Summary: Trial of civilians by court martial under s. 2(1)(d) of Pakistan Army Act 1952 declared ultra vires the Constitution. --- Merged Final Judgement of Justice Munib Akhtar, Justice Yahya Afridi, Justice Ayesha A. Malik ---- The examination of the War Articles reveals that it substantially contained provisions corresponding to the Army Act, particularly in matters related to the military justice system. Title III of the War Articles, dealing with courts martial, aligns with the current court martial system under the Army Act and the 1954 Rules. The historical perspective emphasizes that legislative competence regarding armed forces, including the military justice system, has been integral since the early days of British rule.The analysis draws parallels with the Muhammad Yusuf case, highlighting that legislative competence may extend to matters judicial, even if seemingly unrelated. The challenge regarding the constitutionality of courts martial under Article 175 is dismissed, asserting that courts martial, deeply embedded in the military justice system, fall within the legislative competence of entry No. 1 of the Federal Legislative List.The composition of courts martial, historically manned by military officers, aligns with their current structure under the Army Act. The challenge asserting a separation between the judiciary and executive under Article 175 is rejected, emphasizing the unique historical arc of courts martial.Moving to the challenge based on fundamental rights, Article 10A (right to a fair trial) is invoked, arguing that civilians brought before courts martial are denied their fundamental rights under Article 8(3)(a). The court explores the historical context of Article 8(3)(a) across different constitutions, emphasizing its consistent purpose of ensuring the proper discharge of duties and maintaining discipline among armed forces.Comparatively, the court notes the Indian Constitution's Article 33, which allows Parliament flexibility in restricting or abrogating fundamental rights for armed forces. However, the Pakistani Constitution's Article 8(3)(a) follows a more rigid approach.The court concludes that the challenge based on specific fundamental rights may miss the broader picture. Regardless, the denial of fundamental rights stems from Article 8(3)(a). The court explores the historical and comparative aspects of this provision, emphasizing its consistent purpose. While acknowledging the need for flexibility, the court upholds the constitutional validity of Article 8(3)(a) in the context of the military justice system. The case involves a constitutional challenge regarding the insertion of para (i) provisions into the Army Act, which pertain to the trial of civilians by military courts. The court interprets Article 8(3)(a) and Article 8(5) of the Constitution, addressing the denial or derogation of fundamental rights. It emphasizes the need for a narrow interpretation of Article 8(3)(a) due to its drastic consequences, contrasting it with the robust protection provided by Article 8(5).The court discusses the historical context, citing the Indian Constitution's approach, and distinguishes it from the rigid nature of Article 8(3)(a) in the local context. The judgment also references the case of Prithi Pal Singh vs. The Union of India, highlighting the importance of not creating a separate class of citizens devoid of constitutional protections.The court introduces Article 8(5) and underscores its role in safeguarding fundamental rights. It explains that Article 8(5) protects fundamental rights collectively and requires both situational and anticipatory consideration. The court emphasizes that if a law, including para (i) insertions, results in the suspension or denial of fundamental rights, it must be declared ultra vires the Constitution.The judgment critiques the decision in F.B. Ali within the context of the 1962 Constitution, asserting that the present Constitution, with Article 8(5), necessitates a different analysis. It concludes that para (i) insertions are ultra vires the Constitution, particularly Article 8(5), irrespective of whether they were initially insertions or became provisions of the Army Act.The court addresses the argument concerning Article 10A and clarifies that the essence of fundamental rights cannot be altered by granting transitory rights through legislation. It underscores that citizens should not be reduced to seeking additional rights as a plea to the State.The court makes it clear that its judgment does not question the fairness of courts martial within their traditional framework for the military but addresses the constitutional issues raised in the case.the court reviewed constitutional provisions and legal precedents to address the interpretation of Article 8(3)(a) and the validity of certain provisions. The court acknowledged the 1956 Constitution's Article 22, which guaranteed the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. However, it emphasized the limited scope of Article 22(3) compared to the contemporary Article 8(5), highlighting the latter's explicit requirement for express suspension.The court then delved into the Attorney