Summary: (a) Punjab Civil Servants Recruitment (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1976--- ----R. 3(v)---Police Order (22 of 2002), Arts. 7(3) & 112---Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2013, R.13, Schd.---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Police service---Advertisement for the rank of Sub-Inspector without relaxation in upper age limit---Policy decision---Interference by High Court---Scope---Exclusion of application of Punjab Civil Servants Recruitment (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1976 (Rules-1976), in recruitment in Police Force---Legality---Petitioners challenged the advertisement on the basis of general relaxation in upper age limits given in the Rules and on the analogy of a previous advertisement---Validity---Appointment of Sub-Inspectors in Punjab Police Department is governed by the Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2013, made by the Provincial Police Officer with approval of the Provincial Government in exercise of powers under Art. 112 of the Police Order, 2002---These rules provide requisite qualification, physical standards, and age limits for candidates applying for recruitment---Determining the appropriate age for appointment of Sub-Inspector on open merit or from in-service quota is a policy decision based on the specific and strenuous requirements of police service, which demands physical fitness and ability associated with a younger age bracket for new entrants---Jurisdiction of Courts is to apply the law and rules on the statute book---Courts are cautious of interfering with policy decisions unless shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or in violation of a statute, none of which was established by the petitioners---Relaxation of upper age limit for recruitment of civil servants is governed by the Rules, 1976---Police force is a distinct and disciplined entity with its own service structure and rules, separate from general civil service, thus petitioners' reliance on the Rules-1976 was misplaced and they could not claim, as of right, the benefit of a relaxation that the rule-makers had deliberately not extended to the police force---Five years age relaxation granted in a previous advertisement for service quota posts was of no avail, as that was a one-time dispensation granted by the provincial cabinet for specific reasons, mentioned in the advertisement---One-time policy decision or relaxation does not create a vested right, nor can it be cited as a binding precedent to demand similar relaxation in a subsequent and different recruitment process, especially for a different category of candidates---Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. Mian Muhammad Afzal v. Province of Punjab and others 2004 SCMR 1570 and Muhammad Aamir Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Senior Member Board of Revenue, KP and others 2019 SCMR 1021 ref. Muhammad Mohsin Ghuman and others v. Government of Punjab through Home Secretary, Lahore and others 2013 SCMR 85; Muhammad Aamir Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Senior Menber Board of Revenue, KP and others 2019 SCMR 1021 and Mian Muhammad Afzal v. Province of Punjab and others 2004 SCMR 1570 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 25---Principle of equality---Reasonable classification---Intelligible differentia---Scope---Art. 25 guarantees equality before the law, but does not prohibit reasonable classification---Equality is not absolute similarity---For a classification to be valid, it must satisfy: (i) an intelligible differentia distinguishing persons or things grouped together from others, and (ii) a rational nexus between the differentia and the object of the statute or policy. (c) Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2013--- ----R.13 & Sched.---Police service---Initial recruitment and in-service quota---Different age limits---Object and scope---Object of recruitment on open merit is to induct young talent into the force, whereas the object of the service quota is to provide a channel for career progression for experienced personnel already serving---Different age limits prescribed for these categories have a rational nexus to these objects---Lower age limit for fresh entrants ensures they are physically and mentally equipped for rigorous training and long service tenure, whereas a higher age limit for in-service candidates recognizes that they joined at a young age in a lower rank and have since gained experience fitting them for promotion to Sub-Inspector---To treat these two different classes alike would be illogical and would amount to treating unequals as equals, violating the principle of equality. I.A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041 and Gul Zarif Khan and others v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others 2025 SCMR 415 rel. Muhammad Ahmad Akram for Petitioner (in W.Ps. Nos.56545 of 2025 and 58260 of 2025). Moeen Yousaf Hanjra for Petitoner (in W.P. No.57997 of 2025). Mohammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab with Saad Ali, Law Officer Punjab Public Service Commission and Malik Khuda Yar, Inspector (Legal), I.G. Office, Lahore for Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th October, 2025. RAHEEL KAMRAN, J.