Summary: The seizing officer while appearing before the Court as PW-2, deposed in his Court s statement that after recovery of contraband, he separated samples for FSL purpose and sealed in parcels No.1 to 8 and remaining stuff in parcel No.9 with a monogram of MK which, he categorically admitted that same is not pertained to his name and in fact the same stands for Mukhtiar Khan, SI, who was stated to be present with the complainant. The alleged recovery seems to be doubtful, rather hints at something to be planted by complainant, because said Mukhtiar Khan SI was never cited as a witness during proceedings. The Witness, after few moments, in his cross examination contradicted his own statement by deposing that Mukhtiar Khan SI was present in the PS at that very time. The MK monogram was lying with me in the official van . Be that as it may, the Seizing Officer, pursuant to spy information, should have been required to have his own monogram with the letters RK in his possession to have strengthened and substantiated his version, but he disrupted the episode in a casual manner. Though it transpires that he handed over the case property to the Moharrir of the PS, but, said Moharrir was not produced before the Court so as to support the version of the complainant and to have to depose about the safe custody of the case property. The prosecution even did not produce the Register No.19 of the PS so as to prove that the case property was ever kept in Malkhana of the PS.

Summary: ''Lahore High Court in Pakistan declared that the governmentís inaction in implementing laws and policies to mitigate food loss and waste violated the Constitutional right to food. '' ------Background:The case, titled Muhammad Ahmad Pansota and others V/S Federation of Pakistan etc., was brought before the Lahore High Court by a group of petitioners led by Muhammad Ahmad Pansota. They sought judicial directives for the Federation of Pakistan and associated entities to address issues related to the preservation, conservation, and management of food within Pakistan. The petitioners, including individuals and representatives of the Robin Hood Army NGO, aimed to tackle food wastage and ensure food security, aligning their efforts with Islamic principles and constitutional rights.----Issues:The primary issues presented before the court were:The need for legislative action to address food wastage and ensure food preservation and conservation.The evaluation of food wastage in Pakistan and steps taken to raise awareness and manage food resources effectively.The petitioners argued that the right to food and the prevention of food wastage are integral to the fundamental rights under the Pakistani Constitution and Islamic teachings.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court, led by Justice Jawad Hassan, acknowledged the gravity of food wastage and the intrinsic right to food as fundamental. The Lahore High Court in Pakistan declared that the governmentís inaction in implementing laws and policies to mitigate food loss and waste violated the Constitutional right to food. The judgment highlighted the responsibility of the state and relevant authorities to legislate and implement policies ensuring food conservation and effective management. The court directed the government departments to enforce existing laws and policies rigorously, promote public awareness, and establish a management system to redirect surplus food to those in need. The court appreciated the efforts of all stakeholders, including government departments and NGOs, in addressing this critical issue.-----Citations/Precedents:Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973Various international treaties and conventions on human rights and food security, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966)National and provincial legislations related to food safety and authority, including the Punjab Pure Food Ordinance 1960, Punjab Pure Food Rules 2011, and Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011Previous judicial decisions highlighting the importance of fundamental rights and the state's responsibility to ensure the well-being of its citizens, such as the cases mentioned in the judgment like SHEHLA ZIA CASE (PLD 1994 SC 693) and others.

Summary: The appellant, was convicted by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offenses under the Explosive Substances Act, Arms Ordinance, and Anti-Terrorism Act. The judgment details the charges, evidence presented during the trial, and the sentencing. The appellant claimed innocence, arguing that the case was fabricated, but the court found the prosecution's evidence, including witness statements and forensic reports, convincing. The appeal was dismissed, and the original conviction and sentences were upheld.

Summary: The central issue revolved around the maintainability of the appeals. The learned Law Officer argued that, according to the Punjab Local Government Act, 2019, there is a remedy of appeal, and additionally, the arbitration clause in the rent agreement makes these appeals not maintainable. The appellants counter that there is no available remedy against the respondents' actions and that there is no order against which an appeal can be filed. The court deliberates on the definition of "Order" in the context of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2019, and concludes that any direction or determination resulting from proceedings, such as those of the District Assessment Committee, can be considered an order under the Act. Drawing parallels with the Civil Servant (Appeal) Rules, the court emphasized the broad interpretation of "Order." The judgment also discusses the applicability of Section 3 of The Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, regarding the maintainability of Intra Court Appeals. The court emphasized that if the law applicable provides for at least one appeal against the original order, then an Intra Court Appeal is not competent. Reference is made to previous cases to support this interpretation. Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeals, asserting that they are not maintainable in light of the proviso to Subsection 2 of Section 3 of The Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.

Summary: The petitioner, dissatisfied with not being recommended for promotion to the rank of S.P (BS-18) in a Departmental Promotion Board (DPB) meeting, filed the appeal. The DPB's decision was based on various considerations, including the officer's alleged lack of critical analysis skills, emotional maturity, unsatisfactory behavior with the public, and doubts about integrity and professional competence. The appellant department contends that the impugned order did not considered the subjective evaluation and objective criteria presented in the DPB's report. The legal arguments revolved around the maintainability of the constitutional petition concerning the fitness of a civil servant for promotion. The court discussed whether it has the jurisdiction to interfere in matters of subjective evaluation by the competent authority, emphasizing that such interference is only warranted in cases of legal violations, excess of jurisdiction, or malfeasance. The court concluded that the Single Bench did not adequately examine the subjective evaluations or consider the objective criteria for determining fitness. It asserted that unless there is a jurisdictional defect, malfeasance, patent illegality, or a colorable exercise of power, the court should not interfere in matters of fitness for promotion. Consequently, the appeal was allowed.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending