Summary: Service Law – Absence Without Permission – Disciplinary Proceedings: Wilful absence from duty constitutes gross misconduct under service laws. Filing a leave application without waiting for its approval or necessary clearances does not imply permission, and leaving without such approval constitutes unauthorized absence. Such conduct demonstrates intentional neglect and indiscipline, warranting a major penalty, including removal from service. (2003 SCMR 1090; PLD 2008 SC 355; 2005 SCMR 17) ----- Role of Service Tribunal – Judicial Discretion in Modifying Punishments: The Service Tribunal’s power to vary or modify departmental penalties is restricted. Any reduction of penalties must be based on legally sustainable reasoning and cannot be arbitrary. The Tribunal must analyze the evidence on record and provide cogent reasons for modifying punishments, particularly when penalties align with departmental rules and procedural fairness. (2023 PLC (C.S.) 283; 2022 SCMR 745; 2021 SCMR 1033) ----- Judicial Discretion – Principles of Exercise: Judicial discretion must be exercised judiciously, transparently, and within the bounds of established legal principles. Arbitrary exercise of discretion undermines the rule of law, predictability, and public confidence in the judicial system. Courts must ensure fairness, equity, and adherence to the law in discretionary decisions. (2021 SCMR 1367; Access to Justice Report 1996) ----- Foreign Education and Public Service Obligations: Obtaining foreign education at personal expense does not exempt a public servant from adherence to service rules, including the requirement to seek and obtain necessary permissions for leave and travel. Unauthorized absence from duty, even for educational purposes, violates service discipline and may justify major penalties, as it constitutes a breach of the employer-employee contract. (PLD 2020 SC 1418; 2021 SCMR 584) ----- Outcome: The Supreme Court converted the Civil Petition into an appeal and allowed it, setting aside the Tribunal’s decision to reduce the major penalty of removal from service to compulsory retirement. The Court held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by arbitrarily reducing the penalty without providing legally sustainable reasoning. The departmental decision to remove the Respondent from service was restored as it was procedurally sound, legally justified, and proportionate to the misconduct. ----- Citations and Precedents Cited: Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Nargis Jamal (2023 PLC (C.S.) 283) Deputy Postmaster General, Central Punjab v. Habib Ahmad (2021 SCMR 584) Usman Ghani v. Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi (2022 SCMR 745) Commissioner Faisalabad Division v. Allah Bakhsh (2020 SCMR 1418) Tahira Waheed v. Director, FGEI (2003 SCMR 1090) Imtiaz Ahmed Lali v. Returning Officer (PLD 2008 SC 355) Secretary Education v. Mustamir Khan (2005 SCMR 17) Tasawar Hussain v. Deputy Commissioner, Jhelum (2021 SCMR 1367) Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Muhammad Arif Butt (2021 SCMR 1033)

Summary: ----Scope of Labour Court Jurisdiction—Regularization of Work-Charge Employees: Labour Courts and Appellate Tribunals lack jurisdiction to issue directions treating work-charge employees as civil servants, including instructions for preparation and issuance of service books. Regularized employees remain “permanent workmen” and not civil servants. Relevant Statutes: Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, Section 33 of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010. ----Applicability of Standing Orders, 1968 to Government Departments: A government department can be considered a ‘commercial’ or ‘industrial establishment’ under the Standing Orders, 1968 only if the functional nature of its work aligns with these definitions. Departments performing sovereign or administrative functions are excluded. Reference Case: Abdul Aziz vs. Executive Engineer, Central Civil Division (PLD 1996 SC 610). ----Employment in the Administration of the State: Not all employees of government departments are considered to be in the “administration of the State.” Distinction must be made between those engaged in governance roles and those performing non-sovereign duties. Relevant Clause: Section 1(3)(b), Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010. ----Right to Regularization—Clause 1(b) of the Standing Orders, 1968: Employees with continuous service exceeding nine months are entitled to regularization under Clause 1(b) of the Standing Orders, 1968. Such rights are enforceable under Section 33 of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010. Condition: The employing government department must qualify as an establishment under the law. ----Per-Incuriam Doctrine—Conflicting Precedents: Decisions in Sajjad Naseem (2022 PLC 44) and Farzana Basharat (2020 PLC 260) were declared per-incuriam as they did not consider the binding precedent in Abdul Aziz (PLD 1996 SC 610). ----Government Policy for Work-Charge Employees: Relevance: Policy Notification No. SO(ERB)5-44/2019/WC-DW-Policy of 29th January 2021, issued for the regularization of work-charge and daily-wage employees, must be considered in light of the Supreme Court directives in CP Nos. 3340-3344/2018. Petition Allowed: Orders of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal were set aside. Matters were remanded for re-determination on legal and jurisdictional issues, including whether government departments qualify as establishments under the relevant laws and compliance with regularization criteria. Direction to Appellate Tribunal: The tribunal is to decide cases independently and preferably within three months, considering both the legal framework and policy notifications.