--- By this single judgment, I intend to decide the titled petition as well as Writ Petitions Nos.57997 of 2025 and 58260 of 2025 as all these petitions raise the same legal issue.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S.22---Suit for declaration, refund, damages by the customer against the Bank---Disputed credit card transactions---Fraudulent issuance of the card, allegation of---Failure of Bank to lead evidence---Effect---Closure of defense---Non-blocking of credit card by Bank despite non-payment by customer for months, effect of---Brief facts were that the respondent/customer was an account holder of the appellant bank and had two credit cards, of which one was cancelled on his request; in 2013 he discovered that Rs.114,681/- had been deducted from his account and was informed that another credit card had been issued in his name and used for transactions, which he denied applying for or receiving; after receiving a recovery notice for Rs.455,782.68, he filed a suit before the Banking Court for declaration, refund, damages and injunction; the bank claimed the disputed card was a replacement and used by him, but failed to produce its witness for evidence despite repeated chances, leading to closure of right; suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff, which was being challenged in through the present appeal---Held: The impugned order closing side of the bank showed that initially the matter remained pending before the banking court for filing of affidavit in evidence of appellant’s witness from 23.10.2017 to 23.01.2019 for about more than one year---But even after filing of affidavit on latter date, the bank’s witness failed to come in the witness box and adduce evidence---On a number of occasions strict directions were given to the bank to produce him and lead his evidence but to no avail---Finally, on 11.12.2020, a last chance in this regard was given to the bank but then again on 20.1.2021 the case was adjourned at the request of bank but this time a cost of Rs.1000/- was imposed and the matter was adjourned to 23.02.2021---Even then the bank failed to lead evidence of its witness on that date citing some problem and this time against a cost of Rs.1500/-, indulgence was shown by the Banking Court and the matter was adjourned---On 07.04.2021 the bank finally produced its witness but the witness demanded adjournment saying that he was not ready to give evidence for want of documents---The court then called it a day and closed the side---The order passed by the Banking Court closing the side of the bank was well-reasoned and in accordance with law---It was very strange that the credit card was kept activated for a number of months although no payment against the transactions made through it were made by the plaintiff/respondent---It was noted that usually credit card was blocked after a month on nonpayment of outstanding amount---But in the present case, despite nonpayment for months together, the card holder was being allowed to carry on transactions without any hindrance---The bank could not produce any documentary evidence showing copies of monthly bills or notices given to respondent on his failure to make good on the monthly payments against the transactions---Present appeal of the bank was dismissed, in circumstances. Ghulam Rasool Koari for Appellants. Respondent in person. MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO, J.--- This appeal impugns judgment dated 05.211(sic)2022 and Decree dated 10.12.2022 passed by the Banking Court at Karachi in Suit No.476/2013 filed by respondent Waqar Ahmed Chandio for declaration, damages and permanent injunction.

Summary: Sindh Coal Mines Rules, 2016--- ----Preamble---Sindh Coal Act, 2012 (XXVIII of 2013), S.20---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Notices issued under Rules framed without lawful approval, challenge to---Subordinate legislation---Cabinet approval---Mandatory requirement---Non-compliance, effect of---Ex post facto approval---Validity and scope---Briefly, the petitioners (mining companies) filed the present constitutional petition challenging the validity of the Sindh Coal Mines Rules, 2016 framed under the Sindh Coal Act, 2012, on the ground that the Rules were promulgated without prior approval of the Cabinet and thereafter notices were issued to them under the said Rules requiring compliance in respect of various matters; during proceedings, it was acknowledged that Cabinet approval had not been obtained at the time of framing of the Rules but was subsequently granted, and the petitioners sought relief against the impugned notices issued under the said Rules---Held: Rules framed without prior approval of the cabinet were of no effect---High Court set aside the impugned notices on the ground that the same were anchored in the rules which were not framed in accordance with the requirement of ratio laid down by the Supreme Court---Moreover, no action in terms of the said rules were to be taken unless the matter was reconsidered by the cabinet and the fresh rules were framed---Constitutional petition was disposed of, in circumstances. Ayan Mustafa Memon along with Ghulam Mustafa Shah for Petitioners. Muhammad Hisham Mahar, Assistant Advocate General and Muhammad Ishaque, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th October, 2025.

