Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---- ----Ss. 24, 27 & 28---Pre-emption suit---Deposit of one-third sale consideration---Actual sale consideration disputed---Plaint rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. for alleged non-compliance with statutory deposit requirement---Supreme Court held that pre-emption law is anchored to the sale transaction itself and not to an independent or automatic assessment of market value---Pre-emptor ordinarily steps into shoes of vendee and must purchase property at same consideration where price is found genuine and fixed in good faith---Market value is not the default rule; it becomes relevant only where declared consideration is proved fictitious, inflated or mala fide. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---- ----S. 27---Determination of price payable by pre-emptor---Genuine sale price versus market value---Two-stage mechanism---Supreme Court held that where sale consideration is found to be genuine and fixed in good faith, Court shall fix such price to be paid by pre-emptor---Pre-emptor cannot claim property merely on perceived “realistic” or market value---Only where Court concludes that stated price was not fixed in good faith, for example where it was inflated or fictitious to defeat pre-emption, Court may determine market value as price payable by pre-emptor. Cited Cases: • Zilla Muhammad v. Qamar Ali Khan 2016 SCMR 184 • Allah Bakhsh v. Umar 1991 SCMR 1692 (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---- ----S. 24---Deposit in pre-emption suit---“Sale consideration” not “pre-emption money”---Supreme Court reiterated that statutory deposit under S.24 is one-third of sale consideration---Courts should avoid loose expression “pre-emption money” and instead use correct statutory terminology, namely “sale consideration”---Lower Courts must calculate and specify precise amount required for deposit within reasonable time. Cited Case: • Wasal Khan v. Niaz Ali Khan 2016 SCMR 40 (d) Pre-emption---- ----Inflated or exaggerated sale consideration---Burden of proof---Market value lower than transaction price---Effect---Appellant/pre-emptor contended that value shown in sale transaction was exorbitantly higher than market value---Supreme Court held that such plea is insignificant unless it is shown that inflated value was purposely stated to defeat right of pre-emption---A very heavy burden rests on pre-emptor seeking to enforce pre-emption on such plea---Seller is not deprived merely because property fetched price higher than prevailing market value; what matters is whether declared price was actually paid and represented bona fide transactional value. (e) Pre-emption---- ----Bona fide transactional value---Court’s duty---Supreme Court held that Trial Court must determine whether sale consideration disclosed in transaction was exaggerated and not actually paid to vendor, or whether it was true transactional value actually paid, irrespective of market value---The Court must first examine bona fides of sale price before resorting to valuation based on comparable sales or surrounding circumstances. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Pre-emption suit---Dispute regarding correct sale consideration and statutory deposit---Trial Court rejected plaint on ground that plaintiff had not deposited actual one-third sale consideration and bank guarantee for remaining two-thirds---Appellate Court restored suit because substantial evidence had already been recorded and dispute regarding actual transactional value required determination---Supreme Court upheld restoration approach, observing that where sale consideration itself is disputed and evidence exists, matter should proceed for determination in accordance with Ss.24, 27 and 28 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Limits---Appellate Court’s lawful exercise of jurisdiction---High Court in revision set aside Appellate Court’s judgment and restored Trial Court’s rejection of plaint---Supreme Court held that once Appellate Court had lawfully exercised jurisdiction by remanding/restoring suit for proper determination, revisional Court had no room to substitute another view in absence of jurisdictional defect, illegality or material irregularity---No ground was available for High Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction under S.115, C.P.C. (h) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185(2)(d)---Appeal as of right---Pre-emption matter---Appellant filed direct appeal before Supreme Court against High Court judgment allowing revision and restoring rejection of plaint---Supreme Court entertained appeal as of right and corrected High Court’s interference with Appellate Court’s lawful order. Disposition: Appeal was allowed; judgment of Peshawar High Court dated 23.02.2022 was set aside; matter was remanded to Trial Court to proceed with pre-emption suit in light of Supreme Court’s observations regarding genuine sale consideration, market value as exceptional mechanism, and statutory deposit; Trial Court was permitted to frame issue if deemed necessary and allow additional evidence, if any; trial was directed not to take more than three months.