Summary: ----Quote: The Petitioner was dismissed by NBP when Statutory Service Rules, 1973 instead of Non-Statutory Service Rules, 2021 were in force, therefore, the Petition was maintainable; the Petitioner could not have been arbitrarily dismissed without following due process when allegation of presenting fake antecedent casted a stigma upon him. ----Maintainability of Constitutional Petition - Contractual Employment: A constitutional petition challenging termination of a contractual employee is maintainable if statutory service rules govern the employment. Where termination occurs under statutory rules, courts can intervene under constitutional jurisdiction. Termination under non-statutory rules, however, requires seeking remedies through a civil suit. (Umar Asghar Qureshi v. Federation of Pakistan, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 640; Muhammad Tariq Badr v. National Bank of Pakistan, 2013 SCMR 314; Muhammad Tariq Khan v. National Bank of Pakistan, PLJ 2024 Lahore 376). ----Employment Termination - Verification of Antecedents: Where antecedents and educational testimonials of an employee are to be verified within a stipulated period (e.g., three months under Clause 5.7 of the appointment letter), reliance on allegations of misconduct after prolonged service without prior verification renders termination arbitrary and unlawful. (Relevant clauses of appointment letter; PLD 2024 Lahore 376). ----Termination on Grounds of Misconduct - Procedural Safeguards: Termination on allegations of misconduct requires compliance with principles of natural justice, including issuance of a show-cause notice, framing of a charge sheet, and conducting an inquiry. Failure to observe these procedures invalidates the dismissal. (Muhammad Tariq Khan v. National Bank of Pakistan, PLJ 2024 Lahore 376). ----Clause Interpretation - Termination with Stigma: Invocation of a termination clause that attaches a stigma, such as providing false information, mandates strict adherence to procedural safeguards. Disregard for a fair opportunity to defend undermines the validity of termination. (Clause 5.2(a) and Clause 5.6 of the appointment letter). ----Verification Discrepancies - Burden of Proof: Where an employee is dismissed based on unverified documents, the employer must ensure verification through proper channels. Dismissal on account of discrepancies that arise from the employer's failure to verify documents within the prescribed time limit is unjustified. (Clause 5.7 of the appointment letter). ----Statutory Service Rules - Applicability at Time of Termination: The service rules in force at the time of termination determine the legal framework governing the employment relationship. Employees terminated under statutory rules are entitled to remedies under constitutional jurisdiction, even if new non-statutory rules are later enacted. (Muhammad Tariq Badr v. National Bank of Pakistan, 2013 SCMR 314). ----Violation of Contractual Obligations - Mala Fide Action: Termination in disregard of contractual clauses and procedural safeguards constitutes mala fide action. Such termination, attaching stigma without due process, infringes upon the employee's rights. (Umar Asghar Qureshi v. Federation of Pakistan, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 640; Muhammad Tariq Khan v. National Bank of Pakistan, PLJ 2024 Lahore 376). ----Case References: Umar Asghar Qureshi v. Federation of Pakistan, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 640. Muhammad Tariq Badr v. National Bank of Pakistan, 2013 SCMR 314. Muhammad Tariq Khan v. National Bank of Pakistan, PLJ 2024 Lahore 376. Owais Shams Durrani v. Vice Chancellor, Bacha Khan University, 2020 SCMR 1041. Federation of Pakistan, Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Ali Ahmed Qureshi, 2001 SCMR 1733. Dr. Ishaque Muhammad Shah v. President, National Bank of Pakistan, 2010 PLC (C.S.) 748.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10A & Art. 199---Promotion of civil servant---Denial of due process---Consideration of intelligence reports without opportunity of rebuttal---Petitioner, a BS-20 officer of the Information Group, was superseded by the Central Selection Board (CSB) on the basis of intelligence reports alleging questionable integrity, despite having an outstanding service record and strong recommendations from his Secretary---Court held that reliance on undisclosed, unverified, and untested intelligence reports without confronting the petitioner violated the fundamental right to due process under Art. 10A of the Constitution---Promotion decisions must be based on tangible, credible material subject to rebuttal by the affected officer---Such reports, when not lawfully commissioned or procedurally vetted, cannot override a consistent professional service record. (b) Civil Servants Promotion (BPS-18 to BPS-21) Rules, 2019 (CSPR) ----Rr. 2(p), 4(5), 18(3)(b), 18(3)(d) & Schedule IV---Intelligence reports---Marking criteria---Scope---Court observed that the 2022 amendment introducing Special Vetting Agencies (SVAs) and authorizing the CSB to consider intelligence reports lacked clear procedural safeguards and failed to define weightage in the scoring scheme under CSPR---The CSB’s award of only 10 out of 30 discretionary marks under “collective judgment” was not explained in light of Schedule IV, which allows a maximum deduction of 3 marks for integrity