General's arguments, particularly focusing on the "nexus" theory derived from the F.B. Ali case. The "nexus" theory posits that legislative competence exists if an offense has a connection with the defense of Pakistan. The court scrutinized this theory, quoting relevant passages from the F.B. Ali judgment and underlining the importance of the term "expressly" in Article 8(5).Rejecting the "nexus" theory, the court addressed the second strand of the argument concerning the purposes of Article 8(3)(a). The Attorney General asserted that laws ensuring the proper discharge of duties by the Armed Forces, either internally or externally, fell within Article 8(3)(a). However, the court disagreed, emphasizing a holistic interpretation of the provision and rejecting attempts to create internal and external aspects.The court then clarified constitutional principles, distinguishing between legislative competence and constitutional permissibility. It highlighted that even if a law falls within legislative competence, it might be constitutionally impermissible due to violations of fundamental rights. It cited examples related to concurrent competences and fundamental rights challenges.The court concluded that the "nexus" theory and the expansive interpretation of Article 8(3)(a) were not sustainable. It affirmed the ultra vires status of the para (i) provisions, reiterating the role of Article 8(5) in scrutinizing laws affecting fundamental rights. The court noted that its conclusion was provisional, pending an examination of Emergency Provisions, as outlined in Article 233.Turning to Emergency Provisions, the court explored Article 233, highlighting its two clauses and their respective implications during a Proclamation of Emergency. It explained how clause (1) allows the State to make laws that would be competent but for the specific fundamental rights restrictions during an emergency. The court underscored that this suspension was temporary, automatically ceasing when the Proclamation ended.The court then addressed clause (2) of Article 233, which empowers the President to suspend the right to move courts for the enforcement of specified fundamental rights during an emergency. It drew a parallel with the Indian Constitution's Articles 358 and 359, emphasizing the distinction between the suspension of fundamental rights and the suspension of the right to enforce them.Referring to the Indian case Makhan Singh Tarsikka v State of Punjab, the court highlighted the acknowledgment that an order under Article 359(1) suspended the right to move courts for enforcement without expressly suspending the fundamental rights themselves.The court concluded by acknowledging subsequent amendments in the Indian Constitution, specifically clauses (1A) and (1B) of Article 359, which further clarified the distinction between the suspension of rights and the suspension of the right to enforce them during an emergency.In summary, the court thoroughly examined constitutional provisions, the "nexus" theory, and relevant precedents to assert the provisional ultra vires status of the para (i) provisions and laid the groundwork for further analysis in the context of Emergency Provisions. The passage discusses the legal implications of Clause (1A) in comparison with Article 358 of the Indian Constitution, highlighting its attempt to equalize the effects of a Proclamation of Emergency and the suspension of fundamental rights enforcement. The discussion includes citations from Durga Das Basu's treatise and Union of India v Bhanudas Krishna Gawde case.Furthermore, the passage distinguishes the constitutional context between India and the jurisdiction under consideration, particularly in relation to Article 8(5) and the absence of an equivalent provision in Article 233(2). It emphasizes that the explicit suspension of fundamental rights under Article 8(5) prevents any implicit suspension and underscores the importance of adhering to the express provisions of the Constitution.The text then delves into the analysis of Article 233(2) and the distinction between the suspension of the right to move a court for enforcement and the suspension of the fundamental rights themselves. It argues that even during a Proclamation of Emergency, the rights specified in Article 233(1) are suspended, but not all fundamental rights, as highlighted in the context of Article 8(5).The passage subsequently explores the three cases discussed in paragraph 4, particularly focusing on F.B. Ali. It asserts that F.B. Ali is distinguishable due to the material differences in the present Constitution, particularly the existence of Article 8(5), and concludes that even within the framework of F.B. Ali, the handling of around 103 persons appears contrary to law, violating Articles 9 and 10A.Finally, the discussion turns to Liaquat Hussain, a decision made in the context of a state of emergency. The passage briefly outlines the key aspects of the case, highlighting the unconstitutional nature of the Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in Aid of the Civil Power) Ordinance, 1998, and the subsequent striking down of the law. The case under consideration