Summary: Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----S.6---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S.20---Foreign arbitral award---Recognition and enforcement sought---Grounds for refusal---Ex-parte foreign arbitral award proceedings---Violation of fair trial, plea of---Impact on enforceability of award---Brief facts were that the applicant filed a miscellaneous application seeking recognition and enforcement of a Final Foreign Arbitral Award, rendered by the RUCIP Arbitration Committee in the Netherlands, to be treated as a decree of the Court---Respondent opposed the recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award and maintained that there was no privity of contract between the parties and the arbitral proceedings were conducted unilaterally and ex-parte in violation of the respondent’s right to a fair trial---Held: Respondent failed to highlight any ground specifically which could merit refusal to enforce the award---It was apparent and admitted that the respondent categorically refused to participate in the proceedings, hence, his plea that the award was passed unilaterally was not sustainable---Further the question of privity of contract had already been addressed in paragraph number 4.2 of the award---The noted arguments ought to have been taken by the respondent in the arbitration proceedings---Refusal of the respondent to appear in the noted proceedings disentitled him to raise the said ground at the present stage---Award was recognized as binding, hence, stood enforced by the High Court---The applicant was granted judgment in the amount mentioned in the award in question which was to be executed as a decree passed by the High Court---Present application stood converted into execution and was to be fixed for further proceedings---Present application was allowed, and award was enforced, in circumstances. Taisei Corporation’s case 2024 SCMR 640 and Orient Power Company Private Limited’s case 2021 SCMR 1728 rel. Messrs Tradehol International SA Sociedad Unipersonal’s case PLD 2023 Lah. 621 ref. Mobeen Rana for Applicant. Muhammad Ali Hakro for Respondent. Date of hearing: 26th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O.XVII, R.3---Failure to produce evidence despite repeated opportunities---Dismissal of application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. for want of evidence---Scope and purpose of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. explained---Petitioner, after filing an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. seeking annulment of a decree on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation, repeatedly failed to produce evidence despite several adjournments and explicit warnings---Trial Court, applying Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C., dismissed the application; appellate and constitutional forums maintained that order---Held, that Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. is designed to ensure procedural discipline and prevent litigants from abusing the judicial process by unnecessary adjournments---Where a party, despite being present, fails to produce evidence or perform acts necessary for the case’s progress, the Court may decide the case on merits without further adjournment---Such decision constitutes a decree appealable on merits, not one to be restored under Order IX, C.P.C.---The Rule reflects the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” and serves to ensure that litigation comes to an end rather than continuing indefinitely---Petitioner having been granted nearly ten opportunities, including last and final chances accompanied by cost and warning, failed to adduce evidence; therefore, the Trial Court rightly invoked Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. and dismissed the application---No illegality or jurisdictional defect found in the concurrent findings of the Courts below---Petition dismissed and leave to appeal declined. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Aslam v. Nazir Ahmad (2008 SCMR 942) • Ghulam Qadir alias Qadir Bakhsh v. Haji Muhammad Suleman (PLD 2003 SC 180) • Rana Tanveer Khan v. Naseer-ud-Din (2015 SCMR 1401) • Moon Enterprises v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. (2020 SCMR 300) • Settlement Authority v. Mst. Akhtar Sultana (1976 SCMR 401) • Gul Hassan v. Muhammad Ayub (1986 SCMR 1349). (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O.XVII, Rr.1, 2 & 3---Adjournments---Regulation and consequences of default---Court discussed the interrelationship of Rules 1, 2, and 3 of Order XVII, C.P.C.---Rule 1 regulates grant of adjournments, which are discretionary and conditional upon showing sufficient cause and payment of costs; Rule 2 applies when a party is absent, authorizing proceedings under Order IX, C.P.C.; Rule 3 applies where the party is present but defaults in producing evidence or performing acts necessary for progress of the case---Held, that excessive adjournments are a chronic affliction of civil litigation and corrode public confidence in the justice system---Courts must exercise discretion with restraint, discourage frivolous adjournments, and ensure expeditious disposal of cases---The purpose of procedural rules is to aid, not obstruct, justice---Judicial discipline and finality are essential attributes of an efficient adjudicatory process. (c) Administration of justice--- ----Procedural discipline---Excessive adjournments condemned---Supreme Court observed with concern that chronic delay and repeated adjournments have become systemic in civil litigation, impairing efficiency and timely justice---Judicial intervention and strict enforcement of procedural discipline were emphasized as necessary to curb dilatory tactics---Trial Courts directed to exercise discretion firmly and ensure that parties act with diligence, as justice demands finality rather than perpetual indulgence---Petition dismissed. Disposition: Petition dismissed; leave to appeal declined.