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 115---Estoppel of tenant---Tenant disputing landlord’s title while retaining possession---Bar---Respondents instituted suit for recovery of produce and ejectment against petitioners before DDO(R)/AAC(R), Peshawar---Petitioners resisted claim and subsequently asserted acquisition of certain ownership rights in part of demised premises---Supreme Court held that where a person enters into possession as tenant, he is estopped from disputing landlord’s title so long as he continues to retain possession under tenancy---Doctrine is founded on public policy, preserves sanctity of contractual relationship and prevents tenant from approbating and reprobating simultaneously. Cited Case: • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 (b) Landlord and tenant---- ----Tenant claiming ownership/proprietary rights---Obligation to surrender possession first---Supreme Court held that if a tenant disputes proprietary title of landlord or sets up hostile title, he must first vacate and surrender possession and thereafter contest his alleged proprietary rights before competent forum---Law does not permit tenant to retain possession under tenancy while simultaneously denying landlord’s title. Cited Case: • Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad through LRs 2006 SCMR 1068 (c) Landlord and tenant---- ----Assertion of ownership on basis of agreement to sell---Effect on ejectment proceedings---Mere assertion of ownership or claim based on alleged agreement to sell does not defeat maintainability of ejectment proceedings---Until tenant establishes specific performance or proprietary claim before competent Court, landlord continues to enjoy status of owner/landlord and relationship between parties remains governed by tenancy terms---Tenant cannot resist ejectment merely on basis of alleged sale agreement. Cited Cases: • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 • Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 (d) Ejectment proceedings---- ----Tenant purchasing share in property---Co-ownership plea---Effect on tenancy---Supreme Court held that even if tenant asserts acquisition of ownership rights by purchase of share in property, such assertion by itself does not terminate tenancy or render ejectment proceedings incompetent---Qua demised premises, tenant’s position remains that of tenant unless and until his proprietary claim is established in accordance with law. Cited Cases: • Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913 • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 (e) Rent / ejectment jurisdiction---- ----Limited jurisdiction of Rent Controller / ejectment forum---Complicated questions of title---Supreme Court reiterated that ejectment forum exercises limited jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate complicated ownership disputes---Where tenant claims to have purchased share or acquired co-ownership, proper remedy is not to resist ejectment proceedings by raising disputed title questions, but to seek partition or appropriate declaration before competent civil forum. (f) Civil remedy---- ----Tenant claiming co-ownership by purchase of share---Proper remedy---Partition suit---Supreme Court held that tenant claiming co-ownership or purchase of share must pursue proprietary remedy by filing civil suit for partition before competent forum---Such claim cannot be used as defence to defeat ejectment proceedings while tenant continues in possession under tenancy. (g) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Concurrent findings of revenue/ejectment forums and High Court---No interference by Supreme Court---Trial Court decreed suit for recovery of produce and ejectment; appeal, revision, second revision and constitutional petition were dismissed---Supreme Court held that High Court had correctly construed settled law on tenant’s estoppel and maintainability of ejectment proceedings, and no illegality warranting interference was made out. Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal was dismissed and leave refused; judgment of Peshawar High Court dated 19.10.2018 maintaining orders of forums below in suit for recovery of produce and ejectment was upheld; connected CMA was disposed of as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 117---Burden of proof---Suit for declaration of ownership over alleged allotted land---Foundational allotment document not produced---Respondents/plaintiffs claimed title over 66 kanals 9 marlas on basis of alleged allotment in favour of respondent No.9 through R.L-II No.188, followed by Mutation No.1 and subsequent purchase by respondents No.1 to 8---Supreme Court held that entire claim rested upon R.L-II No.188, but said foundational document was never produced in evidence, nor proved through competent witness from concerned department---Mere oral assertions or mutation entries could not establish lawful allotment or title---Plaintiff must succeed on strength of his own case and not on weakness of defendant’s case. Cited Case: • Nasir Ali v. Muhammad Asghar 2022 SCMR 1054 (b) Evidence---- ----Document mentioned during cross-examination---No substitute for formal proof---Respondents argued that R.L-II No.188 stood admitted or established because it surfaced during cross-examination---Supreme Court rejected contention and held that mere mention of a document in cross-examination does not prove its existence, authenticity, contents or legality---Obligating statement in cross-examination may at best be treated as inferential evidence and cannot replace strict proof of foundational transaction. Cited Case: • Mst. Farrukh Jabin v. Maqbool Hussain through LRs and others PLD 2004 SC 499 (c) Revenue record---- ----Mutation entries---Fiscal nature---No conferment of title---Respondents relied upon Mutation No.1 and subsequent revenue entries to establish ownership---Supreme Court reiterated that mutation entries are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and do not by themselves