Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Record shows that the date of birth as per Bay Form of the accused/petitioner is 30.08.2002, as such, he is to be considered and treated as a juvenile offender being under the age of 18 years, as per definition of child provided in section 2 (b) of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000.Sages down the ages have generally perceived an accused person, before establishing of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the darling of a Criminal Court, and if such an accused person happens to be a child, then the romance about him usually receives a further sympathetic boost. Moreover, investigation in the case is complete and accused-petitioner is no more required to the prosecution for the very purpose, therefore, his further incarceration in jail will serve no useful purpose. Bail granted.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XX, R.5, O.XIV, Rr.1, 2 & O.XLI, R.31---Suit for cancellation of lease and possession---Recording evidence of the parties after framing of issues---Dismissal of suit while deciding issue of maintainability without touching any other issues---Scope---Plaintiff filed suit for cancellation of lease and possession wherein issues were framed and evidence was recorded---Trial Court dismissed the suit while giving findings on issue of maintainability while treating it preliminary issue without deciding issues of facts which was upheld by the Appellate Court---Validity---Purpose of conferring power on the Court to first decide the case or any part thereof only on the issue of law was to save the time of Courts and litigants---Court for deciding a case on the issue of law should form a conscious opinion in the light of pleadings of the parties and give notice to the parties that in its opinion the case mighty be disposed of on the issues of law and it should try those issues first---Trial Court, in the present case, had neither consciously framed issue of law nor expressed its intent to dispose of the case on the issue of law---Even settlement of issues of facts had not been postponed and evidence of both the parties had been recorded---Once Court had consumed time in recording evidence then efforts were to be made to decide the case both on law points as well as on merit---Trial Court after completing trial should have passed judgment on all the issues, in circumstances---Courts below had failed to appreciate the pleadings of the parties in correct perspective---Plaintiff had prayed for recovery of possession of suit property on the basis of registered title document and his suit was simple suit for recovery of possession under S.8 of Specific Relief Act, 1877---Plaintiff had not sought any declaration as to his entitlement to any legal character---Even defendant had not raised any legal objection with regard to bar to the present suit in terms of S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877---Dispute between the parties was with regard to entitlement to possession specific suit plot on the basis of title documents---Question of title of the plaintiff and/or defendant could have automatically been determined had the Court decided the issues of facts with regard to entitlement of possession of suit land---Provisions of Ss.42 & 8 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 were not complementing each other and were independent provisions of law and dealt with different kinds of grievances---Any person who had been deprived of his immovable property by any unscrupulous person could sue the said illegal occupant and recover its possession without seeking a declaration of his entitlement to his legal character---Findings recorded by the Courts below treating issue of maintainability as preliminary and dismissing the suit were not sustainable, in circumstances---Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below were set aside---Matter was remanded to the Trial Court for decision afresh while giving findings on each and every issue---Revision was allowed, in circumstances. Syed Iftikar-ud-Din Haider Gardezi and 9 others v. Central Bank of India Ltd., Lahore 1996 SCMR 669; Sh. Abdul Kabeer v. Mian Abdul Wahid and others 1968 SCMR 464; Sultan Mehmood Shah through L.Rs. v. Muhammad Din and 2 others 2005 SCMR 1872; Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 and Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board, Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 distinguished. Hafiz Muhammad Siddique Anwar v. Faisalabad Development Authority and others 2007 SCMR 1126 and Taj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman 2019 SCMR 84 rel.(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss.42 & 8---Provisions of Ss.42 & 8 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 were independent provisions of law and dealt with different kinds of grievances---Principles.

Summary: (a) Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002)-------S.12(2)---Appeal---Regulating activity---Scope---When decision is 'concerning a regulating activity' which adversely affects licensee, the aggrieved licensee can approach High Court as no other adequate remedy is provided in Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 to deal with such decision of Authority.(b) Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002)-------Ss. 12(2) & 45---Pakistan Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016, R. 12(1)(c), Schedule-V, Part-A---Appeal---Existing blending plant---Phrase 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Ordinance'---Scope---Appellant was running lube and oil blending plant prior to promulgation of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Appellant assailed letter issued by Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority imposing additional conditions on its licence---Validity---Use of phrase 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Ordinance' and its repetition in relevant Rule of Pakistan Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016, indicated that decision and direction contained in letters in question were not applicable to appellant who fell within the category of existing operations/existing blending plants which were in field before commencement of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Non-obstante clause was repeated by Pakistan Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016,making the Authority while making Rules in exercise of powers conferred on the Authority wherever it referred to the existing lubricant blending plant, which amounted to acknowledgement of the Authority that Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 and Pakistan Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016, would not affect or apply on existing Lube Oil blending plant---High Court refrained the Authority from applying additional condition on the licensees to whom licences were granted under R.13 of Pakistan Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016, including appellant as they were already carrying out regulated activities of running lube oil blending plants immediately before commencement of Pakistan Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, and requirement of Part-A of Schedule-V of R. 12 (1)(c) of Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016,were not enforceable against them---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------Ss.96, 115 & O.I, R.10---Appeal or revision on behalf of a party having no grievance against dismissal of suit---Maintainability---Applicant was impleaded in the suit under O.I, R.10, C.P.C., but she neither filed written statement nor appeared in the witness box---Suit was dismissed on merits against which no appeal had been filed on behalf of plaintiff---Validity---Defendants were not supposed to have any grievance against the dismissal of suit unless they had raised a counter claim in their written statement against the plaintiff which had also been dismissed or not decided by the Trial Court---No adverse observations had been passed against the applicant in the case---If applicant wanted the suit to be decreed then she should have either filed a separate suit or should have paid court fee to become co-plaintiff provided she had any claim in the suit property to be adjudicated in her favour---Applicant, after having been impleaded as defendant had not filed written statement nor she had appeared in the witness box---Suit had been dismissed on merits against which no appeal had been filed on behalf of plaintiff---Present suit could not be decreed against main contesting defendants on appeal by one of the defendants who had not filed even written statement in the Trial Court---Applicant was not aggrieved person in consequence of impugned judgment---Revision as well as appeal pending before Appellate Court filed by the applicant were not maintainable, which were dismissed with cost, in circumstances. H.M Yahya & Co., Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd., Karachi and another PLD 1969 SC 65; Syed Musarat Hussain Zaidi and another v. Syed Salim Jawaid Zaidi and another PLD 1983 Kar. 548; Habibullah v. Zakir Ali and another PLD 2000 Kar. 238 and Mst. Arfa Arif v. Mst. Kulsoom Naqvi PLD 2000 Kar. 31 rel.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd and common intention---Bail, grant of---Implication of accused on supplementary statement---Absconsion---Acquittalof co-accused---Further inquiry--- Scope--- Accused sought bail after arrest in a case lodgedunder Ss. 302 & 34, P.P.C.---Accused was not nominated in the FIR rather he was arrestedon the basis of supplementary statement of complainant recorded after nine days of lodgingof FIR, thus, the possibility of deliberations and consultations could not be ruled out---Onlypiece of evidence against the accused was his disclosure, which prima facie was notcorroborated by any other piece of evidence---Court, while considering the bail plea ofaccused, could not ignore the acquittal of co-accused vis-?-vis the merits of his case---Accused person's absconsion of ten years could not be treated as a bar to his release on bail---Case of accused was one of further inquiry---Petition for grant of bail was allowed, incircumstances.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.497---Bail---Tentative assessment---Scope---Only tentative assessment of facts isrequired while disposing of ancillary matters like bail, etc.(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497---Bail---Further inquiry---Scope---Bail is to be allowed to an accused as of rightand not by way of grace or concession in a case calling for further inquiry into his guilt.Muhammad Sadiq v. Sadiq and others PLD 1985 SC 182; Qamar alias Mitho v. TheState and others PLD 2012 SC 222 and Ehsanullah v. The State 2012 SCMR 1137 ref.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497---Bail---Acquittal of co-accused--- Scope--- Court, while considering the bail pleaof an accused, cannot ignore the acquittal of co-accused.Jam Sadiq Ali v. State 1989 PCr.LJ 1910 and Nawab Ali v. State 2003 YLR 113 rel.(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 497---Bail---Absconsion---Scope---Absconsion of an accused cannot be treated as abar to his release on bail---Rule that fugitive from law shall under no circumstances beenlarged on bail is not absolute if the case of an accused is otherwise found fit for bail onmerits.State v. Malik Mukhtar Ahmed Awan 1991 SCMR 322 and Mithu Pitafi v. The State2009 SCMR 299 ref.