Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)- -Ss.3, 5 & First Sched. Arts. 151 & 156-Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S.17-Time-barred appeal against award made rule of court by High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction-Limitation-Condonation of delay-Plea of award being void as ground for seeking condonation of delay-Sufficient cause-Scope-Present Civil Appeal arose against the judgment of the Divisional Bench of the High Court, whereby, the appeal was dismissed as being time-barred - The appellant contended that the High Court erroneously applied Article 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribed twenty days for filing an appeal against a decree, whereas the correct provision was Article 156 of the Limitation Act, 1908 allowing 90 days-It was further argued that while making the award a rule of court, the Single Judge in Chambers failed to consider material defects rendering the award void ab initio, and hence no limitation could run against a void order-Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider whether-the High Court rightly applied Article 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which provides limitation of twenty days for filing a High Court appeal against a decree and whether award which was made rule of court was not a decree, therefore, Article 156 which prescribed limitation of ninety days was applicable in the case-Held: Decree was obviously passed by the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction for which twenty days’ time was provided for challenging such a decree in accordance with Article 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908-Nevertheless, even if Article 156 applied then also the appeal was filed much later than ninety days-Award being void could not qualify as a ground for condoning the delay in filing of appeal-Due to carelessness and inattention or lack of bona fide on the part of the appellant there was no lawful justification to expose or burden the other side to the time-barred appeal-There was no justification warranting interreference of the Supreme Court-Civil appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)- -S.5-Condonation of delay, seeking of-Void order pleaded as-sufficient cause-Validity-Ground of, order being void, cannot be considered for condoning the delay in filing of appeal. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)- -S.5-Condonation of delay, seeking of-Duty of the applicant to explain delay of each and every day-Scope-A person applying for condonation of delay by means of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 has to satisfactorily explain the delay of each and every day. (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)- -S.5-Condonation of delay-Factors to be considered-Sufficient cause-Scope-The expression-sufficient cause-is always dependent on bona fide explanation-The purpose of limitation set down in the Limitation Act, 1908 is not meant to obliterate or devastate the rights of the parties but in all intent and purposes, it is to make sure that parties do not resort to lagging or sluggish trickeries and the bright idea is to keep alive every legal remedy for a period specified by the legislature under the Limitation Act, 1908 and within such period, a legal remedy can be availed for the recompense and reparation of the grievance-While considering an application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is provided or vouched for but each case has to be weighed on its own peculiar facts and circumstances including the conduct of the parties regarding its procrastination or laxity is also quite relevant for weighing the scale of balance of justice-The concocted or fanciful grounds cannot be considered a sufficient cause to overturn the lifespan of limitation period fixed for recourse-Careless, intentional or obvious sluggishness, or dearth of bona fide are no reasons for condonation of delay-The law of limitation is founded on public policy with the common sense and wisdom of attaining finality to the judgments. (e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)- -S.5-Condonation of delay-Preferential treatment to Government departments deprecated-While considering the grounds for condonation of delay, whether rational or irrational, no extraordinary clemency or compassion and / or preferential treatment may be accorded to the Government departments, autonomous bodies or private sector/organizations, rather their cases should be dealt with uniformly and in the same manner as cases of ordinary litigants and citizens. Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari 2024 SCMR 1021=2023 SCP 323 rel. (f) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)- -S.3-Inherent duty of Court to deal with the question of limitation on its own motion-Scope-Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 it is the inherent duty of the Court to delve into the question of limitation, regardless of whether it is raised or not. (g) Maxim- -Expression; -interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium-Meaning and concept-The latin phrase-interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium-accentuates that-it is in the interest of the State that there be an end to litigation. (h) Maxim- -Expression; -Leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviuent-or-Vigilantibus Non Dormeintibus Jura Subveniunt-articulates that the law aids and assists those who are vigilant but not those who are sleeping or slumbering. (i) Limitation- -Principle-The astuteness of the law of limitation does not confer a right but ensues incapacitation after the lapse of the period allowed for enforcing some existing legal rights and it foresees the culmination of claims which have decayed by efflux of time.

