Summary: Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act (V of 1912)--- ----Ss. 32 & 34---State land---Allotment, cancellation of---Original allotee passing occupancy to sub-tenants---Locus standi---Scope---Resumption of land---Scope---Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue) resumed the state land in favour of the state imposing tawan against the occupants of the disputed land declaring their occupancy illegal---Ejected occupants (sub-tenants of original allottee of the disputed land) assailed the said order by preferring appeal before the Additional Commissioner (Revenue)emphasizing upon implementation of a previous order of District Court having been passed in their favour about 35 years ago; the appeal was accepted in favour of ejected occupants (respondents)---Validity---Record revealed that the allotment of the disputed land was cancelled from the name of original allottee as he had secured double allotment of land---The lease period of the disputed land expired in 1980, and the same was not further extended---Therefore, the original allottee had no locus standi to appoint respondents as sub-tenants of the disputed land, as he could not retain the said land, and could not sub-let the same---Moreover, the respondents could not provide order of any competent authority labeling them as sub-tenants or allottees of the land in question; rather, repeated orders of the revenue authorities were passed against them---Respondents only emphasized upon implementation of a previous order of District Court having been passed 35 years ago without appreciating the non-disputed facts that the same could not be implemented specially when the (respondents’) execution decree was dismissed and the same was never challenged---Moreover, the High Court twice remanded the case to district authorities without ordering to implement the said order passed by District Court and the revenue authorities gave concrete plausible and legal justifications in favour of resumption of the state land which could not be rebutted by the respondents---The Additional Commissioner (Revenue) by ignoring all said facts, instead of issuing order on merits, accepted the appeal against the facts and record, which was highly questionable and illegal---Thus, the impugned order was not sustainable in the eyes of law---Member –Board of Revenue set-aside the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Commissioner (Revenue) while the order passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue)was upheld---Revision petition, filed by State / District Collector , having legal force and merit, was accepted. Bashir Ahmed, Colony Clerk/Representative for the State. Malik Riasat Ali Kodhan for Respondents.

Summary: (a) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)- -Ss. 4 & 13(4)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A-Show-cause notice-Requirement of minimum contents, non-fulfillment of-Fundamental right of fair trial, violation of-Award of punishment not provided under the law-Effect-Withdrawal of promotion/selection grade and recovery after retirement-Validity-Show cause notice depicted that neither the detail of commission of act or omission was provided, nor the proposed penalty or recommendations were provided in the notice-No provision of the PEEDA Act was provided under which petitioner was liable to be penalized upon proving of charges-Strict compliance of requirements was vital to avoid violation of principles of natural justice, as it would not only frustrate the requirement of giving him a reasonable opportunity to put up a defence but also amount to violation of his fundamental right to fair trial-Statutory ingredients must appear on face of notice and in absence of requisite allegations, the notice was void for vagueness-Neither inquiry officer inquired the signing authority of the order which granted promotion and selection grade, nor members of DPC were inquired, which depicted how proceedings were solely revolving against petitioner only and not in any other direction, that was a blatant violation of fair trial and ultimately principles of natural justice-Punishment to lower scale awarded to petitioner was for serving employees and not retired employees under PEEDA Act, thus, no recovery could be effected, as being penal it required a finding that petitioner’s act or omission caused a quantified loss to exchequer after due inquiry and fair opportunity, however, no such finding existed, thus, retrospective deprivation and recovery of benefits long enjoyed on higher post was disallowed by Supreme Court-Withdrawal of promotion/selection grade and recovery under Section 4(1)(c) of PEEDA Act were declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Sana Ullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools 2024 SCMR 80; Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan 2025 SCP 227; Noor Ahmed v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1962 Dacca 533; Faridsons Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1961 SC 537; Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrik PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 45; Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works 143 ER 414; Russel v. Russel 14 Ch D 471; Noor Ahmed v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1964 Dacca 546; Lakhu Sarkar v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1964 Dacca 217; Muhammad Abdus Salam v. District Council, Rajshahi PLD 1964 Dacca 554 and Assistant Collector Customs v. Khyber Electric Lamp 2001 SCMR 838 rel. (b) Maxim- -Audi alteram partem’-Application-Maxim-audi alteram partem-applies with full vigour to administrative action affecting rights and it also applies to judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies-Where a statute is silent, the justice of the common law supplies the omission of the legislature and the right of hearing has to be read in that statute. Mall Syare Residents Association v. Mall Developers PLD 1997 Kar. 1 rel. (c) Locus poenitentiae, doctrine of- -Scope-Once an administrative decision has taken legal effect, conferred benefits, and been acted upon for years, it cannot ordinarily be withdrawn to the detriment of the beneficiary unless illegality or want of competence in the original grant is shown. Mst. Basharat Jehan v. Director-General, FGEI (C/Q) 2015 SCMR 1418; Government of the Punjab v. Aamir Junaid 2015 SCMR 74; Federation of Pakistan v. Flt Lt Farrukh Rashid (R) 2008 SCMR 544 and Engineer-in-Chief v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207 rel. (d) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)- -Ss. 2(n) & 4-Penalties not provided under the law-Power of competent authority to award a penalty-Scope-Even if the misconduct is proved under the PEEDA Act, the competent authority is not empowered to award a punishment different to what is prescribed under the law. Shams-ur-Rahman v. Military Accountant General 2020 SCMR 188 rel. Assistance by: Muhammad Subhan Malik, (Judicial Law Clerk).