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 17-A(2)(a)---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance by wife and minor children---Minor needing special care---Obligation of father to maintain minor children---Quantum of maintenance, determination of---Father contracting second marriage---Effect---Financial capacity of father, consideration of---Power of family court to fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint---Scope---Facts in brevity were that the petitioner/wife contracted marriage with respondent/husband and from the wedlock a son was born---During her pregnancy, the respondent/husband expelled the petitioner/wife from his house and failed to provide any financial support during pregnancy or after childbirth---The petitioner filed suit for recovery of past and future maintenance for herself and the minor child, along with dowry articles and dower amount---The family court decreed partial maintenance i.e. Rs. 20,000 per month for the petitioner till the iddat period and Rs.25,000 per month for the minor till an interim order, followed by Rs. 30,000 per month with annual increment, while dismissing her claim for dowry and delivery expenses---The appellate court later reduced the maintenance by Rs.10,000/-, leading the petitioner/wife to file the present writ petition---Held: When the quantum of maintenance was examined in the context of double-digit inflation, the rising cost of living, and the specialized requirements of an autistic child, it became manifest that the sum of Rs.10,000/- reduced by the appellate court did not align with either the welfare of the minor or the established principles of law---Moreover, plea of father of having contracted second marriage and having more dependents to maintain was misconceived---Obligations arising from subsequent marriage could not operate to the detriment of children from an earlier marriage particularly where the child needed special care---Father could not absolve himself from his primary and continuous duty of maintaining such a child merely on the plea that he had additional dependents---Amount determined by the appellate court was inadequate to meet even the most basic needs of a child, much less a special child requiring continuous medical and therapeutic attention---As and when the final order was passed the amount fixed by the family court could be modified and revisited in that the quantum of maintenance could be increased or decreased after appraising, evaluating and examining the evidence produced during the trial---Thus, the mere fact that the interim maintenance was initially fixed at Rs.7000/- could not have constrained the Trial Court from enhancing the quantum of final maintenance to Rs.30,000/- due to peculiar needs of the minor who was a special child---Appellate court was directed to make a fresh determination of maintenance keeping in view the updated medical, special, educational and other living expenses of the minor---However, the assessment was to be made whilst considering the father's actual income and financial capacity which required determination through cogent evidence---Impugned order was set aside to the extent of the quantum of maintenance fixed for the minor---Constitutional petition was partially allowed, in circumstances. Murad Khan v. Mst. Humaira Qayyum 2025 SCMR 739 rel. Syeda Farhat Jahan v. Syed Iqbal Hussain Rizvi and another 2010 YLR 3275; Dr. Muhammad Jawad Jan Arif v. Dr. Ayesha Chaudhry and 2 others 2022 CLC 89 and Syed Zain Muntazar Mehdi v. Mst. Sara Naqvi 2024 CLC 1580 ref. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance for minor children---Minor with special needs---Obligation of father to maintain his minor children---Scope---A father is not only under a legal obligation but it is also his moral and religious duty to maintain his children---This obligation is firmly rooted in the injunctions of the Holy Qur'an, which in Surah Al-Baqarah declares, "And clothing and maintenance must be borne by the father in a fair manner." [Al-Baqarah: 233]---The dictate of the Qur'an, therefore, places upon the father a continuous responsibility to provide sustenance, clothing, education, and medical care to his children in a just and equitable manner, commensurate with his means and status---This duty becomes even more accentuated where the child requires special care---Any attempt to dilute or evade such responsibility would be contrary not only to the law of the land but also to the spirit of Shariah, which emphasizes compassion, fairness, and protection of the vulnerable---Father is under a legal and moral obligation to maintain his children---The concept of maintenance is not confined merely to food and shelter; rather, it encompasses all necessary expenses relating to education, clothing, medical treatment, transportation, and recreational activities, so as to enable the child to live a life of dignity consistent with the status of his father. Humayun Hassan v. Arslan Humayun and another PLD 2013 SC 557 rel. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 17A(4)---Maintenance allowance for minor children---Minor requiring special needs---Obligation of father---Quantum of maintenance---Determination---Factors to considered---Scope---Quantum of maintenance requires due consideration of all factors on the basis of which the court can determine the actual need of the minor---In this regard, it is important for the court to first determine the expenses incurred or likely to be incurred on the minors---For this purpose the court must look into the living conditions of the minor and the manner and means by which the mother is maintaining the minors which will include factors like where they reside, whether the mother is dependent upon her family, if so what is the income on the basis of which the minor is also being cared, whether she has a job and whether she has any source of independent income---Special needs of the minor which will include medical or physical needs or special educational needs should also be seen---Special needs will vary from case to case, if relevant, as it is unique to the situation and individual---Yet for the purpose of maintenance it is the obligation of the father to fulfill these special needs---In the case of enhancement, the court must also determine as to what extent the maintenance already fixed meets the requirement and expenses of the minor and for what purpose, further enhancement is required---At the same time the court must determine the income of the father either through proper documentary evidence or on the basis of the social status and earning capacity of the father---In order to ensure that proper information is before the court, it may always require the father to produce documents such as his salary slips or any bank statement or property document on the basis of which he is able to show his monthly income or earning or his financial status---In this regard, the assets owned by the father are relevant as it contributes towards establishing the financial status of the father that has to be probed into by the court and based on attending circumstances the court can conclusively establish the means through which the father will be able to maintain the minors---It is also important to take into consideration any liability of the father, that is whether he is paying any bank loan or debt, whether he has remarried or has other children or whether his parents are dependent on him---In this way the court can determine the manner in which the income of the father is spent and balance the income and capacity with the reasonable requirements of the minors seeking maintenance---In this regard, it is noted that S.17(A) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 specifically provides in subsection (4) that for the purposes of fixing maintenance, the court may summon the relevant documentary evidence from any organization, body or authority to determine the estate and resources of the defendant---The purpose of this provision is to facilitate the court to determine the financial position of the father---The court therefore is not dependent on documents or information provided by the father and can call for relevant documents or information be it from the relevant department or organization or as the case requires, in order to determine the income of the father. Nazia Bibi and others v. Additional District Judge, Ferozewala and others PLD 2018 Lahore 916 ref. (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.17-A(2)(a)---Power of family court to fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint---Scope---Family court is empowered to fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint or higher than what was fixed as interim maintenance, having regard to the afflux of time or other relevant circumstances. Ms. Hajira Zakir Shah and Ms. Sana Liaqat for Petitioner. Sardar Muhammad Nasir Khan along with the Respondent No. 1. Date of hearing: 16th November, 2025.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.12 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.55---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art.113---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell filed after a seven years delay---Time being essence of contract---Principle---Discretionary relief, granting of---Scope---Failure to deposit balance sale consideration at institution of suit---Impact on entitlement to relief stated---Brief facts were that the appellant (vendee) and respondent (vendor) entered into a sale agreement regarding suit property, under which only Rs.14,00,000/- of the agreed Rs.19 million sale consideration was paid, and the balance was required to be cleared under a compromise order stipulating payment by 07.07.2013---The appellant neither complied with the compromise terms nor made any further payment, and after several years filed suit for specific performance, which was rejected under O.VII R.11, C.P.C. as barred by limitation---The issue before the High Court was “whether the appellant’s suit for specific performance which was filed years after the agreed timelines and without payment of the remaining consideration, was maintainable in law and within limitation, so as to justify interference with the rejection of plaint and denial of discretionary relief?”