Summary: (On appeal from the Judgment dated 03.10.2019 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in High Court Appeal No. 88 of 2013). (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Ss.3, 5 & First Sched. Arts. 151 & 156---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S.17---Time-barred appeal against award made rule of court by High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Plea of award being void as ground for seeking condonation of delay---“Sufficient cause”---Scope---Present Civil Appeal arose against the judgment of the Divisional Bench of the High Court, whereby, the appeal was dismissed as being time-barred --- The appellant contended that the High Court erroneously applied Article 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribed twenty days for filing an appeal against a decree, whereas the correct provision was Article 156 of the Limitation Act, 1908 allowing 90 days---It was further argued that while making the award a rule of court, the Single Judge in Chambers failed to consider material defects rendering the award void ab initio, and hence no limitation could run against a void order---Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider whether “the High Court rightly applied Article 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which provides limitation of twenty days for filing a High Court appeal against a decree and whether award which was made rule of court was not a decree, therefore, Article 156 which prescribed limitation of ninety days was applicable in the case”---Held: Decree was obviously passed by the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction for which twenty days’ time was provided for challenging such a decree in accordance with Article 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Nevertheless, even if Article 156 applied then also the appeal was filed much later than ninety days---Award being void could not qualify as a ground for condoning the delay in filing of appeal---Due to carelessness and inattention or lack of bona fide on the part of the appellant there was no lawful justification to expose or burden the other side to the time-barred appeal---There was no justification warranting interreference of the Supreme Court---Civil appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Condonation of delay, seeking of---Void order pleaded as “sufficient cause”---Validity---Ground of, order being void, cannot be considered for condoning the delay in filing of appeal. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Condonation of delay, seeking of---Duty of the applicant to explain delay of each and every day---Scope---A person applying for condonation of delay by means of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 has to satisfactorily explain the delay of each and every day. (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Condonation of delay---Factors to be considered---Sufficient cause---Scope---The expression “sufficient cause” is always dependent on bona fide explanation---The purpose of limitation set down in the Limitation Act, 1908 is not meant to obliterate or devastate the rights of the parties but in all intent and purposes, it is to make sure that parties do not resort to lagging or sluggish trickeries and the bright idea is to keep alive every legal remedy for a period specified by the legislature under the Limitation Act, 1908 and within such period, a legal remedy can be availed for the recompense and reparation of the grievance---While considering an application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is provided or vouched for but each case has to be weighed on its own peculiar facts and circumstances including the conduct of the parties regarding its procrastination or laxity is also quite relevant for weighing the scale of balance of justice---The concocted or fanciful grounds cannot be considered a sufficient cause to overturn the lifespan of limitation period fixed for recourse---Careless, intentional or obvious sluggishness, or dearth of bona fide are no reasons for condonation of delay---The law of limitation is founded on public policy with the common sense and wisdom of attaining finality to the judgments. (e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Condonation of delay---Preferential treatment to Government departments deprecated---While considering the grounds for condonation of delay, whether rational or irrational, no extraordinary clemency or compassion and / or preferential treatment may be accorded to the Government departments, autonomous bodies or private sector/organizations, rather their cases should be dealt with uniformly and in the same manner as cases of ordinary litigants and citizens. Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari 2024 SCMR 1021=2023 SCP 323 rel. (f) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.3---Inherent duty of Court to deal with the question of limitation on its own motion---Scope---Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 it is the inherent duty of the Court to delve into the question of limitation, regardless of whether it is raised or not. (g) Maxim--- ----Expression; “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”---Meaning and concept---The latin phrase “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” accentuates that “it is in the interest of the State that there be an end to litigation. (h) Maxim--- ----Expression; “Leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviuent” or “Vigilantibus Non Dormeintibus Jura Subveniunt” articulates that the law aids and assists those who are vigilant but not those who are sleeping or slumbering. (i) Limitation--- ----Principle---The astuteness of the law of limitation does not confer a right but ensues incapacitation after the lapse of the period allowed for enforcing some existing legal rights and it foresees the culmination of claims which have decayed by efflux of time. Altaf Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant. Suresh Kumar, Additional Advocate General for Respondent No. 1. Badar Alam, Advocate Supreme Court, assisted by M. Kashif Alam, Advocate for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 24th July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Arts. 151 & 156----Appeal against order making arbitral award rule of the Court----Whether governed by Art.151 (20 days) or Art.156 (90 days)----Scope---Single Judge of High Court, in exercise of original civil jurisdiction, made award rule of the Court on 22.01.2013 and directed decree to be drawn; decree was drafted the same day and signed on 31.01.2013---Certified copy applied for on 26.04.2013 (after expiry of 20 days); copies supplied on 29.04.2013; High Court Appeal filed on 11.06.2013---Held, decision making award rule of the Court and consequent decree was a “decree or order of a High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction”, thus squarely attracting Art.151 which provides 20 days’ limitation---Even assuming Art.156 (90 days) to apply, the appeal was still hopelessly time-barred on the admitted dates---High Court rightly dismissed appeal as barred by time; no question of law arose to justify interference. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.5 & Art.151----Condonation of delay---“Sufficient cause”---Obligation to explain each day’s delay---Effect of plea that impugned award/order is “void”---Appellant’s application under S.5 for condonation of delay neither disclosed any plausible ground nor explained each day’s delay; only plea taken was that award/ proceedings were “void”, hence no limitation would run----Held, mere assertion that an award or decree is void does not by itself constitute “sufficient cause” for condoning delay; party seeking condonation must furnish bona fide, detailed and satisfactory explanation for entire period of delay; carelessness, inattention or lack of bona fide cannot be rewarded by extending limitation---In absence of any convincing explanation, High Court was justified in refusing condonation and dismissing time-barred appeal. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.3----Duty of Court to examine limitation; public policy; law aids the vigilant and not the indolent----Scope---Law of limitation is founded on public policy to secure finality in litigation and prevent stale claims from being agitated after lapse of the prescribed period; under S.3 it is the Court’s inherent duty to examine limitation and dismiss proceedings instituted after expiry of prescribed period, whether or not limitation is pleaded as a defence---Expression “sufficient cause” in S.5 is conditioned by bona fide conduct; concocted or fanciful grounds cannot displace statutory bar; law assists vigilant litigants, not those sleeping over their rights, as encapsulated in maxims “Leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviunt” and “Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt”---Government departments, autonomous bodies and private entities are all to be treated alike; no extra leniency is to be extended to institutional litigants in condonation matters; delay caused by negligence or lack of diligence must not be condoned. Cited case: Regional Police Officer, Dera Ghazi Khan Region v. Riaz Hussain Bukhari (2024 SCMR 1021 = 2023 SCP 323). Disposition: Civil appeal dismissed; impugned judgment of High Court dismissing High Court Appeal as hopelessly time-barred maintained; no interference warranted.