create, extinguish or confer title---Once mutation was disputed, party relying upon it was bound to prove original transaction giving rise thereto through lawful evidence---Mutation could not become substitute for unproved allotment record. (d) Government / State land---- ----TDA land---Alleged allotment by Settlement Department---Public property not to be lost through negligence or collusion of officials---Petitioners pleaded that suit land belonged to Thal Development Authority/Government and was not capable of lawful allotment by Settlement Department---Supreme Court held that even if subordinate officials failed to safeguard Government interest, their omission, negligence or possible connivance could not operate to deprive State of its property---Courts must exercise heightened vigilance in matters involving public land, alleged allotments, collusive decrees and engineered revenue entries. Cited Case: • Ashiq Hussain Shah v. Province of Punjab through Collector District, Attock and others 2003 SCMR 1840 (e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----First Sched., Art. 14---Suit to set aside act/order of Government officer---One year limitation---Respondents sought to question official orders passed in 1992 and 1995, including resumption order dated 17.10.1995, but instituted suit long thereafter---Supreme Court held that where relief is sought to set aside act or order of Government officer made in official capacity, limitation is one year from date of such act or order under Art.14 of First Schedule to Limitation Act, 1908---No plausible explanation for delay was furnished; claim was prima facie barred by limitation. Cited Case: • Muhammad Din v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner and others 2022 SCMR 1481 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 9---Civil Court jurisdiction after revenue hierarchy has decided matter---Scope limited to legality of orders, not full retrial---Matter had already travelled through revenue hierarchy, including orders of Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Chief Settlement Commissioner and resumption in favour of Government---Supreme Court held that after statutory revenue remedies are exhausted, Civil Court may examine whether acts/orders of special tribunal were made in accordance with law, but cannot sit as appellate authority or conduct complete retrial on merits---Civil Court’s role is to examine legality, jurisdictional defect, mala fide, absence of evidence or lack of lawful authority on existing record. Cited Case: • Nausher v. Province of Punjab through District Collector, Khanewal and another PLD 2022 SC 699 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XV, Rr. 3 & 4---Summary procedure---Challenge to orders of administrative/revenue tribunal---Supreme Court observed that in suits questioning legality of administrative/revenue orders, Civil Court may adopt summary procedure and treat complete record of proceedings before administrative tribunal as sufficient evidence---Parties should not ordinarily be allowed to reopen whole controversy through full-fledged civil trial with fresh oral and documentary evidence after revenue forums have already adjudicated matter. (h) Doctrine of election---- ----Exhaustion of statutory remedy before revenue hierarchy---Fresh civil suit to relitigate same controversy---Not permissible---Respondents, after revenue hierarchy decided matter against them, instituted fresh civil suit and led evidence as if dispute were being tried at first instance---Supreme Court held that such course was inconsistent with doctrine of election---A litigant who has consciously chosen and pursued one statutory remedy to its logical conclusion cannot seek another bite of cherry by reopening same matter through original civil jurisdiction merely because earlier result was unfavourable. Cited Cases: • Qazi Mumtaz Hussain and others v. Government of Sindh through Secretary Revenue and others 2025 SCMR 939 • Mir Mujib-Ur-Rehman Muhammad Hassani v. Returning Officer and others PLD 2020 SC 718 • Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Limited PLD 2018 SC 828 (i) Public property---- ----Revenue entries, alleged allotments and collusive proceedings---Duty of Courts---Supreme Court emphasized that Courts are under solemn obligation to jealously guard public property and ensure that revenue entries, alleged allotments or fiscal mutations do not become instruments for unlawful deprivation of State land through defective proof, procedural laxity or collusive conduct---Parallel and protracted civil trials after statutory revenue adjudication undermine finality, encourage forum-shopping and burden civil courts with disputes falling essentially within revenue administration. (j) Civil revision---- ----High Court restoring Trial Court decree in favour of private claimants---Interference by Supreme Court---Trial Court decreed suit; Appellate Court set aside decree and dismissed suit; High Court in civil revision restored Trial Court decree---Supreme Court held that respondents failed to establish lawful title and valid allotment, foundational document remained unproved, mutation entries did not confer title, claim was hit by limitation, and fresh civil trial after revenue hierarchy was legally objectionable---High Court’s judgment could not be sustained. Disposition: Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgment of Lahore High Court dated 23.05.2014 was set aside; judgment and decree of Appellate Court dated 31.01.2006 was restored; suit filed by respondents No.1 to 8 was dismissed with costs throughout.