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -O.IX, Rr.8 & 9-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5-Civil suit fixed for passing of order on interlocutory application-Suit dismissed for non-appearance of plaintiff-Legality-Whether the entire suit could be dismissed in circumstances-Date of-hearing-, meaning of-Petitioner filed a civil suit for declaration and specific performance regarding a registered sale deed along with correction/transfer of mutation and permanent injunction; suit was dismissed for non-appearance under O.IXR.8, C.P.C.; the petitioner’s application for restoration under O.IXR.9, C.P.C. (with S.5 Limitation Act) was allowed and the suit was restored; the respondents filed revision petition against restoration order, whereby restoration order was set aside, leading to the filing of the present constitutional petition-Held: The case was not fixed for hearing of the main suit rather for passing of an order on a miscellaneous application under O.XXXIX Rr.1 and 2 C.P.C.-Trial Court while dismissing the entire suit due to non-appearance of the plaintiff clearly exceeded its jurisdiction-Proceedings under O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 and 2 C.P.C. were of an interlocutory nature-Dismissal of such application or non-appearance of a party thereon could not entail dismissal of the main suit unless specifically fixed for hearing-Order dismissing the entire suit was illegal-As regards the question of limitation for filing application for restoration of the suit, even if the same was filed after some delay, it was rightly considered and allowed by the trial court after condoning delay as limitation did not run against the void order. Mst. Surya Parveen v. Mst. Rukhsana Hanif and others 2012 SCMR 656 rel. Sabir Hussain v. Azra Begum and 5 others 2017 YLR Note 410 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -O.IX, Rr.6 & 7-Suit fixed for order on miscellaneous or interlocutory matter-Suit not fixed for-hearing-Court passing ex-parte order-Legality-Date of-hearing-, meaning of-Legal import of the term-hearing-relates to the stage of proceedings where the court examines the evidence or considers the substantial questions involved in the suit, enabling it to arrive at a final adjudication-It does not encompass the consideration of an interlocutory or miscellaneous matter-When the date is not fixed for hearing a suit, rather the same was fixed merely for consideration of an interim or interlocutory application, the passing of any ex-parte order on such a date would be without jurisdiction, and such an order, being coram non judice, would be nullity in the eyes of law. Habib Bank Ltd v. Kh. Muhammad Ishaque PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K) 223 rel. (c) Limitation- -Void order-Limitation does not run against a void order because an order that has no legal existence cannot trigger the period of limitation. Asif Iqbal Lehri for Private Respondents. Changez Dashti, Assistant Advocate General for Official Respondents.