concerns---Such arbitrary deductions, without evidentiary basis or procedural opportunity to rebut, render the evaluation flawed and unlawful. **(c) Service Law---Promotion---Right to fair consideration---Maintainability of writ petition---Court reaffirmed that while no vested right to promotion exists, a civil servant has a constitutional and statutory right to fair consideration for promotion under law---Constitutional petition was held maintainable under Art. 199 as the supersession, based on extraneous and procedurally flawed considerations, constituted a violation of fundamental rights---Relied on Orya Maqbool Jan v. Federation of Pakistan (2014 SCMR 817), Secretary Establishment v. Aftab Ahmad Maneka (2015 SCMR 1006), and I.A. Sherwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041). (d) Principles of Natural Justice ----Quasi-judicial forums---Application---CSB, while exercising promotion functions, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and is bound to follow principles of natural justice---Reports introduced at the last moment without prior disclosure to the affected civil servant and without granting a hearing amount to a serious procedural irregularity---Court criticized the manner in which the intelligence reports were accepted uncritically despite lacking credibility or substantiation, and without affording petitioner any opportunity to counter them. (e) Observations on Administrative Governance ----Court strongly condemned the practice of allowing unverified intelligence reports to dictate promotion outcomes---Lack of procedural framework to govern use of such reports poses serious risks to administrative integrity and undermines morale within civil services---Promotion decisions must be merit-based and consistent with record, not influenced by fear or manipulation through anonymous allegations. (f) Disposition Petition was allowed. CSB decision dated 01.08.2023 superseding the petitioner was set aside. CSB was directed to reconsider the petitioner’s promotion to BPS-21 in its next meeting from the date of supersession, strictly in accordance with CSPR criteria and without reliance on intelligence reports not subjected to due process or rebuttal.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (XL of 1958--- ----Ss. 4 & 5---Jurisdiction of Special Judge, Anti-Corruption---Scope---Special Judge issued directions against petitioner (Circle Officer Anti-Corruption Establishment) for suspension, initiation of inquiry and criminal prosecution for criminal intimidation, hindering court proceedings and bribery---Violation of principle of natural justice---Contention of the petitioner was that Special Judge Anti-Corruption could not issue suspension of a civil servant in collateral proceedings in a criminal matter, as his powers were limited while trying offences relating to corruption within his designated jurisdiction---Validity---Court in collateral proceedings cannot order the suspension of a civil servant while directing the initiation of departmental proceedings in a criminal case while it can recommend an inquiry if misconduct is suspected and the decision to suspend rests with the relevant authority---Special Judge Anti-Corruption’s role is limited in corruption matters and it cannot directly order the suspension of civil servants for the simple reason that a person being criticized by a Judge should be given a chance to explain himself, however, the petitioner was not given that opportunity, instead, his silence was interpreted as an admission of guilt which factum needed through inquiry by the competent authority as the petitioner placed on record certain documents along with his memo. of petition to show his innocence about bail bond obtained from the respondent for his appearance in Court and the allegations levelled by the respondent required thorough probe by the competent authority on the administrative side without being influenced by the observation of the Trial Court in the impugned order---High Court ordered removal of harmful remarks against the petitioner, subject to the independent inquiry of the allegations by the official respondents, without being influenced by the observation of the Special Judge Anti-Corruption, after providing a meaningful hearing to the parties concerned---Constitutional petition was disposed of, in circumstances. Imad Ali Khawaja v. The State and others 2016 SCMR 2057 rel. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Issuance of pejorative remarks and unjust criticism by Court---Duty of Court---Principally, Courts should avoid pejorative remarks against non-parties and unjust criticism of parties; vilifying them should also be avoided---Judges can criticize relevant matters and witnesses but should avoid criticizing those in official positions without valid justification, that is subject to jurisdiction---Presiding Officer of the Court must give a person the opportunity to explain condemnatory facts before criticizing him/her---This is especially important for public servants, who should be given a chance to defend themselves before being criticized---Criticizing someone without giving them a chance to respond is unfair and may be considered outside the judge's jurisdiction---Judges must be independent and also fair and restrained---They should only criticize people if they have a chance to defend themselves if there is evidence to support the criticism, and if it is necessary for the case---Judicial pronouncements should be sober, moderate and reserved. Nusrat Yasmin v. Registrar, PHC PLD 2019 SC 719 and Aijaz Ahmed v. The State PLD 2021 SC 752 rel. Ayatullah Khawaja for Petitioner. Sagheer Abbasi and Irshad Ahmed Shaikh, A.A.G. along with Asif Ali Rajper, Assistant Director ACE West Zone. Ali Hyder Saleem, APG. Shehryar for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Date of hearing: 21st November, 2024.