Summary: Pending

Summary: Background: This case involves a civil revision filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) against a judgment by the Additional District Judge. The dispute pertains to a suit for declaration regarding ownership of certain land, challenging a mutation entry alleged to have been based on fraud and misrepresentation. The respondents (plaintiffs) claimed inheritance rights as legal heirs of the original owner, asserting that the mutation erroneously listed a deceased individual as alive. The trial court decreed the suit, and the appellate court upheld the decree. An application for additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC was dismissed along with the appeal, prompting this civil revision. -----Issues: 1- Whether the appellate court erred in deciding the application for additional evidence along with the appeal. -----2- Whether the appellate court failed to decide the application for additional evidence in accordance with legal requirements. -----3- Whether the judgment and decree of the appellate court were sustainable under the law. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court held that the appellate court acted with material irregularity by deciding the application for additional evidence simultaneously with the main appeal. It emphasized that such an application must be decided before addressing the merits of the appeal. The court reiterated the principle that deciding a miscellaneous application alongside the main case renders the judgment a nullity. It cited precedents establishing that courts must decide applications for additional evidence separately to ensure fair adjudication and avoid prejudicing the parties. The appellate court's failure to first determine the sufficiency of existing evidence before addressing the application was contrary to procedural requirements under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. The High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the appellate court, remanding the case for separate adjudication of the application for additional evidence and the appeal. Directions were issued for expeditious resolution within two months. -----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Umar vs. Muhammad Qasim and another (1991 SCMR 1232) Mst. Imtiaz Begum vs. Mst. Sultan Jan and others (2008 SCMR 1259) Pineen Khan vs. Muhammad Anwar and others (2011 CLC 550) Sultan Ali alias Sultan through L.Rs. and others vs. Rasheed Ahmad and others (2005 SCMR 1444) Mst. Umari and another vs. Faqir Muhammad and another (PLD 1983 Lahore 349) Muhammad Yousuf and others vs. Abdul Khaliq and others (1991 SCMR 1981) Muhammad Azam vs. Muhammad Abdullah through L.Rs. (2009 SCMR 326) Federation of Pakistan and others vs. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others (PLD 2009 Supreme Court 284) Chairman, State Life Insurance Corporation and others vs. Hamayun Irfan and others (2010 SCMR 1495) Abdul Jabbar Shahid and others vs. National Bank of Pakistan and others (PLD 2019 Lahore 76)

Summary: Where the petitioner seeks setting aside of his transfer order on the ground that he is the proposed president of a trade union, registration of which is pending with the Registrar of Trade Unions and Section 17 of the National Industrial Relations Act, 2012 bars passing of a transfer order without prior approval of the Registrar of trade Unions, the said plea raised by the petitioner is covered under the definition of unfair trade practices on behalf of the employer in terms of Section 31 of the afore-referred Act, remedy of which is available under Section 33 of the said Act which remedy provided by the special law for protection of rights of the petitioner is to be availed prior to availing any remedy under the law and in these circumstances, the constitution petition is not maintainable.

Summary: mere admission in statement under section 342, Cr.P.C. is not sufficient for the conviction of accused

Summary: Recruitment process proved illegal through inquiry by the executive can be validly scrapped in lieu of de novo recruitment process. Principle of locus poenitentiae and right of personal hearing would not apply.

Summary: The Supreme Court allowed the jail petition to be converted into an appeal and granted the petitioner certain reliefs.The Court upheld the conviction and sentence of Muhammad Iqbal under Section 5(1) of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950, in Complaint Case No. 01/2012. However, it set aside the requirement for Muhammad Iqbal to pay/refund a compensation amount for his release. This was based on the fact that the petitioner had already served his sentence.The Court also directed the Federal Government, under Section 5-B (5) of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950, to pay compensation/refund to Mrs. Lina Bomba of JEAD Textile Limited, Sydney, Australia (buyer), in the amount of US Dollar $87,671.21, along with interest at the prevailing bank rate from the date of the trial court's judgment (25.06.2014) until the date of payment. The payment was to be made from the Revolving Fund established under Section 8 of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950, or from the Federal Consolidated Fund if the former was not established.Furthermore, the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, was directed to submit a compliance report to the Additional Registrar (Judicial) of the Supreme Court within a fortnight.The Court also addressed the recovery of the compensation amount, indicating that the Federal Government could recover the amount from convict Muhammad Iqbal as arrears of land revenue, as per the provisions of Section 5-B (6) and (7) of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950, in separate proceedings as per the law.