Summary: (a) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)- -Sched., S.Os. 1(b) & 12-Disciplinary proceedings-Submitting a fake medical expenses bill, allegation of-Inquiry officer failing to call key witness from dental clinic for verification of the bill-Effect-Burden of proof to establish misconduct in inquiry proceedings-Duty of employer to prove misconduct-Scope-The petitioner, a permanent workman within the meaning of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, was employed by the respondent company-In September 2015, he underwent a dental procedure for which he submitted a medical bill of Rs.10,000 to the company for reimbursement under the approved policy-Subsequently, on 1st December 2015, he was served a show-cause notice alleging that the bill was bogus-Despite denying the allegations and participating in the inquiry, he was dismissed from service-The petitioner filed a grievance before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), where a single-bench upheld his dismissal, but the full-bench later set aside that decision and ordered his reinstatement-The company then filed a Constitutional petition before the High Court which was allowed restoring the order of dismissal, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court-Held: Since there were several bills for the dental treatment available on record, it was the responsibility of the inquiry officer either to call the doctor or the representative of dental clinic for evidence in the inquiry to prove which document issued by them was true and correct and which document was fake or forged-When the contradictory receipts were available on record it was obligatory for the inquiry officer to call the witnesses from the hospital for evidence and verification with the right of cross-examination to the petitioner without which the truth could not be unearthed-In the present case, the evidence of the representative of dental clinic/doctor was inevitable for proving the guilt whether the petitioner paid Rs.7000 or Rs.10,000/- and whether he really submitted a bill of excess amount or not-The witness from the hospital could be the star witness in this case who was ignored and no efforts were made by the management representative to call him before the inquiry officer as management’s witness and no burden could be shifted on the employee to call him if the management did not want to verify or confront those medical bills to their star/key witness which by their own mistake lost its evidentiary value and nothing proved on record which bill of hospital/clinic was genuine-Appellate judgment of full bench NIRC was quite rational and judicious-Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and appellate judgment of NIRC’s full bench was restored-Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances. Sakhib Zar v. Messrs K-Electric Limited and others 2024 SCMR 1722 rel. (b) Employment- -Quantum of punishment-Determination-Prerogative of the employer-Prerequisite-Misconduct has to be established and employee should be found guilty-Proportionality of the penalty-Scope-As soon as the act of misconduct is established and the employee is found guilty after due process of law, it is the prerogative of the employer to decide the quantum of punishment, out of the various penalties provided in law-The casual or unpremeditated observation that the penalty imposed is not proportionate with the seriousness of the act of misconduct is not adequate but the order must show that the court and tribunal has applied its mind and exercised its discretion in a structured and lawful manner-Court or tribunal in exceptional or appropriate cases or circumstances, may examine the quantum of punishment to figure out the proportionality and reasonableness and may also nullify or overturn such punishment if found out of proportion vis-à-vis the act of misconduct and in this scenario, the punishment awarded by the competent authority may be revisited and converted into some lesser or alternative punishment if provided under the law but in order to exercise such jurisdiction for mitigation, the set of circumstances of each and every case have to be considered minutely. (c) Employment- -Disciplinary proceedings-It is the prerogative and inherent right of employer to trigger the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with the law to address the misconduct of committed by any employee but the course of action for encountering any act of misconduct should stick to the principle of natural justice and the set of guidelines provided to ensure due process of law. (d) Employment- (e) Employment- -Inquiry proceedings-Purpose and essence-Scope-The purpose of domestic inquiry under the labour laws, if taken so lightly, destroys the whole substratum-Regardless of the fact that inquiry officer in the domestic inquiry cannot be equated with well-trained judicial officer, the bare minimum requirements of natural justice and due process are commonsensical and essential elements for the conscience of inquiry officer before finding an employee guilty of misconduct and sending inquiry report/recommendations to the management. (f) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 199-Writ of certiorari-Scope and essence-This type of writ can be issued when a lower court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial forum/authority surpasses or transcends its jurisdiction-The higher courts issue writ of certiorari to nullify and overturn ultra vires actions for impeding the misuse and abuse of judicial powers-Exercise of this writ jurisdiction is unquestionably available in case of obvious contravention or infringement of natural justice or right to fair trial/due process-Under this writ jurisdiction, as engrained in the Constitution, under Article 199, the High Courts have wide-ranging powers within their territorial jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari not only in the case of violation of any fundamental right but also against judicial or quasi-judicial decisions/orders if for any reason they are found against the law-In nutshell, this remedy can be availed and writ of certiorari can be issued by the High Court when a lower body acts without or in excess of jurisdiction; when there is a violation of natural justice; when there is a clear error of law on the face of the record; when the decision is based on fraud, mala fide intent, or corruption and when the authority refuses to exercise its jurisdiction despite being legally bound to do so. Syed Yagub v. Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477 rel.