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, holding the position of Sub-Engineer within a municipal entity, challenged their transfer via a notification issued by the Secretary Local Government & Community Development Department, South Punjab. The petitioner argued the transfer was contrary to the tenure protections under Section 186 of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2022. They further cited a precedent where a similar transfer order was invalidated by the same court in a previous writ petition. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner, a Sub-Engineer, falls under the tenure protection provisions of Section 186 of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2022. ----2- Whether the transfer order violates statutory protections or was issued without valid reasons. ----3- To what extent can tenure protections be overridden in cases of extraordinary circumstances. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court ruled that the protections under Section 186 apply not only to Chief Officers but also to "such other officers" as specified by the Secretary, which includes the petitioner. The court found that the petitioner had been transferred excessively—five times in 14 months, with the latest transfer occurring within four months of the previous posting. Such frequent transfers violate the ordinary tenure provision under Section 186. Transfers can be justified only for valid and extraordinary reasons, which must be explicitly stated. The court observed no valid reasons or exigencies in the impugned notification. Relying on precedents, the court emphasized the principles of good governance and operational stability. Arbitrary or politically motivated transfers undermine professionalism and are impermissible. The transfer notification dated 06.12.2023 was set aside. However, the court clarified that the competent authority retains the power to issue transfer orders for valid, extraordinary reasons or after the completion of the requisite tenure. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 186 of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2022: Security of tenure for Chief Officers and specified officers. Muhammad Ilyas Khan v. Senior Member, Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P., Peshawar and others (2011 PLC (C.S.) 935): Principles on tenure and transfer. Syed Mahmood Akhtar Naqvi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2013 SC 195): On administrative grounds for transfer and its limitations.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)- -Art. 4(14)-Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S. 4-Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act (XII of 1957), S.18-B & Preamble-Right to property-Islamic principles-Acquisition of land without compensation-Effect-Writ petition filed by the respondents was allowed accepting their claim that they should not be deprived of their property save in accordance with law-Validity-Record revealed that the land-in-question was originally allotted to the father of the respondents through an allotment chit dated 28.02.1963, which was further solidified by the issuance of Proprietary Rights Transfer Order (PRTO) on 22.01.1991; said assertion of ownership was later reinforced in a legal proceeding in 1993, when an application under Section 18-B of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, was filed before competent forum (Custodian) challenging the allotment of father of respondents-In the said application, the Agriculture Department was also arrayed as respondent, which/Department filed objections-The Custodian, vide judgment dated 23.09.1993, being the forum of exclusive jurisdiction, declared the allotment of respondents valid because the Agriculture Department failed to produce any proof of allotment-When a particular forum or authority had been vested with jurisdiction over a matter by law, its decision carried finality unless successfully challenged through an appellate process-Islam provides a complete code of life offering detailed and comprehensive guidance with a universal approach to every aspect of human existence-Among other principles, Islam safeguards and guarantees the rights to life and property for all individuals-Islamic teachings strictly forbid the unlawful seizure of other's property unless fair and compatible compensation is provided to the rightful owners-Even, in the initial era of Islam first acquisition of land was made for the construction of Al-Masjid-e-Nabawi-Said land was owned by two orphan children who offered the said land as a gift which was refused by the Holy Prophet Muhammad (صلى Øلل٠علي٠Ùسلم) and after payment of full price of t he land, construction of the Mosque was started, which establishes a glorious principle that the land of even any feeble person cannot be taken away even for any sacred object without payment of its compensation-The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, also