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)---- ----Ss. 2(c), 2(i) & 13---Ejectment of tenant---Bona fide personal need---Meaning of “landlord”---Attorney / authorised person acting on behalf of landlord---Respondent-landlord filed ejectment application through attorney against tenant in respect of shop situated at Old Bus Stand, GT Road, Haripur, on ground of bona fide personal need for business---Tenant objected that premises were not required by landlord personally but by his attorney, Muhammad Sohail---Supreme Court held that definition of “landlord” under S.2(c) is broad and includes any person entitled to receive rent in respect of building or rented land, whether on his own account or on behalf or for benefit of another person, and also includes trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator---Attorney duly authorised through authority letter/NOC and special power of attorney could institute and pursue ejectment proceedings on behalf of landlord. (b) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)---- ----S. 13(3)(a)---Bona fide personal need---Non-residential building---Requirement for own use or use of children---For non-residential building, scheduled building or rented land, landlord may seek eviction if premises are required in good faith for his own use or for use of any of his children, provided he or such child is not occupying another suitable building/rented land in same urban area for business and has not vacated such premises without sufficient cause after commencement of Ordinance---Supreme Court held that appellate Court and High Court rightly found bona fide personal need established through cogent and reliable evidence. (c) Landlord and tenant---- ----Ejectment through attorney---Delegation of landlord’s powers---Competency to file rent petition---Landlord had entrusted all powers as landlord to Muhammad Sohail through authority letter and special power of attorney---Supreme Court held that any person authorised even to collect rent can be treated as landlord within meaning of Ordinance and may file ejectment proceedings in his name/on behalf of landlord---There is no bar or restriction under law preventing an attorney from instituting ejectment proceedings on ground of bona fide personal need. (d) Landlord and tenant---- ----Bona fide personal need---Statement on oath---Sufficiency---Supreme Court reiterated that statement of landlord on oath, if consistent with ejectment application and not shaken in cross-examination or disproved in rebuttal, is sufficient to prove bona fide personal need---Tenant failed to disprove landlord’s case; no inconsistency between pleadings and evidence was shown. Cited Cases: • Messrs F.K. Irani & Co. v. Begum Feroze 1996 SCMR 1178 • Mst. Toheed Khanam v. Muhammad Shamshad 1980 SCMR 593 • Muhammad Shoaib Alam v. Muhammad Iqbal 2000 SCMR 903 • Messrs Al-Karam Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. East West Insurance Co. Ltd. 2001 SCMR 688 (e) Landlord and tenant---- ----Commercial premises---Nature of intended business---Experience in business---Not mandatory---Supreme Court reiterated that landlord seeking ejectment from commercial premises on ground of personal bona fide need is not legally required to disclose exact nature of business intended to be started, nor required to prove prior experience in such trade or business. Cited Case: • Juma Sher v. Sabz Ali 1997 SCMR 1062 (f) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Art. 199 of Constitution---Concurrent findings in rent matter---Scope of interference---High Court dismissed tenant’s writ petition after appellate Court had accepted landlord’s appeal and ordered ejectment---Supreme Court held that constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary and meant to correct orders passed without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or in violation of law---High Court should not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded after proper appraisal of evidence where substantial justice has been done. (g) Concurrent findings---- ----Interference by Supreme Court---Limited scope---Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of lower courts are not to be disturbed unless there is patent illegality, misreading or non-consideration of material evidence, error of law apparent on face of record, perversity, physical impossibility, or grave miscarriage of justice---No such defect was shown in appellate Court’s findings as affirmed by High Court; impugned judgment was based on proper appreciation of evidence and relevant legal principles. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 10---Plea of previously pending proceedings---Rent ejectment matter---Tenant argued that S.10, C.P.C. was applicable because another case between parties regarding same subject matter was pending---Supreme Court found no illegality, perversity or jurisdictional defect in High Court judgment and declined interference; ejectment proceedings were maintained on basis of landlord’s proved bona fide personal need and valid authority of attorney. Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal was dismissed and leave refused; judgment of Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench dated 23.07.2025 dismissing tenant’s writ petition was maintained; appellate Court’s order allowing ejectment petition on ground of bona fide personal need through duly authorised attorney remained intact.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XX, R. 3 & S. 152---Judgment once signed---Finality---Exception for clerical/arithmetical mistakes and accidental slips---Supreme Court held that although a judgment, once dated and signed in open Court, ordinarily cannot be altered or added to, the legislature has expressly carved out an exception under S.152, C.P.C. for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes, or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions---Such correction may be made by Court either suo motu or on application of any party. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 152---Correction of judgment---Scope---Power exercisable “at any time”---Discretionary nature---Supreme Court reiterated that power under S.152, C.P.C. may be exercised at any time and even suo motu, but such power remains discretionary and must be exercised in light of facts and circumstances of each case, particularly where third-party rights may be affected. Cited Case: • Mst. Farosha v. Fazal Gul and others PLD 1983 SC 220 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 152---Error apparent on face of record---No elaborate inquiry into facts or law---Supreme Court held that S.152, C.P.C. is confined to correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes and errors arising from accidental slips or omissions---Such error must be apparent on face of record and should not require elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. Cited Case: • Baqar v. Muhammad Rafique and others 2003 SCMR 1401 (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 152---Accidental slip in name of party---Father’s name mentioned instead of correct owner---Correction allowed---Appellate Court, while recording findings on certain issues, inadvertently mentioned name of “Behram Khan” instead of “Azad Khan”, although pleadings, evidence, and other parts of judgment consistently acknowledged Azad Khan as owner of disputed property---Supreme Court held that such mistake was clerical/accidental and correction merely brought judgment into conformity with manifest intention of Court as discernible from record. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 152---Correction not amounting to review or alteration of merits---Effect---Correction substituting correct name of owner did not introduce any new relief, alter substantive findings, reopen merits of case, or materially change judgment---Supreme Court held that such correction squarely fell within expression “error arising from accidental slip or omission” under S.152, C.P.C. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 152---Third-party rights---No prejudice shown---Supreme Court observed that correction made by Appellate Court was neither inequitable nor prejudicial and no third-party rights were shown to have intervened or been infringed---Exercise of jurisdiction under S.152, C.P.C. was therefore lawful and proper. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 12(2)---Application challenging correction under S.152, C.P.C.---Conversion into revision---Dismissal---Petitioners challenged correction of accidental mistake by filing application under S.12(2), C.P.C., which was converted into revision and dismissed---High Court also dismissed civil revision---Supreme Court found no illegality, irregularity, jurisdictional defect or misreading of law in High Court judgment. (h) Judgment---- ----Pronouncement and signature---Operative judgment---Alteration after signing---Supreme Court referred to principle that a judgment becomes operative upon formal pronouncement in open Court and signature; drafts, tentative views or exchanged opinions do not constitute judgment---After pronouncement and signature, alteration/addition is impermissible except through S.152, review or exceptional inherent jurisdiction. Cited Case: • Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University and others 1989 MLD 3215 Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal was dismissed and leave refused; order of Appellate Court correcting accidental mistake under S.152, C.P.C. by substituting name of “Azad Khan” in place of “Behram Khan” was maintained; High Court judgment dated 14.10.2022 dismissing petitioners’ revision was upheld; connected CMA was disposed of as infructuous.