involves the challenge to an ordinance on the grounds that it establishes a parallel judicial system, specifically military courts, which is deemed impermissible under the Constitution. The dispute focuses on whether the Armed Forces, acting in aid of civil power under Article 245 of the Constitution, can set up Military Courts for the trial of civilians for offenses not connected with the Armed Forces.The judgment, delivered by Chief Justice Ajmal Mian, concludes that the impugned Ordinance, which established Military Courts for trying civilians, is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament and therefore ultra vires the Constitution. The Chief Justice references previous cases, including Mehram Ali's case, to emphasize that the Constitution only allows specific tribunals to share judicial power and that Military Courts are not within this category.The Court rejects the argument that Military Courts, convened under the Ordinance, are incidental measures under Article 245 and asserts that such courts cannot be exempted from the constitutional provisions governing the judiciary. It concludes that the power to legislate the impugned Ordinance for establishing Military Courts cannot be derived from Article 245 or the Federal Legislative List.In the course of the judgment, the Chief Justice considers F.B. Ali, emphasizing that it dealt with a different context, legislative competence, and the specific application of the Army Act. The judgment clarifies that F.B. Ali does not support the arguments put forth by the Attorney General in the present case.Additionally, the judgment delves into the Full Court decision in District Bar Association, which involved constitutional amendments enabling the trial of civilians by military courts. The Court distinguishes the context of District Bar Association, where amendments were time-bound and exceptional due to the perceived warlike situation, from the present case, where the impugned Ordinance lacked legislative competence without such extraordinary circumstances.The case involves a constitutional challenge to certain provisions, specifically para (i) of sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (d) of s. 2(1) of the Army Act, inserted by the Ordinances of 1967, and equivalent provisions in the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, and the Navy Ordinance, 1961. These provisions pertain to the jurisdiction of courts martial over civilians in certain circumstances.The constitutional amendments incorporated laws related to the Armed Forces and the Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014, into the First Schedule, immunizing them against challenges based on fundamental rights. The court emphasizes that any alteration to the First Schedule requires a constitutional amendment.The District Bar Association case is discussed, noting that it addressed different issues and questions, making it distinguishable from the present case. The court rejects the argument that legislative competence, as established in F.B. Ali, becomes ineffective under the present Constitution, asserting that the legislative competence can be limited, and its exercise is subject to conditions outlined in District Bar Association.The court also discusses Article 199(3) and rejects the argument that it recognizes the legislative competence identified in F.B. Ali, pointing out that the Constitution can be amended to omit such provisions.The judgment declares para (i) provisions as ultra vires the Constitution, impacting the jurisdiction of courts martial over civilians. It addresses the maintainability of petitions, emphasizing the denial of fundamental rights and the public importance of the issues raised.Concerning cases already decided by courts martial, the court establishes categories and directions for their treatment based on whether the sentences have been served, legal remedies exhausted, or convictions are still under review.In conclusion, the court reaffirms its view on the unconstitutionality of para (i) provisions and provides directions for the treatment of past and ongoing cases affected by the judgment.

Summary: The judge explored the definition of "moral turpitude" from various sources, including Ramantha Aiyer?s Law Lexicon and Justice M.C. Desai's Law Lexicon with Legal Maxims. The judgment concluded that the conviction, which included terms like "dishonesty" and "deceitful," fell within the ambit of moral turpitude as per Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution.The judge upheld the rejection of the appellant's nomination papers, emphasizing the Returning Officer's authority to assess qualifications under Article 63(1)(h) and Sections 60 and 61 of the Elections Act, 2017. The judgment also addressed the appellant's argument regarding the ECP notification, stating that its legality was pending decision in the Lahore High Court and was beyond the jurisdiction of the current Tribunal.Regarding the suspension of the sentence, the judgment clarified that it did not erase the conviction, citing precedents such as Abdul Kabir v. The State (PLD 1990 Supreme Court 823) and Nasir Mehmood v. Umer Sajid (2019 SCMR 382).