safeguards the fundamental right to property-Article 4(14) of the Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of their property except in accordance with the law-Thus, in the present case, the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents-The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference-Appeal, filed by Education Department, was dismissed. (b) Evidence- -Photostat of document, tendering of-Scope and effect-It was alleged that the land in dispute was allotted to the Appellant (Agriculture Department) vide allotment chit dated 03.06.1957, however, in support of said claim only a photocopy of allotment chit had been produced-A photostat copy cannot be read into evidence-Thus, in the present case, the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents-The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference-Appeal, filed by the Department, was dismissed. 2000 YLR 2326 ref. (c) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)- -Art. 44-Issuance of writ, assailing of-Locus standi-Scope-Record showed that judgment was passed against six respondents, yet only the Education Department filed the (present) appeal-Notably, the Agriculture Department, which claimed to be the allottee of the disputed land, had not challenged the High Court's judgment that declared it not a valid allottee-It was perplexing that the alleged allottee (Agricultural Department) had chosen not to dispute the High Court's conclusion, while a third party, the Education Department, was asserting the Agriculture Department's status as the allottee, which was a very strange aspect of the matter-Thus, in the present case, the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents-The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference-Appeal, filed by Education Department, was dismissed. (d) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)- -Art. 44-Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S. 15-Acquisition of property, matter of-Writ petition, filing of-Non-impleading of necessary parties, assertion of-Record revealed that respondents were the owners of the land and in the writ petition filed by them their main claim was that they should not be deprived of their property save in accordance with law i.e. without payment of compensation-Under Section 15 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, when the Collector makes an award, he may take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government-In such state of affairs, the necessary party in the present case was Azad Government, which had been duly arrayed in the writ petition-Thus, in the present case, the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents-The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference-Appeal, filed by Education Department, was dismissed. (e) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)- -Art. 44-Acquisition of property, matter of-Writ petition, filing of-Laches, doctrine of-Argument of the appellant was that the High Court failed to consider the issue of laches-Validity-In view of the respondents' prayer clause before the High Court, the principle of laches was inapplicable in the present case as the non-payment of compensation constituted a violation of a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and amounted to a continuous wrong-Therefore, the doctrine of laches did not apply-Thus, in the present case, the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents-The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference-Appeal, filed by Education Department, was dismissed.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Art. 4(14)---Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S. 4---Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act (XII of 1957), S.18-B & Preamble---Right to property---Islamic principles---Acquisition of land without compensation---Effect---Writ petition filed by the respondents was allowed accepting their claim that they should not be deprived of their property save in accordance with law---Validity---Record revealed that the land-in-question was originally allotted to the father of the respondents through an allotment chit dated 28.02.1963, which was further solidified by the issuance of Proprietary Rights Transfer Order (PRTO) on 22.01.1991; said assertion of ownership was later reinforced in a legal proceeding in 1993, when an application under Section 18-B of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, was filed before competent forum (Custodian) challenging the allotment of father of respondents---In the said application, the Agriculture Department was also arrayed as respondent, which/Department filed objections---The Custodian, vide judgment dated 23.09.1993, being the forum of exclusive jurisdiction, declared the allotment of respondents valid because the Agriculture Department failed to produce any proof of allotment---When a particular forum or authority had been vested with jurisdiction over a matter by law, its decision carried finality unless successfully challenged through an appellate process---Islam provides a complete code of life offering detailed and comprehensive guidance with a universal approach to every aspect of human existence---Among other principles, Islam safeguards and guarantees the rights to life and property for all individuals---Islamic teachings strictly