Summary: (On appeal from the Judgment dated 11.10.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No. D-4469 of 2019). (a) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)--- ----Sched., S.Os. 1(b) & 12---Disciplinary proceedings---Submitting a fake medical expenses bill, allegation of---Inquiry officer failing to call key witness from dental clinic for verification of the bill---Effect---Burden of proof to establish misconduct in inquiry proceedings---Duty of employer to prove misconduct---Scope---The petitioner, a permanent workman within the meaning of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, was employed by the respondent company---In September 2015, he underwent a dental procedure for which he submitted a medical bill of Rs.10,000 to the company for reimbursement under the approved policy---Subsequently, on 1st December 2015, he was served a show-cause notice alleging that the bill was bogus---Despite denying the allegations and participating in the inquiry, he was dismissed from service---The petitioner filed a grievance before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), where a single-bench upheld his dismissal, but the full-bench later set aside that decision and ordered his reinstatement---The company then filed a Constitutional petition before the High Court which was allowed restoring the order of dismissal, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court---Held: Since there were several bills for the dental treatment available on record, it was the responsibility of the inquiry officer either to call the doctor or the representative of dental clinic for evidence in the inquiry to prove which document issued by them was true and correct and which document was fake or forged---When the contradictory receipts were available on record it was obligatory for the inquiry officer to call the witnesses from the hospital for evidence and verification with the right of cross-examination to the petitioner without which the truth could not be unearthed---In the present case, the evidence of the representative of dental clinic/doctor was inevitable for proving the guilt whether the petitioner paid Rs.7000 or Rs.10,000/- and whether he really submitted a bill of excess amount or not---The witness from the hospital could be the star witness in this case who was ignored and no efforts were made by the management representative to call him before the inquiry officer as management’s witness and no burden could be shifted on the employee to call him if the management did not want to verify or confront those medical bills to their star/key witness which by their own mistake lost its evidentiary value and nothing proved on record which bill of hospital/clinic was genuine---Appellate judgment of full bench NIRC was quite rational and judicious---Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and appellate judgment of NIRC’s full bench was restored---Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances. Sakhib Zar v. Messrs K-Electric Limited and others 2024 SCMR 1722 rel. (b) Employment--- ----Quantum of punishment---Determination---Prerogative of the employer---Prerequisite---Misconduct has to be established and employee should be found guilty---Proportionality of the penalty---Scope---As soon as the act of misconduct is established and the employee is found guilty after due process of law, it is the prerogative of the employer to decide the quantum of punishment, out of the various penalties provided in law---The casual or unpremeditated observation that the penalty imposed is not proportionate with the seriousness of the act of misconduct is not adequate but the order must show that the court and tribunal has applied its mind and exercised its discretion in a structured and lawful manner---Court or tribunal in exceptional or appropriate cases or circumstances, may examine the quantum of punishment to figure out the proportionality and reasonableness and may also nullify or overturn such punishment if found out of proportion vis-à-vis the act of misconduct and in this scenario, the punishment awarded by the competent authority may be revisited and converted into some lesser or alternative punishment if provided under the law but in order to exercise such jurisdiction for mitigation, the set of circumstances of each and every case have to be considered minutely. Sakhib Zar v. Messrs K-Electric Limited and others 2024 SCMR 1722 rel. (c) Employment--- ----Disciplinary proceedings---It is the prerogative and inherent right of employer to trigger the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with the law to address the misconduct of committed by any employee but the course of action for encountering any act of misconduct should stick to the principle of natural justice and the set of guidelines provided to ensure due process of law. (d) Employment--- ----Disciplinary proceedings---Misconduct---Burden of proof---Employer’s obligation to prove misconduct---Scope---In the disciplinary proceedings under the Industrial Relations Laws, the primary burden rests on the employer to prove the misconduct so that the matter be decided on preponderance of the evidence which is so clear, credible and gives support to the finale with little room for doubt---By and large, when any employee challenges his termination or dismissal from service, the burden often shifts upon the employer to establish that the action was based on independent, unbiased and logical reasons and while terminating the employee or dismissing the employee from service, the principle of natural justice and due process was religiously followed and the employer has to produce substantial evidence to persuade the court that the decision was not motivated by any revenge, bias and/or with any prejudiced aspiration---To prove the guilt on the charges of misconduct is a serious matter and at least for the delinquent, the stakes are much higher than the employer, therefore, before declaring guilty, due diligence should be made. (e) Employment--- ----Inquiry proceedings---Purpose and essence---Scope---The purpose of domestic inquiry under the labour laws, if taken so lightly, destroys the whole substratum---Regardless of the fact that inquiry officer in the domestic inquiry cannot be equated with well-trained judicial officer, the bare minimum requirements of natural justice and due process are commonsensical and essential elements for the conscience of inquiry officer before finding an employee guilty of misconduct and sending inquiry report/recommendations to the management. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Writ of certiorari---Scope and essence---This type of writ can be issued when a lower court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial forum/authority surpasses or transcends its jurisdiction---The higher courts issue writ of certiorari to nullify and overturn ultra vires actions for impeding the misuse and abuse of judicial powers---Exercise of this writ jurisdiction is unquestionably available in case of obvious contravention or infringement of natural justice or right to fair trial/due process---Under this writ jurisdiction, as engrained in the Constitution, under Article 199, the High Courts have wide-ranging powers within their territorial jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari not only in the case of violation of any fundamental right but also against judicial or quasi-judicial decisions/orders if for any reason they are found against the law---In nutshell, this remedy can be availed and writ of certiorari can be issued by the High Court when a lower body acts without or in excess of jurisdiction; when there is a violation of natural justice; when there is a clear error of law on the face of the record; when the decision is based on fraud, mala fide intent, or corruption and when the authority refuses to exercise its jurisdiction despite being legally bound to do so. Syed Yagub v. Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477 rel. Imtiaz Ali Solangi, Advocate High Court for Petitioner (with special permission of the Court). Faisal Mehmood Ghani, Advocate Supreme Court and K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents. Date of hearing: 23rd July, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal from the Judgment dated 11.10.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No. D-4469 of 2019). (a) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)--- ----Sched., S.Os. 1(b) & 12---Disciplinary proceedings---Submitting a fake medical expenses bill, allegation of---Inquiry officer failing to call key witness from dental clinic for verification of the bill---Effect---Burden of proof to establish misconduct in inquiry proceedings---Duty of employer to prove misconduct---Scope---The petitioner, a permanent workman within the meaning of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, was employed by the respondent company---In September 2015, he underwent a dental procedure for which he submitted a medical bill of Rs.10,000 to the company for reimbursement under the approved policy---Subsequently, on 1st December 2015, he was served a show-cause notice alleging that the bill was bogus---Despite denying the allegations and participating in the inquiry, he was dismissed from service---The petitioner filed a grievance before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), where a single-bench upheld his dismissal, but the full-bench later set aside that decision and ordered his reinstatement---The company then filed a Constitutional petition before the High Court which was allowed restoring the order of dismissal, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court---Held: Since there were several bills for the dental treatment available on record, it was the responsibility of the inquiry officer either to call the doctor or the representative of dental clinic for evidence in the inquiry to prove which document issued by them was true and correct and which document was fake or forged---When the contradictory receipts were available on record it was obligatory for the inquiry officer to call the witnesses from the hospital for evidence and verification with the right of cross-examination to the petitioner without which the truth could not be unearthed---In the present case, the evidence of the representative of dental clinic/doctor was inevitable for proving the guilt whether the petitioner paid Rs.7000 or Rs.10,000/- and whether he really submitted a bill of excess amount or not---The witness from the hospital could be the star witness in this case who was ignored and no efforts were made by the management representative to call him before the inquiry officer as management’s witness and no burden could be shifted on the employee to call him if the management did not want to verify or confront those medical bills to their star/key witness which by their own mistake lost its evidentiary value and nothing proved on record which bill of hospital/clinic was genuine---Appellate judgment of full bench NIRC was quite rational and judicious---Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and appellate judgment of NIRC’s full bench was restored---Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances. Sakhib Zar v. Messrs K-Electric Limited and others 2024 SCMR 1722 rel. (b) Employment--- ----Quantum of punishment---Determination---Prerogative of the employer---Prerequisite---Misconduct has to be established and employee should be found guilty---Proportionality of the penalty---Scope---As soon as the act of misconduct is established and the employee is found guilty after due process of law, it is the prerogative of the employer to decide the quantum of punishment, out of the various penalties provided in law---The casual or unpremeditated observation that the penalty imposed is not proportionate with the seriousness of the act of misconduct is not adequate but the order must show that the court and tribunal has applied its mind and exercised its discretion in a structured and lawful manner---Court or tribunal in exceptional or appropriate cases or circumstances, may examine the quantum of punishment to figure out the proportionality and reasonableness and may also nullify or overturn such punishment if found out of proportion vis-à-vis the act of misconduct and in this scenario, the punishment awarded by the competent authority may be revisited and converted into some lesser or alternative punishment if provided under the law but in order to exercise such jurisdiction for mitigation, the set of circumstances of each and every case have to be considered minutely. Sakhib Zar v. Messrs K-Electric Limited and others 2024 SCMR 1722 rel. (c) Employment--- ----Disciplinary proceedings---It is the prerogative and inherent right of employer to trigger the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with the law to address the misconduct of committed by any employee but the course of action for encountering any act of misconduct should stick to the principle of natural justice and the set of guidelines provided to ensure due process of law. (d) Employment--- ----Disciplinary proceedings---Misconduct---Burden of proof---Employer’s obligation to prove misconduct---Scope---In the disciplinary proceedings under the Industrial Relations Laws, the primary burden rests on the employer to prove the misconduct so that the matter be decided on preponderance of the evidence which is so clear, credible and gives support to the finale with little room for doubt---By and large, when any employee challenges his termination or dismissal from service, the burden often shifts upon the employer to establish that the action was based on independent, unbiased and logical reasons and while terminating the employee or dismissing the employee from service, the principle of natural justice and due process was religiously followed and the employer has to produce substantial evidence to persuade the court that the decision was not motivated by any revenge, bias and/or with any prejudiced aspiration---To prove the guilt on the charges of misconduct is a serious matter and at least for the delinquent, the stakes are much higher than the employer, therefore, before declaring guilty, due diligence should be made. (e) Employment--- ----Inquiry proceedings---Purpose and essence---Scope---The purpose of domestic inquiry under the labour laws, if taken so lightly, destroys the whole substratum---Regardless of the fact that inquiry officer in the domestic inquiry cannot be equated with well-trained judicial officer, the bare minimum requirements of natural justice and due process are commonsensical and essential elements for the conscience of inquiry officer before finding an employee guilty of misconduct and sending inquiry report/recommendations to the management. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Writ of certiorari---Scope and essence---This type of writ can be issued when a lower court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial forum/authority surpasses or transcends its jurisdiction---The higher courts issue writ of certiorari to nullify and overturn ultra vires actions for impeding the misuse and abuse of judicial powers---Exercise of this writ jurisdiction is unquestionably available in case of obvious contravention or infringement of natural justice or right to fair trial/due process---Under this writ jurisdiction, as engrained in the Constitution, under Article 199, the High Courts have wide-ranging powers within their territorial jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari not only in the case of violation of any fundamental right but also against judicial or quasi-judicial decisions/orders if for any reason they are found against the law---In nutshell, this remedy can be availed and writ of certiorari can be issued by the High Court when a lower body acts without or in excess of jurisdiction; when there is a violation of natural justice; when there is a clear error of law on the face of the record; when the decision is based on fraud, mala fide intent, or corruption and when the authority refuses to exercise its jurisdiction despite being legally bound to do so. Syed Yagub v. Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477 rel. Imtiaz Ali Solangi, Advocate High Court for Petitioner (with special permission of the Court). Faisal Mehmood Ghani, Advocate Supreme Court and K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents. Date of hearing: 23rd July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Citizenship Act (II of 1951)- -S.17-Pakistan Citizenship Rules, 1952, R.23(b)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199-Domicile Certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate, issuance of-Prerequisites and criterion-Continuous residence and supporting ownership or tenancy records, proving of-Mandatory ten-year residency criterion-Scope-The petitioners challenged the impugned order whereby the domicile of petitioner No.1, originally issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan in 1994, was cancelled on 21.01.2025 by the Deputy Commissioner, Quetta, on grounds of prior domicile-Petitioner No.1 had permanently shifted to Quetta in 2003, married there, and since then resided continuously with his family, including petitioner Nos.2 to 6, who were all born and raised in Quetta-Upon petitioner No.2's application for issuance of domicile of District Quetta, required for higher education, the application was rejected under the impugned order-Held: The petitioner No.1 had a domicile of Dera Ghazi Khan issued in his favour on 25.04.1994 which was cancelled on his own request on 21.01.2025 by the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan-With respect to seeking domicile of District Quetta by the children of the petitioner No.1 for higher studies it was necessary to clarify that the petitioner No.2 (daughter of petitioner No.1) had not annexed her educational credentials to establish her permanent residence in Quetta City-Petitioner No.2 was born on 17.10.2005 and after a considerable delay of thirteen years she obtained her birth registration certificate on 18.01.2018 which showed mala fide on her part-Petitioners failed to provide adequate proof of compliance with the SOPs including mandatory 10-year residency critera and supporting evidence such as valid property ownership or long terms rental agreements-No infirmity or perversity was found in the impugned order warranting interference by the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction-Petition was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. (b) Pakistan Citizenship Act (II of 1951)- -S. 17-Pakistan Citizenship Rules, 1952, R.23(b)-Domicile certificate, acquiring of-Procedural framework-Criterion-Factors to be considered stated-Legally domicile in Pakistan is governed by S. 17 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 and R. 23 of the Pakistan Citizenship Rules, 1952-These provide the basis and procedural framework for acquiring domicile-Rule 23(b) empowers the competent authority to demand evidence establishing both continuous residence and intent to remain-Factors considered include length of stay, family ties, property ownership, school enrollment, local employment, and community participation-Therefore, person seeking issuance of domicile must substantiate their permanent and continuous residence and intent to remain at the place through credible evidence. (c) Pakistan Citizenship Act (II of 1951)- -S.17-Pakistan Citizenship Rules, 1952, R. 23-Domicile and Permanent Residency Certificate-Distinction-Scope-The word "Domicile", derived from the Latin"domicilium," denotes a person's permanent legal home and establishes their legal affiliation with a specific territorial jurisdiction-It plays a central role in determining personal legal status, including matters of marriage, succession, and eligibility for region-specific rights and obligations-Domicile is not synonymous with residence or nationality; it is a unique legal concept rooted in both fact and intention-Classically, domicile consists of two elements: (i) factum; actual residence in a place, and (ii) animus manendi; the intention to remain there indefinitely-Three primary types of domicile are recognized: (1) domicile of origin, acquired at birth; (2) domicile of choice, acquired upon lawful settlement in a new place with intent to remain; and (3) domicile of dependence, which applies to minors and others under legal incapacity-A person may have several residences but only one domicile at a time, and a domicile persists until displaced by a new one through both residence and intent (facto et animo). Joan Mary Carter v. Albert William Carter PLD 1961 SC 616 and Muhammad Yar Khan v. Deputy Commissioner 1980 SCMR 456 rel. Mst. Kishwar Rehman v. Government of Balochistan PLD 2001 Quetta 78; Mubashar Mehmood v. Home and Tribal Affairs PLD 2018 Balochistan 49 and Muhammad Zaryab Ali v. Ministry of Religious Affairs 2019 PLC (C.S.) 1361 ref. (d) Fundamental Rights- -Administrative guidelines-Such guidelines when issued within the bounds of statutory authority and aimed at maintaining public order or verifying claims, do not infringe constitutional rights.