Summary: ''A convicted person cannot contest elections in terms of Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 if he is involved in a case of moral turpitude. Concealment of a fact of obtaining gifts from Tosha Khana falls within the definition of moral turpitude.'' --- In the present appeal, the appellant's nomination papers were rejected by the Returning Officer based on three grounds: firstly, that the proposer Muneeb-ur-Rehman was not a voter-member of NA-122; secondly, the appellant had been convicted and sentenced by a court of law; and thirdly, the appellant had been disqualified by the Election Commission of Pakistan for a five-year period. The appellant argued that the delimitation report, which excluded his proposer from the voter list, was issued prior to the submission of nomination papers. However, the court held that the revised final delimitation report, issued before the nomination papers, was not challenged by any party, making the Returning Officer's rejection valid. Precedents, such as "Jamshed Iqbal Cheema v. The Election Appellate Tribunal" and others, were cited to support this position.The court also considered the Election Commission's argument that the judgment in "Gul Khan and others v. Saeed-ur-Rehman and others" did not apply, as it was a judgment in personam. The concepts of judgments in rem and in personam were extensively discussed, referring to cases like "Pir Bakhsh v. Chairman Allotment Committee" and "Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder and others v. Federation of Pakistan and another." The court concluded that the judgment in "Gul Khan" was confined to the delimitation of two constituencies in Baluchistan and did not affect the revised final delimitation of NA-122, Lahore-VI.Regarding the second ground for rejection, which was based on the appellant's conviction under section 174 of the Elections Act, 2017, the court analyzed whether the conviction fell within the category of moral turpitude under Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution. Definitions of "moral turpitude" were provided from sources like Major Law Lexicon, Advanced Law Lexicon, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, and Black?s Law Dictionary. The court referred to the case-law "Imtiaz Ahmed Lali v. Returning Officer and 3 others" to affirm that moral turpitude involves acts contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, demonstrating depravity in private and social duties. --- In the case of "Ghulam Hussain versus Chairman, P.O.F. Board, Wah Cantt and another" (2002 SCMR 1691), the Supreme Court of Pakistan referred to various definitions of moral turpitude. According to Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition 27-A, moral turpitude is determined by whether the act denounced by the statute offends the generally accepted moral code of mankind. Another definition from Legal Terms and Phrases (Judicially defined) by M. Ilyas Khan, Advocate, describes moral turpitude as anything done against justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, implying something inherently immoral, regardless of legal punishment.In the case "Muhammad Shabbir Abbasi v. Abdur Rashid Mughal" (1984 CLC 270), Lahore High Court defined moral turpitude based on Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition. It includes acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity contrary to accepted moral standards, and such acts are morally culpable. The judgment in Saudagar Ali's case emphasized that moral turpitude involves anything contrary to good principles of morality, injuring one's moral fiber, and lowering moral values.The Peshawar High Court, in the case "Zaheer Ul Islam Abbasi v. Umar Ayub Khan and 5 others" (PLD 2003 Pesh. 27), stressed that the expression "moral turpitude or delinquency" should not receive a narrow construction. Conduct contrary to honesty, opposed to good morals, or unethical is considered involving moral turpitude.Analyzing these definitions, it can be concluded that an action falls under the ambit of moral turpitude if it injures a person's moral fiber, lowers moral values, or involves inherent baseness in fulfilling private, social, or public obligations to fellow citizens, society, country, institutions, and government.Addressing the suspension of sentence and conviction, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in "Nasir Mehmood and another v. Umar Sajid and others" (2019 SCMR 382) clarified that the suspension of sentence has no consequence on the conviction. Similarly, in "Abdul Kabir v. The State" (PLD 1990 Supreme Court 823), the court highlighted the distinction between conviction and sentence, stating that the suspension of sentence does not mean automatic suspension of conviction.In summary, the rejection of the appellant's nomination papers was justified based on the non-suspension of the appellant's conviction, which remains intact despite the suspension of the sentence. The decision of the Election Commission of Pakistan regarding the appellant's disqualification for five years also stands, making the appeal devoid of substance and leading to its dismissal by the Election Tribunal.