forbid the unlawful seizure of other's property unless fair and compatible compensation is provided to the rightful owners---Even , in the initial era of Islam first acquisition of land was made for the construction of Al-Masjid-e-Nabawi---Said land was owned by two orphan children who offered the said land as a gift which was refused by the Holy Prophet Muhammad (صلى الله عليه وسلم) and after payment of full price of t he land, construction of the Mosque was started, which establishes a glorious principle that the land of even any feeble person cannot be taken away even for any sacred object without payment of its compensation---The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, also safeguards the fundamental right to property---Article 4(14) of the Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of their property except in accordance with the law---Thus, in the present case, the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents---The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference---Appeal, filed by Education Department, was dismissed. (b) Evidence--- ----Photostat of document , tendering of ---Scope and effect---It was alleged that the land in dispute was allotted to the Appellant (Agriculture Department) vide allotment chit dated 03.06.1957, however, in support of said claim only a photocopy of allotment chit had been produced---A photostat copy cannot be read into evidence---Thus, in the present case, the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents---The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference---Appeal, filed by the Department, was dismissed. 2000 YLR 2326 ref. (c) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Art. 44---Issuance of writ, assailing of---Locus standi---Scope---Record showed that judgment was passed against six respondents, yet only the Education Department filed the (present) appeal---Notably, the Agriculture Department, which claimed to be the allottee of the disputed land, had not challenged the High Court's judgment that declared it not a valid allottee---It was perplexing that the alleged allottee (Agricultural Department) had chosen not to dispute the High Court's conclusion, while a third party, the Education Department, was asserting the Agriculture Department's status as the allottee, which was a very strange aspect of the matter---Thus, in the present case , the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents---The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference---Appeal, filed by Education Department, was dismissed. (d) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Art. 44---Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894),S. 15---Acquisition of property, matter of---Writ petition, filing of---Non-impleading of necessary parties, assertion of---Record revealed that respondents were the owners of the land and in the writ petition filed by them their main claim was that they should not be deprived of their property save in accordance with law i.e. without payment of compensation---Under Section 15 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, when the Collector makes an award, he may take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government---In such state of affairs, the necessary party in the present case was Azad Government, which had been duly arrayed in the writ petition---Thus, in the present case, the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents---The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference---Appeal, filed by Education Department, was dismissed. (e) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Art. 44---Acquisition of property, matter of---Writ petition, filing of---Laches, doctrine of---Argument of the appellant was that the High Court failed to consider the issue of laches---Validity---In view of the respondents’ prayer clause before the High Court, the principle of laches was inapplicable in the present case as the non-payment of compensation constituted a violation of a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and amounted to a continuous wrong---Therefore, the doctrine of laches did not apply---Thus, in the present case, the High Court acted in accordance with law while accepting the writ petition of the respondents---The impugned judgment being well-reasoned did not call for interference---Appeal, filed by Education Department, was dismissed. Syed Atif Mushtaq Gillani, Advocate for Appellant. Kh. Imtiaz Ahmed, Advocate for Respondents. Date of hearing: 12th November, 2024.

Summary: Pakistan Engineering Council impugns decision by Board of HEC wherein degree of Bachelor in Engineering was declared as equivalent to BTECH, A degree of non-engineers. (a) Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 (Ordinance LIII of 2002): ----S. 10(a), (e), (o), (q) & 20---Scope of authority of Higher Education Commission (HEC)---Equivalence of degrees---Jurisdiction of HEC vis-à-vis recruitment and promotion criteria---HEC issued a notification declaring B.Sc. Engineering and B-Tech (Honors) as equivalent for purposes of grade determination and promotion---Validity---HEC, under its statutory mandate, was empowered to grant equivalence to academic and educational qualifications, but such equivalence was limited to academic comparability and did not extend to recruitment or promotion matters within public or private sector employment---HEC