---Held: Nothing by the appellant was articulated to explain such inordinate delay, let alone making efforts to make payment of remaining sale consideration in time---Single Judge had taken into account the fact that the contract between the parties was more than a decade old and worth of the subject property had meanwhile increased manifold; hence, such development i.e. property getting hugely costly was sufficient to deny the discretionary relief to the appellant---On the point of limitation, it had been held by the Single Judge that the sale agreement was executed on 19.04.2012 and the plaint was presented on 09.11.2019 after seven years, whereas, under Art.113 of the Limitation Act, appellant had only three years to file suit for seeking enforcement of the contract from the date of refusal---Not only the suit was barred by time but because of failure of the appellant to adhere to the terms and conditions mentioned in the compromise order he had made himself disentitled to seek discretionary relief of specific performance by the respondent---Further, due to failure of appellant to deposit the remaining sale consideration in the Court at the time of instituting the suit, the case of the appellant seeking relief of specific performance got on weaker footings from the very inception---In the present case, relevant material showing genuine efforts of the appellant to adhere to his part of the agreement was lacking---Further, no justification had been articulated to warrant in action of the appellant to file the suit within time firstly, and secondly his failure to deposit the remaining sale consideration within time in the Court even---The plaint had been rightly rejected under O.VII, R.11 of C.P.C.---No illegality or error in the impugned order to justify its reversal was found---Present appeal was without any merit and was dismissed. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.12 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.55---Time being essence of contract---Principle---Scope---When the time is essence of the agreement, its violation will render the defaulting party disentitled to Court’s interference in the shape of discretionary relief. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.12 & 22---Specific performance of agreement to sell---Discretionary relief, grant of---Scope---The discretionary relief can be extended to a person whose actions are anchored in bona fide while pursuing a contract, and he is seen to be making genuine efforts to perform his part of the agreement---Anyone whose action speaks otherwise will not be held entitled to such a relief. Anwar Hussain for Appellant. Khalil Ahmed for Respondent No. 1. Date of hearing: 7th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10-A (fair trial & due process)---Quasi-judicial proceedings before statutory tribunals---Impartiality and appearance of fairness---Held, Art. 10-A guarantees not only actual fairness but the appearance of fairness; adjudication must be free from bias and from any structural imbalance that disadvantages a party---Where a statutory chairperson who has already voted in the cause is further empowered to break a tie by a “second” or casting vote, the arrangement undermines impartiality and public confidence and offends Art. 10-A. (b) Competition Act, 2010 ----S. 24(5)---Casting vote of Chairperson---Scope---Reading down---Commission’s dual roles distinguished (administrative vs adjudicatory)---Held, S. 24(5) confers a casting vote to resolve equality of votes; however, to preserve Art. 10-A fairness in adjudicatory/quasi-judicial proceedings, the provision is read down to apply only to the Commission’s administrative or internal matters---In adjudication determining civil rights/obligations (e.g., post-show-cause proceedings under S. 30), each member’s vote must carry equal weight; no member may exercise a “double vote.” (c) Administrative law / Natural justice ----Bias—Structure of decision-making bodies—Equal weight of members’ votes---In adjudicatory forums, a chairperson’s casting vote after already expressing an opinion creates an appearance of bias and violates the equal-weight principle inherent in fair trial guarantees---Tribunal correctly set aside the Chairperson’s casting-vote decision rendered to resolve a deadlock in a four-member bench. (d) Comparative jurisprudence (persuasive only) ----Competition law—Casting vote in adjudication—Reference to Indian law---Delhi High Court declared unconstitutional the provision granting a casting vote to the chairperson in quasi-judicial decisions under S. 22(3) of the Indian Competition Act, 2002; the Indian legislature later omitted the casting-vote words (Act 9 of 2023). This comparative reasoning reinforces limiting such powers to non-adjudicatory matters. (e) Appellate review—Remand directions ----Tribunal’s approach examined---While upholding the setting aside of the Chairperson’s casting-vote decision in adjudication, the Supreme Court modified the consequential directions: instead of remitting to the Commission for rehearing by the Chairperson/another non-signatory member, the matter is remanded to the Tribunal to decide afresh after full hearing, within ninety days, uninfluenced by prior opinions. Held: (i) The Chairperson of the Competition Commission has no authority to exercise a casting vote in quasi-judicial/adjudicatory proceedings; S. 24(5) of the Competition Act, 2010 is read down to administrative/internal matters to conform with Art. 10-A. (ii) The Tribunal rightly set aside the Chairperson’s casting-vote decision; however, its direction remitting the matters to the Commission is modified—cases are remanded to the Tribunal to decide afresh within ninety days after hearing all parties. No order as to costs. Cited Cases: • Suo Motu Case No. 4 of 2010, PLD 2012 SC 553 • Mahindra Electric Mobility Ltd. & others v. CCI & others, 2019 DHC 2043-DB (Delhi High Court) Disposition: Appeals partly allowed—Chairperson’s casting-vote in adjudication held impermissible; Tribunal’s annulment of casting-vote decision upheld; remand modified—matters sent to the Tribunal for fresh decision within ninety days; no costs.