Summary: ----S. 25---Custody of minors---Minors and parents being foreign nationals---Guardian Court refusing to exercise jurisdiction due to nationality of minors and their parents---Legality---Invocation of “Hague Convention” seeking the return of the children to their habitual place of residence abroad---Scope---Hague Convention ensured that rights of custody and access under the law of a State are effectively respected by other Contracting States---The petitioner (father) and respondent No. 3 (mother) were both German nationals and had two children---The family, domiciled in Germany, moved to the UK where the children were habitually resident---Later the family travelled to Pakistan, allegedly for a holiday, but due to marital disputes, the parties divorced in Pakistan, and the children had remained there (Pakistan) since---Later the father filed a custody petition under S. 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890---Guardian Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, citing that the children were foreign nationals and residents of the UK---This decision was upheld by the Appellate Court---The respondent No.3/ mother, opposing the petitioner/father's claim, raised jurisdictional objections and invoked the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 1980 (Hague Convention) seeking the return of the children to their habitual place of residence in the UK---Held: In the given circumstances of the present case, where even no other Court or competent forum in Contracting State was seized with the matter or assumed jurisdiction prior to alleged wrongful removal or retention, the determination regarding the issue of return of the children was necessary, to be made at the earliest because there was risk of completely no assessment of rights of children or for that matter rights of the parents---This was what happened in the present case---Guardian Court had refused to entertain the claim on the basis of their nationality---No other forum in any Contracting State was making any determination---The issue of wrongful removal or retention was not properly pressed before the competent forum or the Guardian Court for some reason best known to the parents---This essentially had left the aggrieved un-remedied---There was nothing on record to show that “right of custody” was being exercised or when they came to Pakistan gravity of dispute was so that these rights would have been exercised but for the alleged removal---Mother had not approached the Guardian Court, which was empowered to look into the matter relating to the Hague Convention---Custody petition was filed by the father after thirteen months of their entry in Pakistan---Only in response to this petition, mother had set-up the claim under the Hague Convention and also raised question of jurisdiction on the basis of nationality---One of the minors had spent most of his life in Pakistan---Both the children were apparently well adjusted in their respective schools in Pakistan---Their passports could not be renewed, inter alia, for the reason that none of the parents had right of custody---Courts below failed to examine the interest or welfare of the children---It was deemed just and in the best interest of the minors to proceed further with the present matter---The decisions of the two courts below refusing to exercise jurisdiction were set-aside---The case was deemed to be pending and was directed to be decided by the Guardian Court on its merits---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances. (b) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S. 25---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), Sched., Art. 6-A---Custody of minors---Minors and parents being foreign nationals---Invocation of “Hague Convention” seeking the return of the children to their habitual place of residence abroad---Applicability, object and scope---Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 1980 (Hague Convention) requires restoration of children who are wrongfully removed or wrongfully retained in any Contracting State and to ensure that rights of custody and access under the law of a State are effectively respected by other Contracting States---This requires from signatory States to take appropriate measures to secure within their territories the implementation of the objects of the Convention, in most expeditious procedures which are available---It also protects rights of custody even where there has been no order of custody---The rights of custody can arise by operation of law or under decision of competent forum or because of agreement which is legally recognized by the State from where a child is allegedly removed---There are a number of judgments from English jurisdiction to the effect that first task of the Court is to see what right has been left behind by the parent that she/he had under the law of the State of habitual residence immediately prior to removal---Secondly, to see those rights amount to “right of custody” in terms of Art. 3 of Hague Convention or the “rights of access” that includes the rights to take a child for a limited period to a place other than the habitual residence---For the purposes of the Hague Convention “habitual residence” must not be just a temporary or intermittent place, however, there is no need for an intention to reside indefinitely---There must be some degree of integration into the social and family environment in the State---The presence should be voluntarily---Enforced presence or residing somewhere with opportunity to escape is not included---To make the Hague Convention effective in all the Contracting States, particularly the States which have joined it lately, the meanings to the rights given therein and related terms should be interpreted in the literal sense otherwise difficulty can be faced in protection from harmful consequences to a child by wrongful removal or retention---It is also vital to establish procedures to ensure prompt return of the removed child to the State of habitual residence---Article 6-A in Schedule (Part-I) to Family Courts Act (FCA-1964), through SRO 980(I)/2017 dated 25.09.2017 has been inserted---This confers jurisdiction upon the Guardian/Family Court to resolve these issues in the country---An examination of the Hague Convention also reveals that it warrants taking measures of the nature that the question of wrongful removal and detention should be determined at earliest, so that upon being convinced the order of return can be passed without delay or harmful effect to any child---The provisions of Hague Convention necessitate that if less than a year has elapsed from the wrongful removal the order of return should be forthwith---After one year, position depends on the question as to whether a child has settled in his/her new environment?