, 1964, stating that the provision allows for the calling of witnesses at a later stage with the court's permission, if deemed necessary in the interest of justice. The judgment highlights that the Act doesn't specify consequences for non-compliance, implying a discretionary aspect for the court to decide the matter based on the requirement of justice.The judgment also distinguishes the application of The Family Courts Act, 1964 from the Civil Procedure Code, emphasizing the discretion vested with the Family Court. It cites previous cases supporting the court's power to permit the inclusion of witnesses even if not initially listed, provided it serves the interest of justice.Ultimately, the judgment rules that the impugned order was passed in the interest of justice and did not prejudice either side. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed, indicating that the order in question is an interim one and not illegally prejudicial to warrant intervention via constitutional jurisdiction.

Summary: An employee of the Pakistan Railways, filed this constitutional petition seeking to set aside an order issued by respondent No. 4. Satti's absence stemmed from his departure to his village in Kotli Sattian, District Rawalpindi, due to the collapse of his parents' house caused by heavy rain. He received a show cause notice for his extended absence, and although he replied, he was later dismissed from service. One of the dismissed employees, Farman Shah (Muawan), had his appeal accepted by the Federal Service Tribunal leading to his reinstatement. Upon learning of this, Satti filed a representation to be granted the same relief, which was rejected leading to the filing of this writ petition. The main contention of Satti's counsel was that since Farman Shah's appeal had been accepted based on his date of absence, Satti was entitled to the same relief. However, the respondents argued that Satti had a history of absenteeism, and there was no evidence to support his absence being due to the house collapse. The court found that Satti's case was different from Farman Shah's, and the benefit of the latter's judgment could not be extended to Satti. The court dismissed the writ petition, concluding that it had no merit.