Summary: (a) Muslim Personal Law (Hiba / Oral Gift) ----Oral gift—Proof and effect—Competing subsequent registered gift—Held, the plaintiff established a valid oral gift of 50% of the suit property (oral hiba dated 05-01-1984; declaration/confirmation dated 21-05-1986) through his testimony and supporting witnesses, as well as contemporaneous official correspondence and mutation—Once such earlier gift stood proved and the mutation was duly recorded, the donor (R-1) had no subsisting title in that share to gift it later to his wife—Subsequent registered gift (1989) to R-2, made while the earlier mutation in plaintiff’s favour subsisted, could not override the prior hiba to the extent of the already-gifted share. (b) Evidence Act / Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Arts. 102 & 103—Attesting/hostile witness—Weight of testimony—A witness (PW-4) who turned hostile did not dispute his signature on the declaration confirming the oral gift; having admitted the signature, he could not “blow hot and cold”—His later denial of having witnessed the gift carried little value against the admitted signature and surrounding documentary proof—Status as employee of a party, by itself, does not disqualify a witness; credibility is assessed on cross-examination and congruence with other evidence—On the record as a whole, the plaintiff’s witnesses were confidence-inspiring. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O. XVI, R. 3—Court/official witnesses—Production of originals—Official from the Military Estate Office (MEO) produced the original declaration/confirmation of oral gift and contemporaneous letters from the donor acknowledging the gift—Such production dispelled the objection of non-production of original and materially corroborated the plaintiff’s case. (d) Administrative / Revenue Law—Mutation ----Recall of mutation—Notice and natural justice—The mutation earlier entered on the strength of the oral gift in plaintiff’s favour was withdrawn without notice; such recall offended principles of natural justice and could not defeat vested rights flowing from the proved hiba—Presumption of regularity attaches to official acts of statutory bodies (DHA/MEO) unless rebutted; respondents failed to do so. (e) Property / Registration—Subsequent registered gift ----Registration on certified copy; original title deeds with bank—Where original title documents were with the bank (under memorandum of deposit) and later redeemed by the plaintiff, the donor’s failure to deliver originals to the later donee, coupled with the subsisting earlier mutation, undermined the efficacy of the subsequent registered gift vis-à-vis the already-transferred 50% share. Held: (i) Oral gift of 50% in favour of the appellant stood proved; (ii) Recall of the corresponding mutation, effected without notice, was illegal; (iii) Respondent No. 1 lacked title to gift that 50% later to his wife; the subsequent registered gift to R-2 could not prevail against the prior hiba; (iv) Mere denial by the executant at the stage of dispute is inconsequential where documentary and corroborative evidence supports the gift. The appeal is allowed; the learned Single Judge’s decree is restored and the Division Bench’s judgment is set aside. Cited Provisions: • Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 102, 103 • Civil Procedure Code, 1908, O. XVI, R. 3 Disposition: Appeal allowed—Decree of learned Single Judge restored; impugned judgment of Division Bench set aside.

Summary: Intra Court Appeal under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. Acquisition of private land for public purpose. Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued. The land owners challenged the notification through Writ Petition. Thereafter, normal procedure of acquisition was dispensed with and straightway notification under Section 17(4) & 6 of the Act ibid was issued. Application under order VI Rule 17 CPC for amendment to the impugn the subsequent notification in the writ petition was yet pending but the learned Single Judge in Chamber while taking suo moto action allowed the main writ petition and declared above notification as ultra vires, whereas such jurisdiction is not available with the High Court. ICA allowed. 217Criminal Proceedings 31717/24 Muhammad Asif Vs Farmaish Ali etc Mr. Justice Farooq Haider 03- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 6017