lacked authority to impose its equivalence determinations on employers regarding hiring or promotion criteria---HEC's role was restricted to granting academic equivalence, and any notification directing employers to treat two qualifications as interchangeable for employment purposes was ultra vires---Impugned notification issued by HEC was beyond its statutory jurisdiction and was therefore set aside. (b) Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1975 (V of 1976): ----Ss. 2(xii), 2(xxv), 8, 10, 11, 14 & 27---Jurisdiction of Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC) vis-à-vis professional accreditation and employment criteria---PEC was vested with authority to accredit engineering qualifications for registration as Professional Engineers and to regulate the engineering profession---However, PEC had no jurisdiction to dictate employment or promotion criteria within public or private sector organizations---Professional Engineering Work, as defined in the PEC Act, could only be undertaken by registered Professional Engineers, but the determination of whether a specific job required such work was a factual inquiry to be assessed by the employer, not PEC---Employers retained discretion to determine recruitment and promotion policies independent of PEC's accreditation functions---HEC and PEC both lacked authority to mandate employment conditions beyond their respective statutory roles. (c) Employment & Service Law: ----Scope of employer discretion in recruitment and promotion policies---Competence of government and private employers to determine qualification criteria---Neither HEC nor PEC had the authority to prescribe which qualifications were suitable for employment or promotion---Recruitment and promotion policies were quintessential policy matters to be determined by the employer in accordance with its human resource considerations---HEC's notification purporting to impose an equivalence standard for employment purposes was beyond its statutory authority and unenforceable. ----Cited Cases: • Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar v. Farasatullah (2020 PLC (CS) 1423) • Maula Bux Shaikh v. Chief Minister Sindh (2018 SCMR 2098) • Muhammad Siddique Nasim v. Secretary, Government of Punjab (1987 SCMR 302) • Fida Hussain v. Secretary, Kashmir Affairs (PLD 1995 SC 701) • Nazir-ul-Hasan v. Syed Anwar Iqbal (2014 SCMR 1827) • Mohammad Uneeb Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2022 SC 345) ----Disposition: Petition allowed---Impugned notification dated 08.12.2021 set aside---HEC had no jurisdiction to determine employment or promotion criteria---Employers remained competent to allow B.Sc. Engineering and B-Tech degree holders to compete for jobs and promotions on a level playing field.

Summary: Service Law – Promotion – Proforma Promotion: When a civil servant is deferred for promotion due to adverse remarks in their Performance Evaluation Report (PER), the removal of such remarks or their subsequent mitigation entitles the officer to proforma promotion from the date their juniors were promoted. Adverse remarks that have been neutralized through subsequent satisfactory PERs cannot permanently bar the officer’s entitlement to promotion. (1996 SCMR 850; 2013 SCMR 752; 2016 SCMR 1784) ----- Adverse Remarks – Impact on Promotion: Adverse remarks in the PER of a civil servant are temporary obstacles and, once resolved, should not continue to hinder promotion eligibility. The principle of fairness mandates that subsequent satisfactory performance should override the effects of past adverse remarks. (2020 PLC (C.S.) 1226; 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1310) ----- Officiating Promotion vs. Proforma Promotion: Officiating promotions are temporary and meant to address short-term staffing needs. However, in cases where colleagues are promoted to regular posts, a deferred civil servant who subsequently fulfills all eligibility requirements is entitled to proforma promotion. The Punjab Judicial Service Rules, 1994, emphasize seniority-cum-fitness as the guiding principle for such promotions. (2017 PLC (C.S.) 373; Rule 13(1), Punjab Civil Servants Rules, 1974) ----- Principle of Fairness in Promotion: Proforma promotion ensures fairness by rectifying administrative inefficiencies or delays that bypass a senior civil servant. Denying such promotion in the presence of mitigating circumstances, such as the resolution of adverse remarks, violates principles of equity and justice. (PLD 2003 SC 175; 1997 PLC (C.S.) 584) ----- Outcome: The appeal was allowed. The impugned order dated 02.02.2016 was set aside. The Tribunal directed the Departmental Authorities to reconsider the appellant’s case for proforma promotion to the rank of Additional District & Sessions Judge from the date when his juniors were promoted, ensuring adherence to principles of fairness and equity. ----- Citations and Precedents Cited: Abdul Jabbar Khan v. Government of Sindh (1996 SCMR 850) Chairman, State Life Insurance Corp. v. Siddiq Akbar (2013 SCMR 752) Chief Secretary, Sindh v. Riaz Ahmed Massan (2016 SCMR 1784) Arshad Ali v. WAPDA (2020 PLC (C.S.) 1226) Wadhu Mal v. Province of Sindh (2023 PLC (C.S.) 1310) Secretary to Govt. Punjab v. Muhammad Khalid Usmani (2017 PLC (C.S.) 373) Managing Director, WAPDA v. Muhammad Luqman (PLD 2003 SC 175) Deputy Inspector-General of Police v. Anwar Saeed (1997 PLC (C.S.) 584)