Summary: The petitioners challenged the ECP's order dated 22.12.2023, which deemed PTI ineligible for retaining its election symbol 'Bat'.Territorial Jurisdiction and Maintainability: The court affirmed its jurisdiction, citing the intra-party election's occurrence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the ECP operates. It rejected the applicability of the principle of res judicata and the doctrine of propriety, thus maintaining the petition's validity.Scope of ECP?s Power: Analyzing the Constitution of Pakistan and the Election Act, 2017, the court concluded that the ECP's powers, though constitutional, must align with parliamentary laws. It found no legal provision in the Election Act, 2017, authorizing the ECP to adjudicate intra-party elections of political parties.Impugned Order by ECP: The court declared the ECP's order as illegal, lacking legal basis under the Act or the Constitution.Importance of Political Party Symbol: The judgment underscored the symbol's significance in the democratic process, linking it to citizens' rights to form political parties and participate in governance.---- The court relied on several precedents:Mrs. Benazir Bhutto (PLD 1989 SC 66): This case was pivotal in asserting the right to form a political party, including the right to obtain a symbol to facilitate voter identification of party candidates.--- Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto vs. Election Commission of Pakistan: It elaborated on the ECP's general powers, emphasizing they must not contradict laws enacted by Parliament.---- Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1993 SC 473): Highlighted the intrinsic connection between the right to form a political party and the right to form a government, as well as the importance of the party symbol.The judgment concluded by directing the ECP to publish PTI's certificate on its website as mandated by section 209 of the Election Act, 2017. It also declared PTI entitled to its election symbol in accordance with sections 215 and 217 of the same Act. This decision underlines the fundamental rights of political parties in electoral processes and the limited jurisdiction of the ECP in matters of intra-party elections.

Summary: Merged Detailed Judgement ---- Civilian Trials in Military Court declared unconstitutional ---- Ultra Vires Declaration: The Court Declared That Clause (D) Of Subsection (1) Of Section 2 Of The Pakistan Army Act, 1952 (In Both Of Its Sub-Clauses (I) And (Ii)) And Subsection (4) Of Section 59 Of The Same Act Are Ultra Vires The Constitution And Of No Legal Effect. This Means That These Provisions Were Found To Be In Violation Of The Constitution And, Therefore, Were Deemed Legally Invalid. Civilian Trials: The Court Ruled That The Trials Of Civilians And Accused Persons, Specifically Around 103 Individuals Mentioned In The List Provided By The Attorney General, And Others Similarly Situated Regarding The Events Of 9th And 10th May 2023, Should Be Conducted By Criminal Courts Of Competent Jurisdiction Established Under Ordinary And Special Laws. This Decision Underscores The Fundamental Principle That Civilians Should Be Tried In Civilian Courts, Not Military Tribunals. No Legal Effect Of Military Proceedings: The Court Explicitly Stated That Any Actions Or Proceedings Under The Pakistan Army Act, Including Trials By Court Martial, In Respect Of The Aforementioned Persons Are And Would Be Of No Legal Effect. This Means That Military Proceedings Or Trials Under The Army Act Against Civilians Or Accused Individuals In This Context Were Rendered Legally Null And Void. Partial Dissent: One Member Of The Bench, Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi, Reserved Judgment As To One Part Of The Declaration But Joined The Other Members Of The Bench Regarding The Other Aspects. This Indicates That There May Have Been Some Differences In Opinion Among The Judges On Certain Elements Of The Case. In Summary, The Supreme Court's Legal Analysis In This Judgment Focused On The Constitutionality Of Specific Provisions Within The Pakistan Army Act, The Rights Of Civilians To Be Tried In Civilian Courts, And The Legal Consequences Of Military Proceedings Against Civilians In The Specified Context. The Judgment Sets A Legal Precedent For The Treatment Of Civilians In Legal Matters Related To The Armed Forces In Pakistan.