Summary: The petitioner failed to timely ship a bath towel order and was unable to refund the advance payment received from the buyer. The Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP) initiated legal action against the petitioner for unfair trade practices.The petitioner was charged and convicted under section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, along with section 4(a) of the Export (Quality Control) Order, 1973. He was sentenced to 9 months of rigorous imprisonment (RI) and directed to refund the amount of US $87,671.21 to the foreign buyer. The High Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone but maintained the conviction. The petitioner filed a jail petition seeking special leave to appeal, along with a request for condonation of delay.The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner's release had been withheld due to his inability to pay the compensation amount, and this raised constitutional questions. The court referred to past cases where delays were condoned to prevent grave miscarriages of justice. Considering the extraordinary circumstances that prevented the petitioner from filing the appeal, the court allowed the application for condonation of delay.The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the petitioner based on documentary evidence showing his failure to honor his commitment and return the advance payment. However, the court found issue with the sentencing approach. It clarified that the law did not call for indefinite incarceration in cases of default in payment. The court set aside the condition of payment/refund of compensation amount for the petitioner's release, stating that indefinite confinement for default in payment violated constitutional rights.In its final order, the court converted the jail petition into an appeal and maintained the conviction and sentence. It directed the Federal Government to pay the foreign buyer the compensation amount of US $87,671.21 along with interest from the date of the trial court's judgment. The court ordered the release of the petitioner, as he had already served his sentence. The Federal Government was tasked with recovering the compensation amount from the petitioner as arrears of land revenue, as per the law.

Summary: The core issue revolved around the grant of remissions (reductions in sentences) to the respondents who had been previously convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) for murder. The President of Pakistan had issued notifications granting remissions on special occasions, such as Eid and Independence Day. However, these notifications explicitly excluded prisoners convicted of serious crimes like murder, espionage, anti-state activities, sectarianism, robbery, kidnapping, and terrorist acts.The court deliberated whether the respondents, convicted of murder, were entitled to remissions despite the notifications' exclusions. The petitioner's argument was that since the notifications clearly excluded such convicts, they were not eligible for remissions. The court also discussed the President's authority to grant pardons, reprieves, and remissions under Article 45 of the Constitution.The court referred to previous case law, particularly a judgment from 2010 (Nazar Hussain and Another v. The State), which highlighted the President's wide-ranging powers under Article 45. The court noted that while prison superintendents had the authority to grant certain remissions under prison rules, the President's powers were broader and more discretionary.The court rejected the argument that denying remissions based on exclusions in the notifications violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Article 25). The court emphasized that differentiating between convicts based on the nature of their crimes was rational and justified. It also highlighted that the notifications specifically excluded prisoners convicted of murder, among other serious offenses.Additionally, the court addressed the applicability of previous judgments to the specific cases of abduction under Section 365-A of the PPC. The court ruled that such cases were distinct and should not have been equated with murder cases in previous judgments.In conclusion, the court converted the civil petitions into appeals and set aside the impugned judgments of the Peshawar High Court, which had allowed the respondents' requests for remissions. The court clarified that the notifications' exclusions applied, and the respondents were not entitled to remissions due to their convictions for serious crimes like murder. Some of the related appeals were dismissed as moot since the convicts had already served their sentences and been released.

Summary: The key legal question in this case was whether the Islamabad High Court had wrongly applied the State Immunity Ordinance No.VI of 1981 and section 4 thereof. The petitioner contended that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit due to a contract clause (Clause 16 of General Conditions of Contract) that mandated amicable settlement through conciliation and arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL rules.After considering the arguments from both sides, the court found that the petitioner's assertion that the law had been incorrectly applied by the High Court held merit in the context of this case. However, since the matter between the parties had been resolved out of court, the court converted the petition into an appeal. The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment passed by the High Court. Additionally, it was noted that the judgment should have no precedential value as per Article 201 of the Constitution.

Summary: Summary Pending