Summary: (On appeal against Judgment dated 15.03.2022 passed in S.A. No. 1251 of 2019). (a) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)--- ----Ss. 4 & 13(4)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Show-cause notice---Requirement of minimum contents, non-fulfillment of---Fundamental right of fair trial, violation of---Award of punishment not provided under the law---Effect---Withdrawal of promotion/selection grade and recovery after retirement---Validity---Show cause notice depicted that neither the detail of commission of act or omission was provided, nor the proposed penalty or recommendations were provided in the notice---No provision of the PEEDA Act was provided under which petitioner was liable to be penalized upon proving of charges---Strict compliance of requirements was vital to avoid violation of principles of natural justice, as it would not only frustrate the requirement of giving him a reasonable opportunity to put up a defence but also amount to violation of his fundamental right to fair trial---Statutory ingredients must appear on face of notice and in absence of requisite allegations, the notice was void for vagueness---Neither inquiry officer inquired the signing authority of the order which granted promotion and selection grade, nor members of DPC were inquired, which depicted how proceedings were solely revolving against petitioner only and not in any other direction, that was a blatant violation of fair trial and ultimately principles of natural justice---Punishment to lower scale awarded to petitioner was for serving employees and not retired employees under PEEDA Act, thus, no recovery could be effected, as being penal it required a finding that petitioner’s act or omission caused a quantified loss to exchequer after due inquiry and fair opportunity, however, no such finding existed, thus, retrospective deprivation and recovery of benefits long enjoyed on higher post was disallowed by Supreme Court---Withdrawal of promotion/selection grade and recovery under Section 4(1)(c) of PEEDA Act were declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect---Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Sana Ullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools 2024 SCMR 80; Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan 2025 SCP 227; Noor Ahmed v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1962 Dacca 533; Faridsons Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1961 SC 537; Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrik PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 45; Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works 143 ER 414; Russel v. Russel 14 Ch D 471; Noor Ahmed v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1964 Dacca 546; Lakhu Sarkar v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1964 Dacca 217; Muhammad Abdus Salam v. District Council, Rajshahi PLD 1964 Dacca 554 and Assistant Collector Customs v. Khyber Electric Lamp 2001 SCMR 838 rel. (b) Maxim--- ----“Audi alteram partem’---Application---Maxim “audi alteram partem” applies with full vigour to administrative action affecting rights and it also applies to judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies---Where a statute is silent, the justice of the common law supplies the omission of the legislature and the right of hearing has to be read in that statute. Mall Syare Residents Association v. Mall Developers PLD 1997 Kar. 1 rel. (c) Locus poenitentiae, doctrine of--- ----Scope---Once an administrative decision has taken legal effect, conferred benefits, and been acted upon for years, it cannot ordinarily be withdrawn to the detriment of the beneficiary unless illegality or want of competence in the original grant is shown. Mst. Basharat Jehan v. Director-General, FGEI (C/Q) 2015 SCMR 1418; Government of the Punjab v. Aamir Junaid 2015 SCMR 74; Federation of Pakistan v. Flt Lt Farrukh Rashid (R) 2008 SCMR 544 and Engineer-in-Chief v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207 rel. (d) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)--- ----Ss. 2(n) & 4---Penalties not provided under the law---Power of competent authority to award a penalty---Scope---Even if the misconduct is proved under the PEEDA Act, the competent authority is not empowered to award a punishment different to what is prescribed under the law. Shams-ur-Rahman v. Military Accountant General 2020 SCMR 188 rel. Abdul Rehman Khan Lashari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Khalid Masood Ghani, A.A.G, Punjab for Respondents. Assistance by: Muhammad Subhan Malik, (Judicial Law Clerk). Date of hearing: 15th October, 2025.

Summary: ----O.IX, Rr.8 & 9---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Civil suit fixed for passing of order on interlocutory application---Suit dismissed for non-appearance of plaintiff---Legality---Whether the entire suit could be dismissed in circumstances---Date of “hearing”, meaning of---Petitioner filed a civil suit for declaration and specific performance regarding a registered sale deed along with correction/transfer of mutation and permanent injunction; suit was dismissed for non-appearance under O.IX R.8, C.P.C.; the petitioner’s application for restoration under O.IX R.9, C.P.C. (with S.5 Limitation Act) was allowed and the suit was restored; the respondents filed revision petition against restoration order, whereby restoration order was set aside, leading to the filing of the present constitutional petition ---Held: The case was not fixed for hearing of the main suit rather for passing of an order on a miscellaneous application under O.XXXIX Rr.1 and 2 C.P.C.