Summary: Facts:The respondent, General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf, imposed an emergency in 2007, suspending the Constitution. This action was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Sindh High Court Bar Association case. Subsequently, under Article 6 of the Constitution and relevant laws, a Special Court was established to try Musharraf for high treason. The Lahore High Court, however, in its judgment dated 13.01.2020, declared the initiation of proceedings against Musharraf as unconstitutional and void, leading to the current appeals.-----Issue(s):Whether the Lahore High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed against the acts and proceedings of the Special Court in Islamabad.Whether an alternate adequate remedy was available, rendering the writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution inappropriate.The validity of the High Court's decisions on the merits of the case and its authority to grant reliefs not sought in the original petition.The constitutionality of Section 9 of the Special Court Act.The application of the Mustafa Impex decision to the constitution and actions of the Special Court.The High Court's adherence to the directions and judgments of the Supreme Court.Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the Lahore High Court's judgment, holding it unsustainable.----Reasoning:Territorial Jurisdiction: The Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction as the acts and proceedings challenged were done by the Special Court in Islamabad, hence only the Islamabad High Court could entertain such a challenge.Alternate Remedy: An adequate remedy was available through an appeal against the Special Court's judgment directly to the Supreme Court, as provided by the Special Court Act.Merits and Unasked Relief: The High Court overstepped its jurisdiction by discussing the case's merits and granting relief not sought by the petitioner, usurping the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court and the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.Section 9 of the Special Court Act: The High Court improperly declared Section 9 as ultra vires in its entirety, though only a portion was challenged.Mustafa Impex Misapplication: The Lahore High Court failed to recognize that the principle established in Mustafa Impex had no retrospective effect and that the constitution of the Special Court complied with this principle post its pronouncement.Violation of Supreme Court Directions: The Lahore High Court acted in violation of the Supreme Court's directions and judgments, undermining the judicial system's integrity.Disposition: The appeals were allowed, and the impugned judgment of the Lahore High Court was set aside.-----Key Precedents Relied On:Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 789Abdul Hameed Dogar v. Federal Government, PLD 2016 SC 454Lahore High Court Bar Association v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf, 2019 SCMR 1029Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan, PLD 2016 SC 808PMDC v. Muhammad Fahad Malik, 2018 SCMR 1956

Summary: . It was observed that the complaints were characterized as mala fide, politically motivated, and lacking in jurisdiction. The Court also considered the questions of law raised in the petitions, all of which were related to the complaints.In light of these considerations, the Court concluded that the informers/complainants should be made parties in the petitions. The Court emphasized that in the interest of justice and to ensure that no one is condemned unheard, the complainants/informers should be given an opportunity to be heard. The Court cited Rule 9 of Order XXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, to support the impleadment of the informers as respondents. It deemed their presence as essential for a comprehensive examination of the complaints.The Court ordered the petitioners in Constitution Petitions No. 43, 44, and 45 to include all the complainants/informers as respondents in their respective petitions. Additionally, the petitioner in Constitution Petition No. 45 was directed to include the petitioner from Constitution Petition No. 43 as a respondent in their petition. Similarly, the petitioner in Constitution Petition No. 46 was instructed to include the petitioners from Constitution Petitions No. 43 and 44 as respondents in their petition.Finally, the Court rejected the request for a stay of proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council at this stage and instructed the petitioners to file amended petitions. Once the necessary amendments were made, the office was directed to schedule the matters for future hearings.

Summary: The petitions, filed by various parties including Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi of the Supreme Court, the District Bar Association Gujranwala, and Mian Dawood, an advocate from Lahore, challenge the proceedings initiated by the SJC. They raise questions about the validity and motives of the complaints against the petitioner judge, arguing they are mala fide, politically motivated, and lack jurisdiction. The petitions include detailed arguments and references to legal provisions, including the Contempt of Court Act and Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).The Court emphasized that the non-joinder of necessary parties does not warrant dismissal of a suit but highlighted the importance of having all relevant parties, especially the informers/complainants, included for a comprehensive adjudication. The bench directed the petitioners in CP Nos.43, 44, and 45 to implead all complainants/informers as respondents. Furthermore, in CP No.45, the petitioner was instructed to implead Justice Naqvi (petitioner in CP No.43) as a respondent, and in CP No.46, the petitioner was directed to implead the petitioner of CP Nos. 43 & 44.The Court dismissed a request for a stay of the proceedings against the petitioner in CP Nos.43 & 44, noting that the situation differed from a cited precedent case involving Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. The bench directed the filing of amended petitions to include the necessary parties and adjourned the case for a subsequent hearing after the amendments.This order represents a meticulous application of legal principles to ensure fairness and comprehensive adjudication in a matter involving high constitutional significance, particularly in the context of judicial accountability and the safeguarding of fundamental rights.