Summary: Deferred dower becomes payable in the wake of proved polygamy under Section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. 11Murder Reference 23-23 The State . Vs Usman . Mr. Justice Farooq Haider 09-02- 2026 2026 LHC 1118

Summary: Public Procurement Rules, 2004--- ----R.25---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.175F(c)---Public procurement---Tender process---Additional security, demand of---Demand based on undisclosed engineer’s estimate---Legality---Transparency and fairness---Change in essential terms after advertisement---Effect---Advertisement, scope and significance of---Brief facts were that the petitioners invited tenders in which the respondent emerged successful and deposited earnest money on the advertised estimated cost; later, the petitioners demanded 8% additional security on the basis of an undisclosed engineer’s estimate, and upon refusal, rejected the bid, forfeited the earnest money, and debarred the respondent for six months; the respondent challenged this action through a writ petition, which was allowed by the High Court---The issue before the Federal Constitutional Court was “whether additional security could lawfully be imposed on the basis of a benchmark not disclosed in the tender notice?”---Held: Petitioner’s approach of computingthe 2% earnest money on the basis of the estimated cost expresslydisclosed in the advertisement, while switching to an undisclosedengineer estimate later on, was legally untenable, as it offended therequirements of transparency, consistency, and equal treatment inpublic procurement---Any midstreamdeparture from the stipulated tender terms, without prior public notice,and in the absence of legal/cogent justification, was inherently arbitrary,and undermined the principle of equal opportunity among bidders---Theintroduction of an additional security requirement by reference to abenchmark not disclosed in the advertisement, appeared to be patentlyarbitrary and incompatible with the requirements of transparency andfairness in the facts and circumstances of the case---No interference was required in the impugned judgment passed by the High Court---Leave was refused and the petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Habibullah Energy Limited and another v. WAPDA through Chairman PLD 2014 SC 47 and Ishaq Khan Khakwani and another v. Railway Board through Chairman and others PLD 2019 SC 602 rel. Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and others AIR 2000 SC 2272 ref. Khalilullah Khalil, Advocate Supreme Court with Abid Shafi, Director (Law) for Petitioners. Mian Abdul Rauf, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 3rd February, 2026.

Summary: Public procurement / tender process--- ----Notice Inviting Tenders (NIT)---Undisclosed engineer’s estimate---Additional security---Rejection of bid---Forfeiture of earnest money---Debarment---Transparency and fairness in public procurement--- Petitioners invited tenders for improvement and widening of road project---Respondent bidder was successful for Package-I and had deposited earnest money at 2% of estimated cost disclosed in advertisement---Petitioners subsequently demanded 8% additional security on basis of engineer’s estimate, asserting that bid was 22.5% below such estimate---Said engineer’s estimate, however, had not been disclosed in NIT---On bidder’s refusal to deposit additional security, bid was rejected, earnest money forfeited, and bidder debarred for six months---High Court set aside such action---Validity---Federal Constitutional Court held that where petitioners had themselves computed earnest money on basis of estimated cost expressly mentioned in advertisement, they could not later shift to an undisclosed benchmark for imposing additional burden upon bidder---Such course offended requirements of transparency, consistency, fairness and equal treatment in public procurement---Any change in essential tender terms or introduction of a fresh financial benchmark after commencement of bidding process, without prior disclosure or fresh advertisement, was arbitrary and legally untenable---Judgment of High Court was found consistent with governing law and principles of public procurement---Leave to appeal was refused and petition was dismissed. Habibullah Energy Limited and another v. WAPDA through Chairman (PLD 2014 SC 47); Ishaq Khan Khakwani and another v. Railway Board through Chairman and others (PLD 2019 SC 602); Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and others (AIR 2000 SC 2272) rel. (a) Notice Inviting Tenders---Disclosure of material terms---Necessity--- In public procurement, all material and essential terms governing participation in the bidding process must be disclosed in the advertisement / Notice Inviting Tenders so as to ensure a free, fair, open, competitive and transparent process. An undisclosed criterion cannot subsequently be invoked to the prejudice of a bidder. (b) Additional security---Basis not disclosed in NIT---Effect--- Where the petitioners demanded additional security on the basis of an engineer’s estimate not mentioned in the advertisement, such demand