---Trial Court while dismissing the entire suit due to non-appearance of the plaintiff clearly exceeded its jurisdiction---Proceedings under O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 and 2 C.P.C. were of an interlocutory nature---Dismissal of such application or non-appearance of a party thereon could not entail dismissal of the main suit unless specifically fixed for hearing---Order dismissing the entire suit was illegal---As regards the question of limitation for filing application for restoration of the suit, even if the same was filed after some delay, it was rightly considered and allowed by the trial court after condoning delay as limitation did not run against the void order. Mst. Surya Parveen v. Mst. Rukhsana Hanif and others 2012 SCMR 656 rel. Sabir Hussain v. Azra Begum and 5 others 2017 YLR Note 410 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.IX, Rr.6 & 7---Suit fixed for order on miscellaneous or interlocutory matter---Suit not fixed for “hearing”---Court passing ex-parte order---Legality---Date of “hearing”, meaning of---Legal import of the term “hearing” relates to the stage of proceedings where the court examines the evidence or considers the substantial questions involved in the suit, enabling it to arrive at a final adjudication---It does not encompass the consideration of an interlocutory or miscellaneous matter---When the date is not fixed for hearing a suit, rather the same was fixed merely for consideration of an interim or interlocutory application, the passing of any ex-parte order on such a date would be without jurisdiction, and such an order, being coram non judice, would be nullity in the eyes of law. Habib Bank Ltd v. Kh. Muhammad Ishaque PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K) 223 rel. (c) Limitation--- ----Void order---Limitation does not run against a void order because an order that has no legal existence cannot trigger the period of limitation. Asadullah Baloch and Siraj Ahmed for Petitioner. Asif Iqbal Lehri for Private Respondents. Changez Dashti, Assistant Advocate General for Official Respondents. Date of hearing: 6th October, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure — Non-party appeals; leave to appeal — Test —Constitutional/Procedural practice; CPC, S.115; Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S.52 (lis pendens); Limitation Act, 1908, Art.113— A non-party may appeal with leave if they could properly have been a party to the proceedings and are affected by the impugned order. Applied: leave refused where applicants purchased subject property pendente lite, concealed the transaction, and could not show why they failed to seek impleadment at trial. Precedents reaffirmed: H.M. Saya, Sahib Dad, Munir Ahmed, Kanwar Arif Ali Khan. (b) Transfers pendente lite — Impleadment of transferee — Scope & discretion —TPA, S.52— Ordinarily, a transferee pendente lite may be joined to protect its interest; however, joinder is discretionary, and can be declined when the transfer appears not bona fide, is designed to frustrate proceedings, or where parties withheld disclosure from the court. Followed: Sajjad Hussain v. State; Fazal Karim v. Muhammad Afzal. (c) Bona fides & concealment — Effect Applicants were tenants who entered an agreement to purchase the disputed house during the suit without leave of court and kept it secret until after dismissal at trial. A contract clause envisaging loss of title and refund revealed awareness of the litigation risk; applicants therefore not bona fide purchasers and squarely hit by lis pendens. (d) Limitation for specific performance — Starting point & consequence —Limitation Act, 1908, Art.113— Agreement dated 22-01-2010 required balance payment by 22-07-2010; suit for specific performance filed 14-07-2016 was time-barred. A time-barred independent claim confers no enforceable interest warranting impleadment or leave to appeal. (e) Appellate/revisional posture — No right to protract litigation Applicants’ sequence—filing SP suit, then impleadment in appeal after a compromise between original parties—was viewed as a calculated attempt to prolong litigation; absent any valid reason for not joining at trial, they cannot intrude at the revisional stage. (f) Disposition: CMA No. 9923 of 2024 dismissed (leave to appeal refused); CMA No. 9924 of 2024 dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: The legislative policy underlying the Arbitration is one of minimal judicial intervention. Permitting parties to approach Civil Courts to challenge every procedural or interlocutory order passed by a tribunal would defeat the very object of arbitration, opening the floodgates for recalcitrant parties to delay proceedings and transforming the arbitrator into a trial court and the Civil Court into a court of first appeal for every minor procedural decision. The scheme of the Act of 1940 reveals no provision granting a right to challenge interlocutory orders. If, however, a party is genuinely aggrieved by an arbitrator's conduct, such as undue delay, partiality or biased procedure, the appropriate remedy lies under Section 11 of the Act of 1940, which empowers the Court to remove an arbitrator or umpire in certain circumstances. 197Crl. Appeal 198685/18 Muhammad Ismail etc. Vs ASJ Pakpattan Sharif etc. Mr. Justice Farooq Haider 14- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 6025

Summary: The legal question before this Court is whether the entry in the registered Nikah Nama can be disregarded on the basis of conjecture or assumptions drawn from a prior sale deed between the spouses. Held that the law does not prohibit a man from selling property to a woman whom he later marries. However, when a registered Nikah Nama specifically records the subject matter of Haq Mahr, and there is no pleading or proof of its prior discharge, the presumption attached to such document must prevail. 196Civil Revision 48106/25 Lahore Development Authority through its Chief Engineer- I Vs MS Zahir Khan & Brothers through its Chief Executive Officer etc Mr. Justice Raheel Kamran 14- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 6277

Summary: The importance of adopting a purposive and liberal interpretive approach toward family statutes. Writ Petition is allowed. 195Writ Petition- Family- Dowry Articles 11759-