Summary: Supreme Court of Pakistan's Landmark Ruling on Article 62(1)(f) --- Majority Decision Sets Aside Lifetime Disqualification, Establishing a Five-Year Limit --- The court declared that Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is not self-executory and lacks clarity on the court responsible for making the mentioned declaration, the procedure for making it, and the duration of disqualification. --- It emphasized the absence of a law outlining the procedure for Article 62(1)(f) and highlighted the violation of the Fundamental Right to a fair trial and due process guaranteed by Article 10A. --- The court rejected the interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) that imposes a lifetime disqualification through an implied declaration of a civil court, considering it beyond the article's scope. --- The court ruled that until a law is enacted to make its provisions executable, Article 62(1)(f) serves as a guideline for voters, similar to other subsections of Article 62(1). ---- The court overturned the decision in Sami Ullah Baloch v Abdul Karim Nausherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405), stating that it amounted to reading into the Constitution and was therefore overruled. --- The court acknowledged Section 232(2) of the Elections Act, 2017, added through the Elections (Amendment) Act, 2023, which sets a five-year disqualification period and subjects the declaration to due process. --- As a result of these determinations, specific civil appeals and petitions were allowed, dismissed, or disposed of based on the individual circumstances of each case. The court also addressed withdrawal requests and de-listed certain cases for separate hearings. The order was announced on January 2024, with one judge dissenting on the interpretation of the duration of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f).

Summary: Background:In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the scope and application of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, which pertains to the disqualification of members of the parliament. The case involved multiple appellants challenging the legality of their disqualification under this Article, particularly focusing on whether such disqualification should be considered lifetime based on decisions made by civil courts in matters concerning civil rights and obligations.---Issues:The central issue was the constitutionality and interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) regarding lifetime disqualification imposed by civil courts and whether such interpretations infringe upon fundamental rights, particularly the right to a fair trial and electoral participation under Articles 10A and 17 of the Constitution.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The majority of the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa, held that Article 62(1)(f) was not self-executory and required explicit legal procedures to be established for its enforcement. The Court overruled the previous interpretation that allowed for lifetime disqualification based on civil court declarations concerning breaches of civil rights, stating this was a misreading of the Constitution. It was emphasized that until a specific law is enacted detailing the process and implications of such disqualifications, Article 62(1)(f) should only serve as a guideline for voters.Article 62(1)(f) does not specify the court responsible for issuing disqualifications nor outline the process and duration.There is no existing law that meets the requirements of Article 10A for a fair trial in the context of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f).The imposition of a lifetime disqualification by civil courts on this basis is beyond the scope of Article 62(1)(f) and infringes on fundamental electoral rights.The Supreme Court also noted that Section 232(2) of the Elections Act, 2017, as amended, provides a five-year period for such disqualifications, aligning them with due process requirements.----Citations/Precedents:Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nausherwani, PLD 2018 SC 405: This case was explicitly overruled for extending lifetime disqualifications based on civil court declarations under Article 62(1)(f).Elections Act, 2017, Section 232(2): Amended to define the duration of disqualifications imposed under Article 62(1)(f) as five years.---Dissenting Opinion:Justice Yahya Afridi dissented, arguing that disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) should not be viewed as lifelong or permanent but should only last as long as the legal declaration that supports the disqualification remains in effect. He supported the legal validity of the earlier decision in Sami Ullah Baloch.