was without lawful basis---A bidder could not be burdened with additional security calculated on a benchmark withheld from all participants at the time of tender. (c) Transparency, consistency and equal treatment---Public contracts--- The procuring agency, having calculated the 2% earnest money on the basis of the estimated cost expressly disclosed in the advertisement, could not lawfully switch to another undisclosed valuation standard later on---Such inconsistency violated the principles of transparency, fairness and equal treatment among bidders. (d) Change in essential tender terms after commencement of process---Propriety--- A change in an essential term or financial basis of tender after initiation of bidding process cannot be sustained unless the same is publicly notified through a fresh advertisement enabling all potential bidders to compete on equal footing---Midstream alteration of tender conditions is akin to changing the rules of the game after it has begun and is inherently arbitrary. (e) Rejection of bid, forfeiture of earnest money and debarment---Legality--- Where demand for additional security itself was founded on an undisclosed and impermissible basis, consequential actions of rejection of bid, forfeiture of earnest money and debarment of bidder could not be legally sustained. (f) Leave to appeal---Refusal of--- As the High Court had correctly applied the law and the settled principles of public procurement, no legal infirmity was found in the impugned judgment and no ground for interference was made out. Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XVIII, cross-examination---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 144, 145, 146 & 148---Right of cross-examination---Scope and limitations---Harassing, irrelevant, repetitive, indecent, scandalous or insulting questions---Petitioner/defendant No.1 had already cross-examined PW-1 on seven dates over nearly two months and an extensive cross-examination of about thirty pages had been recorded---Trial Court, on objection by plaintiff’s counsel, held that prolonged cross-examination had become irrelevant to the controversy and amounted to misuse of right of cross-examination and abuse of process of Court---Supreme Court held that right of cross-examination, though valuable, was neither unlimited nor unbridled---Object of cross-examination was discovery of truth and not humiliation, intimidation, harassment or scandalizing of witness---Court was not required to remain a silent spectator where cross-examination was being abused by irrelevant, repetitive or offensive questions---Trial Court was competent to regulate proceedings and close petitioner’s right of further cross-examination where sufficient opportunity had already been afforded. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Shafi PLD 1967 SC 167 • Mir Hassan 1999 SCMR 1418 • Meera Shafi v. Ali Zafar PLD 2023 SC 211 (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Arts. 144, 145, 146 & 148---Questions in cross-examination---Reasonable grounds---Indecent, scandalous, insulting or annoying questions---Court’s power to forbid questions---Under Art.144, no question as to imputation could be asked unless person asking had reasonable grounds for thinking that imputation was well-founded---Under Art.145, Court could require reporting of circumstances where question was asked without reasonable grounds---Under Art.146, Court could forbid indecent or scandalous questions unless related to facts in issue or necessary matters---Under Art.148, Court was required to forbid questions intended to insult or annoy, or which appeared needlessly offensive in form---Such provisions empowered Court to protect witness from abusive cross-examination and ensure that questioning remained relevant to matters in controversy. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XVII, R.3---Failure to perform act necessary for progress of suit---Court’s power to proceed---Where a party, despite opportunity, failed to perform any act necessary for further progress of suit, Court could proceed to decide suit forthwith---Petitioner/defendant No.1 had been given more than adequate opportunity to cross-examine PW-1 but continued with questioning which Trial Court found irrelevant and harassing---Closure of further cross-examination in such circumstances was not illegal or irregular. (d) Administration of justice---- ----Control over proceedings---Protection of witnesses---Abuse of cross-examination---Court’s duty---Cross-examination must remain confined to relevant matters and may be used to test veracity, credibility, bias, interest, corruption or prior inconsistent statements of witness---Witnesses, including witnesses in adversarial litigation, must be treated with dignity and respect by Courts---Court has duty to intervene where witness is subjected to unnecessary harassment, intimidation, scandalizing or humiliation---Court should disallow irrelevant questions designed merely to prolong cross-examination or manipulate witness into error---Trial Court, therefore, lawfully protected PW-1 from further abusive cross-examination. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 151---Inherent powers of Court---Fixing specific date and time for cross-examination---Power to regulate proceedings---Petitioner contended that High Court lacked authority to fix and limit a specific date and time for conducting cross-examination---Supreme Court repelled contention and held that Courts possess ample inherent powers under S.151, CPC to make such orders as necessary to secure ends of justice and prevent abuse of process---Power to regulate judicial proceedings, including fixing specific date and time for cross-examination after repeated and sufficient lenience, fell within inherent jurisdiction of Court---Such exercise was lawful where required to ensure orderly and expeditious disposal of proceedings, maintain discipline in conduct of trial and protect witness from needless harassment or protraction. Cited Case: • NWFP Government v. Abdul Ghafoor through L.Rs PLD 1993 SC 418 (f) Judicial proceedings---- ----Presumption of correctness---Consent recorded in judicial order---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art.129(e)---Petitioner asserted that no consent had been recorded before High Court for grant of limited opportunity of cross-examination, though impugned order itself recorded existence of such consent---Supreme Court held that strong and well-entrenched presumption existed in favour of correctness of judicial proceedings and veracity of judicial record---Such presumption could not be displaced by mere assertions or bald allegations but only by cogent, convincing and unimpeachable proof---No material was placed on record to rebut presumption or show that recital in High Court order was incorrect---Contention that no consent was recorded was wholly unsubstantiated and devoid of merit. Cited Cases: • Syed Ali Ahmed Shah v. Syed Shoukat Hussain Shah and others 2025 SCMR 361 • Fayyaz Hussain v. Akbar Hussain and others 2004 SCMR 964 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 114 & O. XLVII, R.1---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Review not appeal in disguise---Review could be sought only on discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after due diligence, was not within knowledge or could not be produced at time of decree/order; some mistake or error apparent on face of record; or any other sufficient reason---Review Court does not act as appellate Court and review jurisdiction cannot be invoked for rehearing on merits or for correcting every alleged erroneous decision---Petitioner attempted to characterize recording of consent in High Court order as omission or error attributable to Court, but impugned judgment reflected conscious and reasoned exercise of jurisdiction and not accidental slip or error apparent on face of record---High Court rightly declined review. Cited Cases: • Syed Ali Ahmed Shah v. Syed Shoukat Hussain Shah 2025 SCMR 361 • Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119 • M/s Habib and Co. v. Muslim Commercial Bank PLD 2020 SC 227 • Engineers Study Forum v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 SCMR 1961 • Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq PLD 2016 SC 421 • Haji Muhammad Boota v. Member (Revenue) BOR 2010 SCMR 1049 • Mehdi Hassan v. Province of Punjab 2007 SCMR 755 (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 114 & O. XLVII, R.1---Review jurisdiction---Limits---Error apparent on face of record---A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an allegedly erroneous decision is reheard and corrected---Review lies only for a patent error apparent on face of record, not for elaborate re-argument or reappraisal of merits---Where a party merely contended that all aspects had not been highlighted or argued more forcefully, such grievance could not constitute ground for review---No case for interference in review jurisdiction was made out. Cited Cases: • Smt. Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari AIR 1995 SC 455 • M/s Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 1372 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Interference with discretionary order regulating trial---High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, declined interference with Trial Court’s order closing further cross-examination after finding that Trial Court had acted within lawful authority to regulate proceedings and prevent harassment of witness---High Court nevertheless, with consent of parties, granted one final controlled opportunity for cross-examination under supervision of Trial Court---Supreme Court held that High Court had lawfully structured remaining opportunity of cross-examination in controlled and supervised manner and such exercise could not be termed without authority or in excess of jurisdiction. Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1078-L of 2025 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; Supreme Court upheld concurrent orders of Trial Court and Lahore High Court whereby petitioner’s right of further cross-examination was closed/regulated after repeated opportunities, and review order of High Court was maintained.