---The word “demonstrated” as provided by Art. 12 of Hague Convention will make it a question of fact---It will depend upon case to case basis---However, when the same could not be demonstrated on the balance of probability the Court or authority should make an order of return---Nonetheless, this also is dependent on Arts. 13 & 20 of the Hague Convention---Further discussion on Art. 13(a) of the Convention will also be relevant---The requested State is not bound to order the return if the one opposing can establish that the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or had subsequently acquiesced in the removal of or the retention. Malik Mahmood Ahmad Khan v. Malik Moazam Mahmood and others (C.P.L.A. No. 2250-L of 2016); Dr. Muhammad Asif v. Dr. Sana Sattar and others (C.R.P. No. 458 of 2024); Anne Zahra v. Tahir Ali Khilji and 2 others 2001 SCMR 2000 and Sohail Ahmed v. Mst. Samreena Rasheed Memon and another 2024 SCMR 634 rel. Mark v. Mark [2005] UKHL 42; Shah's case [1983] 2 AC 309; Udny v. Udny [1869] LR 1 SC; Shah v Barnet London Borough Council and other appeals [1983] 1 All ER; Re M (Children)(Abduction) [2007] UK HL 55; Re D (a child) [2006] UK HL 51; Dr. Aisha Yousuf v. Khalid Muneer and 2 others PLD 2012 Sindh 166; Scherazade Jamali v. Hisham Gillani and others PLD 2018 Sindh 377 and Saadia Khalil v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and 2 others 2025 CLC 478 ref. (c) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)--- ----S.25---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.83---Custody of minor---Minors and parents being foreign nationals---Guardian Court refusing to entertain the case due to foreign nationalities of parents and minors---Exercise of jurisdiction by courts in cases where parties are foreign nationals---Scope---Nationality, concept of---Nationality represents a person’s status, by virtue of which she or he owes allegiance to a country---Nationality in common parlance means membership of a particular nation---In international law it refers to the attributes of a person natural or artificial belonging to a State with certain rights and obligations which the law may prescribe---The question of citizenship or nationality is not relevant while determining the issue of jurisdiction for the courts in Pakistan---Section 83 of C.P.C. also provides that even if a person is not a citizen of Pakistan he can as an alien always sue in Pakistan unless he falls within the definition of an alien enemy-- -Thus, any foreigner can avail and invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in Pakistan provided the defendant resides within the jurisdiction or the cause of action whether wholly or in part has arisen in Pakistan. Umar Ahmad Ghumman v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 2002 Lah. 521 and Muhammad Zaman v. Uzma Bibi and 4 others 2012 CLC 24 ref. Petitioner in person. Rana Muhammad Arshad Gadi, along with maternal grandfather for Respondent No. 3. Barrister Haris Azmat, Amicus Curiae. Dates of hearing: 5th March and 28th April, 2025.

Summary: Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction-1980 314Criminal Proceedings 40844/25 Abdul Rehman Faryad Vs Govt. of the Punjab etc. Justice Abher Gul Khan 18- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 5162 PLD 2026 Lahore 84

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 4, 9 & 10A ---- Right to fair and timely trial ---- Delay in adjudication as constitutional infraction ---- Access to justice undermined by systemic delay Fourteen years elapsed between the original auction of immovable property and the final hearing before the Supreme Court, during which the petitioner’s appeal remained pending for over a decade before the High Court. The Court held that such delay, though administrative on the surface, constitutes a constitutional violation of Articles 4, 9, and 10A, which guarantee the right to due process and meaningful access to justice. Held, justice delayed for such an extraordinary duration is justice effectively denied; prolonged pendency rendered the petitioner’s claim moot, fragile, and extinguished by time. Remedy without timeliness is not a remedy in law. Cited Cases: • Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 923 • Khan Asfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 607 • Liaqat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 504 • Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1445 • Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324 • Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon PLD 1993 SC 341 • Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416 (b) Civil Procedure --- Execution proceedings --- Challenge to auction of immovable property --- Concurrent findings by courts below --- No interference by Supreme Court Petitioner challenged the 2011 auction of immovable property conducted in execution of a 2010 money decree. His objections were dismissed at trial, and the appellate challenge before the High Court remained pending for over ten years. The Supreme Court, after independent examination of the record, upheld the concurrent findings of the courts below and found no merit in the objections to the auction proceedings. Petition was also dismissed for non-prosecution as no representative appeared to argue the case, despite notice. (c) Judicial governance --- Systemic delay --- Structural reforms required --- Judicial credibility dependent on timely adjudication The Court observed that over 2.2 million cases were pending nationwide, including nearly 56,000 before the Supreme Court itself. Such delays erode public trust, discourage economic investment, distort contractual enforcement, and disproportionately burden the vulnerable. Held, delay is not merely a docket management issue but a challenge to constitutional governance and the legitimacy of the justice system. It calls for intelligent case management, elimination of queue-jumping, prioritization of constitutional and high-impact matters, and technology-assisted scheduling using artificial intelligence tools without compromising judicial discretion. (d) Comparative constitutional law --- Judicial efficiency --- International models of reform cited --- Technology and procedural restructuring as imperatives The Court referenced judicial innovations in Singapore, UK, Brazil, Estonia, Canada, China, Denmark, and Australia, where digital dashboards, automated scheduling, and e-filing systems have transformed judicial delivery from passive docket handling to active justice management. Held, Pakistani courts must draw inspiration from such global experiences and adopt institutional reform through administrative discipline, structural redesign, and technological modernization to combat the endemic delay and deliver timely, citizen-centric justice. Disposition: Petition dismissed both on merits and for non-prosecution. Supreme Court calls for urgent judicial reform to ensure timely access to justice.